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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Disorderly Histories: An Anthropology of Decolonization in Western Sahara 
by 
Mark Drury 
 
Advisor: Gary Wilder 
 
This dissertation situates the disputed geopolitical territory of Western Sahara in a broader, 
regional history of decolonization. Eschewing the conceptual framework of methodological 
nationalism, and pushing beyond the period of Moroccan-Sahrawi political conflict, it examines 
how decolonization has generated multiple, unresolved political projects in this region of the 
Sahara, dating back to the 1950s. These formations, encompassing southern Morocco, 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, and northern 
Mauritania, include a zone of militarized occupation, a movement for nation-state sovereignty 
based in refugee camps, and the borderlands in between. By considering the overlapping 
processes that emerge through these unresolved political projects, this study considers how the 
“disorderly histories” of decolonization have produced multiple forms of political space, time 
and subjectivity in the Sahara, from the late 1950s, through the 1970s, and to today. The ongoing 
effects of these projects in the Sahara bring several tensions underlying post-World War II 
political formations – between borders and belonging, dependence and autonomy, sovereignty 
and international law – into particularly sharp relief. 
 
  
  v 
A Note Regarding Transliteration 
 
In a context where different spellings of the same place name (“Laâyoune/El Aaiún”) reflect 
overlapping and competing political projects, trying to adhere to a single standard of 
transliteration may be, to a certain extent, futile. However, for ease of reading, this text follows a 
modified version of IJMES transliteration standards for formal Arabic terms, with minimal 
diacritical markings. Only those diacritical marks indicating the hamza (’) and the ‘ayn (‘) are 
used here. 
 There are two, significant sets of exceptions to this standard. First, spelling of proper 
nouns foregoes even these minimal diacritical marks when they are not commonly included in 
conventional spelling (e.g.: Bucraa). The second exception involves terms from Hassaniya 
Arabic, or Moroccan Colloquial Arabic (darija). Because Hassaniya Arabic and darija differ 
from formal Arabic in certain, significant ways, transliteration of terms from these colloquial 
forms of Arabic reflects norms of pronunciation (e.g.: melga l-’ahkama), rather than IJMES 
standards.  
Regardless of formal or colloquial use, all Arabic words have been italicized save for 
those that have entered the English language, such as intifada, or shaykh, and proper nouns. All 
translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own. 
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Introduction: Western Sahara, Western Sahara (1975) and Decolonization 
 
“But there has also grown up through the vast majority of cases a clear pattern of orderly 
decolonization through freely conducted elections or plebiscites, often under UN supervision, in 
which the local population has had the opportunity to choose its own national destiny. It is this 
pattern which is so dramatically broken in the case of the Spanish Sahara.”  Franck, Thomas M. 
“The Stealing of the Sahara.” American Journal of International Law 70, no. 4 (1976): 701. 
 
"…I refer to what Rhodesia rebelled against as the orderly process of decolonization. By orderly 
I do not mean a political process free of riots and repression, but orderly in terms of the idea of 
African territories crossing a threshold by which they would become nation-states and take a 
newly claimed rightful place in the community of nations, the UN, the Commonwealth, and even 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU).” White, Luise. Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian 
Independence and African Decolonization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015: 22. 
 
Western Sahara and the 1975 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion: An 
Introduction 
 
In December 1974, the UN General Assembly solicited a non-binding advisory opinion 
from the International Court of Justice (the UN’s main judicial arm) concerning the 
decolonization of Western Sahara. Since 1884 a Spanish colony on the northwest coast of Africa, 
Western Sahara had, by 1974, already been the subject of UN deliberation for over a decade.1 
But as Spanish withdrawal appeared imminent, Mauritania and Morocco initiated the request for 
the advisory opinion in an attempt to forestall a potential referendum, and to validate their claim 
that a decolonized Western Sahara should be divided between the two countries. Driven largely 
by Morocco’s King Hassan II2 – and with clandestine US advice and support3 – this claim was 
based on the position that Morocco’s and Mauritania’s respective sovereign ties with the people 
of Western Sahara predated Spanish colonialism and therefore necessitated the restoration of 
                                                
1 Thomas M Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,” American Journal of International Law 70, no. 4 (1976): 701. 
The UN Special Committee on Decolonization had been discussing the question of Spanish Sahara since October 
1963; the first UN General Assembly resolution on the matter was passed in 1965. 
2 Although Mauritania joined Morocco as claimant to the ICJ Opinion, the political impetus to prevent independence 
in Western Sahara was driven by King Hassan II. David Seddon, Morocco at War: Military, Political and Economic 
Dimensions of Intervention in the Western Sahara (Norwich, Great Britain: School of Development Studies, 
University of East Anglia, 1986). 
3 Jacob Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish 
Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 3 (2006): 275–306. 
 2 
both countries’ territorial integrity. Whereas by 1974 it had become customary for 
decolonization to be effected through self-determination under UN oversight, Hassan II sought a 
favorable opinion that would pre-empt self-determination and legitimate Moroccan and 
Mauritanian annexation. As it turned out, the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on 
Western Sahara, published October 16, 1975,4 did not grant legal recognition to either country’s 
claim to pre-existing sovereign ties with the region, affirming the right of the people of Western 
Sahara to self-determination, instead. 
Although Western Sahara (1975) affirmed the right to self-determination for the people 
of Western Sahara, no sooner was it issued than Morocco and Mauritania disregarded the 
Advisory Opinion.5 Two days after the publication of Western Sahara (1975), on October 18, 
1975, Morocco announced its intention to send 350,000 unarmed civilians marching into the 
Sahara.6 Morocco’s armed forces, massed at the northern, desert border of Spanish Sahara, had 
already infiltrated the territory by the time the civilian march, celebrated in Morocco as the 
Green March, took place on November 6, 1975.7 Under pressure from Morocco’s civilian and 
military incursion, and with General Franco on his deathbed, Spain reneged on previous 
commitments to self-determination.8 Instead, Spain agreed to transfer authority over Western 
Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco through the tripartite Madrid Agreement. No sooner was this 
                                                
4 Hereafter, Western Sahara (1975). 
5 Morocco went so far as to misrepresent the decision to its people, and before the UN, as affirming its legitimacy. 
Jacob Mundy has pointed out that Henry Kissinger, in close contact with Hassan II during this time, similarly 
misrepresented the decision to President Ford during a White House meeting. Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,” 
711; Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity?,” 294–95. 
6 Franck, 711. For an analysis of the Green March and its legacies in Morocco, see Emilio Spadola, “‘Our Master’s 
Call’: Mass Media and the People in Morocco’s 1975 Green March,” in Anthropology of the Middle East and North 
Africa: Into the New Millennium, ed. Sherine Hafez and Susan Slyomovics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2013): 261-283. 
7 Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity?”; Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and 
Conflict Irresolution, 1st ed. (Syracuse  N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 4–9. More on this in Chapter 1. 
8 These commitments had been made before the UN, as well as al-Jema‘a, the Sahrawi political council set up under 
Spanish colonial rule, and Polisario, the Sahrawi national liberation front that had been gaining concessions from 
Spain since beginning its insurgency in 1973.Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,” 704–5; Mundy, “Neutrality or 
Complicity?,” 283.  
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transfer completed than Morocco began a brutal military campaign in January and February 1976 
across the northern region of Western Sahara, known as Saguiet al-Hamra, precipitating the 
exodus of thousands of Sahrawis to refugee camps in southwest Algeria, where many remain 
today.9 Since Spanish withdrawal at the beginning of 1976, the general contours of the Western 
Sahara conflict have remained largely in place: Morocco continues to claim (and, since the 
1980’s, effectively occupies) the region as its own, but lacks international legitimacy;10 Sahrawi 
nationalists, led by the Polisario Front and governed by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic,11 a state-in-exile backed by Algeria, maintain the right to self-determination; and, 
although the UN Security Council continues to recognize the right of the people of Western 
Sahara to self-determination, a referendum has never been held and the UN remains 
peacekeeping steward to a stalled process of decolonization.12  
One international legal scholar distilled the divergence between Western Sahara (1975) 
and Western Sahara to the following pithy observation: 
                                                
9 For journalistic coverage and detailed summaries of these events, see: Jim Paul et al., “With the Polisario Front of 
Sahara,” MERIP Reports 53 (December 1976): 16–21; Tami Hultman, “The Struggle for Western Sahara,” Issue: A 
Journal of Opinion. - 7 (1977): 27–32; Tami Hultman, “A Nation of Refugees: Western Sahara,” Response 9, no. 3 
(March 1977): 4–7, 42; Anne Lippert and Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, The Struggle in 
Western Sahara and Foreign Intervention: Presented at the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the African Studies 
Association, Baltimore, Maryland, November 1-4, 1978 (Baltimore, Ma.: African Studies Association, 1978); Teresa 
K. Smith, “Africa Rights Monitor: Human Rights and the Western Saharan War,” Africa Today 34, no. 3 (1987): 
61–73. 
10 Mauritania’s involvement in the conflict over Western Sahara ended in 1979, when it declared a ceasefire with 
Polisario, and withdrew from Rio de Oro, the southern strip of Western Sahara. Morocco immediately occupied that 
territory. Since the ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario in 1991, Morocco has controlled an estimated 75-80% 
of the territory. Alice Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Liberation Movement Governs (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 6. 
11 Polisario Front is technically the liberation movement for Sahrawi nationalism, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR) is the state-in-exile that governs the refugee camps in Algeria. As Alice Wilson notes, however, 
the two operate in “sometimes indistinguishable fusion.” In following Wilson’s usage, I will hereafter refer to them 
in tandem “Polisario/SADR” unless discussing an activity that solely involves one or the other.   Wilson, 2. 
12 For histories of the conflict, see Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport  Conn.: L. 
Hill, 1983); John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford  Calif.: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1983); Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara; Raquel Ojeda-Garcia, Irene Fernández-Molina, and 
Victoria Veguilla, eds., Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: 
When a Conflict Gets Old (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017). 
 4 
The Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975 did more for the legal fortunes of 
the right of self-determination of peoples than it did for the political fortunes of 
the people of the Western Sahara.13 
This bitter irony revolves around the gap between legal norms and political realities, a gap that 
applies to a wide range of political contexts. As such, this observation is as much a commentary 
on international law as it is about Western Sahara, or Western Sahara (1975). Indeed, in 
reinterpreting or reinforcing legal concepts such as terra nullius and self-determination, Western 
Sahara (1975) has subsequently become an important point of reference among scholars of 
international law. From one perspective, the decision has contributed to the emergence of a more 
inclusive, multicultural international law characterized by a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” 
between European and non-European concepts, thanks to its narrowing of terra nullius.14 
Conversely, others have contended that, given its very reliance upon terra nullius, a concept used 
to justify colonial occupation throughout the 19th century, Western Sahara (1975) participates in 
reproducing international law’s irrevocable Eurocentrism.15 Still others see an “ambivalent 
compromise” in the case’s reinforcement of self-determination and, by association, normative 
concepts of territorial sovereignty, even as it engaged with non-Western political formations.16 
 These approaches all point to how Western Sahara (1975) probed the limits of 
international law, yet none of them capture the paradox between Western Sahara (1975) and 
Western Sahara. Even as the decision established a legal norm and political form for orderly 
decolonization, Western Sahara (1975) – from the operative decision to the Oral Pleadings and 
                                                
13 Catriona Drew, “The Meaning of Self-Determination: ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’ Redux?,” International Law 
and the Question of Western Sahara International Law and the Question of Western Sahara / Ed. by Karin Arts, 
Pedro Pinto Leite, 2007, 90. 
14 Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 116–67. 
15 Antony Anghie, Colonialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge  UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 112. 
16 Michelle L Burgis, “Determining the Limits of Law in the Western Sahara Case,” in Boundaries of Discourse in 
the International Court of Justice Mapping Arguments in Arab Territorial Disputes (Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009), 192. 
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dissenting statements – contains within it all of decolonization’s disorderliness.17 Western 
Sahara (1975) grapples with broader questions regarding the relationship between people, 
territory and political authority, on the one hand, and past, present and future, on the other. In 
contending with historical, anthropological and sociological information presented by Morocco, 
Mauritania and Spain, Jurists involved in the case were forced to consider wide-ranging issues 
surrounding the constitution of sovereign ties, and whether the criteria defining these ties have 
changed over time. What forms of political authority can be recognized as sovereign? Is 
sovereignty a matter of control over territory, or a relation between people for control over 
things? To what extent do claims based on historical ties determine political futures? Do 19th 
century normative political concepts inform 20th century international law? To what extent does 
international law determine sovereignty? 
The Jurists involved in the case were addressing these questions in order to determine the 
outlines of a political formation “Western Sahara.” To a certain extent, this dissertation is 
engaging with a similar problematic. Rather than assuming that Western Sahara is a known 
entity, geographically, juridically or politically, this dissertation begins with the contemporary 
political formation by engaging with it as an object of inquiry in need of explanation. Western 
Sahara (1975) provides an ideal point of departure precisely because, at the very moment when 
Western Sahara became paradigmatic in defining self-determination as an international legal 
right, its political history diverged drastically from this formal, orderly process.18 How could 
                                                
17 A fuller analysis of the Case, and the international legal scholarship surrounding it, can be found in the Appendix. 
18 Several studies incorporate Western Sahara (1975) within broader appraisals of international law. See Knop, 
Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The 
Structure of International Legal Argument: Reissue with a New Epilogue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); Anghie, Colonialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law; Franck, “The Stealing of the 
Sahara”; Malcolm Shaw, “The Western Sahara Case,” British Yearbook of International Law 49, no. 1 (January 1, 
1979): 119–54; Drew, “The Meaning of Self-Determination”; Burgis, “Determining the Limits of Law in the 
Western Sahara Case”; Jacques Eric Roussellier, “Elusive Sovereignty—People, Land and Frontiers of the Desert: 
 6 
Western Sahara (1975) become paradigmatic for defining de jure decolonization by self-
determination, while Western Sahara has, in fact, become something else entirely? How might 
this divergence between de jure and de facto decolonization inform our conceptualization of this 
transformative process? What if we take Western Sahara as it exists today – in all of its 
complexity, conflict, disaggregated authority, overlapping sovereignties, and unresolved political 
projects – as paradigmatic of de facto decolonization? How might we be forced to 
reconceptualize both Western Sahara and decolonization? 
I introduce this study of Western Sahara by way of Western Sahara (1975), because I 
find it significant that the geopolitical territory and legal case emerge as pivotal to both the 
consolidation and disruption of the “pattern of orderly decolonization.” A broader reading of 
Western Sahara (1975), along with a broader contextualization of the history of Western 
Sahara’s decolonization, raise questions about this “orderly” decolonization. What constituted 
this “pattern,” or process? And why do the conflict and ICJ decision appear to mark both its 
consolidation and its end? By questioning the assumed historical complementarity between the 
end of “orderly decolonization” and the origin of the Western Sahara conflict, this dissertation 
presents the ongoing political conflict over Western Sahara, and the concept of decolonization, 
as problematics requiring further explanation. And, despite beginning with the events and legal 
decisions of 1975, this dissertation – like Western Sahara (1975) – looks both to the past and 
future of this inflection point and moment of crisis, situating the formation of Western Sahara in 
a broader history of decolonization dating back to the 1950s, while also tracing this process 
through to – and from – the present. Thus, like Western Sahara (1975), this dissertation 
examines how the terms of decolonization are necessarily a part of the formation of Western 
                                                                                                                                                       
The Case of the Western Sahara and the International Court of Justice,” The Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 
1 (2007): 55–78. 
 7 
Sahara. The mutual imbrication of decolonization with the formation of Western Sahara also 
invites the following question: from the standpoint of western Sahara, “What is decolonization?” 
By beginning with the Morocco-Sahrawi conflict in 1975, Western Sahara as an object of 
struggle is already taken for granted, as is nationalist struggle. The nationalist conflict as 
framework for analysis begins by assuming the normative form of post-World War II nation-
state sovereignty, and the legal framework of national self-determination. It assumes, in other 
words, the “orderly process of decolonization.” By contrast, I assert that this problematic of 
“orderly decolonization” is precisely what requires explanation.  
 
The Decolonization of western Sahara, and the Production of Western Sahara as a 
Geopolitical Space of Contention 
 
Western Sahara as a geopolitical space was carved out of the northwest coast of Africa in 1884 at 
the Berlin Conference, and granted to Spain as protection for its claims to the nearby Canary 
Islands. The territories surrounding Western Sahara were colonized by France, although these 
French colonies were divided administratively between the French Protectorate in Morocco, 
French Algeria, and French West Africa. Much of this region was only nominally under colonial 
rule well into the 20th century. This is particularly true of Spanish-controlled Sahara where, at the 
turn of the century, the shaykh Ma al-Aynayn established the city of Smara, from which he 
rallied followers to attack French colonial forces.19 While the French military established its 
presence by 1934 (an event known colloquially in Hassaniya Arabic as “melga l-’ahkama,” or 
the “meeting of the rulers”), Spanish rule was largely limited to coastal fishing enclaves until 
after World War II. The central regional trading hubs – Goulmime in southern Morocco, Tindouf 
                                                
19 Later, Ma al-Aynayn attempted to overthrow the Moroccan Sultan Abdelaziz, after the Sultan capitulated to 
French rule. G.M. Désiré-Vuillemin, “Cheikh Ma El Aïnin et le Maroc, ou l’échec d’un moderne Almoravide,” 
Revue d’histoire des colonies, 1958, 29–60. 
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in southwest Algeria, Atar in northern Mauritania – all lay outside of Spain’s colonial territory. 
Some of the best seasonal pasturage for pastoralists, however, was found in the southern part of 
Spanish Sahara known as Tiris, while a number of the most important shrines and affiliated 
zawaya for certain tribes were concentrated in the northern part of Spanish Sahara, known as 
Saguiet el-Hamra’. According to interlocutors during fieldwork, it was typical to refer to oneself 
or one’s kin group during colonialism as “registered with the French” or “registered with the 
Spanish,”20 while still moving throughout the region with little regard for colonial borders. The 
geopolitical form of Western Sahara, in other words, had very little bearing on the socio-cultural 
space of Saharan life until decolonization emerged as a horizon of expectation in the 1950s.  
When the horizon of decolonization emerged during the mid-1950s, it transformed 
political and social life across western Sahara. And, I argue, these transformations in many 
respects precipitated Spanish colonialism in the Sahara, rather than the inverse, while also 
preceding the emergence of Sahrawi national identity. At that time, I contend that the region of 
western Sahara was not yet structured by national identities, or territorial boundaries, in the same 
way that it has been since the 1970s. For this reason, the scope of this study exceeds the 
boundaries of nationalist conflict in spatio-temporal, as well as conceptual, terms. The region of 
western Sahara, then, is not coterminous with the geopolitical territory of Western Sahara: rather, 
it encompasses parts of southern Morocco, southwest Algeria, northern Mali and all of 
Mauritania. My use of the term western Sahara follows from the French “L’ouest saharien,” with 
an historical, geographical and cultural referent much broader than the political label “Sahara 
occidental,” or “Western Sahara,” which references the geopolitical territory.21 
                                                
20 “makatib bifaransa,” “makatib bisbaniya” 
21 See, for example, the journal Revue l’Ouest saharien, as well as Mustapha Naimi, La dynamique des alliances 
ouest-sahariennes: de l’espace géographique à l’espace social (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de 
l’homme, 2004); Mustapha Naimi, L’Ouest saharien: la perception de l’espace dans la pensée politique tribale 
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While the terms “Western Sahara” and “western Sahara” are clearly quite similar, my aim 
is that their proximity and difference as terms will contribute to a sense of the multiple, 
overlapping registers of identification and belonging which exist for Saharans living throughout 
this region. In referring to a geography that surpasses geopolitical boundaries, “western Sahara” 
encompasses a socio-cultural space associated with speakers of the Hassaniya dialect of Arabic, 
whose seminomadic pastoralism and bidani cultural identity distinguish them from neighbors to 
the north, in the Maghreb, and those to the south, in the Sahel. This is the space that, in the ICJ 
Opinion Western Sahara (1975), Mauritania claims under the historical name of Bilad Shinguiti, 
or what is also commonly referred to as “Land of the Bidan,” [trab al-bidan]. In recent literature 
on Western Sahara, authors often refer to this cultural space as “Hassanophone Sahara,” utilizing 
the related identity marker, “Hassani.”22  
Indeed, there are multiple names for this cultural space, but in this dissertation I have 
focused on the bidani cultural identity as its most encompassing marker. Defined in 
contradistinction to Amazigh/Berber (chilha, pl. chleuh) and non-Arab Black African identities 
(kury, pl. l-kwar), bidani identity corresponds to the socio-cultural space of Hassaniya-speaking 
Saharans described above. As I show in an interpretation of a poem in Chapter 3, however, the 
bidani identity is complex, with genealogical and racial referents that do not simply correspond 
to bounded concepts of ethnicity. My reasons for using bidani over other terms are largely 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Paris: Karthala, 2013). The term “Western Sahara” has also been used in scholarly literature to refer to this broader 
historical and geographical region, which is generally coterminous with the cultural space of Hassaniya-speaking 
Bidanis. H. T Norris, The Arab Conquest of the Western Sahara: Studies of the Historical Events, Religious Beliefs 
and Social Customs Which Made the Remotest Sahara a Part of the Arab World (Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex; Beirut, 
Lebanon: Longman; Librairie du Liban, 1986). “Bilad Shinguitti” refers to a similar cultural space: Harry Thirlwall 
Norris, Shinqītī Folk Literature and Song. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). The term “Atlantic Sahara” is 
used in Moroccan scholarship, both because it foregrounds coastal, North-South linkages, while avoiding 
legitimating the term “Western Sahara” as an object of knowledge: Rahal Boubrik and Colloque International la 
Reforme et ses Usages, Le Sahara atlantique (Rabat: Univ. Mohammed V, Fac. des Lettres et des Sciences 
Humaines, 2012). 
22 E.g.: Tara Deubel refers to “hassani poetry,” “hassani literature” and “Hassaniya speakers.” Tara Flynn Deubel, 
“Poetics of Diaspora: Sahrawi Poets and Postcolonial Transformations of a Trans-Saharan Genre in Northwest 
Africa,” The Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 2 (2012): 295–314. 
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ethnographic: from the 1950s poem to a variety of fieldwork interactions, the term carried a 
significance to my interlocutors that encompassed everything from language to pastoral living to 
the cultivation of moral behaviors and cultural practices. The term named, in short, a form of life. 
I use bidani, then, because it references a form of life historically associated with the socio-
cultural space of western Sahara, while also remaining salient in the present as a form of 
identification that surpasses the border-making processes of decolonization.  
This focus on decolonization, and the political formations that it has engendered, has 
important implications for the framework of this study. In Disorderly Histories, I conceptualize 
decolonization as a horizon of expectation that has generated a series of unresolved political 
projects. This dissertation examines the decolonization of western Sahara through these political 
projects, while, conversely, also examining these political projects through the lens of 
decolonization. From the 1950s to the present, the study looks at several moments of this history, 
while considering how the afterlives of these multiple, unresolved projects manifest themselves 
in the political formations that structure the region today. These formations include: Morocco’s 
militarized occupation of Western Sahara; Polisario/SADR-governed refugee camps in Algeria; 
the regions at the margins of this conflict, including northern Mauritania and southern Morocco; 
and human rights advocacy throughout the region. In moving between historical moments and 
political formations, there will be shifts in emphasis or use between bidani or Sahrawi, or 
between “Western” and “western” Sahara. When writing about 1950s decolonization, for 
example, I will use the term bidani rather than Sahrawi, since this period preceded the 
emergence of Sahrawi national identity. While there is a historical distinction to using bidani or 
Sahrawi, and a geographical distinction between “Western” and “western” Sahara, there is also 
an overlapping relation between these terms. Used in the present day, one term does not exclude 
 11 
the other; rather they overlap while also operating on different registers. Similarly, I suggest that 
many of the political projects engendered by decolonization overlap across the disaggregated 
political geography of western Sahara today. 
The ambiguity produced by competing political projects is precisely what characterizes 
the de facto decolonization of western Sahara in the present. Many of the political formations 
that constitute western Sahara today, from occupied territory to refugee camps to contested 
borderlands, are familiar to a wide range of contemporary situations, and yet their particular 
features in a region that has never been fully resolved into a nation-state invite futher description. 
Sedimented throughout this political landscape are the histories of political projects – of 
anticolonial irredentism, of humanitarian nationalism, of human rights activism for self-
determination – that point to the overlapping co-presence of colonialism and decolonization, 
human rights and national self-determination, as well as multiple, competing forms of authority. 
Placed in tension with “orderly decolonization,” which privileges both a sequential process 
(colonialism, anticolonial nationalism, decolonization) and a given outcome (territorial nation-
state sovereignty), the disorderly histories of western Sahara often stand in disjunctive relation to 
the nationalist narratives that structure contemporary political conflict. Requiring further 
examination and explanation, these disorderly histories provide the threads through which this 
dissertation attempts to unravel, unpack and understand decolonization in Western Sahara. 
 
Sovereignty and the Sahara 
As George Joffé noted in a brief essay, “the attribution of sovereignty” is “the basic 
theoretical problem posed by the Western Sahara dispute.”23 Danilyn Rutherford suggests that 
                                                
23 George Joffé, “Sovereignty and the Western Sahara,” Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 3 (September 
2010): 378–79. 
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the relation through which sovereignty may be granted is often unstable and shifting. Drawing 
upon the context of West Papua, another political formation that, like Western Sahara, has 
struggled for the right to self-determination since decolonization, Rutherford notes that: 
would-be sovereigns…are often caught off balance when the power they seek 
suddenly appears as dispersed across a shifting political terrain.24 
 
Rutherford’s notion of multiple audiences “dispersed across a shifting political terrain” evokes 
both the increased role of international law in granting or attributing sovereignty after World 
War II, as well as an increasingly dispersed “international community” after the Cold War. In a 
global political context where the power associated with gaining and granting membership to the 
community of sovereign nation-states may be disaggregated, rather than centralized, the struggle 
for self-determination emerges over the longue durée as a “shifting political terrain.”  
Joffé’s observation points to the limitations of any analysis of the Western Sahara dispute 
that begins and ends with the competing parties’ interests and power relations: rather, the 
political terrain which constitutes this dispute must first be understood. Rutherford’s attention to 
the elusive pursuit of the attribution of sovereignty suggests that, if the audience for granting 
sovereignty is ever-changing, so, too, is this political terrain. But how, and in what ways? Joffé 
suggested that sovereignty as a principle of political control had, since the 1975 ICJ decision, 
diminished significantly. Joffé’s perspective on sovereignty follows a vast swath of literature in 
political theory, international relations, and beyond, that analyzes the widening gap between 
“classic” sovereignty and its contemporary practice. In conceptualizing these changes, this 
literature historicizes these departures from classic sovereignty variously, locating the origins of 
this shift in neoliberalism, shifting norms post-Cold War, increasing mechanisms for intervention 
                                                
24 Danilyn Rutherford, Laughing at Leviathan: Sovereignty and Audience in West Papua (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012), 6. 
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in the name of international order, and/or the deterritorializing effects of the War on Terror.25 
Without specifically singling out any of these changes, Joffé asserted that post-Cold War 
sovereignty had been “hollowed out.” By this view, the dispute over Western Sahara “seems part 
of a distant past, a relic from a realist world” from when sovereignty was still something worth 
fighting for.26 
In his study Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, 
Robert H. Jackson provides an alternative perspective. Suggesting that decolonization and the 
post-World War II political order constituted a fundamental shift in “international outlook,” 
Jackson notes that the change was less a transfer of power from the Global North to the 
postcolonial South, than an expansion in the application of a moral and legal framework to 
support nation-states. Where state sovereignty had previously manifested through the de facto 
capacity for occupation and self-defense, postcolonial sovereignty (or what Jackson terms “Third 
World sovereignty”) ended up “consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic 
foundations – like separate buildings – but of territorial jurisdictions (supported from above) by 
international law and material aid – a kind of international safety net.”27 Jackson, like Schmitt, 
believes that the European state system was premised on unitary, equal sovereigns that operated 
“like separate buildings.” This positivist view considers international law antithetical to the 
inviolable basis of state sovereignty. Where Schmitt noted how a moral, legal regime of 
international governance first punctured the European system of sovereignty in the late 19th 
century, Jackson expands upon Schmitt’s perspective by showing that decolonization effectively 
                                                
25 Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2010); Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York; Cambridge  Mass.: Zone Books; 
Distributed by the MIT Press, 2010); Saskia Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 
26 Joffé, “Sovereignty and the Western Sahara,” 382. 
27 Robert H Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge 
[England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5. 
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deflated this system, inverting the basis of sovereignty from a state supported from “below” (i.e., 
domestically) into a juridical form supported from “above” by an international moral-legal 
framework. In place of inviolable state sovereignty, the states emerging from decolonization 
enjoyed what Jackson terms “negative sovereignty,” a formal right to membership in the 
international community, supported by aid in lieu of substantive power.28 
Jackson’s realist perspective is useful for reconceptualizing decolonization not as a shift 
in power between the Global North and South (or, between the West and the Third World), but 
as a shift in the constitution of nation-state sovereigns from empirical to juridical entities. The 
“orderly process of decolonization” mentioned previously was based on a certain temporal 
perspective that viewed this shift as complete with Western Sahara (1975). And yet, the ICJ 
decision and the Western Sahara political conflict together reflect the unresolved nature of this 
shift. Joffé recognized this in pointing to sovereignty as the fundamental issue underlying the 
conflict. Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara is an expression of “classic” sovereignty, but 
one constrained by the recognition of rights to the expression of popular sovereignty on behalf of 
Sahrawi nationalists. In contradistinction to Joffé’s historicization, however, Jackson shows that 
decolonization was integral to the 20th century transformation of sovereignty. In the chapters 
below, I show how Western Sahara has been the site of multiple political projects engendered by 
this transformative process. Far from resulting in the expected outcome of the territorial nation-
state, however, the political projects of decolonization in Western Sahara have defied resolution. 
In doing so, these projects bring the unresolved tensions and contradictions of post-World War II 
political formations – between borders and belonging, dependence and autonomy, sovereignty 
and international law – into sharp relief. Neither part of a prior “realist world,” nor of a 
subsequent world of “simulated sovereignty,” Western Sahara – like Western Sahara (1975) – is 
                                                
28 Jackson, 27–28. 
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a manifestation of the unresolved contradictions in territorial nation-state sovereignty produced 
by decolonization itself. 
Jackson’s Schmittian perspective suggests that, far from resolving the issue of 
sovereignty, decolonization replicated the juridical form of nation-state sovereignty throughout 
the postcolonial world, while simultaneously hollowing out the capacities underpinning positive 
sovereignty. In this sense, he serves to resituate decolonization as constitutive of the dilemma of 
sovereignty identified by Joffé. However, as political theorists and scholars of international 
relations, Jackson, Schmitt and Joffé all assume the state as the normative form of sovereign 
power. This assumption misses an important dimension to the dilemma of sovereignty, which is 
at the center of Western Sahara (1975), wherein the Jurists grapple with applying this normative 
form of state sovereignty to the nonconforming social and political formations of the Sahara. 
In this respect, anthropological approaches to sovereignty provide a useful antidote 
through a more elastic, and less normative, approach to understanding relations of authority. 
Emerging concurrent with the previously mentioned wave of efforts to re-evaluate state 
sovereignty after the end of the Cold War, recent and contemporary anthropological 
contributions on the subject have been characterized as critiques of “formal and legal notions of 
sovereignty.”29 Many of these works, inspired by Foucauldian biopolitics and Agamben’s theory 
of the exception, seek to demonstrate that sovereignty is not simply an achieved fact, but a 
process involving ongoing and emergent instantiations of violence.30 Alternatively, working in 
the vein of postcolonial theory, anthropological approaches often seek to provincialize the 
                                                
29 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, “Sovereignty Revisited,” Annu. Rev. Anthropol. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 35, no. 1 (2006): 295–315. 
30 Hansen and Stepputat; J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” Cultural Anthropology 32, no. 3 
(2017): 323–29. 
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concept sovereignty as “a category of Western political thought.”31 Perhaps most importantly, 
anthropological studies have shown how multiple forms of sovereignty often existed within 
colonial territories where “the reach and efficacy of colonial states was uneven and often 
severely limited.”32 
This last observation is particularly relevant to Alice Wilson’s study of the Sahrawi 
refugee camps in Algeria, governed by Polisario/SADR. In a deeply insightful approach that 
echoes many of the questions raised by Western Sahara (1975), Wilson develops a definition of 
sovereignty that foregrounds social relations: 
The approach taken in this book, prompted by the ethnographic context of 
Sahrawi refugees, is thus to conceptualize sovereignty as social relations between 
governing authorities and governed constituencies played out in relation to 
resources, not necessarily in territorial form. A social relations approach to 
sovereignty allows us to make such connections between extraordinary and 
ordinary projects of sovereignty.33 
 
By analytically foregrounding social relations, Wilson’s definition avoids a preoccupation with 
legal definitions and abstract institutional forms – in Western Sahara (1975), the question of an 
“entity” – from overtaking her framework. Rather than taking recourse to normative definitions 
based on “kingship” or the state, Wilson’s definition remains open to conceptualizing forms of 
authority as they are constituted “on the ground,” so to speak. 
One of the strengths of Wilson’s social relations approach is that it remains open to 
recognizing different forms of sovereignty. In contrast with many other anthropological 
approaches to sovereignty, her definition “decenters state power from discussions of 
sovereignty.”34 Just as impressively, Wilson’s approach displaces the direct relation between 
                                                
31 Yarimar Bonilla, “Unsettling Sovereignty,” Cultural Anthropology 32, no. 3 (2017): 330–39. 
32 Hansen and Stepputat, “Sovereignty Revisited,” 304. Cf. Ann Laura Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial 
Sovereignty,” Public Culture 18, no. 1 (2006): 125–46. 
33 Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile, 7. 
34 Wilson, 9. 
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sovereign and territory that underpins normative conceptions of modern nation-state sovereignty. 
In doing so, Wilson appears to draw inspiration from Katherine Verdery, who defines property as 
a social relation between persons by means of things.35 Situated first among social relations, 
sovereignty is made operative through control over “things” that may, or may not, be territorial 
in nature. Wilson’s understanding of sovereignty as constituted by social relations and effected 
“in relation to resources, not necessarily in territorial form” presents a framework particularly 
apposite to the context of the Sahara where what is often at stake in matters of authority “is not 
landownership in itself but control over people and labour that is its indispensable 
precondition.”36 Here, the knot that confronts the Jurists of Western Sahara (1975) between legal 
ties, in relation to persons, and sovereignty, defined by international law in relation to territory, is 
untied. 
This approach allows Wilson to examine a spatiotemporal context of multiple, coexisting 
projects of sovereignty. Specifically, in Sovereignty in Exile, Wilson examines competing tribal 
and what she terms “state-movement” forms of authority within the Sahrawi refugee camps in 
Algeria. Moving beyond the question of whether there are one or multiple forms of sovereignty, 
she carefully traces the dynamic between both projects as they have been constituted – 
sometimes mutually, sometimes antithetically – throughout the history of the Sahrawi nationalist 
movement’s governance of refugee camps in Algeria starting in 1975. Perhaps most 
convincingly, Wilson shows how Polisario/SADR transformed the site through which political 
subjects were produced from households to political committees beginning in the late 1970s with 
                                                
35 Wilson, 7; Katherine Verdery, “Property and Power in Transylvania’s Decollectivization,” in Property Relations: 
Renewing the Anthropological Tradition / Edited by C.M. Hann, ed. C.M. Hann (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
36 Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 132. 
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the formation of the refugee camps under their governance.37 Here she connects the shifts in 
sovereignty during the Polisario/SADR’s governance to the production of new political subjects. 
 As useful as Wilson’s definition is, this dissertation will attempt to build upon and 
expand her approach beyond the tribe-nation nexus of the refugee camps, which is the focus of 
her work. Whereas Wilson’s ethnographic approach focuses on competing political rationalities 
within a specific site – the refugee camps established in the wake of Moroccan invasion in the 
mid-1970s – I argue that the contemporary landscape of disaggregated authority across western 
Sahara encompasses multiple, competing projects and claims. These claims to authority are often 
overlapping and therefore defy reduction to a single site, or specific relational dyad (whether 
colonizer-colonized, Moroccan-Sahrawi or nation-tribe). For precisely this reason, I introduce 
Western Sahara by way of Western Sahara (1975). Contending with multiple, competing claims, 
the case must engage with Moroccan, Mauritanian, Sahrawi – and, to some extent, Algerian – 
claims to Western Sahara, as well as evidence of multiple, changing forms of social and political 
authority. 
 
Time and Temporality 
Joffé’s analysis of Western Sahara is telling in another respect, beyond his observation that 
sovereignty lies at the heart of the conflict. In noting that the Western Sahara dispute “seems part 
of a distant past, a relic from a realist world,”38 Joffé makes an observation that is not uncommon 
to depictions of Western Sahara. The documentary film Territoire Perdu portrays the Sahrawi 
refugee camps in Algeria as a place outside of history, populated by refugees and soldiers 
                                                
37 Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile, 69–73. 
38 Joffé, “Sovereignty and the Western Sahara,” 382. 
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engaged in a Godot-like state of existential waiting.39 Journalistic depictions often accentuate the 
features of Western Saharan politics that appear anomalous, or even alien to our times: video 
reportage, for example, that features the military exercises of a national liberation movement that 
still exists decades after the “end” of decolonization.40 There are, of course, a wide range of 
documentary and journalistic depictions that focus less on the peculiar, but these examples show 
how the sense of Western Sahara being “out of step” with world politics serves as an easy point 
of reference. Although Joffé uses the phrase as part of a broader, insightful argument about 
sovereignty and Western Sahara, it is nonetheless symptomatic of a chronotope for 
representations of Western Sahara. 
It is important to note, however, that this sense of Western Sahara's anomalous 
temporality in world history depends upon a concept of the global political community as a 
collection of nation-states. From this perceived totality, Western Sahara appears out of step 
either because its political status remains unresolved, or because, as in Joffé’s example, nation-
state sovereignty would hardly seem worth fighting over in an ostensibly globalized world. This 
view of the past in the present itself depends upon an “orderly” history of decolonization, which 
assumes a sequential transition, from colony to anticolonial nationalism to nation-state. A 
particularly seductive aspect of this “orderly” historiography of decolonization involves the 
assumption of synchronism, or the idea that anticolonial struggle coincided with the achievement 
of national consciousness, culminating in a wave of newly independent nation states. 
A number of recent scholars have turned their critical attention to decolonization in order 
to question this orderly process. Gary Wilder suggests that “to presuppose that national 
                                                
39 Pierre-Yves Vandeweerd and Richard Skelton, Territoire perdu = Lost Land (Paris; Bruxelles: Zeugma Films 
[éd.]; Cobra Films, 2010). 
40 See, for example, VICE News, Escaping Moroccan Occupation: The Sahara’s Forgotten War (Part 1), 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Y8w-ACs7Bw. 
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independence is the necessary form of colonial emancipation is to mistake a product of 
decolonization for an optic through which to study it.”41 From the context of the Caribbean, 
Yarimar Bonilla writes:  
I argue that we need to examine how the postwar project of decolonization 
operated similarly to other projects of political modernity, such as modernization 
and secularization. Like secularization – which as a project of government 
produced the idea of religions as discrete and transhistorical spheres of life – I 
argue that decolonization also operated as part of a larger project that sought to 
naturalize the idea of nation-states as discrete and necessary units of political and 
economic organization, while silencing and foreclosing other forms and 
alignments.42 
In arguing against methodological nationalism, both Bonilla and Wilder are also making a call to 
historicize the concept decolonization, in order to excavate the futures past that animated a 
variety of anticolonial projects in the postwar era. As I will argue throughout this dissertation, 
western Sahara defies this assumed synchronism when it comes to the relationship between 
decolonization, colonialism and nationalism. Precisely because of its “nonsynchronous” relation 
to decolonization, this region provides a context particularly well-suited to historicize the 
concept of decolonization.  
In recent literature, historical materialism as a philosophy of history has been used to 
show that naturalized concepts of modernity contain within them the sedimentation of multiple 
temporalities. The resulting geological metaphor suggests that “historical forms do not follow a 
linear model of past and present, but they become ‘geological formations’ in which the already-
been coexists with the now, allowing us to think the co-presence of temporalities on a surface 
and not according to a linear vector.”43 The sedimented layering of past social and political forms 
                                                
41 Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Durham: Duke University 
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provides a concept-metaphor, and methodology, for practicing a history of the present that 
accounts for the co-presence of multiple historical processes. In the context of western Sahara, 
the co-presence of multiple relations to authority along with competing projects of national 
sovereignty have defied resolution into the nation-state form. This region, then, holds nation-
state sovereignty – often presumed to be the universal political formation of a modern, 
decolonized world – in abeyance.44 I practice this kind of history of the present in Chapter 1 by 
exploring how past projects of decolonization remain sedimented in the nomenclature and built 
environment of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the largest city in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara and 
the epicenter of political conflict, in Chapter 1. 
 Drawing upon this concept-metaphor of a vertically stratified past-in-the-present, I 
suggest that the history of decolonization in the Sahara during the 1950s, involving the 
Moroccan Liberation Army in the Sahara, appears as a “nonsynchronous contradiction,” to 
borrow Ernst Bloch’s term, in relation to the present nationalist conflict in Western Sahara. I use 
Bloch’s term advisedly, because he describes a “real nonsynchronism” as an “unsettled past” that 
is “alien to the times” of the present.45 In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I explore how the MLA’s 
past can neither be buried nor resolved under the present conditions in Western Sahara, precisely 
because the conditions which gave rise to this political project remain in disjunctive relation to 
Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalist histories. The mobilization of Sahrawis and Moroccans 
around the MLA involved a set of complex relations of autonomy and dependence that belie 
notions of either sovereign unity, or two independent, separate peoples. As a result, the history of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), who notes "a history derived from the present inclines 
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German Critique, no. 11 (1932 1977): 31, 35. 
 22 
the MLA generates ongoing controversies in the Moroccan context, which nonetheless fail to 
confront the underlying conditions of this anticolonial armed movement, while this history is 
largely ignored in the Sahrawi context. This “unsettled past” of western Sahara’s decolonization 
sits in disjunctive, or nonsynchronous, relation to both Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalist 
narratives that otherwise structure understandings of the past in the present context of ongoing 
political dispute. 
 If 1950s decolonization in the Sahara illustrates how the appearance of “unsettled pasts” 
may appear out of step in the present only in relation to nationalist historical narratives, 
decolonization has also shaped the experience of time, or temporality, as a political terrain in the 
Sahara through a dynamic relationship between present and future. The emergence of political 
possibility at a specific historical conjuncture assumes a changing relationship between present 
and future. Understanding the significance of these changing temporal horizons entails a broader 
understanding of time itself as a political terrain. This approach incorporates insights from 
critical theory relative to the multiple temporalities of historical change that exist in tension with 
progress-oriented modern historical time. Drawing upon Reinhardt Koselleck’s concepts of 
horizon of expectation and space of experience, Chapter 4 notes how the expectation for 
imminent change animated a constellation of political movements from Mauritania to Western 
Sahara to Morocco a generation following the MLA.46 In this chapter, oral histories with 
members and former members of national liberation and anti-imperial movements in Mauritania 
and Western Sahara in the 1970s reveal how a horizon of imminent change shaped the 
temporality of political action throughout the region during that period. This expectation for 
change, which structured a temporal sense of culmination for a generation of Sahrawis, 
                                                
46 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985). 
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Moroccans and Mauritanians, stood in tension with a major shift in global politics during the 
1970s from Third World national liberation, to a global ethic of humanitarianism.47 
These disorderly histories evince three kinds of “nonsynchronism.” The first 
nonsynchronism challenges the stagist conceptualization of “orderly” decolonization: first 
colonialism, then anticolonial nationalism resulting in, finally, postcolonial nation-state 
sovereignty. That this sequential ordering is inapplicable to western Sahara has already been 
discussed in terms of the overlap between colonialism and decolonization across the region. This 
kind of nonsynchronism becomes most evident in the the Moroccan Liberation Army of the 
1950s, which could be described in terms of “anticolonial irredentism.” The second 
nonsynchronism exists in the relation between anticolonial political projects across western 
Sahara and the prevailing global conditions of possibility for realizing these projects. This 
appears most starkly through the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism during the 1970s, precisely 
as the political imperative for anticolonial self-determination was displaced by a global ethic of 
humanitarianism. This nonsynchronism remains evident today in the contemporary form of 
Sahrawi nationalism, which becomes legible simultaneously as a project of both national 
sovereignty and humanitarianism, or a “nation of refugees.” And, finally, the third aspect of 
nonsynchronism can be found in the coexistence of multiple political projects in the present.  
Without denying its global impact, decolonization, from the vantage point of the Sahara, 
has engendered political processes that have not resolved into the nation-state form and that 
disrupt an “orderly” or sequential understanding of its events. Moreover, a number of these 
Saharan political formations overlap with multiple political processes at once: colonization and 
                                                
47 This sense of culmination compares to David Scott’s account of the Granadan revolution, which “was 
generationally historic in the sense that, for the generation who made it or who recognized their identity in it…the 
revolution was the vindication and culmination of a certain organization of temporal expectation and political 
longing.” David Scott, Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
2014), 20. 
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decolonization, national liberation and humanitarianism, sovereignty as material occupation and 
as legal attribution. Captured by the terms “anticolonial irredentism” to describe the Moroccan 
Liberation Army (MLA) in the 1950s, and later “humanitarian nationalism” to describe 
Polisario/SADR’s national liberation project based out of refugee camps in Algeria, several 
political formations that emerged from the Sahara straddle multiple political terrains at once. 
Even the prolonged death of General Francisco Franco, which played a key role in Morocco’s 
ability negotiate the backdoor Madrid Agreement with Mauritania and Spain and to pre-empt the 
application of Western Sahara (1975), can be seen as bridging a kind of transition between two 
forms of sovereignty. As Michel Foucault notes in Society Must Be Defended, the management 
Franco’s death by keeping him alive “symbolizes the clash between two systems of power: that 
of sovereignty over death, and that of the regularization of life.”48 This suspension between 
forms of sovereignty also inaugurated the much longer, suspended status of Western Sahara, 
which has continued since Franco’s death. Brought together, these overlapping processes point to 
the need for a framework that contends with decolonization in Western Sahara in all of its 
complexity and disorder. 
 
Pursuing New Analytical Frameworks for Western Sahara 
The limitations to a nationalist conflict framework manifests itself in recent literature on 
Western Sahara. Representing some of the first studies to conduct research in the region after the 
ceasefire in 1991, this literature has been based upon research carried out primarily in the 
Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.49 With its attention to life on the ground in these camps (some 
                                                
48 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-76 (London [u.a.: Penguin, 
2008), 249. 
49 Stephen Zunes, “Participatory Democracy in the Sahara: A Study of Polisario Self-Governance,” Scandinavian 
Journal of Development Alternatives, 1988; Pablo San Martin, “Nationalism, Identity and Citizenship in the Western 
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of these studies are based on longterm, intensive fieldwork) this literature has pushed scholarship 
on Western Sahara well beyond the institutional analysis of national and international actors 
which characterized earlier studies on the topic.50 In one of the most compelling products of this 
research, Jacob Mundy wrote: 
Since 1975, the analysis of Western Sahara, with a few notable exceptions, has 
been dominated by macro-level political analysis. Just as the conflict remains 
stalemated, the discourse on the subject remains fairly monolithic, preoccupied by 
one question: Who will win the Western Sahara? One of the goals of this paper is 
to re-locate the Western Sahara problem in a variety of disciplines and a number 
of analytical frames.51  
The political significance of the work by Mundy and others, which included important 
contributions to understanding the roles of the United States and France in the history of the 
conflict, cannot be understated.52 By focusing on the emergence and resilience of Sahrawi 
nationalism as a social fact, this scholarship also plays an important role in the face of Morocco’s 
refusal to acknowledge Sahrawi nationalism as either a popular movement or the project of an 
institutional state-in-exile. And yet, it also emphasizes the supposed autonomy of the Sahrawi 
people as reflected in the form of the refugee camps. Studies situated entirely in the camps 
                                                                                                                                                       
Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies 10, no. 3 (2005): 565–92; J Mundy, “Performing the Nation, Pre-
Figuring the State: The Western Saharan Refugees, Thirty Years Later,” Journal of Modern African Studies 45, no. 
2 (2007): 275–98; Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara; Manuel Herz, From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the 
Western Sahara (Zurich, Switzerland: ETH Studio Basel, Lars Muller Publishers, 2013); A Wilson, “Democratising 
Elections without Parties: Reflections on the Case of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,” Journal of North 
African Studies 15, no. 4 (2010): 423–38; Alice Wilson, “Refracting Custom in Western Sahara’s Quest for 
Statehood,” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 38, no. 1 (2015): 72–90; Wilson, Sovereignty in 
Exile. 
50 Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa; Yahia H Zoubir and Daniel Volman, International Dimensions of the 
Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993); Yahia H. Zoubir, “Western Sahara: Political Economy 
of a Conflict,” in Economic Crisis and Political Change in North Africa, by Azzedine Layachi (Westport  Conn.: 
Praeger, 1998), 149–63; Khadija Mohsen-Finan, Sahara occidental: les enjeux d’un conflit régional (Paris: CNRS 
éditions, 1997); K Von Hippel, “Sunk in the Sahara: The Applicability of the Sunk Cost Effect to Irredentist 
Disputes,” Journal of North African Studies 1, no. 1 (1996): 95–116. 
51 Jacob Mundy, “Colonial Formations in Western Saharan National Identity,” in North African Mosaic: A Cultural 
Reappraisal of Ethnic and Religious Minorities, ed. J. H Krause and Nabil Boudraa (Newcastle (UK): Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2007), 299. 
52 Mundy, in particular, has shed light on the role of the United States and France in perpetuating the historical and 
ongoing injustices of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara. See Jacob Mundy, “‘Seized of the Matter’: The UN 
and the Western Sahara Dispute,” Mediterranean Quarterly 15, no. 3 (October 1, 2004): 130–48; Zunes and Mundy, 
Western Sahara. 
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reproduce the normative fictions of bounded national sovereignty, rather than examining the 
complications involved in forging an autonomous territorial political entity in the Sahara. 
Therefore, in following up on Mundy’s call for “a number of analytical frames” for 
understanding the situation in Western Sahara, I ask: Why has the opening created by this 
intervention produced scholarship that remains oriented almost entirely by methodological 
nationalism? 
A new edited volume on the Western Sahara conflict, entitled Global, Regional and 
Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: When a Conflict Gets Old, 
adeptly illustrates how the conflict’s oft-noted intractability entails not only continuity over time, 
but also the emergence of new dynamics. Bringing together a range of perspectives, the 
collection provides a broad and comprehensive view of recent developments in this prolonged 
and ongoing political conflict. Through a collection of articles that reflect multifaceted analysis 
among scholars from across disciplines and countries, this collection demonstrates that, although 
the conflict remains unresolved, it does not remain unchanged, with contributions that show how 
the complexities of the Western Sahara conflict intersect with and have been shaped by a range 
of developments, institutions, and forces, including the Arab Spring, the European Union, the 
post-Qaddafi security politics in the Sahel, and even United States hegemony. In showing how 
the conflict continues to change, the volume’s introduction foregrounds the question of time, 
noting how the conflict’s intractability invites further inquiry into “the actual traces of the 
passage of time” on the conflict itself.53 And yet, the vast majority of articles for the edited 
volume are weighted toward the recent past, with little attention to how this past has been 
                                                
53 Irene Fernández-Molina, “Introduction: Towards a Multilevel Analysis of the Western Sahara Conflict and the 
Effects of Its Protractedness,” in Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted 
Decolonization: When a Conflict Gets Old, ed. Raquel Ojeda-Garcia, Irene Fernández-Molina, and Victoria Veguilla 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 2. 
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historicized, leaving questions of time and temporality by the wayside. This appears to be a 
curious omission, if only because a conflict as long-lasting as the Western Sahara conflict is 
bound to produce a wide range of narratives, counternarratives, conjunctures, generational 
perspectives, archives and temporalities. This preoccupation with scale, to the exclusion of time, 
is perhaps oriented by the conflict resolution framework, which focuses on comprehensively 
identifying the factors that may be preventing resolution of this political dispute. 
Thus, we have two frameworks: one of methodological nationalism, and another of 
conflict resolution. But what if we take the Western Sahara not to be an incomplete political 
formation, or an unrealized process, but a full manifestation of decolonization – in all of its 
complexity and unresolved contradictions? Beginning from this framework, I suggest, helps to 
raise a different set of questions about both Western Sahara and decolonization. What if the 
decolonization of Western Sahara weren’t approached as a “failed,” “interrupted” or 
“unrealized” process of decolonization, but an exemplary political formation of decolonization? 
This would force us to ask, what is decolonization? What forms of political space, time and 
subjectivity do we find here? What do these heightened tensions reveal about the conceptual 
grammar underpinning a concept of “orderly decolonization”? And how might the complexity of 
this formation in the Sahara inform our understanding of the tensions underpinning post-World 
War II political formations more broadly? 
 
Chapter Summaries 
Set in the contested territory of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Chapter 1 examines 
how the poles of loyalty and betrayal structure everyday life in a city where competing 
sovereignties operate within a single space. As the largest city in the disputed territory of 
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Western Sahara, Laâyoune/El Aaiún is located at the nexus of conflict and epitomizes the 
polarizing effects of contested sovereignty. Through reflexive ethnographic writing that accounts 
for the conditions of widespread surveillance and suspicion in which I conducted research, I 
suggest that competing Moroccan and Sahrawi sovereignties affect residents’ subjectivities 
through the very names used to designate the spaces in which they move. The composite spelling 
of Laâyoune/El Aaiún foregrounds this dichotomy: the dual spellings denote the same name in 
Arabic [el-‘ayun] but, in the context of the dispute between Morocco and Polisario, connote two 
different political regimes. My use of both names is a redundancy and exaggeration. But I hold 
onto this split nomenclature to show how competing sovereignties have for decades divided the 
attention, allegiances and subjectivities among people sharing the same absolute space of the 
city. 
In Chapter 2, “Subjectivity in Abeyance,” I move from the nexus of Moroccan-Sahrawi 
conflict to its margins. While national identities such as “Sahrawi,” “Moroccan,” “Algerian” and 
“Mauritanian” are frequently taken for granted in literature on Western Sahara, this chapter 
critiques methodological nationalism for assuming a homology between territory, nation and 
identity in a region long characterized by many borders, and much mobility. In order to counter 
the use of categories that analytically “fix” the political subjectivities of people in this region of 
northwest Africa, this chapter foregrounds multiplicity, movement and overlapping identities. 
Beginning from Nouadhibou, a Mauritanian coastal enclave that attracts people from across 
western Sahara during the summer, I present a geography of movement and mobility in a context 
of political fragmentation and confinement, focusing on the figure of the ‘ai’d, or “returnee.” 
The “returnee” is a subject position produced by the conflict between Morocco and Polisario that 
is defined by movement, or “defection,” between the parties to the conflict. Despite the cynicism 
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and stigma of betrayal frequently associated with this figure, I suggest that the “returnee” 
provides an example of a subject that occasionally escapes the nationalist political epistemology 
upon which the conflict is based, thereby illustrating the tension between ambivalence and 
commitment underlying seemingly fixed political identities in this region. 
Chapter 3, “Home Is Knocking on the Mind,” follows another figure in the contemporary 
political landscape of northwest Africa, the veteran of the Moroccan Liberation Army of the 
Sahara, to explore how and why this little-known anticolonial movement of the 1950s remains 
politicized today. Though led by Moroccans, many of them young, nationalist and socialist, the 
armed movement was composed largely of Saharans. The subsequent conflict between young 
Moroccan freedom fighters and Saharan combatants mobilized by genealogical structures of 
authority and jihad contributed to the demise of this fleeting movement, and is the focus of this 
chapter’s analysis. I suggest that the MLA as an anticolonial armed movement captures how 
1950s decolonization in the Sahara constituted a historical moment involving the convergence of 
several political projects – of nationalism and jihad, for example – subtended by a single horizon 
of expectation. I also note that the history of this moment sits in disjunctive, or nonsynchronous, 
relation to competing Moroccan and Sahrawi national histories in the present, both of which 
attempt to erase important aspects of this 1950s moment of decolonization. I suggest that this 
erasure indicates how national narratives fail to capture the complex dynamics of autonomy and 
dependence that characterize longstanding relations between people of the Sahara and their 
neighbors to the north. 
If the 1950s highlight a disjuncture between the Sahara and surrounding regions, the 
1970s foreground how the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism was shaped by contemporaneous 
regional and global politics. Chapter 4, entitled “Open Horizons of Change, Narrow Spaces of 
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Dissent” traces how Sahrawi nationalism, in the form of the Polisario Front, emerged in the early 
1970s contemporaneously with a constellation of rising anti-imperial movements from across 
northwest Africa. Through oral histories gathered from across the region, I show how this open 
but contested horizon of expectation rendered Western Sahara an object upon which multiple 
futures, shaped by competing political ideologies, were projected. Furthermore, I show how the 
tensions underlying Western Sahara’s future were resolved only after Morocco’s invasion of the 
territory in 1975, which forced many Sahrawis to flee to refugee camps in Algeria, where 
Polisario, a state-in-exile, remains in place today. In the process, I suggest that this violent 
rupture transformed Sahrawi nationalism from an anticolonial project into a humanitarian one. 
This transformation constitutes another “nonsynchronous” aspect of Saharan decolonization, I 
argue, since Sahrawi national liberation emerged as the prevailing moral framework of global 
politics was shifting from anticolonial self-determination to human rights and humanitarianism.  
Chapter 5 returns to the present to examine how human rights discourse has emerged as a 
political terrain across Western Sahara. This chapter traces the proliferation of human rights 
activists, or huquqiyyin, representing parties on all sides of the conflict since a ceasefire in the 
early 1990s. Examining the emergence, deployment and proliferation of human rights discourse 
in the Western Sahara conflict since the 1990s, the chapter then moves across multiple sites to 
consider the uses and effects of human rights practice throughout the region’s disaggregated 
political geography. In New York City, I reflect on the media, narrative and enframing devices 
used in an attempt for the documentation of human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied 
Western Sahara to find publicity and audience. In Marrakesh, I describe the spectacle of an 
international human rights forum and how it reveals the ways in which the Moroccan state 
utilizes human rights discourse to serve its own security agenda. In the refugee camps in Algeria, 
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I consider the intersection between human rights activism and the gendered politics of 
Polisario/SADR. And, finally, in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, I consider the huquqiyyin as both avatars 
of Sahrawi resistance, and prone to being judged by those who view human rights in the context 
of nationalist conflict in cynical and instrumental terms. Across these different contexts, I 
consider the manifold versions of human rights activism operating as a tactic embedded within a 
broader political struggle. Depicting the practice of human rights in a context of political conflict 
where sovereignty and self-determination remain the ultimate aims, I show how human rights 
discourse has become an extension of political conflict, or war, itself. 
This returns the study to Western Sahara (1975), which is discussed in greater detail in an 
Appendix. A sustained analysis of Western Sahara (1975) engages with the forms of reasoning 
and regimes of evidence presented in the operative decision, oral pleadings, as well as dissenting 
opinions. In contrast to much of the existing legal scholarship on the decision, which situates this 
decision in relation international law and its Eurocentrism, I argue that the decision foregrounds 
the tensions inherent in fashioning a formal legal process of decolonization around the 
realization of territorial nation-state sovereignty. Despite consolidating the legal right to self-
determination, Western Sahara (1975) paradoxically expresses the limits to “orderly 
decolonization.”  
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Chapter 1 –Sedimented Histories and the Competing Sovereignties of Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara 
 
Tonight I am dining in occupied territory.54 In a simple apartment on the second floor of one of 
the cavernous concrete edifices known as “Batimat” (from the French bâtiment, or building), off 
a main thoroughfare in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the largest city in Moroccan-occupied Western 
Sahara, I am hosted by a young man and his mother. The mother is telling me about the heavily 
mythologized Green March of November 6, 1975, when, as a state-sponsored act of protest, 
some 350,000 Moroccan civilians crossed en masse into Spanish Sahara from the southern 
Moroccan region of Wed Nun. But far from celebrating this event as it is memorialized in 
Moroccan nationalist doctrine, she is recounting the arrival of Moroccan soldiers into 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún ahead of the much-publicized civilian march. In an attempt to annex the 
territory and preempt the flight of Saharan people who had been anticipating a vote on self-
determination, Moroccan soldiers began encroaching on the territory from the east, beginning in 
October 1975.55 After the tripartite Madrid Agreement was signed on November 12, finalizing 
Spanish withdrawal and handing de facto authority to Morocco and Mauritania,56 many Sahrawi 
men serving in the Spanish colonial army fled the city to join the Polisario Front,57 the armed 
national liberation movement that had emerged two years earlier to fight Spanish colonialism. 
Residents who stayed behind moved their livestock from the pens surrounding their homes up to 
                                                
54 On dining in the Saharawi refugee camps, some 3000 km east from Laâyoune/El Aaiún near Tindouf, Algeria, see 
Robin Kahn and Federico Guzmán, Dining in Refugee Camps: The Art of Sahrawi Cooking = Cenando En Los 
Campamentos de Refugiados: Un Libro de Cocina Saharaui (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 2010). 
55 Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport  Conn.: L. Hill, 1983), 221–225. 
56 Mauritania withdrew from the southern tier of Western Sahara in 1979, and Morocco immediately annexed this 
territory. The Madrid Agreement is not recognized internationally, because it did not conform to international norms 
for decolonization by self-determination. See “Madrid Agreement (of November 14, 1975)” in Anthony G 
Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 248–51. 
57 Hereafter, Polisario. The acronym Polisario, also referred to as the Polisario Front, is derived from the Front’s 
Spanish name: Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro. Saguia el-Hamra, in the north, 
and Rio de Oro (sometimes Wadi Dahhab, or, less frequently, Tiris Gharbiya) in the south, are the two main regions 
that constitute Western Sahara. 
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the roof. When this woman, then six or seven years old, accompanied her grandmother to the 
roof of her family’s house, they encountered a Moroccan soldier. Upon seeing them, the soldier 
promptly knocked this woman’s grandmother over with his rifle, spilling a kerosene lamp she 
was carrying and burning the young girl in the process. This, for her, was how decolonization 
took place, and how the Moroccan occupation began. 
As we talk, propping ourselves up with pillows on the carpet-covered apartment floor, the 
son makes round after round of tea. Eventually, he begins recounting the litany of beatings, 
arrests and torture that pro-independence Sahrawi presently suffer at the hands of the Moroccan 
security forces. His reports of abuse are interspersed with the mother’s narrative when she joins 
us between trips to the kitchen preparing dinner. Her interjections take us back in time, recalling 
the conditions of living in Laâyoune/El Aaiún in the early years of the military occupation, when 
the Moroccan Army and Polisario were fighting in the surrounding desert countryside, or badiya. 
For five years, she says, no one was allowed to leave the city and go to the desert, an inversion of 
the norm for many Sahrawis for whom city life represented little more than a pause from pastoral 
or nomadic life in the badiya. She recounts the horrors of people disappearing, the rumors of 
bodies being thrown into the ocean from helicopters and of being buried in mass graves, and the 
terror that “If you say ‘Polisario,’ tomorrow you’ll end up in M’gouna.”58  
 The mother’s sister, who joins us in the sparsely furnished room as the son prepares tea, 
begins recounting the chaos and uncertainty endured by people who fled east during this time, 
embarking on a journey that, for some, involved Moroccan aircraft strafing them with napalm. 
                                                
58 Kela‘a M’gouna is a fortress in southern Morocco that was converted into a jail and housed political prisoners, 
including leftists and Sahrawi nationalists, throughout the 1980s and 90s. Estimates of the numbers of disappeared 
Sahrawi civilians vary, but Abdesslam Omar, director of AFAPREDESA, the Association of Families of Sahrawi 
Prisoners and Disappeared based in the refugee camps, claims that there are “over 400.” [Interview, Jan 24 2016, 
Rabouni, Sahrawi refugee camps.] Omar provided a similar figure to the New York Times in Carlotta Gall, 
“Fighting Is Long Over, but Western Sahara Still Lacks Peace,” The New York Times, February 22, 2015.  
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This epic of violence, displacement, deprivation and loss has itself become foundational to the 
national narrative of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a state-in-exile established 
in 1976, based out of refugee camps in Algeria, and run by Polisario with humanitarian and 
Algerian support. Before the aunt can finish, however, the sound of pattering footsteps from 
outside the building interrupts her story. The voiceless, arrhythmic syncopation of small feet 
hitting the ground reaches us with the suddenness of unexpected rainfall as a group of kids try to 
escape the police van’s headlights, running along one of the dirt paths that connect the buildings 
of this apartment complex. Testimonials of the past, recounting the violent origins of Morocco’s 
occupation, are interrupted by its ongoing presence. The dynamic exchange between mother and 
son, a contrapuntal narrative weaving a history of injustice with today’s ongoing resistance, 
gives way to a silent pause. “Stay down,” the mother tells everyone. “Stay down.” 
 From this point on, I try to speak very little and we all converse in hushed tones, except 
for the son at whose invitation I had come to dinner. He has too many arrests, confiscations, 
beatings and confrontations with the police to recount, and whatever fear he may have doesn’t 
seem to modulate the anger and excitement in his voice. He tells me about Sahrawi students at 
university in Moroccan cities who had been attacked and then jailed in the aftermath of 
celebrating Algeria’s success in a World Cup match last month. He names the leader of an 
activist/media crew in Laâyoune/El Aaiún who was arrested just last night, a fellow videographer 
whose equipment was taken and destroyed. Just before Ramadan, he says, two women were 
treated roughly by the police, which, he suggests with foreboding but also not without 
excitement, portends an upcoming “hot month,” fraught with the potential for escalating rock-
throwing confrontations between young folk and the security forces. He shows me a sheet of 
paper that lists, day-by-day, the locations where protests are set to take place in the coming 
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weeks. The kids running in and around Batimat in their game of cat-and-mouse with the police 
vans have become a nightly presence, and their footfalls pass beneath the apartment several more 
times before the evening is over. 
 
Chapter Overview: History, Geography and Subjectivity in Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the capital of a Non-Self-Governing Territory, a politically isolated 
urban space at the epicenter of an international conflict, a city populated largely as a 
consequence of coercion and necessity, is, above all, a place of competing sovereignties. These 
sovereign forces concentrated within the single absolute space of the city produce a highly 
structured political field. The machinery of the Moroccan military state – soldiers and police in 
riot gear, undercover mukhabarat of Moroccan state intelligence services, and informants 
embedded in every neighborhood – represses any sign of visible support for Sahrawi nationalism. 
Unsurprisingly, the tight control begins before entering the city limits. Two military checkpoints 
stationed north of the Saguiet al-Hamra river greet travelers coming overland from Morocco. 
Security coming through the Laâyoune airport can be similarly, and selectively, tight, as 
Morocco restricts foreign journalists from traveling to the city in an effort to maintain a media 
blackout.59 Much of the territory to the east of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, toward the sand berm where 
most of the estimated 100,000 Moroccan soldiers are stationed60 and the refugee camps beyond, 
remains off-limits to civilian travel. 
Pro-independence Sahrawis find spaces within the crevices of this machinery – the inside 
                                                
59 84 foreigners were reportedly expelled from the territory in 2016. “Morocco Continues the Arbitrary Expulsion of 
International Observers from Western Sahara,” Adala UK (blog), January 22, 2017, 
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60 Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 1st ed. (Syracuse  
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 27; Mitch Swenson, “The World’s Longest Minefield Isn’t Where You 
Think It Is,” The Week, January 26, 2015, http://theweek.com/articles/534866/worlds-longest-minefield-isnt-where-
think. The article in The Week places the number at 120,000. 
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of a cab, the interior or rooftop of a home – to carve out shared spaces of resistance to Moroccan 
occupation and to affirm their commitment to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The 
barely hidden presence of this affiliation exists everywhere: people’s homes may be tuned to 
SADR television and radio broadcasts from the refugee camps in Algeria, or even decorated with 
SADR flags for Sahrawi national holidays. A cab driver with like-minded passengers may play 
songs or poems that are explicitly pro-independence (“Every day we will rise up under the feet of 
the invader…”61). At the same time, pro-independence activists devise tactics to confront the 
coercion of Moroccan rule and make it visible by staging a street protest and videotaping it from 
a nearby rooftop or apartment window. The refugee camps where Polisario’s state-in-exile 
maintains television and radio broadcasts give the protesters an outlet and an audience, and 
Polisario’s Ministry for the Occupied Territories coordinates political strategy between the 
camps and the city, including money transfers that reportedly pass through expatriate Sahrawis 
living in the nearby Canary Islands.62 Gaining international attention remains the ever-present, if 
elusive, goal. 
The conflict’s polarization seeps into daily life and overdetermines public activity. Even 
public gatherings that, on the surface, may not involve protest of any kind get drawn into the 
field of political conflict. Soccer matches that draw the largest crowds to the cafés (Barcelona-
Real Madrid, in particular) sometimes end in clashes where flags for Morocco, SADR or Algeria 
(Polisario’s main backer) are raised. Police and soldiers are also quick to descend upon 
unemployed college graduates demanding work under the pretense that their protest might 
“become political.” This threat of “the political” is so pervasive that residents sometimes refer to 
                                                
61 Kul nhar al-intifada taht ’aqdam al-ghuza… 
62 Fieldnote Dec 5, 2014. The Canary Islands are an archipelago off the coast of northwest Africa and an 
autonomous community of Spain. The island nearest mainland Africa, Fuertaventura, lies 62 miles from Tarfaya, in 
southern Morocco. The “Tarfaya Strip” was a part of Spanish Sahara until 1958. 
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Laâyoune/El Aaiún in dark, even foreboding terms: “the belly of the beast” (kersh al-duba‘) or 
“the mouth of the volcano” (fuhat al-burkan). Sahrawi activists have compared it to being 
trapped inside a box wrapped in darkness, such that no one can see in from the outside.63 Even 
Moroccan officials have complained that being assigned there is akin to punishment, despite a 
wage bonus (reportedly fifty percent, for public functionaries). 
The structuring effects of competing sovereignties within a single urban space evoke the 
confusion, suspicion and disciplining of subjects described in China Miéville’s The City & the 
City. In Miéville’s fictional account, an historical rupture has produced a political formation in 
which two, politically separate cities exist on top of one another. Everyday life for the residents 
is carried out on the same streets and in the same built environment, but the citizens of the two 
cities must discipline themselves to “unsee” the people, signs and architecture of the “other” city. 
When the borders between these two cities are transgressed, a shadowy, interstitial force asserts 
itself, known as the “Breach.” Miéville’s masterfully rendered fictional world evokes what Gil 
Hochberg has called, in reference to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, “parallel geopolitical 
realities invisible to each other.”64 For Hochberg and Miéville, a political field structured by 
competing sovereignties produces subjects disciplined by distinct “ways of seeing,” where the 
salient boundaries are less geographical than social, concerning what can be seen and who can 
see it. This conceptualization of the political field draws from Jacques Rancière’s formulation of 
the distribution of the sensible through which politics revolves around “what is seen and what 
can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the 
properties of space and the possibilities of time.”65 In these contexts, political geographies can 
                                                
63 Interview, 12 November, 2014. Laâyoune/El Aaiún. 
64 April 14, 2016 talk at NYU. “The Right to Look: On the Visual Politics of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine.” 
65 Jacques Ranciere, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2013), 13. 
 38 
only be discerned through an examination of how competing sovereignties shape and structure 
political subjectivity in a given political field. 
The first half of this chapter explores some of the effects of contested political authority 
on everyday life in the city. The competing sovereignties of Morocco and Polisario/SADR 
structure this disaggregated political space into a polarized political field characterized by intense 
surveillance and pervasive suspicion. In addressing the challenges that this surveillance and 
suspicion presented for conducting ethnographic research, this section frames the methodological 
situation of being subjected to surveillance in terms of “observed participation.” In examining 
the pervasiveness of surveillance and suspicion in everyday urban life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, I 
describe how this longstanding, polarizing national conflict destabilizes epistemological 
hierarchies of truth both at the level of subjectivity, but also by destabilizing discursive fields of 
memory. Despite these methodological challenges, I suggest that this condition of “observed 
participation” can contribute ethnographically to conceptualizing how surveillance shapes 
political subjectivity in what Ilana Feldman terms “security society.”66 
The second half of this chapter will examine the structuring effects of competing 
sovereignties in Laâyoune/El Aaiún through the sedimentation of the city’s history, tracing this 
history back to the 1950s and the emergence of decolonization as a horizon of political 
possibility. This history involves a series of contested, unrealized political projects that include: 
joint Moroccan-Sahrawi anticolonial armed struggle in the 1950s; Spanish counterinsurgency 
and colonialism in the 1960s and 70s; the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism led by the Polisario 
Front in the 1970s; and the shifting terrain of Moroccan-Sahrawi conflict since the 1970s. 
                                                
66 Ilana Feldman, Police Encounters: Security and Surveillance in Gaza under Egyptian Rule (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), 17. In addition to civil society and Partha Chatterjee’s formulation of a “political 
society,” Feldman suggests that “Security society is a space defined by practices of surveillance and informing, by 
the forwarding of claims through expressions of suspicion, and by networks of relations that are defined by 
hesitancy as much as comfortable connection.”  
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Attending to this history is important, I suggest, for several reasons. First, I suggest that the 
prolonged and ongoing history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s decolonization is also the history of the 
city’s formation. In this way, attending to the city’s history points to urbanization as a nexus 
through which postcolonial sovereignty has transformed the relationship between people, 
authority and territory in this region of the Sahara. Rather than a unitary political entity, however, 
the formation and history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún epitomizes the unresolved contradictions 
inherent in post-World War II sovereignty under the United Nations: is sovereignty itself 
legitimate occupation, or a matter of legal recognition? And, finally, the afterlives of these 
unresolved political projects are referenced through a variety of place-names still in use 
throughout Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Together, I suggest, the different political projects referenced 
through a concatenation of names in Laâyoune/El Aaiún describe a layered history of unresolved 
political projects sedimented in the city’s built environment and nomenclature. 
 
Section I – “Observed Participation”: some notes on participant observation in a “security 
society” 
 
Note A – The Immediacy of Surveillance: a knock on the door, a call from police 
 Early in my fieldwork, I came to know several different ‘a’idin (sing. ‘a’id), or 
“returnees,” many of whom grew up under Spanish colonialism, joined the Polisario Front in the 
1970s, and fought against Morocco throughout the 80s, only to return to Moroccan-occupied 
territory after the ceasefire in 1991. The designation of ‘a’id refers to former members of the 
Polisario Front who left the refugee camps to live, with Moroccan state support, in either 
Moroccan-occupied territory or Morocco proper. Though ‘a’idin and their changing position 
within the field of contemporary political conflict will be discussed more in Chapter 2, for the 
purposes of this example it should be noted that they are typically assumed to be “defectors” 
from Polisario and therefore loyal to Morocco.  
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The subject position of the ‘a’id lent itself to a particular narrative of Western Sahara’s 
history, which many ‘a’idin were eager to share in their own cautious way. As a result, I found 
myself visiting their homes several times.67 In order to refer to these experiences without 
singling out an individual ‘a’id, I will refer to a composite figure throughout this chapter as 
Lahcen. It should be noted, however, that ‘a’idin are not exclusively men; women and families, 
including children, have followed this trajectory of “return.” On one occasion, Lahcen and I were 
reviewing my written account of his historical narrative when there was a knock on his door. He 
went downstairs to answer and, following a brief conversation that I did not overhear, he 
returned and peeked his head out through the shuttered, second-story window overlooking the 
street. Once he was satisfied that the unexpected visitor had left, we resumed proof-reading 
Lahcen’s historical narrative. When we were done, he mentioned that the person at the door had 
been a clerk from the qa‘id’s office, which serves as the most local jurisdiction for government 
administration. The clerk, he mentioned, had reported that the office had been made aware of an 
Arabic-speaking foreigner visiting Lahcen’s house and was checking to see if the visitor was still 
present. Lahcen said that he had covered for me, telling this low-level government official that 
we had met one another through a friend, but that I was not at Lahcen’s house at that time. For 
the rest of my visit that evening, we left our historical review aside, and instead Lahcen provided 
cautionary advice for how to stay safe and look after my belongings. Some of this advice seemed 
curious (“Address anyone questioning you firmly and confidently”), while other suggestions 
seemed utterly necessary (“Don’t carry your notes with you – put them somewhere secure, like 
under a bed mattress”). At the same time, Lahcen tried to reassure me that government 
                                                
67 This narrative, particular in some ways to a generation of ‘a’idin, asserts the historical independence of certain 
tribes of the Sahara (implicitly distinguishing the territory from “Moroccan” land). Unlike pro-Polisario Sahrawis, 
however, ‘a’idin historical narratives frequently foreground the authoritarian nature of Polisario rule prior to a 
popular uprising that took place in 1988. 
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surveillance was unusually tight at that moment, given the pending visit of the Princess of 
Morocco, Lalla Meriem, to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. After we wrapped things up, 
rather than walking to the nearby mosque to catch a cab as I had done previously after visiting 
his house, Lahcen called for a friend to take me home by car, and came along for the ride as his 
friend took a roundabout route through dark, side streets. 
 On another occasion, the police called me after I had returned from conducting an 
interview with officials from MINURSO, the UN mission tasked since 1991 with monitoring the 
cease-fire established between Morocco and Polisario. A security perimeter lines MINURSO’s 
headquarters in lower Laâyoune/El Aaiún, a modest campus converted from a school. Dark blue, 
Moroccan police vans park across the street from MINURSO’s headquarters, monitoring the 
monitors at all times.68 Despite the constant police presence, I was caught by surprise when I 
received a call the day following my visit. The caller, speaking carefully in English, sought to 
remind me that we had met previously at the city’s wilaya, or central administration. I had gone 
to the wilaya several months prior to register in an attempt to procure my research authorization 
but, instead, ended up in a room for over an hour while different security officials cycled through 
repeating the same questions, presumably to get a good look at my face. While the caller 
remembered me, I could not seem to put a face to his name. After dispensing with the chit-chat, 
he asked if I had been to MINURSO the previous day and wanted to know my reasons for the 
visit. I told him that I had been to MINURSO to learn about its role in regional governance, and 
that I had taken the opportunity to go because daytime appointments were otherwise hard to 
                                                
68 Since its establishment, Morocco has restricted contact between MINURSO staff and Sahrawis in Moroccan-
occupied territory. (Presentation by Katlyn Thomas, “Watching Western Sahara” Feb 16, 2017, Roosevelt House at 
Hunter College.) Still, the expulsion of more than 70 civilian MINURSO employees in March 2016 was 
unprecedented, and MINURSO operations have reportedly remained understaffed since then. Hannah Armstrong, 
“North Africa’s Next War,” The New York Times, January 16, 2017, 
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come by during Ramadan. He asked if I had changed my research topic, expanding into other 
matters “such as the Green March,” he suggested, but I told him no. He asked how long I was 
planning to conduct research (I told him until the end of the year) and whether I had received my 
research authorization (I was still waiting). 
These occasions when I interfaced directly with the Moroccan state security apparatus 
were infrequent and always unanticipated. In the case of the knock at Lahcen’s door, my first 
thought was to suspend contact with all of my interlocutors, for fear that state security agents 
would be following up with whomever I met. With the phone call following my visit to 
MINURSO, I realized that, no matter how many unsolicited warnings that I received to avoid 
certain people or neighborhoods, the trip wires that put the state on alert were difficult, if not 
impossible, to know in advance. Though irregular in their occurrence, the moments when state 
surveillance became manifest – a knock on the door, a phone call from a government official – 
were significant. In confirming that the state was, indeed, following me, these interventions 
provided empirical proof to validate the warnings and rumors of state surveillance that were so 
pervasive to daily life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún.  
In this sense, such events constituted moments of clarity: here is when the klieg lights 
became bright enough to pierce the fog of suspicion. Although they punctuated the everyday 
rumors and warnings with more immediate forms of contact with the state security forces, the 
confirmation that these moments of direct contact provided was anything but reassuring. As I 
wrote in my fieldnotes following the phone call from the government official: 
I’m beginning to think that my participant-observation activity might just 
involve “being observed.” Nevermind the countless police vans and quwwat al-
musa‘ida69 trucks that I walk past everyday on Avenues Tan-Tan and Smara. It’s 
the second-hand joking response to a question (“What are you, mukhabarat?”), 
                                                
69 Auxiliary Forces, or the equivalent of National Guard in the U.S. Armed Forces. Where the police are outfitted in 
dark blue, quwwat al-musa’ida soldiers manning these vehicles wear military green pantsuits. 
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unsolicited advice from a friend (“don’t talk to people you don’t know; eyes are 
on you”) and/or statement of the obvious to everyone involved (“you know they 
know exactly where you are right now…”) 
     But the really unnerving thing about it all is not knowing what they really 
know and what sets them off. I know that the organized groups around hr [human 
rights] activism (CODESA, Agdim Izig Coord Committee, etc.) are under close 
surveillance, and so too are these “Media” groups. But I wouldn’t have guessed 
that going to see MINURSO would set them off. But not knowing has been 
what’s made me nervous… 
     The other aspect is not knowing just how sophisticated and thorough their 
oversight really is. Do they basically know everywhere I am at all times, which is 
the impression given by most people’s comments, like, “They know that you’re 
here, right now, for sure.” But if that’s the case, then is going to MINURSO really 
more telling or controversial than some of the other people I’ve been meeting 
with over the last months?70 
In its diffuse prevalence, the panopticon has a felt presence in Laâyoune/El Aaiún: a constitutive 
element of the city’s social fabric, built environment, and communications infrastructure. State 
surveillance creeps into the walls, the phones, the air. The resulting suspicion is everywhere, too. 
This fieldnote conveys how the invisible aspects of the militarized state are more unsettling than 
its readily apparent presence in the form of, for example, armored vehicles (“police vans and 
quwwat al-musa’ida trucks”) stationed throughout the city. Coming several months into my 
fieldwork experience in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, this note also reflects how the state’s occasional 
manifestation only served to amplify my sense of suspicion rather than clarifying the outlines of 
its presence. 
There are several dimensions to being observed in this manner and, as in many 
ethnographic situations, the implications are both subjective and methodological. The first 
involves the immediacy of those moments when the state contacted me directly. I found that the 
immediacy of fear, uncertainty and disorientation produced in these moments defied 
rationalization. This includes the self-analysis intended by reflexive anthropology, which 
foregrounds the relational experience between anthropologist and interlocutor at the heart of 
                                                
70 Fieldnote, July 9, 2014. 
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ethnographic research. These well-meaning approaches help to deconstruct colonial forms of 
knowledge and power, which underpin much of the anthropologist’s authority when writing 
ethnography. However, a reflexive analysis assumes that this dynamic can be resolved by 
attending to the dialogic encounter between anthropologist and interlocutor.71 The crisis of 
authority engendered by conducting ethnographic research under close state surveillance, 
however, does not lend itself to the same reflexive analysis based on dialogic encounter. As the 
examples above illustrate, in the moments of hearing a knock on the door, or receiving a phone 
call, I experienced a sense of both disintegration, and an impulse toward self-preservation. These 
encounters were neither dialogic, nor between individuals per se; rather, they entailed the 
interpellation of a subject by institutional agents. While these moments are not productive in a 
dialogic manner, in the ethnographic sense of reflexive anthropology, they may be productive of 
a relation to authority – an experience, in other words, of subjection. 
Being made aware of the presence of surveillance is not strictly dependent upon these 
moments of direct contact with security and intelligence forces. On the contrary, the pervasive 
suspicion and occasional manifestation of surveillance work in complementary ways to amplify 
the state’s seemingly all-encompassing presence and arbitrary interventions. Constantly being 
made aware of state surveillance is generative not simply of fear, but paranoia. Early in my 
fieldwork, I was walking along a street during a busy part of the evening when a car slowed 
alongside me, tinted windows rolled down, and a young guy in the passenger seat asked me for 
directions. I pointed in the opposite direction and, in somewhat broken Arabic answered “another 
direction” (“tija l-akhur”). The passenger corrected me in mock seriousness - “tijah al-mu‘akis, 
you mean?” – rolled up the window and drove off. There was no particularly good reason why I 
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should have interpreted this interaction as anything other than some young guys exploiting an 
easy target for amusement during their drive around the city at night. But in the aftermath of that 
brief encounter, I was sure that someone was sending me a message. For the rest of that walk 
home, I somehow convinced myself that, rather than asking me for directions, these were agents 
of police or intelligence or security, letting me know that they knew exactly where to find me. 
 Months later, as much as I would have liked to say that I had developed a more reliable 
sense of equanimity, I remained susceptible to this paranoia. One fine afternoon, seated at a café 
on Avenue Mekka in an area not far from the Moroccan-dominated lower part of the city, I 
became acutely aware of security personnel on all sides of me. I remember sensing a stillness to 
the scene, even as the afternoon wind was gaining its usual strength. A couple of National 
Security vehicles – one jeep and one van – pulled up onto the sidewalk down the street from 
where I was sitting. A man standing in the doorway behind me was checking his phone. A BMW 
and a black Renault minivan - the kind the undercover ride around in – then parked in front of 
the National Security vehicles. An official-looking man stepped out of his BMW and walked 
over with a big Samsung smart phone, greeting his friends a couple tables over from me. He sat 
down, sunglasses on, facing my direction. I looked up: a man in a hotel room across the street 
was surveying the scene from his hotel window. Fifteen minutes later it would seem absurd, but 
at that moment I thought: this is it, they’re going to arrest me. Would I call the US Embassy 
first? Would that be shameful? If not, who would I call? What is worse, I had just run out of 
minutes on my phone. 
 The two National Security vehicles pulled out onto the street and drove away, up Avenue 
Mekka. The black Renault van pulled up the street and only then I saw it had civilian plates: just 
a father and his son, who had possibly made a stop at the patisserie nearby. The man in 
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sunglasses was still facing me, but he and his friends were engrossed in conversation. At that 
point, I could reinterpret my whole frame of reference as a misguided conspiracy theory. 
Reframed in this way, the acute pang of anxiety I had felt also became an embarrassing moment 
of narcissism: I was not nearly as central to the plot as my mind would have had me believe. And 
yet, repeated over weeks and months, this constant need to check my frame of reference only 
compounded the subjective sense of instability: whether before or after the reinterpretation, I 
could no longer trust myself to know what to think – nor who to trust. And in this way, a kind of 
paranoia takes root and engenders a need both for constant vigilance to reassert my own sense of 
reality, and a constant sense that the hierarchies of truth could be shifted by a single, punctuating 
event that could decisively rearrange my own position within this field of suspicion and 
surveillance. 
In his account of losing his wife unexpectedly during ethnographic fieldwork, Renato 
Rosaldo describes how the personal experience of loss within his own family profoundly shaped 
his subsequent ability to relate to his interlocutors’ expressions of anger, grief and rage. While 
Rosaldo’s experience of loss was not directly related to the “dialogic encounter” of ethnographic 
research, it was an emotional and deeply personal experience that, in shaping his subjectivity, 
provided him with insight into the experience of rage. While he would never claim to fully grasp 
his interlocutors’ experiences based on his own, Rosaldo noted that through his own subjective 
experience he was able to recognize that “Ilongot anger and my own overlap, rather like two 
circles, partially overlaid and partially separate. They are not identical.”72  
Similarly, I suggest that the immediacy of state interventions was significant to my 
ongoing analysis because it imparted an emotional, subjective experience through which I could 
relate – however provisionally – to some of the stories that Sahrawis relayed about Moroccan 
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police, soldiers, or intelligence officers appearing at their homes. Sometimes, these stories were 
framed in terms of finding one’s agency and pushing back against different forms of state 
intimidation. In one case a Sahrawi man living in Mauritania was visiting family in Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún when he answered the door at his relatives’ house and encountered a Moroccan security 
officer demanding identification. Refusing to capitulate, this man confronted the officer and 
demanded that he leave him and his relatives alone. Whereas certain encounters engender the 
space for political action, other memories demonstrate how contact with the police lead to the 
imprisonment and even disappearance of family members. One media activist recounted his 
vivid memory of an early morning raid in the early 1990s when Moroccan police broke into his 
family’s home and hauled off his older brother, allegedly for spray-painting pro-Polisario graffiti 
on a public wall. While I want to be clear that my life never in any way felt endangered in the 
way many Sahrawis experienced, the anxiety and loss of perspective that I felt in the moments 
where I directly encountered state surveillance punctuated the regularly occurring narratives and 
warnings of surveillance and suspicion with the immediacy of subjective experience. In these 
moments, I could relate, however provisionally, to certain shared, subjective effects of living 
under state surveillance – of “observed participation” in a political field shaped by contested 
sovereignty.73 
As it shaped my partial understanding of certain aspects of my interlocutors’ subjective 
experiences, “observed participation” also provides a framework for unpacking the relationship 
between individual experience and historical process. Where Renato Rosaldo draws upon 
personal experience to mediate between the particularity of his interlocutors’ experience and a 
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broader, anthropological interpretation, Theodor Adorno draws upon the immediacy of personal 
experience to consider the relationship between history and the individual. Writing about the 
experience of having his house searched by Nazi police officers, Adorno notes that subjective 
immediacy supersedes political or historical analysis: 
A fact like a house search in which you do not know whether you will be taken 
off somewhere or whether you will escape with your life has a greater immediacy 
for the knowing subject than any amount of political information, itself on the 
level of the facts, to say nothing of the so-called larger historical context to which 
only reflection and, ultimately, theory can give us access.74 
At the same time, Adorno writes that the house search posed such a threat precisely because of 
the historical context of National Socialism in which it took place: 
If all that had happened was that two relatively harmless officials belonging to the 
old police force had turned up on my doorstep, and if I had had no knowledge of 
the complete change in the political system, my experience would have been quite 
different from what it was. And, in the same way, no one can appreciate the 
terrors of a totalitarian regime if he has not personally experienced that ominous 
knock at the door and opened it to find the police waiting outside.75 
Nothing that I experienced approached the level of threat or terror that confronted a Jew living 
under National Socialism, or even a Sahrawi nationalist living in Moroccan-occupied territory. 
But I reference Adorno because he draws upon personal experience to illustrate that the 
immediacy of subjective experience is still mediated by historical context and, likewise, that 
context is itself constituted by the immediacy of subjective experience. One of the tasks of this 
dissertation is to unpack the dialectic between individual experience and historical context. In an 
effort to understand the structures that mediate between the two – between the experience of the 
knock on Lahcen’s door, and the circumstances that produced this knock – this anthropology of 
decolonization is also, then, a history of the present. 
While my direct interactions with Moroccan state surveillance proved to be significant in 
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shaping my experience of “observed participation,” these moments were relatively few and far 
between. Though they may have had the effect of amplifying suspicion and fear through the 
occasional, punctuating event, the vast majority of my time spent in “observed participation” was 
refracted through others. This includes the constant warnings mentioned above, which served as 
a kind of fog machine for state surveillance, producing effects of this surveillance while at the 
same time obscuring the “real” presence of the state by making it seem like the state was 
everywhere, all of the time. Like the punctuating events of direct contact, the refracted 
experience of state surveillance served to amplify its effects, ultimately producing a pervasive 
suspicion to which I became more vulnerable the longer I stayed in Moroccan-occupied Western 
Sahara. In what follows, I will provide some examples of the different figures through which this 
suspicion is refracted. 
Note B – Refracted Surveillance and Three Figures of the Moroccan Security State 
Today, I am meeting Salih and an acquaintance of his at a café. The resumption of construction, 
welding and auto repair activities, along with foot- and car-traffic filling the markets and streets, 
has brought the stillness of the afternoon gayl, or nap, to a clattering end. By the time I arrive, 
my friend and his acquaintance are sitting out front of a large, four-story building, known as 
Agjijimat, which houses a couple of popular cafés on the outskirts of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Today 
the weather is unusually serene: the blustery wind hasn’t kept its usual, late-afternoon 
appointment, leaving the day’s heat to dissipate slowly as the sun goes down. This lends a more 
relaxed feel to the daily welter of activity that emerges out of the afternoon prayer and 
crescendos at sundown. On a clear, placid day like this, men fill café sidewalk seating across the 
city. Here at Agjijimat, recorded music of a woman’s voice and electric guitar – with the 
patented distortion that, to an outsider, gives the music of the Sahara, or azawan, its psychedelic 
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sound – emanates from inside the building. We are far from the Moroccan-dominated lower city. 
Across the wide avenue that heads east to Smara, older men dressed in light blue robes, or dra‘a, 
gather in groups of 15 to 20, sitting on the ground outside of apartment buildings to play cards 
and other games. At its eastern reaches where the expanse of the desert countryside appears 
through gaps of undeveloped building lots and wide avenues, the urban landscape is 
foreshortened. Here, where (and when) the city exhales, the setting would seem to be perfect for 
chatting over tea. 
The ambiance is so pleasant that Salih’s apology (he had planned to host us at his 
family’s house, but relatives were visiting) barely registers. The man who has accompanied Salih 
appears at ease in a way that I have come to recognize as the disposition of someone who has 
nothing to hide from the authorities. No glancing around, no hunching over to speak: he has no 
affiliations with, nor any leanings toward, Sahrawi independence. As soon as Salih finishes 
introducing us, his acquaintance, who is at least twenty-five years older than either of us, wastes 
no time in cutting to the chase. Pausing only to retrieve and light a narrow metal pipe from his 
leather pouch, the older man begins narrating his experience working as a policeman under 
Spanish colonialism, speaking eagerly about all of the history he has lived through, and how 
happy he is to tell me all about it. The ease with which he begins sharing his personal history 
catches me off-guard and, as if to regain my bearings so that he might start from the beginning 
and go through his biography chronologically, I pose an innocuous question: 
“When were you born, and where?” I ask. 
“Sidi Ifni,” he says, “then I moved to Laâyoune/El Aaiún in 1961." 
“Where did you live in Laâyoune/El Aaiún?" 
“Hay al-Masira,” he says. “Or Khasriatou." 
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Khasriatou? The Spanish name from colonial times for the neighborhood al-Massira? This is not 
something I had heard of before. Gingerly, I reach for something to jot that down, pulling out a 
rectangular, legal notebook. The gesture itself feels strange – typically, I would use a pocket-
sized pad for casual conversation in public space – but since we are far from the lower city, or 
even the center of town (where the visible presence of state functionaries and members of the 
Moroccan state security apparatus overdetermine what can be said), I overcome my hesitation. 
Besides, after this man’s willingness to talk caught me by surprise, I am scrambling to keep up. 
My notebook is out just long enough for me to jot down “Khasriatou” when I observe a 
shift in Salih’s and his acquaintance’s demeanor: it comes over them like a shadow, suddenly 
and in concert, as they lean back in their seats, eyes widening. The man stops talking, moving 
with measured understatement as our collective attention shifts away from his narrative and 
toward the notebook in my hands. There is no sudden start, no reflexive command to “put that 
away,” but the looks on their faces indicate clearly enough that something going on behind me 
altered the space. The bright white of my notepad now feels like it is screaming, so I put it away 
and ask about Salih’s houseguests. The music goes on, but for us, the conversational ease of our 
interaction has dissipated, and the late afternoon ambiance has been interrupted. We agree to 
move somewhere else to do the interview, taking a taxi to my apartment. 
*** 
The Moroccan state makes its presence felt in Laâyoune/El Aaiún in multiple ways. The 
combined presence of the police and auxiliary forces make the politics of control visible 
throughout the city: dark blue police vans, sheathed in protective grating and sometimes pock-
marked from numerous past encounters with rock-throwing protesters, patrol the neighborhoods. 
Auxiliary forces’ bulbous white vans sit parked at sensitive intersections, grouped by the half-
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dozen and ready for rapid deployment. These vans and the riot-helmeted security forces they 
transport mark the most visible elements of a militarized state governing without consent. They 
manifest the overbearing presence of the state in its struggle to establish its sovereignty and quell 
dissent. Their purpose is to repress the visible manifestation of pro-independence protest, and 
therefore their targets are fairly clear. Indeed, from the moment I arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, 
interlocutors told me to avoid certain types of people (human rights activists, known as 
huquqiyyin), neighborhoods (Hay Mu‘atalla), and situations (organized protests).76 In this respect, 
the conflict made certain lines very bright. 
But state surveillance reached far beyond the sites of regular political protest and specific 
hubs of activism. This became clear to me one day as I was walking on a busy commercial street 
in the direction of Avenue Smara, the central artery bisecting the city’s eastward expansion.77 A 
relatively high-profile protest had been planned that day, one coordinated by pro-independence 
Sahrawi groups such as CODESA and ASVDH.78 After stopping at a bookstore, I walked to the 
corner of Avenue Smara. Young women were walking in my direction, some looking back over 
their shoulders toward a band of helmeted officers on the next block. From the confused air and 
lingering crowd, it appeared as though I had reached a protest at mid-dispersal. I did not see any 
batons raised, nor anyone on the ground, but some kind of confrontation had just taken place and, 
in the aftermath, some people milled around, watching, while others were running. I turned off 
                                                
76 For protests, I was told that the police spared no foreigners from their batons when intervening to put down a 
protest. 
77 In a large protest May 4, 2013, the street filled with a thousand or more protestors. Morris, Loveday. “In Western 
Sahara, Women Play Large Role in Forgotten Struggle for Independence.” Washington Post, July 7, 2013. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-western-sahara-women-play-large-role-in-forgotten-struggle-for-
independence/2013/07/07/f46f23ec-dd06-11e2-85de-c03ca84cb4ef_story.html. 
78 CODESA (Collectif des défenseurs Sahraouis des droits de l’homme) and ASVDH (the Sahrawi Association of 
Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations) are two leading Sahrawi human rights organizations operating in 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Morocco refused recognition to them for years, finally granting ASVDH 
recognition in 2015 (reportedly to fulfill a demand by the US Department of State in exchange for not pushing for 
UN oversight of human rights in Western Sahara before the UN Security Council). More on these organizations in 
Chapter 5. 
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onto the first side street I could find, behind a supermarket, and checked my phone. When I 
looked up, two plainclothes men were standing before me. I had not seen them arrive, but one of 
them had his hand extended and was already introducing himself. He had a thick mustache. 
Behind them was parked a late-model, black Citroën minivan. The mustachioed man began 
peppering me with questions in formal Arabic: he said that the police had reported my 
whereabouts, asked how I was doing, demanded to know where I was going, and what, exactly, I 
was doing with my phone. I told them I was going to shop at a supermarket, and that I had a 
missed call. They told me to go inside the supermarket, already, and escorted me to its entrance.  
These are the mukhabarat, members of Morocco’s bevy of intelligence agencies. They 
may accompany police and soldiers to protests, in plainclothes, for the purposes of singling out 
specific, known activists for arrest or beating. For reasons evident from the experience above, I 
rarely witnessed protests first-hand unless they took place directly outside my apartment. 
However, Sahrawi activist media teams such as Equipe Media and others often record protests 
from the rooftop of a building or an apartment window, and their videos frequently show 
plainclothes officers at the frontlines of protest interventions.79 Their presence carries more 
sinister implications since, unlike the police and soldiers who simply use force to repress and 
arrest protesters, the mukhabarat are responsible for interrogating and torturing activists arrested 
for their political activities. As one Sahrawi activist whom I met in the Moroccan capital of 
Rabat told me, anytime he went to certain city government offices to take care of an 
administrative issue for his family, he would recognize the men who had tortured him from a 
previous arrest.80 Thus, the mukhabarat occupy a position within the coercive state apparatus 
that, though ostensibly unmarked, remains only partially concealed.  
                                                
79 See Witness Media Labs for archived footage: https://lab.witness.org/tag/western-sahara/. 
80 Fieldnote November 26, 2014. 
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The sheer size and intensity of the intelligence-gathering state apparatus manifests itself 
in peculiar ways, as well. One day, while chatting with a friend at a neighborhood café, a black 
Citroën minivan pulled out of a side street across from us. The minivan had been parked at a 
neighborhood branch for the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), the ruling party at the 
national level of Moroccan politics since 2011.81 Shortly thereafter, the Citroën minivan returned, 
accompanied by a black Mercedes, and swept by the party offices again where a meeting was 
being held. My friend interrupted our conversation and shook his head, unable to overlook the 
banality and absurdity of what we had just witnessed. In keeping tabs on a local meeting of the 
national ruling party, the intelligence officers, as agents of the state, were spying on the state.82 
*** 
At Agjijimat, sitting with my back to the café, I could not see what Salih and his 
acquaintance had seen. But their looks captured, and reflected, the emergence or manifestation of 
yet another, still more submerged layer of Moroccan state surveillance, one that was constantly 
referenced but rarely defined. Unlike the ever-present police and soldiers, and my encounters 
with the shadowy mukhabarat, I had only experienced this least visible layer of surveillance 
refracted through my interlocutors’ warnings, suggestions, and advice. But when Salih turns to 
the older man and says something about bergag83 (pl. braguig; the word comes from Moroccan 
                                                
81 Despite a constitutional amendment in 2012, the monarchy maintains direct control over certain ministries: 
defense, foreign affairs, and the interior. This part of the Moroccan state is referred to as the makhzen. Other 
consultative groups related to the Sahara report directly to the makhzen, bypassing parliamentary oversight. These 
include the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), and the High Commission for Former 
Resistance Fighters and Members of the Liberation Army.  
82 PJD won a new mandate through national parliamentary elections held Oct 7, 2016. At the regional level, 
however, Laâyoune/El Aaiún has long been a bastion of control for the Istiqlal Party, the center-right political party 
and, as the oldest continuous political party in Morocco, the one most closely associated with nationalism. The most 
powerful local elected official, Hamdi Ould Rachid, comes from a family closely tied to Moroccan rule and is a 
member of the Istiqlal Party. Elections in the Sahara, unsurprisingly, are notoriously corrupt. Many Sahrawi boycott 
them. However, to pride itself on high turnout, people are allegedly paid to vote. A couple of interlocutors told of 
having been paid to work to pay people to “get out the vote” in this manner.   
83 It is sometimes suggested that the figure of the bergag is distinctly Moroccan. Playing on the Algerian motto 
“land of 1.5 million martyrs” referring to the number of Algerians who died in the War of Independence, the 
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Colloquial Arabic, or darija), I realize that a particularly embedded and diffuse, yet 
technologically rudimentary, form of this surveillance emerged before their very eyes in the 
moment when I pulled out my notebook. Neither police nor necessarily mukhabarat, the state 
uses (and, perhaps, pays) braguig to inform on people to the state.  
The bergag could be a neighbor, a teacher, a café server, a Sahrawi, a dakhili84 – they 
could have been any one of the customers drinking tea or coffee in front of the Agjijimat 
building. I constantly received warnings about braguig, and while I could infer from certain 
interactions that specific small shop owners, café servers – or even interlocutors – were likely 
serving as government informants, their embeddedness in the social fabric of the city itself made 
it difficult to confirm their presence with any certainty. For that same reason, they were always 
on the mind. Months earlier, when I was still beginning fieldwork, a friend lingered with me in 
the street not far from my apartment, pointing up and down the block. Warning me about the 
perils of conducting research in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in 
general, he suggested ominously that, on this block, alone, at least 15 people were under the 
employ of the state. These were the braguig whom Salih and his acquaintance saw emerge 
outside the Agjijimat café one late afternoon in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. And in that moment of 
emergence, refracted through their reactions, I felt as though the mutually imbricated relationship 
between “state” and “society” in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, and its diffuse effects in producing 
suspicion, manifested itself most fully. 
*** 
This pervasive sense of suspicion sometimes meant that my interlocutors were speaking to an 
audience that was at once invisible and immediately present. On one occasion, after a 
                                                                                                                                                       
Moroccan equivalent, someone told me, is “land of 6 million bergag.” (Mauritania, meanwhile, is the “land of 1.5 
million poets.”) 
84 Known in the plural as “dakhiliyyin,” or “insiders,” meaning those from “inside” Morocco. 
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conversation in his taxi, a driver invited me to call and meet up at a later date. After several 
weeks passed, we met at a café on Avenue Mekka, which had been known as Avenida Galicia 
before Spanish withdrawal and now sits at the heart of the city’s more upscale commercial 
district. While not as overwhelmingly Moroccan as the military and police neighborhoods in the 
lower city, this part of Laâyoune/El Aaiún attracts a mixed crowd at night with the well-lit streets 
and shiny cafés. In our first encounter in the cab, the driver had proffered the kind of impromptu 
historical narrative – of the Sahara having been colonized not once, but twice (first by Spain, 
then by Morocco), the second time being much worse than the first – that became a hallmark of 
entering alone into a cab with a Sahrawi driver. This time, however, as we entered the public 
space downtown, the taxi driver opened our conversation by asking me about my religion and 
extolling the virtues of Islam. For the next hour and a half, he spoke to me about the sunna and 
Qur’an in an almost unbroken monologue, continuing even after we left the café and reached the 
outer neighborhoods where we both lived. It wasn’t until sometime later that I realized that his 
monopolization of discourse and his choice of topic was related as much to his discomfort with 
the surroundings as to his interest in proselytizing (which was not unusual as far as a topic of 
conversation, but usually was brought up by people whom I had only just met). In this way, the 
Moroccan state’s far-reaching surveillance and the pervasive sense of suspicion that it produced 
created a general, impersonal third party to many conversations, and shaped what people did, and 
did not talk about, in substantial ways. 
Widespread suspicion, and tight surveillance, had broad ramifications for carrying out 
fieldwork in what I have been calling, in borrowing a phrase from Ilana Feldman, a “security 
society.” On one level, I was constantly preoccupied with the ethical concern about exposing 
someone I had met to retaliation by the state. On another level, I was worried that the creeping 
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fear which resulted from regularly hearing about the state surveillance would make me shy away 
from connecting with pro-independence Sahrawi activists. If I too closely followed the advice to 
steer clear of those bright lines demarcating people and places which the Moroccan state 
considered particularly sensitive (human rights activists, Hay Mu‘atalla, organized protest), then 
I risked letting the machinery of the state influence my research.  
But in a context as politicized as Laâyoune/El Aaiún, where different sets of names and 
vocabulary had to be used with different interlocutors, I was concerned with more than just 
access. I realized with time that, through sheer overexposure, I actually risked internalizing one 
propaganda discourse over another: there was no neutral space. Over time, it became surprisingly 
and dangerously easy to conflate the Moroccan view that the “separatists” (“al-infissaliyyin,” or 
pro-independence Sahrawis) posed a “nuisance” (resistance) as if they – and not the state – 
necessitated the constant surveillance, and that therefore the “separatists” – and not the state – 
were the cause of the fear, instability, and suspicion that permeated my experience of 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In this sense, the activity of fieldwork research felt as though it were 
working not only against the interference of the state security apparatus, but against the felt 
weight of sovereignty, that authority which, in Carl Schmitt’s words “turns a part of the earth’s 
surface into the force-field of a particular order.”85 Schmitt’s nomos is a force of both order and 
orientation, naming the enemy and shaping politics not just as a struggle between factions and 
institutions but through, in Jacques Rancière’s terms, “the distribution of the sensible,” through 
which “[p]olitics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the 
                                                
85 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth: In the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: 
Telos Press, 2006), 70. 
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ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of space and the possibilities of 
time.”86 
 This posed a number of methodological challenges, which, as I have outlined in this 
section, were both logistical and, in Rancière’s terms, sensible. On one occasion, for example, a 
friend arranged for us to conduct an interview with a pro-independence activist in what 
amounted to a kind of “safe house” about ten minutes outside the city; another time, I climbed 
into someone’s car thinking that I was going to a standard interview, only to find that we wove in 
and out of side streets as the other passengers looked out the back to see if we were being tailed 
by state intelligence. Aside from the difficulties and anxieties that attended the logistics of 
arranging interviews, the ever-present awareness of surveillance had various effects on what 
could be said. On the one hand, it was not uncommon to encounter someone and be spoken to on 
a quasi-diplomatic register. In these instances, people were reciting political scripts to counteract 
an enemy discourse. This diplomatic register reflects the degree to which the conflict, as a 
struggle over sovereignty, has long been imbricated in the politics of international recognition. 
Indeed, despite its political isolation under Morocco’s media blackout, and its relative obscurity 
beyond regional, North African politics, the pivotal role of the international community in 
resolving the conflict dates back to the 1950s, when the question was first put before the United 
Nations’ Committee on Decolonization.87 
The absent presence of a third party – whether the fear of Moroccan surveillance, or the 
appeal to international attention – shapes what can and cannot be said in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, 
much the way that a shadowy force known as the “Breach” upholds the overlapping 
                                                
86 Jacques Rancière, The politics of aesthetics: the distribution of the sensible (London: Continuum, 2004), 13. 
87 Listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory since 1963, the status of the territory has been the subject of debate at 
the UN since at least October 1957, when a Moroccan delegate opposed the territory’s inclusion on the Committee 
for Decolonization, claiming it as an integral part of Morocco, instead. José Ramón Diego Aguirre, La última guerra 
colonial de España: Ifni-Sáhara (1957-1958) (Málaga: Editorial Algazara, 1993), 23. 
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sovereignties in Miéville’s The City & the City. Together with the contemporary conditions of 
intensive policing and surveillance, everyday life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún is structured by the 
binary field of national conflict, and is shot through with suspicion. This suspicion continues to 
shape the construction of Sahrawi political subjectivity in important ways, with the opposition of 
Moroccan to Sahrawi, and of political loyalty to opportunism. The longstanding struggle over 
sovereignty that has marked decolonization in the Sahara continues to shape both everyday life 
in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, as well constructions of the past. With the polarization of national conflict 
structuring everyday life in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara today, the evocation of different 
historical narratives and memories capture the ways in which this past is structured by the binary 
oppositions of the present. 
 
Section II – Suspicion, Contestation and Historical Memory: El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid and 
Agdim Izik 
 
The longstanding struggle over sovereignty that has marked decolonization in the Sahara 
has shaped both the built environment of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, as well as constructions of the 
past. With the polarization of national conflict structuring everyday life in Moroccan-occupied 
Western Sahara today, the evocation of different historical narratives and memories capture the 
ways in which this past is structured by the binary oppositions of the present. Two examples, in 
particular, illustrate how this pervasive surveillance/suspicion produces competing narratives 
about past events and figures. The first involves El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid. El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid 
occupies a singular place in popular and official narratives as a founder, leader and martyr of 
Sahrawi nationalism. Because of drought and the political instability wrought by the Liberation 
Army of Morocco, Sayid’s father, like many Sahrawis, settled in Tan Tan, in the Wed Nun 
region, in the late-1950s. El-Ouali was among the first generation of Sahrawis schooled in 
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southern Morocco. El-Ouali then matriculated at Mohamed V University in Rabat and became 
involved in leftist student politics in the late-1960s. Affected by the experience of his father’s 
generation, many of whom were disillusioned by their experience with the 1950s Liberation 
Army of Morocco, and by news of the 1970 Intifadat al-Zemla in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, El-Ouali 
was at the center of a growing conversation among Sahrawis living in Rabat who were 
concerned about the political future of Spanish Sahara. El-Ouali is said to have consulted broadly 
with leaders of Moroccan political parties in the 1970s, while also participating in the student 
branch of UMT (L’union marocaine du travail), the labor union affiliated with the socialist 
Moroccan party, USFP. El-Ouali also helped to write a polemical piece in the publication Anfas, 
linked to the radical leftist group, Ila al-Amam, which declared “A New Palestine in the Land of 
the Sahara.”88  
 In May 1972, El-Ouali and a group of fellow Sahrawi students in Rabat organized a street 
protest during the yearly festival, or moussem, in Tan Tan. In what is popularly seen as a 
formative moment in what was to become Polisario, local Moroccan authorities imprisoned the 
students, who, eschewing direct engagement with the Moroccan state, subsequently moved to 
northern Mauritania and began organizing Sahrawis living outside of Spanish Sahara, while also 
establishing international contact with figures such as Mu‘ammar al-Qaddafi. Learning from the 
nascent movement which had been destroyed after Intifadat al-Zemla, the goal was to organize 
working cells across the Sahara into a decentralized national liberation front. The students were 
remarkably successful, putting Spain on the defensive with insurgent attacks on military outposts 
beginning in 1973, and organizing pro-independence rallies in front of UN delegations visiting in 
the spring of 1975 (Chapter 4). When Morocco and Mauritania jointly annexed the territory later 
                                                
88 “Philistine Jadida Fi ’Ard Al-Sahra’/A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara,” Anfas 7–8 (December 1971): 
66–76. Accessed via digital archive of the Bibliothèque Nationale du Royaume du Maroc: 
http://bnm.bnrm.ma:86/pdf.aspx?IDc=475. Discussed in Chapter 4. 
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that year, Polisario shepherded large numbers of Sahrawis fleeing the conflict to take refuge in 
camps near Tindouf, Algeria, and later captured more during their attacks on their new 
adversaries. 
 As a leader of the movement during this critical, formative phase, El-Ouali Mustafa 
Sayid remains a uniquely outsized figure in the history of the region. He remains revered as a 
charismatic leader, a hero and a martyr. Not unlike Che Guevara in Latin American leftist 
movements, the face of El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid has become emblematic of Sahrawi liberation 
and, besides perhaps the flag itself, remains the preeminent symbol of Sahrawi self-
determination. For that very reason, narratives about his life are mediated by the politicized 
situation in the region at present. For many Sahrawis, whether they support Polisario, Sahrawi 
nationalism, or not, El-Ouali represents the irrepressible spirit of freedom which the Moroccan 
state cannot eradicate.89 The story which most reflects this dynamic, and which is almost always 
told when El-Ouali’s name comes up, whether in a formal or informal setting, concerns his 
achievements in higher education. While studying at Mohamed V University in Rabat, the story 
goes, El-Ouali achieved the highest score ever on a math exam, earning the honor of having his 
name engraved on a wall at the university, which has since been erased. This story reveals 
several tensions in the relationship between the Moroccan state and the people of the Sahara. 
Whereas the Moroccan government frequently tries to undermine any autonomous Sahrawi 
identity by pointing out that even the leaders of Sahrawi nationalism were products of the 
Moroccan education system, this story inverts such a narrative to suggest that El-Ouali was, 
instead, disavowed by Morocco even though he proved more than capable of excelling in 
                                                
89 Popular memories of El-Ouali in the course of my fieldwork are reminiscent of Aimé Césaire’s depiction of 
Patrice Lumumba, in A Season in the Congo, wherein Lumumba embodied a similarly impossible spirit of freedom, 
inspiring to all and exploited by all at one and the same time. Aimé Césaire, A Season in the Congo; a Play. (New 
York: Grove Press, 1969). 
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postcolonial society. Besides emphasizing the singular intellectual genius of their nationalist 
leader, the story foregrounds the erasure of Sahrawis, despite their ability to contribute as 
modern citizens on par with other Moroccans. This disrespect references a central point of 
tension between bidani people of the Sahara, and their neighbors, the chleuh, to the north.90 A 
couplet from one of Polisario’s rhymes, which circulated in the 1970s and served to mobilize 
people across the region to rally to their cause, references this sense of being looked down upon 
by the Moroccans: 
We climbed the mountain to the summit 
To expose those who call us sheep herders 
The reference to El-Ouali’s legendary achievement at university similarly emphasizes the 
organic intellectual capacity of the Sahrawis, and their ability to surprise anyone who 
underestimates them. 
 Texts about El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid remain heavily censored; an activist I met in 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún mentioned that authorities confiscated a book about El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid 
from him after finding a copy while he was riding a bus back to Laâyoune/El Aaiún from 
college. For this reason, I eagerly took up a friend’s offer to procure a text about El-Ouali as we 
were driving through Goulmime in the Wed Nun region of southern Morocco. As it turned out, a 
copy of the text, a memoire of sorts by the Libyan political operative Mohamed Said Qashshat 
about his time spent fomenting revolution in Mauritania and Western Sahara in the early 1970s, 
was delivered like sensitive contraband. We pulled over on the highway in Goulmime just long 
enough for my traveling companion’s friend, a former classmate from college, to pull up on his 
motorbike and hand the photocopied text over. The fellow on the motorbike barely lingered long 
enough for a greeting, and we promptly buried the text in the car trunk, beneath the rest of our 
                                                
90 Other ethical markers invoked by Sahrawis to differentiate themselves from ahel al-tell, or people from the north, 
include deception and untrustworthiness. 
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luggage. 
Respect for El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid within the Sahrawi community is unparalleled. 
Perhaps uniquely, he transcends deep tribal divisions that have historically riven the community, 
and which the Moroccan state relentlessly tries to exploit.91 A member of the most populous tribe 
in the region, the Reguibat, El-Ouali led a number of successful military campaigns, first against 
Spain, then against Morocco and Mauritania following Spanish withdrawal in 1975. During this 
time, El-Ouali was also traveling between Libya, Algeria, Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle 
East in an attempt to garner material and diplomatic support for Polisario. Though initially close 
to Mu‘ammar al-Qaddafi, Polisario developed particularly close institutional ties to Algeria, 
which has permitted Polisario’s state-in-exile to operate from refugee camps on its territory. El-
Ouali was the point person in all of Polisario’s diplomatic missions. And yet he insisted on 
leading attacks at the front lines of battle, as well. As Polisario fought a war on two fronts against 
both Morocco and Mauritania during the period between 1976 and 1980, it made the strategic 
decision to focus its attacks on “the weakest link,” Mauritania, which increasingly relied on 
French air force support. Between 1976 and 1979 Polisario carried out direct incursions into 
Mauritanian territory, the most audacious of which involved an attack on the Mauritanian capital 
of Nouakchott. During this raid in July 1977, El-Ouali was killed by air strikes. 
During this same period, however, the leadership of the Polisario movement underwent 
significant turmoil. The composition of the political bureau went through multiple changes, with 
dissenters imprisoned or, occasionally, executed. Facing extremely difficult conditions on the 
military front, Polisario became increasingly reliant on, and tied to, Algerian support and certain 
                                                
91 Aminatou Haidar, a human rights activist who gained an international profile following a hunger strike in 2009, 
comes closest to reaching the same stature as El-Ouali. Xan Rice, “Western Sahara Activist on Hunger Strike at 
Lanzarote Airport,” The Guardian, November 17, 2009, sec. World news, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/17/western-sahara-hunger-strike. 
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changes during this time are attributed to Polisario leadership having “sold” the national cause to 
Algeria. It was during this period of turmoil that El-Ouali was killed during a Land Rover-led 
attempt to strike Nouakchott. Whether due to the recklessness which led to his death, or the 
persistent obscurity surrounding his remains (the Mauritanian government has never identified or 
handed over El-Ouali’s body), a story persists which suggests that El-Ouali was “sacrificed” by 
members of Polisario leadership precisely because he would not submit to Algerian command. 
Like the story about El-Ouali’s academic achievements, the story about his death may be 
apocryphal. Or, put another way, it may as well be apocryphal, since its persistence reflects a 
political position more than anything. On the first count, no matter how much Morocco tries to 
undermine his accomplishments, much less erase them, the spread of Sahrawi national 
consciousness remains a social fact. Whether attributed to the work of a charismatic leader, or to 
a cohort or generation, this achievement, like El-Ouali’s score on a university math exam, cannot 
be erased. Or, as a man in the refugee camps in Algeria put it, “For better or worse, we put this 
train on its tracks.” In this sense, El-Ouali serves as a transcendent figure for the Sahrawi people 
in the face of Moroccan repression. 
The second story, meanwhile, is somewhat more complicated. In this narrative, El Ouali 
remains a transcendent figure of Sahrawi nationalism, but one sacrificed by the state-in-exile that 
purports to represent his legacy. In this sense, the persistence of this story matters most to people 
who dissent from both Morocco and Polisario, and therefore have little institutional purchase 
within the political conflict. This may include Sahrawis in Moroccan-occupied territory, refugees 
in Algeria who are disillusioned with Polisario leadership, Mauritanians of Sahrawi origin, and 
Sahrawis living abroad in Europe. In particular, it includes a certain contingent of ‘a’idin, or 
“returnees,” who joined Polisario only to suffer imprisonment or, in some cases, torture, during 
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the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Many ‘a’idin left after the ceasefire in 1991, but others 
remained in the camps until recently. For them, the story of El-Ouali’s death is a repudiation of 
Polisario leadership that, in continuing to revere El-Ouali, refuses to align itself with Moroccan 
propaganda. Here, the conditions of suspicion and uncertainty that allow for alternative historical 
narratives to persist also provide the space for political dissent. 
*** 
This dynamic also plays out in relation to how much more recent events are remembered. 
In the fall of 2010, a Sahrawi protest encampment in an area outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, 
known as Agdim Izik, grew into the thousands. After months of protest, Moroccan security 
forces laid siege to the tent encampment, estimated to include 6000 tents and upwards of 10,000 
Sahrawis.92 During the siege, carried out the morning of 8 November 2010, eleven members of 
Moroccan security forces, as well as two civilians, were killed. Rather than seeking the 
perpetrators, Morocco targeted activists involved in media teams, and brought them to trial. The 
accused were tried before a military trial (since made unconstitutional), and the group of 25 (now 
known as the Agdim Izik 21, given that one was sentenced in absentia, and three others have 
been released) was given sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment.93 
For many supporters of Sahrawi independence, the Agdim Izik protest represented a 
precious breakthrough in popular efforts to make the Sahrawi nationalist cause and resistance to 
                                                
92 Jacob Mundy, “Western Sahara’s 48 Hours of Rage | Middle East Research and Information Project,” Middle East 
Research and Information Project 257 (Winter 2010), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer257/western-saharas-48-hours-
rage; Human Rights Watch, “Morocco: Tainted Trial of Sahrawi Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, April 1, 2013, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/01/morocco-tainted-trial-sahrawi-civilians. 
93 “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Frank La Rue,” Human Rights Council Seventeenth session (United Nations General Assembly, May 
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Watch, “Morocco: Free or Retry 21 Sahrawis Jailed 5 Years Ago,” Human Rights Watch, November 5, 2015, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/05/morocco-free-or-retry-21-sahrawis-jailed-5-years-ago; Human Rights Watch, 
“Morocco,” April 1, 2013. 
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Moroccan oppression visible before an international audience. The largest protest to take place in 
the occupied territories since the intifada of 2005, Agdim Izik represented a continuation, 
escalation and renewal of popular Sahrawi resistance to Moroccan occupation. Whereas major 
uprisings in 1999 and 2005 had involved protests of various kinds within the city, the Agdim Izik 
protest took form as a tent settlement that expressed dissent by moving outside the city of 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún. As such, it represented a rare instance where popular mobilization actually 
outmaneuvered the Moroccan state, in this case by moving beyond the confines of the city. In 
addition, the move to tents and the physical act of displacement resonated with longstanding 
practices in the Sahara where simply leaving a settlement constituted a fundamental rejection of 
authority.94 Although the violence precipitated by the Moroccan siege led to a measure of 
international coverage, Noam Chomsky’s claim that Agdim Izig marked the real beginning of the 
Arab Spring gave the most sought after kind of recognition to Sahrawi nationalism: a recognized 
place in world history.95 Furthermore, Agdim Izik has continued to attract attention from 
Amnesty International and other groups after Morocco conducted a military trial to convict 
media activists for the deaths of several Moroccan soldiers who were killed during the siege.96 
                                                
94 Pierre Bonte, L’émirat de l’Adrar mauritanien: arîm, compétition et protection dans une société tribale 
saharienne (Paris: Karthala, 2008); Boulay, “Poétique et politique de la migration au Sahara occidental. Les 
«'â’idîn»: repentants, migrants ou ralliés?,” 100. Evoking Mohamed’s emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622, 
displacement in this manner “implies not only change of residence but also the ending of ties of kinship and the 
replacement of these by new relationships.” Bearman, PJ, Th Banquis, CE Bowworth, E van Donzel, and WP 
Heinrichs Bowworth, eds. 2013. “Hidjra.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Glossary and Index of Terms. 
Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. 
95 Samia Errazzouki, “Chomsky on the Western Sahara and the ‘Arab Spring,’” Jadaliyya, October 30, 2012, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8093/chomsky-on-the-western-sahara-and-the-“arab-spring. Errazzouki 
rightly points out that Chomsky’s account obscures a longer history of struggle. Nonetheless, in placing the events 
of Agdim Izig on par with other “world historical” events, Chomsky’s historical narrative provides a historical frame 
of political recognition that has resonated with the Sahrawi nationalist movement. Chomsky’s account regularly 
appears in SADR press releases, as well as journalistic accounts sympathetic to the Sahrawi cause. See, for example, 
“POLISARIO Takes Part in Second Syriza Congress Party.” Sahara Press Service, October 18, 2016. 
http://www.spsrasd.info/news/en/articles/2016/10/18/4822.html.  
96 Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports on the trials: https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-
releases/2016/07/retrial-in-a-civilian-court-for-sahrawis-jailed-over-gdeim-izik-clashes-after-grossly-unfair-
military-trial/ 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/05/morocco-free-or-retry-21-sahrawis-jailed-5-years-ago 
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In this manner, Agdim Izik has taken its place in a chain of events constituting the 
national history of Sahrawi popular struggle, from Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970, to protests in 1999 
and the Intifadat al-Istiqlal launched in 2005. Scenes from Agdim Izik, either featuring crowds 
gathered in the tent city listening to speeches and waving SADR flags, or depicting its violent 
dispersal, are constantly played on SADR television broadcast out of the refugee camps, 
generally with reference to the “epic” [al-melhama] of Agdim Izik. Perhaps surprisingly, then, 
there was also a counternarrative of this event that emphasized its origins as a protest started by 
disillusioned, unemployed college graduates who sought jobs, with no other political aims. This 
take on Agdim Izik suggested that security forces did not immediately close down the 
encampment because of a lingering power struggle between Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s Wali, or 
governor, and the longtime president of the regional council and member of a powerful family, 
Hamdi Ould Rachid. What is more, this counternarrative suggests that Ould Rachid and other 
members of the Sahrawi elite actively provisioned the encampment with water, gas and other 
supplies as it grew. As the encampment developed, one member of the camp’s original 
coordination committee told me that they developed careful rules governing the behavior for 
those living in the camps, which included banning the raising of a SADR flag, knowing that such 
an act would give pretext to the Moroccan state to intervene. In this telling, it was an informant 
for the Moroccan state who first raised a SADR flag, sparking what turned into days, if not 
weeks, of political protest. 
It should come as no surprise that, in a place at the center of an ongoing political dispute, 
there would be competing narratives of the past. But what is striking about the counternarrative 
concerning Agdim Izik is how the epistemological basis of political commitment can be inverted 
by a hermeneutics of suspicion. Any visible political act may be attributable to the work of an 
                                                                                                                                                       
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/01/morocco-tainted-trial-sahrawi-civilians 
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informant, or an agent. Any outward expression of support for a cause may be interpreted as an 
opportunistic act to ingratiate oneself with the machinery and political economy of the conflict. 
Yet, similarly, the version of Agdim Izik protest that garnered international attention, and which 
focuses on the Sahrawi nationalist resistance to Moroccan repression, leaves no room to read 
political action outside of the grammar of conflict. Like so much that takes place in Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, there is an endless, ongoing struggle over the very basis of reality: if pro-Sahrawi graffiti 
appears on walls around the city, someone will claim that it is the work of Moroccan security 
forces looking to create more work for itself. Some of these assertions are less plausible than 
others, and appear more blatantly propagandistic. But with so much surveillance embedded in 
everyday life, and with the pervasive sense of suspicion that arises, the relentless struggle in 
shaping discourse over the unfolding past and present of political conflict, act like a blustery 
wind that creates an ongoing sandstorm. This creates the conditions in which political claims to 
truth are frequently destabilized and, as a result, ongoing efforts to produce and sustain political 
legitimacy are constantly churning and muddying the surface of things. 
*** 
 In this next section, I suggest that Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s political geography and built 
environment reflect the sedimentation of a prolonged struggle over political authority and 
sovereignty, ushered in by the arrival of decolonization as a horizon of political possibility 
beginning in the 1950s. As this history of decolonization has shifted from anticolonial struggle in 
the 1950s, to Spanish withdrawal and Morocco-Polisario armed conflict in the 1970s, to new 
arena of struggle following a ceasefire in the 1990s, the city of Laâyoune/El Aaiún has become 
increasingly pivotal to the political dispute. This next section will examine how a history of 
decolonization marked by three unresolved political projects is sedimented in the political 
geography of the city itself. 
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Sedimented histories: the political geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
Near El Ayun, a shed in ruins caught my attention: 
 “That was a phosphate prospecting company,” an officer told me. 
 “Why is it abandoned?”  
 “I don’t know. Military matter.” 
 “But the soil certainly is quite rich, why isn’t it being exploited?” 
 “Military matter.”97 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún is, and has long been, a heavily militarized place. The largest city in 
the disputed territory of Western Sahara, the city has been at the heart of efforts to decolonize the 
region dating back to the 1950s. In 1957, when the anticolonial Liberation Army of Morocco led 
an uprising throughout Spanish Sahara,98 the Spanish colonial administration kept Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún on lockdown, even as it temporarily retreated from the rest of the region.99 In 1970, 
Spanish soldiers shot and killed between two and twelve Sahrawi protesters on a small rise 
known as al-zemla,100 an event widely seen as marking – and, in its violence, amplifying – the 
public emergence of Sahrawi nationalism.101 But the events of 1975 and 76 – Spanish 
withdrawal, Sahrawi flight, and Moroccan annexation – are widely considered decisive in 
shaping the history of conflict that has followed. Since that time, the broad outlines of the 
conflict have remained largely in place: Morocco has effectively occupied the region since the 
Green March and military invasion in 1975; a Sahrawi independence movement, represented 
internationally by Polisario, has been based out of refugee camps in Algeria since 1976; and 
many (but not all) Sahrawis living in Moroccan-occupied territory support Polisario, Sahrawi 
                                                
97 Jean Ferré, Au désert interdit (Lausanne: L’Age d’homme, 2000 [1954]), 118. 
98 This will be the subject of Chapter 3. 
99 One man who was a child living in Laâyoune/El Aaiún at the time, recalls sleeping under a barrel cut in half as a 
protective measure for the clashes taking place outside the city. [Interview, Jan 24, 2016, Rabouni, Sahrawi refugee 
camps.] 
100 This word comes from Hassaniya, the colloquial form of Arabic spoken and written (in poetry, in particular) in 
the Arabic-speaking Sahara. 
101 Hodges, Western Sahara, 155; Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 103. 
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nationalism, or both. While the conflict between Morocco and Polisario has continued without 
resolution for decades and remains ongoing, the locus of struggle has shifted several times: from 
1975 until a UN-brokered ceasefire that took effect in 1991, the two parties were engaged in 
armed struggle; from the ceasefire until 2005, the conflict was displaced onto UN-mediated 
efforts to hold a referendum or, barring that, reach a peace settlement. And, since efforts to reach 
a settlement or hold a referendum have been stalled, if not abandoned, the conflict has shifted 
again, this time onto the moral-political terrain of human rights.102 Each shift in the terrain of 
struggle has transformed Laâyoune/El Aaiún while magnifying its importance within the broader 
landscape of conflict. At the same time, the city’s history is marked by the repeated use of 
incentives and coercion to populate the city, and a mutually imbricated relationship between a 
militarized “state” and a “society” of surveillance, which produces widespread suspicion. 
 
Unfinished Political Project 1: Spanish colonialism, Moroccan contestation, 1956 to 1975 
This shifting terrain of struggle, from Spanish colonialism, to Moroccan military 
intervention, to the past two decades of sustained conflict within the framework of a ceasefire, 
are etched in the three-part political geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. The city first took form as 
a city after World War II, under Spanish colonial rule. Following the discovery of phosphate 
deposits in 1947,103 Spain began building housing both for colonial workers, coming mostly 
                                                
102 Another constant terrain of struggle throughout the conflict has been diplomacy. Carl Schmitt’s observation 
seems apt in this regard: “A British diplomat correctly stated…that the politician is better schooled for the battle 
than the soldier, because the politician fights his whole life whereas the soldier does so in exceptional circumstances 
only.” Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 34.  
103 Phosphate rock, containing high concentrations of the essential agricultural element of phosphorus, is used in 
fertilizer. The Bucraa phosphate deposit, located 67 miles southeast of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, was first reported by the 
Spanish geologist Manuel Alía Medina in 1947. Spain began investments in mining infrastructure in the 1960s, 
exporting the first rock in 1972. For histories of mineral exploitation in the region, see John Mercer, Spanish Sahara 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1976); Hodges, Western Sahara; Toby Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara What 
Future for Africa’s Last Colony? (London; New York: Zed Books Palgrave, 2004); Toby Shelley, “Natural 
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from the nearby Canary Islands, as well as Sahrawi veterans who had fought with General 
Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War.104 What is now known as Spanish Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, or the lower city, consisted primarily of military bases, governmental institutions, a 
church and a cinema on one bank of the seasonal river, and a military post on the other. 
Spaniards lived to the east of the church, and Sahrawis to the west, near a cemetery in a 
neighborhood that became known as Barrio Cementario. The city in aggregate was little more 
than a Spanish military garrison situated on the riverbanks of the Seguiet al-Hamra’. But the 
formation of two markets in Spanish Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Souq Djaj and Souq Lmkhakh, 
indicated that the emerging city was developing a foothold in regional commerce, and therefore 
maintaining a tenuous presence in the lives of people otherwise inclined to avoid the city outside 
of occasional trade, or as temporary refuge from conditions of scarcity in the desert. The name of 
one of the 1950s-era markets is emblematic of this relationship: because the columns supporting 
the market building reminded people of a camel’s leg bones, which contain juicy marrow [l-
mukh, pl., l-mkhakh], this market became known as Souq Lmkhakh.105 To the Sahrawis in the 
1950s, the city existed, like the few, other settlements they frequented, 106 as a marketplace, and 
the name Lmkhakh played ironically with the particularly unfamiliar form of this new concrete 
market, and modern colonial city, rendering this new architectural form and built environment 
                                                                                                                                                       
Resources and the Western Sahara,” in The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural Resources in 
Decolonization (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006).  
104 Between 1934 and 1950, Spanish Sahara was separated administratively from the Canary Islands, and placed 
under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco, based out of the city of Tetouan in northern 
Morocco. During this time, General Franco commandeered colonial subjects in Morocco and the Sahara to fight in 
the Spanish Civil War. M. R. de Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco--: la intervención de tropas coloniales en 
la Guerra Civil Española (Barcelona: Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002). 
105 [Interview, Jan 24, 2016, Rabouni, Sahrawi refugee camps.] 
106 The traditional markets of the region all lay outside of the political boundaries of Spanish (later Western) Sahara. 
Goulmime, the northern hub of trans-Saharan trade, is in southern Morocco. Atar, an oasis with a famous date 
market, is in northern Mauritania. Tindouf, an old trading center rebuilt under French colonialism (and the subject of 
dispute between Morocco and Algeria dating back to the Sand War in 1963) is in southwest Algeria. Before the 50s, 
Spain built upon existing coastal enclaves, Dakhla and Tarfaya, as well as the pre-colonial inland outpost, Smara. In 
this respect, Laâyoune/El Aaiún was the first truly colonial city in the geopolitical territory of Western Sahara. 
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both more and less familiar. 
Though a key moment in this region’s decolonization, events of the 1950s occupy an 
ambivalent place in both Moroccan and Sahrawi national historical memories. A 15-foot high 
monument that stands in the heart of current-day Laâyoune/El Aaiún exemplifies this 
ambivalence. The monument’s inscription memorializes the Battle of Dcheira, perhaps the 
greatest victory in the fleeting existence of the Moroccan Liberation Army, a late-1950s 
Moroccan-Sahrawi effort to destabilize Spanish and French colonial rule in the Sahara. Rather 
than holding a prominent place in the center of an open square, however, the monument sits 
within a fenced-in, open-air café-restaurant complex. Surrounded by café chairs, a flat-screen 
television, and a miniature fake water wheel, the stele is too austere to blend in with the diverting, 
family-friendly décor, and too short to distinguish itself from the prosaic surroundings. As a 
result, it sits markedly out of place and noticeably diminished by its surroundings. This is not by 
accident: after the monument was built in 1981, the open space at one of the busiest round points 
in Laâyoune/El Aaiún was leased indefinitely for a nominal price to the Ould Rachid family, one 
of the most prominent Sahrawi families to have benefited from its collaboration with Moroccan 
rule, who developed the plaza into the café/restaurant/amusement space that it is today.107 
The purposeful marginalization of this monument is fitting, however, given the 
ambiguous place that this battle, and the brief anticolonial insurgency of which it was a part, 
occupies in both Moroccan and Sahrawi national history. Post-World War II decolonization 
began to shape the horizon of political futures in the Sahara as elsewhere, but as will be 
                                                
107 There is also a small aviary, with peacocks and other birds on display, at one end. Recently, reports have emerged 
that there are plans to build the first McDonald’s in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. This holds particular significance because 
of the marked absence of any visible signs of global capital in the city, and because of the symbolic legitimacy that 
any high-profile corporation would confer on Morocco’s occupation. While large-scale fishing and phosphate 
mining involving foreign distribution takes at the port some 15 miles the west, the only signs of foreign capital in 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún during my fieldwork was a French cosmetic chain, Yves Rocher (that might have been a knock-
off, who knows). 
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discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, the region’s status as a colonial hinterland meant that 
well into the 1950s and even 1960s, neither colonial nor national formations defined Sahrawis 
relations to political authority.108 It was in this context that an armed contingent from newly-
independent Morocco sought to mobilize Sahrawis to overthrow Spanish colonialism. The 
movement may have reached its most successful moment in 1957 at the Battle of Dcheira when 
Sahrawi and Moroccan armed groups inflicted significant casualties on Spanish soldiers and 
caused Spain to withdraw from the entire territory, save for a few coastal enclaves. Soon after, 
however, France and Spain routed the forces through a coordinated counterinsurgency involving 
both ground forces and airstrikes.  
At the same time, the Liberation Army was undermined by disputes both within the 
leadership, which was largely Moroccan, and between Moroccans and Sahrawis. Some of this 
may have even been orchestrated by the Moroccan state itself.109 Today, however, the Moroccan 
state promotes the history of the Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) – with certain omissions – 
through ceremonies, conferences, and publications under the auspices of its High Commission on 
the Liberation Army and Former Members of the Resistance. And yet, the underlying discomfort 
with this historical recognition is two-fold: for Sahrawi nationalists, the MLA serves as both an 
uncomfortable reminder of the Moroccan Sultan’s capacity to mobilize Sahrawis through his 
religious and political authority, as well as a precursor to Morocco’s later, successful annexation 
of the territory in the 1970s. For Moroccans, meanwhile, the MLA’s tribulations point to the 
Moroccan state’s inability to maintain Sahrawi acceptance of Moroccan authority, represented by 
                                                
108 For example, the term “Sahrawi” did not become a political identity until the late 1960s and early 1970s. Zunes 
and Mundy suggest “the mid-twentieth century.” Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 93. 
109 In particular, Hassan II, then Prince, commander of the newly formed Royal Army, and inheritor to Mohammed 
V’s throne. This is one of the arguments made in Mohamed Bensaïd Ait Iddr, Safahat Min Melhamat Jaysh Al-
Tahrir Bi Janub Al-Maghrib (Casablanca: Matba’a Taysir, 2001); Mohamed Ben Saïd Ait Iddr, Watha’iq Jaysh Al-
Tahrir Fi Janub Al-Maghrib (Casablanca: Markaz Mohamed Ben Saïd Ait Iddr, 2011). (Discussed in Chapter 3.) 
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the number of Sahrawi resistance fighters who defected from the Army to join (or, as was often 
the case, rejoin) French or Spanish colonial armies. Reasons for the MLA’s disintegration are 
contested and will be discussed in Chapter 3, but the diminished stature of the monument to the 
Battle of Dcheira speaks to the ambiguous place of 1950s decolonization in the historical 
memory of the region, and how this contested history remains sedimented in the contemporary 
political geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún.  
After defeating the MLA in 1958, which required a joint counterinsurgency effort with 
France, Spain redoubled its investment in what it newly considered a colony of some 
consequence, thanks to the discovery of phosphates. Throughout the 1960s, Spain policed the 
border with Morocco tightly, and warned its Saharan subjects against Moroccan designs to 
exploit the region’s mineral wealth.110 As older residents recall, the city gradually climbed the 
southern bank of the river, as more housing was built for Spanish colonists and as Spain 
encouraged Sahrawis in the badiya to resettle in the city: 
BM: There are those (who came to Laâyoune/El Aaiún) because of drought 
conditions, and there are those (who settled) because of the conditions of – 
[because] the Spanish administration/government would bring people from the 
badiya to populate the city. And they would…give them flour and oil and sugar 
from month to month, gratuitement, for free.  
 
Me: Is that what happened to your family - did the Spanish policy attract them to 
settle in Laâyoune? 
 
BM: Yes, on account of the help that the state was providing, people who were 
living in the badiya, when the drought conditions would come, or (when) the 
livestock didn’t produce enough food, or something like that, they’d bring them to 
the city so that they’d get the help. That help attracted people to come live in the 
city. 
                                                
110 “It is certain that, with the scent of these riches, the jackals are beginning to prowl around your khaimas,[tents]” 
Lieutenant-General Camillo Menéndez Tolosa, the Spanish army minister, warned the Sahrawis during a visit to El-
Ayoun on May 16, 1967. “But now more than ever,” he promised, “you will have us by your side, to the end and to 
the last sacrifice, to guarantee your will, without foreign pressure or interference, to protect you against the 
maneuvers and false fraternity in whose name it is intended to bring you into a household to which you have never 
belonged and in which, if they achieved their goal (something they will never do), you would be considered a poor 
relative to be exploited like a domestic.” Quoted in Hodges, Western Sahara, 152. 
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 They lived in tin-roof huts, then later the state demolished those - they 
demolished the metal/tin (huts) - and gave them a place to live. 
 
Me: Like qubibat-111 
 
BM: Like the qubibat, like Colomina, up above, like Hay al-Matar, like the other 
Colomina neighborhood, and like Hay Lahouhum. All of those rose up from the 
city, from here. They were in tents, and tin huts, then they demolished the huts, 
and replaced them with, or gave them houses. They gave them places to live. That 
was how the old El Aaiún was. 
 
With the operationalization of the phosphate mine, the “old El Aaiún” was transformed by an 
influx of Spanish workers and Sahrawi city-dwellers, and what had been a simple military post 
developed by 1974 into “a real town, with a population of over 40,000, one-third Spanish.”112 As 
more worker housing was built, the city climbed above the south riverbank of Saguiet al-Hamra 
onto the flat expanse above, taking form in the neighborhoods of Colomina Vieja, Colominat al-
Hamra’, Hay al-Matar, Hay Lahouhum, and what would later become known as Colomina Tirdis. 
At this time, however, the city remained for most Sahrawis a temporary resting point. The focal 
point for most homes remained the exterior, walled-in area, where sheep and goats were kept. 
Souq Lmkhakh and the emergence of Laâyoune/El Aaiún through the process described 
by BM is characteristic of a regional phenomenon during the 1950s and 60s during which time 
both colonial governments and newly decolonized states sought to settle the people of the Sahara, 
and fix their political subjectivity. As French concerns developed iron mining in northern 
Mauritania in the 1950s, Sahrawis were drawn to Zouérate, F’dérik and Nouadhibou to work on 
building the railroad and other infrastructural projects.113 Newly independent Morocco sought to 
settle Sahrawis in Goulmime, Tan Tan, Zaaq and Tarfaya, across its southernmost region, known 
                                                
111 A group of small, concrete hemispheric homes that were designed to prevent sand accumulation. These and other 
buildings that had domed roofs were characteristic of early Spanish architecture in the Sahara. The name “qubibat” 
is a dimunitive from the Arabic word for dome [al-qubba]. 
112 Hodges, Western Sahara, 130. 
113 Pierre Bonte, La montagne de fer: la SNIM, Mauritanie: une entreprise minière saharienne à l’heure de la 
mondialisation (Paris: Karthala, 2001); Jean Audibert, MIFERMA: une aventure humaine et industrielle en 
Mauritanie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1991). 
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as Wed Nun. Meanwhile, French Algeria promoted the old trans-regional market of Tindouf for 
settlement, a policy that independent Algeria continued through the 1960s.114 
 
Unfinished Political Project 2: Moroccan occupation, Sahrawi armed national liberation 
struggle, 1975-1991 
And then, suddenly, the transition from Spanish colonialism to Moroccan occupation 
transformed the city’s population and built environment again. The abrupt nature of Spain’s 
withdrawal is memorialized both by stories such as that which was recounted to me in Batimat 
one evening, and in the nomenclature of some of the city’s older neighborhoods. One of the 
oldest residential neighborhoods, down by the riverbed near Souq Djaj and Souq Lmkhakh, 
remains known as Catalonia. One of the first neighborhoods to be built up on the riverbank, in 
the 1960s, took its name from the Spanish company responsible for the new housing, Colomina. 
After 1975, this neighborhood became known as Colominat Tirdis. The command tirdis, which 
means “kick” in Hassaniya Arabic, recalls the collective effort among Sahrawis to “kick down” 
the doors of houses abandoned by Spanish colonists. Similarly, another neighborhood remains 
known as Diridik (“put your hands [here]”), referring to the way Sahrawis pushed their way into 
houses abandoned by Spanish colonists. Less marked, but nonetheless remembered in private by 
Sahrawis both in the refugee camps and in Moroccan-occupied territory today, are the properties 
abandoned by fleeing Sahrawis that have subsequently been expropriated by Moroccan settlers. 
The demographics of the neighborhoods in the lower city today are overwhelmingly 
Moroccan, in part because of the density of government offices, military barracks, and security 
facilities such as the notorious jails Habs Lkhal (“the black prison”) and PCCM. As Spanish 
                                                
114 “…en 1962, les autorités algériennes essayèrent de fixer quelque 15000 nomades Rguibat dans la région de 
Tindouf.” Elsa Assidon, Sahara occidental, un enjeu pour le Nord-Ouest africain (Paris: F. Maspero, 1978), 39. 
Regarding the effects of the Algerian Revolution on this part of the Sahara, based on responses I received in 
recording oral histories during fieldwork, Sahrawis had little interaction with the FLN, and were largely cut off from 
the Algerian Revolution. If there are recorded histories that argue otherwise, I have not yet encountered them. 
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Laâyoune/El Aaiún was transformed into a nexus for the Moroccan military state, the 
commercial and demographic center of the city moved up onto the expansive plateau running 
above the Saguiet al-Hamras south bank. Even as the war between Morocco and Polisario 
confined residents to the city limits and sometimes threatened supply lines to Morocco’s interior, 
the Moroccan state sought to place its imprint on the city’s built environment. One of its first 
moves was to construct a kind of Palais de Ville facing onto a vast open, paved, oval plaza at the 
western end of the city. In doing so, the Moroccan state razed most of Colominat al-Hamra’, a 
neighborhood built during Spanish rule. The residents from this neighborhood were moved into a 
new housing development on the other side of town, at what was then the eastern edge of the 
city. The site of this new neighborhood, which took its name from the project developer, 
Mu‘atalla, happened to be near the site of the Spanish colonial government’s 1970 massacre of 
Sahrawi protestors, memorialized as Intifadat al-Zemla among Sahrawis as the moment when 
Sahrawi national consciousness was forged. 
The combination of a community of Sahrawis displaced by a new occupier, and the new 
neighborhood’s politically resonant location, has made Mu‘atalla an enduring center of Sahrawi 
nationalism and resistance to Moroccan occupation. Today, the political temperature of the city 
on any given day can be measured by the number of Auxiliary Forces vans [Quwwat al-
Musa‘da] lining the street at al-zemla, now an intersection across from Mu‘atalla: the greater the 
number, the more likely that a demonstration has been planned. When I first arrived in 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún to do research, I was repeatedly warned to avoid this neighborhood if I 
wanted to remain in the Moroccan state’s good graces. This neighborhood’s committed 
resistance to Moroccan rule has posed such a challenge that subsequent development efforts have 
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focused on creating neighborhoods with a mixed composition of Sahrawis and Moroccans.115  
 
Source: Agence urbaine de Laâyoune. 
Unfinished Political Project 3: Morocco-Polisario conflict after the ceasefire: 1991 to today 
Despite the radical changes of 1975, Moroccan Laâyoune/El Aaiún did not fully take 
shape until after the ceasefire of 1991. On the heels of the ceasefire, it was believed that a 
                                                
115 Fieldnote April 30, 2014 
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referendum on self-determination would be held in a matter of months. As Morocco and 
Polisario staked out conflicting positions over the criteria for establishing a voter list for the 
referendum, defining the determining self in self-determination became the new terrain of 
political struggle, and the referendum preparation process dragged on.116 Taking advantage of 
these delays, Morocco encouraged settlement and invested heavily in urban development across 
the region. Cities throughout Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, including Laâyoune/El Aaiún, 
Boujdour, Dakhla and Smara, practically doubled in size as contingents of poor residents from 
the outskirts of Marrakesh, Rabat and other Moroccan cities were brought to the region, given 
housing and, in some cases, trained to adopt a Saharan background in a Moroccan state-led effort 
to enroll them in the voter lists for the referendum.117 Other settlers came by less formal means, 
looking to capitalize on the demographic growth in the region through small-time commercial 
establishments. This gave rise to the third phase of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s development, as the city 
rapidly expanded south and east. 
As the demographic weight and geographical center of the city shifted, new markets, now 
furnished with produce and second-hand goods trucked south from Morocco’s southern 
distribution hub of Agadir-Inezgane, replaced the old Souq Lmkhakh as the city’s commercial 
center. New neighborhoods settled largely by Moroccans who arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
                                                
116 The effort to hold a referendum, an elaborate and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to define a list of voters for a 
referendum on self-determination, has been described in detail by practitioners closely involved with the process. 
Multiple factors stymied this effort. Because the geographical distribution of Sahrawis was much broader than 
Western Sahara – and because “Sahrawi” as an identity was itself a recent political development – establishing a 
voter list became both a political and anthropological problem. Contesting the voter roll became the new terrain of 
political struggle after the ceasefire, as Morocco and Polisario staked out conflicting positions. The UN 
peacekeeping mission established to carry out this process, MINURSO, established an Identification Commission 
and an increasingly elaborate set of criteria for determining eligible voters. The Identification Commission could not 
complete its work (a flood of applicants by Morocco, in particular, hampered these efforts) as efforts to organize the 
referendum dragged on for years. No significant progress has been made since results of the identification process 
were published in 2000. Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate? (Boulder, CO [etc.]: Rienner, 
2012); Jarat Chopra, United Nations Determination of the Western Saharan Self (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs, 1994).  
117 One scholar has dubbed this phenomenon the “Second Green March” (Mundy 2012) but I did not hear anyone 
use this phrase while conducting fieldwork. 
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during the 1990s seeking economic opportunity grew quickly and chaotically, outpacing urban 
infrastructure despite the Moroccan state’s heavy investment in the region. The names of shops 
lining Tan Tan Avenue, the main avenue in a popular quarter developed during this period, 
reflect the range of locations from “inside” Morocco from which small merchants have 
relocated: Casablanca Butcher, El Jadida Furniture/Upholstery, Agadir Barbershop, Tata 
Provisions, Café Ouezzane. The sustained influx of dakhilis, (or “insiders,” meaning those 
coming from “inside” Morocco) – arriving first as part of the relocation of prospective 
referendum voters in the 1990s, and then continuing throughout the 2000s as the region attracted 
laborers and merchants – reshaped the region’s population. This gave rise to demographically 
mixed, densely settled neighborhoods of three and sometimes four-story houses and apartment 
buildings. The development of a large block of land known as Laâyoune/El Aaiún Thulathi is 
representative of the city’s helter-skelter growth during this time. Because of its size, lack of 
electricity and reputation for high rates of crime, Laâyoune/El Aaiún Thulathi became popularly 
known as “Texas.” One of the first, mixed neighborhoods of Sahrawis and dakhilis, Texas 
epitomized the frontier-like qualities of the Sahara during this time: a representation of space as 
unbounded opportunity in the minds of immigrating Moroccans, while also capturing the city as 
a representational space of chaos and disorder for many Sahrawis.118 The name remains spray-
painted on walls throughout the popular neighborhood today. At the same time, on the other side 
of town, the emergence of a new Sahrawi elite that cooperated with and benefitted from 
Moroccan rule became apparent in the built form of an architecturally distinct neighborhood 
known as Hay Villat (from “villas”). 
With the dramatic demographic changes and the sustained conflict, significant tensions 
developed between dakhilis and Sahrawis. Not infrequently, the state has mobilized Moroccan 
                                                
118 Henri Lefebvre, The production of space (Oxford, OX, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1991), 33. 
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settlers to attack Sahrawi homes or businesses. Some of the largest attacks have taken place in 
retribution for large Sahrawi protests, including those that took place in 1999 in Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, and again in 2010 after the violent breakup of the Agdim Izik protest encampment, 
described earlier in this chapter.119 On a more regular basis, if confrontations take place with the 
police in a specific neighborhood, a select group of plainclothes thugs – perhaps civilian 
“dakhilis,” or perhaps simply plainclothes policemen – are sometimes brought through late at 
night to indiscriminately destroy property in order to turn small shop owners (whether Moroccan 
or Sahrawi) against the protesters. This happened at least once on Tan Tan Avenue, where I 
lived, which was frequently the site of rock-throwing confrontations between young men and 
police and soldiers. 
Meanwhile, another process was taking place in the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire, 
with far-reaching repercussions for the city’s political geography and its emergence as the locus 
for political struggle over the future of Western Sahara. Unlike in other cities across Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara, large numbers of those whom the state relocated to Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún in the 1990s120 came from the nearby region of Wed Nun in southern Morocco. Unlike 
dakhilis, these new arrivals were predominantly from Saharan tribes, including the Rguibat and 
the tribes comprising the Tekna confederation. Many had settled in Wed Nun only in the 1950s, 
and had relatives throughout the region including Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Polisario-
run refugee camps in Algeria, and northern Mauritania. Benefiting from free basic goods such as 
flour, sugar and oil, and with the promise of future free housing (which was ultimately provided 
                                                
119 Other times, the police simply do this work themselves. To take one relatively recent example, from 2013, that 
made it into international press reports: “Sidi Mohammed Salem Saadoun, the executive director of the [Moroccan 
Association of Human Right]’s local branch, said that after a demonstration in October, police broke into some 70 
homes of people in retaliation. He noted that this didn’t happen after the most recent protests Dec. 10, calling it a 
step in the right direction.” Paul Schemm, “Tensions High in Western Sahara despite New Plan,” Yahoo! News, 
January 1, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/tensions-high-western-sahara-despite-plan-110230170.html. 
120 In contrast to laborers and petit commerçants enticed by economic opportunity, who came from all over Morocco. 
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during the 2000’s) these families coming from Wed Nun were placed in a vast tent city known as 
the Tents of Unity (Khaymat al-Wahda),121 which, stretching east on the road to Smara, 
effectively doubled the city’s footprint. A UN peacekeeping official touring Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
in the early 1990s saw a sea of tents marked with symbols of the Moroccan royal family, and 
noted that “this is not a spontaneous mass movement of people but appears an orchestrated 
effort.”122 Or, as one woman who had been resettled in this manner matter-of-factly described it 
one day from her home in Batimat, “The King brought us here and put us in tents” [jabna al-
malik wa khayyimna hun]. Exact figures are hard to come by since Morocco’s census figures 
incorporate Laâyoune/El Aaiún and the surrounding area into administrative units that overlap 
with Morocco proper but, by 2004,123 it is estimated that 75-80% of the population in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara had come from outside the territory.124  
The Khaymat al-Wahda contingent coming from neighboring Wed Nun have had a 
particularly complicated effect on Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s political geography. Despite having been 
resettled to the disputed territory with the expectation that they would vote for Morocco in the 
proposed referendum, their various social ties to longtime and former residents of the Western 
Sahara territory, including refugees in the camps, left their allegiance to the Moroccan cause very 
much in the balance.125 For this same reason, however, the characterization of Western Sahara as 
                                                
121 Also known as Khaymat ak-Kebsh, literally the Tents of the Ram, because every family received a free ram for 
slaughter from the state on Eid al-Adha (the holiday celebrating Abaraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son). 
122 Chopra, United Nations Determination of the Western Saharan Self, 33. 
123 According to the 2014 Moroccan census, the population of Laâyoune/El Aaiún is 238,096. Le Bulletin Officiel 
du Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc. N° 6354, 23 April 2015. 
http://www.sgg.gov.ma/arabe/Legislations/BulletinsOfficiels.aspx. This figure may underestimate the actual 
population as there was a campaign among Sahrawis to boycott the census. 
124 Jacob Mundy, “Moroccan Settlers in Western Sahara: Colonists or Fifth Column?,” The Arab World Geographer 
15, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 110. 
125 Mundy, “Moroccan Settlers in Western Sahara.” 
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a “settler-colony” is more complicated than it might initially seem.126 Because the political 
allegiance of so-called “settlers” coming from Oued Noun could be somewhat fluid, their 
political affiliations and sense of identification became the object of intense politicization 
campaigns on the part of both Morocco and pro-Polisario groups operating in the territory during 
the 1990s. Their arrival to Laâyoune/El Aaiún in the 1990s, and the promises of future housing 
made as part of the bargain to bring them there, also effectively transformed the scale of the city 
and its built environment. In the 2014 government-planning map below, the lower-right portion 
of the shaded, square-shaped area (pink and orange in the color image) encompasses the areas of 
the city developed since 1991. The promise to house the people of Khaymat al-Wahda after their 
arrival in 1992 was the major catalyst for these developments. 
The repetition of this phenomenon – of territorial mobility and confinement, of subjective 
fluidity and fixity, and of the (first Spanish, then Moroccan) state’s preoccupation with and 
indifference toward its subjects in this regard – is a defining characteristic of the social and 
historical process of the decolonization of the Sahara. As this process became structured by the 
conflict between Morocco and Polisario after 1975, the mobilization of people took on another 
dimension: in a region characterized by its low population density, the attraction of people itself 
to one national cause or another became an expression of political power related to mobility and 
                                                
126 The “settler colonial” label has recently been applied to Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara in the following: 
Erica Vásquez, “The Roots of Conflict: From Settler-Colonialism to Military Occupation in the Western Sahara 
(Part 1),” Jadaliyya, January 9, 2015, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20519/the-roots-of-conflict_from-
settler-colonialism-to-; Erica Vásquez, “The Roots of Conflict: From Settler-Colonialism to Military Occupation in 
the Western Sahara (Part 2),” Jadaliyya, January 12, 2015, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20544/the-roots-
of-conflict_from-settler-colonialism-to-. The effects of a state-orchestrated demographic influx of Moroccans (and 
Mauritanians) into Western Sahara are unmistakable. However, in addition to the context-specific complicating 
factors given above, distinguishing between “settler” and “native,” or “indigenous,” land rights in a postcolonial 
African context more generally can be problematic. Amazigh, or Berber, cultural and political identity, for example, 
is predicated on a sense of indigeneity. This identity rejects Sahrawi claims to indigeneity on the basis that Amazigh 
predated Arabs, who were arriving as late as the 13th century, across North Africa and the Sahara. For an analysis of 
the devastating ramifications of politicizing the identities of “settler” and “native” in another, postcolonial African 
context, see Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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mobilization. This was perhaps most successfully demonstrated by Polisario in the 1970s, when 
a transportation network of Land Rovers shuttled people from across the region – Saguiet al-
Hamra, Wedi Dhahhab, as well as Nouadhibou, Zouerate and F’derik across northern Mauritania, 
and Tan Tan in southern Morocco – to live in the refugee camps. This operation succeeded 
because of Polisario’s organizational ability to navigate the desert landscape, as well as its 
popularity in mobilizing large numbers of people from around the region to join its cause. It 
should be noted that Polisario was known for conducting raids and kidnapping people to bring 
them to the camps during this time, as well.  
Distinguishing these actions in terms of voluntary will, consent, or political commitment 
cannot account for the ambiguities of political affiliation for a population that, even in the 1970s, 
frequently sought to avoid affiliation with specific political authorities of any kind.127 I met one 
man, for example, who described spending most of his life in the refugee camps after Polisario 
captured him and his family during a raid of Tan Tan, when he was quite young. Raised in the 
refugee camps in Algeria, he had only recently left the camps and resettled in Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
because of a chronic medical condition. His entire family, including over ten children, remained 
in the camps, as did his allegiance: multiple times during the brief period I spent in his company, 
this man announced that, despite his diminished health, he remained ready “to die for my 
[Sahrawi] nation.”128 By contrast, another man who grew up in the southern Moroccan Wed Nun 
region reported leaving his family as a teenager in the 1970s to find work in Nouakchott, the 
capital of Mauritania. While working in Nouakchott as a mechanic, Polisario supporters 
                                                
127 An anecdote that underscores this relative indifference toward politics concerns a humorous misunderstanding of 
Polisario’s name, Harakat al-Sh‘abiya li Tahrir Saguiet al-Hamra wa Wedi Dhahhab, or The Popular Momvement 
to Liberate Saguiet al-Hamra and Wedi Dhahhab, when it was first becoming known following successful attacks on 
Spanish outposts in 1973. I was told that some women mistook the name Harakat al-sh‘abiya…, or “The Popular 
Movement…” to be Harakat al-sh‘ariya… or Harakat al-sh‘iriya… “sh‘ariya” roughly translates as “Movement of 
the Hair” in reference to the long hair that was popular among young men, who were the movement’s leaders. 
“Sh‘iriya” refers to spaghetti. 
128 Fieldnote May 2, 2014. 
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kidnapped him and took him to the camps. Sought-after for his mechanic skills, this man claims 
that he was eventually imprisoned for refusing orders after witnessing the point-blank execution 
of dissenters in the refugee camps. Spending several years imprisoned and then a number more 
under surveillance, this man left the camps and came to Morocco among the first wave of 
“returnees” (‘a’idin) following the ceasefire in 1991.  
Both men now live in the newer, eastern neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
surrounding Agjijimat – places like Douirat, Hay al-‘Awda, Hay al-Wifaq, Hay 23 Mars and Hay 
al-Raha – which developed as Morocco distributed houses and plots of land to new arrivals 
throughout the 2000s. The first of these developments sprang up to house those living in the tents 
of Khaymat al-Wahda who had moved from Wed Nun in the 1990s. A second wave of growth 
came about in 2007, when Morocco, seeking to push a plan which would create a Sahara 
Autonomous Region under Moroccan sovereignty in lieu of a vote on self-determination,129 
sought to attract “returnees” from the camps with promises of a plot of land and a monthly 
welfare stipend of 2000 dirhams (roughly equivalent to 200 euros a month). While people 
leaving the camps moved to Morocco for a wide variety of reasons – some of them political, 
others explicitly not – this initiative represented just the latest of a series attempts since the 1950s 
to demonstrate sovereignty through the mobilized resettlement of people. Each of these waves of 
controlled resettlement and displacement have shaped and reshaped the city of Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, with the history sedimented in the city’s political geography. 
 
Section IV – Naming Histories and Sovereignties: the Nomoi of the City 
 
The transformations and expansions of the city have been marked, at each stage, with a renewed 
                                                
129 Known as the Autonomy Plan. See Appendix 5 “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for 
the Sahara Region, April 2007” in Jensen, Western Sahara, 161–65. 
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or expanded military government, the mixed use of coercion and necessity to relocate and 
displace populations, and an ongoing struggle over its sovereignty. While this continuous 
struggle has produced a series of largely incomplete political projects, the afterlives of these 
unsettled pasts remain etched in the city’s nomenclature. As I have alluded to throughout this 
chapter, a toponomy of Laâyoune/El Aaiún requires as much attention to vernacular names as 
official designations. There are place-names, such as Diridik (“put your hands [here]”), 
Colomina Tirdis (“kick”), and Zemla (site of the 1970 intifada, or uprising), which index 
moments in time, establishing historical perspective in relation to place. Their use in everyday 
interactions adds a political dimension to the city’s geography. As decidedly unofficial names 
that reference a period of Spanish colonialism which Morocco strenuously seeks to efface, they 
convey an implicit knowledge and provide some kind of purchase, however narrow, on place and 
space within a city that has undergone multiple transformations by repressive rule and population 
resettlement.130 In aggregate, the use of both official and informal names that reference different 
periods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s existence indexes a time and space of contested sovereignty – of 
the right to name – that remains the productive force of urban space and the city’s defining 
feature. 
An entire subset of names capture the relationship between decolonization and efforts to 
populate the city and control the movement of people. The neighborhood of Lahouhum, for 
example, dates back to the period of Spanish colonialism. The name, which translates as “they 
threw them,” refers to the distance of this neighborhood, at the time of its settlement, from the 
rest of the city. Still a popular quarter that is now situated near the city’s geographic center, the 
name indexes today the city’s rapid expansion. At the same time, the indifference implied in the 
                                                
130 Thank you to Julie Skurski, Madhuri Karak and Mohamad Junaid for spurring me to think about the temporal 
dimension implicit in these place-names. 
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name about the subjects who lived there speaks to a relation between people and political 
authority in this region that has served as a recurring feature of the decolonization of the Sahara: 
namely, the sovereign power to mobilize people and control subjects’ movements – by authority, 
force, command, coercion, incentive or otherwise. Lahouhum captures this tension between the 
government’s interest in fixing or confining subjects to the city, and its relative indifference in 
where and how they live once there. Political projects to resettle and move people with relative 
impunity characterize the Sahara’s decolonization more than the colonial period itself. Oral 
histories concerning the settlement of Laâyoune/El Aaiún under Spain in the 1950s and 60s serve 
as an early example, and the name Lahouhum might be thought of as a trace of this process 
sedimented in the city’s popular nomenclature and political geography. The negative space 
marking the location where thousands of tents sheltered the people from Khaymat al-Wahda 
throughout the 1990s serves as another – and perhaps the largest – example of the city as the 
spatial expression of the repeated efforts to fix, and abandon, the people of the Sahara as political 
subjects of decolonization. 
Like other incomplete political projects, these efforts have left their mark on the 
nomenclature and built environment of Laâyoune/El Aaiún in a manner expressive of an 
intertwined relationship between urbanization and coercion, political commitment and 
ambivalence.  Another, more recent, example, involving Agjijimat, captures the intertwined 
relationship between legitimacy and scandal. Agjijimat is a village in Mauritania near the strip of 
Western Sahara that remains unoccupied by Morocco, and which Polisario refers to as the 
Liberated Territories.131 In December 2007, the Polisario Front held its 12th Congress in a nearby 
                                                
131 Built by Morocco with US, French and Saudi funding and technologies in the 1980s, the 2700 km berm 
separating Moroccan-occupation from the Liberated Territories, is a trench and barricade lined with mines and 
manned by upwards of 120,000 Moroccan troops. According to Jarat Chopra, the berm was strategically built so as 
not to coincide with the political boundary of Western Sahara: “If the wall closed the boundary, the POLISARIO 
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settlement within its Liberated Territories known as Tifariti. In response, Moroccan security 
organized a counter-movement in Agjijimat, hoping to upstage the Polisario congress with the 
televised spectacle of Sahrawis defecting en masse as an expression of support for Morocco’s 
recently-announced autonomy plan. To implement this plan, Morocco’s chief collaborator in 
Western Sahara, Khalihenna Ould Rachid,132 sought to employ Hamada Ould Derwich, a 
Mauritanian politician from the Rguibat tribe (the most populous tribe of Western Sahara, in 
general, and of the Sahrawi refugee camps, in particular). Ould Derwich sought to disrupt 
Polisario’s planned congress by mobilizing a group of Sahrawi refugees to cross the border to 
nearby Agjijimat. Moroccan television was going to be there to film what was supposed to be a 
contingent of Sahrawis defecting from Polisario leadership. When Mauritanian authorities got 
word and prevented the intervention from taking place, a group still appeared and was 
transported across the Mauritanian border into Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, to be 
received with great ceremony as the latest wave of “defectors” from Polisario. When this group 
arrived and it was found that the contingent of “defectors” was almost entirely composed of 
Mauritanian villagers, and not former members of Polisario or residents of the refugee camps, 
the whole thing became a scandal. The Moroccan state housed them in a posh hotel at a beach 
                                                                                                                                                       
would be in Algeria and Mauritania. If the Moroccans wished to pursue the POLISARIO it would be politically 
difficult to cross into these countries. Instead, they left a killing zone.” Chopra, United Nations Determination of the 
Western Saharan Self, 31. See also Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 20–24; Swenson, “The World’s Longest 
Minefield Isn’t Where You Think It Is.” 
 With the ceasefire, this “killing zone” has become increasingly integral to Polisario’s construction of 
sovereignty. Dubbed the “Liberated Territories,” Polisario has taken to selling future rights for the exploitation of 
minerals in these territories. Whereas the refugee camps and SADR government are based in Algerian territory, 
Polisario has promoted infrastructural support for settlements in this strip, particularly for older Sahrawis drawn by 
the prospect of living pastorally. The fact that long stretches of this territory adjoin northern Mauritania make the 
territory suitable for raising and herding camels, unlike the more barren hamada where the refugee camps are 
located. Reflecting an increased prominence in SADR’s case for sovereignty, the Liberated Territories feature more 
and more prominently in their maps. 
132 Khalihenna Ould Rachid rose from humble beginnings to become one of the wealthiest, most powerful Sahrawis 
under Moroccan rule. He became involved in politics after marrying the daughter of a wealthy Spanish businessman, 
subsequently becoming the leader of the pro-Spanish PUNS, el Partido de Unión Nacional Saharaui, in the 1970s. 
He later allied with Morocco and has held various positions advising the King on Saharan matters, serving as 
president of CORCAS, the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs since its inception. 
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outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún for a month, until they were resettled in the standard, small, 
single-story box-like houses granted to ‘a’idin who left the refugee camps for Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara during this period.133 These developments dot the eastern reaches of 
the city and wherever they can be found the immediate surroundings are known as “Agjijimat,” 
as in the case of the tall, four-story building that fronts Avenue Smara where I met Salih and his 
acquaintance one afternoon. 
How does a building in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, at the center of a dispute between Morocco 
and Sahrawi nationalists, come to refer to a village in Mauritania? In the contemporary context 
of political conflict and pervasive suspicion, the name, which in practice refers to multiple 
locations around the city, references political scandal. In this sense, the name of Agjijimat, refers 
to the spectacle involved in attempting to create political legitimacy through the mobilization, 
displacement and re-settlement of people, more than a village in Mauritania. But since it was 
also the site, on December 17, 1974, of one of the Polisario Front’s early attacks on Spanish 
colonial outposts, Agjijimat also references a notable, if relatively obscure, event in the 
formative stages of Polisario’s national liberation movement. In this way the name refers to two 
events, in multiple locations, which are situated within different historical narratives of 
competing political projects. Not unlike Texas and Lahouhum, then, Agjijimat indexes the 
fragmented geography of the decolonized Sahara, more generally. In this sense, the city’s built 
environment and nomenclature might be seen as the geographical sedimentation of a shifting, 
historically repeating process, which has characterized the decolonization of the Sahara and 
revolves around regional struggle over mobility and confinement. Taken together, many of the 
names of contemporary Laâyoune/El Aaiún – Catalonia, Colomina Tirdis, Diridik, Lahouhum, 
                                                
133 Sébastien Boulay, “Poétique et politique de la migration au Sahara occidental. Les «câ’idîn»: repentants, 
migrants ou ralliés?,” in La migration prise aux mots: mise en récits et en images des migrations transafricaines, ed. 
Cécile Canut and Catherine Mazauric (Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2014), 97–98. 
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Texas, Khaymat al-Wahda, Agjijimat – make for a concatenation of terms that together reflect 
the tensions of decolonization in the Sahara: a place of displacement, of fixed mobility, of 
mobile confinement, of deferred horizons, split allegiance, and contained insurrection. 
 
Naming/Sovereignty – Field 
The history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s formation is a history of the region’s decolonization. 
That is to say, the history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún is one of multiple, unresolved political projects. 
Not only does the nomenclature and built environment of the city reflect the sedimentation of 
each of these political projects, but Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s formation and tremendous growth 
reflects the importance of urban space as a vector through which attempts to establish 
sovereignty in this region of the Sahara have been carried out. Many of the residents of 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún live in the city thanks to these political projects which, through necessity and 
coercion, have attempted to fix the location and political subjectivities of people living in the 
region. And yet the ongoing contestation over sovereignty in Laâyoune/El Aaiún highlights 
ongoing contradictions in the concept of postcolonial sovereignty that depends upon both control 
of territory, and international legal recognition. 
In asserting the primacy of sovereignty to rule of law, Carl Schmitt revisits the meaning 
of nomos as a concept that articulates the founding act of political order. Nomos, Schmitt 
suggests, “understood in its original spatial sense, is best suited to describe the fundamental 
process involved in the relation between order and orientation.”134 Underpinning the relationship 
between order and orientation, nomos organizes authority through land-appropriation. 
Consequently, political order is spatially produced through the division and distribution of land. 
At the same time, the act of land-appropriation constitutes, for Schmitt, a founding political act, 
                                                
134 Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, 67. 
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and an act of legitimacy: 
In its original sense…nomos is precisely the full immediacy of a legal power not 
mediated by laws; it is a constitutive historical event – an act of legitimacy, 
whereby the legality of a mere law first is made meaningful.135 
Schmitt’s approach is important for understanding the illiberal context of decolonization in 
Western Sahara, where sovereignty has been defined – first by Spain, and then later by Morocco 
– largely by the power to occupy. The very act of occupation encloses and politicizes space 
insofar as it subsumes that space into a political entity, or order. Or, as cited earlier in this 
chapter, nomos, for Schmitt “turns a part of the earth’s surface into the force-field of a particular 
order.” This, too, is important for recognizing that much of the language that coalesces around 
the ongoing dispute over Western Sahara, including human rights and self-determination, 
ethnicity and nationality, overlays a field of force structuring the political geography of the 
Sahara constituted by a struggle to name and occupy – a struggle over nomos. 
 In foregrounding sovereignty as a de facto normative force, Schmitt’s concept of nomos 
betrays a preoccupation with the unitary cohesiveness of any political order. Hence, Schmitt’s 
focus on the primacy of territory, and with sovereignty itself as a norm that supersedes any other 
political claim, legal or otherwise. This is where Schmitt’s concept of nomos reaches its limits in 
the context of decolonization. As is known, the post-World War II decline of European colonial 
empire brought with it the emergence of a multilateral world order, and the enshrinement of the 
legal right to self-determination in the UN Charter. By the 1960s, numerous new nation-states 
(though far from all) exercised this right, by then a cornerstone of the United Nations, as a means 
of decolonization. Whereas a wave of decolonization took place in the 1950s and 60s, Western 
Sahara remained a Spanish colony until 1975. While this temporal disjuncture requires further 
examination and will remain a theme throughout this dissertation, the decolonization of Western 
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Sahara became the object of competing sovereignties, in both a concrete and conceptual sense. 
Concretely, various political forces have struggled to appropriate the territory of Western Sahara 
for themselves. As discussed in the Introduction, Morocco’s occupation, based on claims of 
historical ties, and Sahrawi claims for the right to self-determination, are based on different 
modalities of sovereignty.136 That is, the Sahrawi right to self-determination is premised on 
popular sovereignty granted by legal recognition, in contrast to nomos. 
Schmitt is also useful here in that he points out the contradictions involved in 
“bracketing” force in order to grant sovereignty through legal means: “It was not the abolition of 
war, but rather its bracketing that has been the great, core problem of every legal order.”137 In 
much of the world, this bracketing has been resolved in favor of legal recognition: this order of 
international law underpins the sovereignty of many postcolonies and other small nation-states in 
a post-World War II international order.138 Although decolonization formally disrupted a 
colonial order premised on European imperialism, it did not replace that order with a unitary, 
cohesive political field. Western Sahara exists, in this sense, as a remainder and a reminder of the 
unresolved contradiction between nomos and international law, between sovereignty, and self-
determination. Rather than an ordered nomos, Western Sahara represents a disaggregated 
political space, or a space of competing sovereignties.  
As I have tried to highlight by focusing on Laâyoune/El Aaiún in this chapter, the field is 
structured in binary terms between Moroccan and Sahrawi political causes, which influence the 
things that people can say, narratives about the past, and the spaces in which they can act. The 
politics of the present polarizes everyday life through demands for the expression of loyalty to 
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either Moroccan or Sahrawi nationalism. Scholarship on Western Sahara is structured similarly, 
focusing on nationalism and nationalist conflict as the framework for understanding the region’s 
past and present.139 This is in part due to political constraints from the conflict itself, which, until 
recently, have severely limited the kinds of research that it has been possible to undertake in the 
region. As described throughout this chapter, intense repression of Sahrawi nationalism has made 
research on the topic in Morocco difficult, and foreign visitors to Moroccan-occupied Western 
Sahara are regularly detained at the airport and refused entry, or otherwise expelled. The 
Polisario-run refugee camps based in Algeria, by contrast, has over the past decade increasingly 
sought to attract foreign delegations and other visitors, including researchers, in an effort to 
promote their cause. This has led to a number of important studies, some of them the first of their 
kind to document the vibrant social and political life of the Sahrawi refugee camps. This 
literature counters, in an important way, Moroccan state politics, as well as the obfuscating work 
performed by the discourse of security and terrorism, which overlooks the political organization 
of the camps themselves. 
In focusing on government, citizenship and nationalism within the refugee camps, 
however, some scholarship on Western Sahara conflates the terms of nationalist conflict for the 
“roots of conflict” itself.140 Much of this scholarship reproduces the political scripts that 
interlocutors have at the ready for broadcasting their position to an international audience. Some 
of this is due to methodological constraints: research in the Sahrawi refugee camps, though much 
freer than the conditions in Moroccan-occupied territory, remains subject to the hegemony of 
Sahrawi nationalism. In foregrounding the uniqueness of the camps, however – one study 
                                                
139 Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile; Mundy, “Performing the Nation, Pre-figuring the State”; Zunes and Mundy, 
Western Sahara; Martin, “Nationalism, Identity and Citizenship in the Western Sahara.” 
140 Vásquez, “The Roots of Conflict,” January 9, 2015; Vásquez, “The Roots of Conflict,” January 12, 2015. 
 94 
characterized them as a “controlled experiment,”141 another as a “space of autonomy”142 – these 
approaches tend to represent the refugee camps as a discrete political unit and isolated 
geopolitical space. In many respects, these studies contribute to the project of mapping the 
national “geo-body.”143 The problem is methodological not simply because of who researchers 
can and cannot speak to, but precisely because the conceptual approach naturalizes the nation as 
the object of study. Writing of a similar situation in Israel-Palestine, the scholar Gil Hochberg 
suggests that taking the terms of a conflict as it appears is to mistakenly conceptualize “the 
political” in political conflict: 
What does it mean to speak about a conflict in terms of how it appears or how we 
come to see it? To begin with, it means that we do not take the conflict as our 
point of departure (asking, for example, how it is represented in the media), but 
that we rather explore the very making of the conflict – its contours and mappings 
– by focusing on the distribution of the visual and asking, for example, what or 
who can be seen, what or who remains invisible, who can see and whose vision is 
compromised?144 
Some of the earlier ethnographic research conducted in the Sahrawi refugee camps resembles 
journalistic work, in that it begins and ends with the most visible phenomena of everyday life, 
rather than asking, as Hochberg suggests, “what or who can be seen, what or who remains 
invisible, who can see and whose vision is compromised?” By contrast, I suggest that despite this 
intense politicization along national identities, the ever-present binary tensions of national 
conflict that currently structure so much of Western Sahara ought to be conceptualized as a 
concrete abstraction. 
 Unlike the unitary ordering of space that Schmitt conceptualizes with his notion of nomos, 
Henri Lefebvre recognizes that a given political order contains a multitude of social spaces: 
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We are confronted not by one social space but by many – indeed, by an unlimited 
multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces which we refer to generically as 
‘social space.’…Considered in isolation, such spaces are mere abstractions. As 
concrete abstractions, however, they attain ‘real’ existence by virtue of networks 
and pathways, by virtue of bunches or clusters of relationships.145 
Similarly, in Laâyoune/El Aaiún today, the normative political dispute which organizes and 
mediates so much of social relations cannot fully obscure the fluidity and multiplicity of 
identities in everyday life. Moreover, the conflict between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists is, I 
suggest, a political formation that is neither a fiction, nor a truth. Though it structures and 
organizes social relations and political authority in very real ways, as a conflict based on national 
divisions, it remains a concrete abstraction as defined by Lefebvre in that it “is developed by 
thought – just as it developed in time and space – until it reaches the level of social 
practice…”146 While the binary between two national causes crystallizes and distills difference 
into a politicized binary, as a concrete abstraction it remains a structure that never fully subsumes 
the multiple forms of life which have preceded, and are produced by it. 
Conceptualizing national dispute as concrete abstraction helps to see the current situation 
in Western Sahara not simply “as it appears,” but as a political formation that both embodies 
certain social relations and conceals others. In the case of Western Sahara more generally, the 
division between Moroccan and Sahrawi epitomizes a tension between commercial and pastoral 
modes of living. These overlapping modes of living underpin relations of dependence and 
autonomy between groups that have been in contact for as long as the trans-Saharan trade has 
been in existence. However, the national conflict conceals the contradiction between modalities 
of sovereignty that were raised by the process of decolonization and that remain unresolved. In 
this sense, the decolonization of the Sahara has produced a political formation in concrete 
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abstraction – an “ideological thing/not thing”147 that mediates the social and political space of 
everyday life in the region, and organizes what can be said, seen and acted upon into the binary 
dimensions of national conflict – but which obscures the transformations wrought by 
decolonization in the Sahara. 
 
Conclusion – The Binary Dimensions of Nationalist Conflict in Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
The Batimat buildings where I dined with the mother and her son are a good place to 
begin to understand some of these dynamics between competing sovereignties and their effects 
on people’s subjectivities. After a handful of Polisario leaders defected to Morocco in the late 
1980s, the Moroccan state believed that political unrest and low morale in the refugee camps, 
combined with military stalemate, would contribute to an exodus.148 In anticipation, Batimat was 
constructed along the main road heading east to Smara. However, the influx of defectors never 
materialized in the numbers that Morocco expected. Instead, the vast sea of Khaymat al-Wahda 
populated by Saharans who had been relocated from the neighboring Wed Nun region of 
southern Morocco filled in the open land to the east of Batimat. In the winter of 1992, when 
unusually heavy rains flooded the city and washed away the supplies of sugar, tea and other free 
provisions supplied by the state, a certain number of families dwelling in their tents broke into 
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the unoccupied Batimat and have lived there ever since.149 Khaymat al-Wahda has long since 
disappeared, however, leaving a negative space surrounding Batimat in what, with subsequent 
rapid urban expansion, has become more or less the city’s geographical center. 
Mohamed Salek’s in-laws, like the young videographer and his mother whose narratives 
opened this chapter, live in Batimat. The entire complex, as far as I know, is populated by 
Sahrawis (and not dakhilis). When I visit Mohamed Salek’s in-laws, I am in Laâyoune, the 
largest city in Morocco’s “Southern Provinces” as they are called. When I visit the young 
videographer and his mother (which I could only do at night), I am in El Aaiún, in occupied 
territory. In one house, one says “Moroccan Sahara”; in another, “Western Sahara.” In one house, 
the family watches Moroccan or Mauritanian television channels; in another, the television is set 
to the national Sahrawi SADR tv, broadcast out of the refugee camps in Algeria, which 
frequently airs footage of clandestinely videotaped protests that have, in some instances, taken 
place less than a hundred yards from the apartment where the footage is then viewed.  
While these differences may seem self-evident in the context of a political conflict 
between two, competing nationalisms, the divided attention illustrates a broader phenomenon of 
everyday life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In Arabic, “Laâyoune” and “El Aaiún” are pronounced the 
same, but the insistence among the parties to the conflict on different transliterations reflects the 
importance of naming – to the point of necessity, but also absurdity – in any struggle over 
sovereignty.150 And the struggle between Morocco and Polisario is, at root, not a struggle over 
ethnic differences – or, I would argue, even nationalist differences, strictly speaking – but a 
struggle over sovereignty. The struggle over sovereignty has real effects not just in politicizing 
everyday life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún or in perpetuating violent acts of coercion and resistance, but 
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also in shaping people’s subjectivity. For Sahrawis living as neighbors but with contested 
political allegiances, perhaps the strongest and strangest effect of this struggle is what I would 
call the effect of erasure. The friend-enemy relation is not simply one of war and annihilation 
(even if the prospect of war constitutes a defining aspect of this relation). When this relation 
becomes an important part of everyday life among neighbors, as among Sahrawis in Batimat and 
in Laâyoune/El Aaiún more generally, the effects of this struggle over naming discipline the 
subjects involved into practicing a kind of erasure. They cohabit with the enemy – sometimes 
even in the same family – but refuse them recognition. Put another way, their political 
subjectivity demands that they “unsee” the enemy in their midst.  
Here, I am borrowing again from China Miéville’s novel, The City & The City,151 which 
imagines a city divided on itself – perhaps not unlike Sarajevo or Jerusalem – inhabited by the 
residents of two, sovereign city-states. In the world Miéville creates, the two city-states occupy 
the same space geographically, but citizens are disciplined from birth to “unsee” the objects or 
activities located in the sovereignty to which they don’t belong: 
Such rigorous separation requires citizens to act and even to think and perceive as 
though the cities were not ‘grosstopically’ – that is, in the terms of actual, 
physical, Newtonian space – coterminous. From early childhood, every Besź and 
every Ul Qoman [the names of the two types of citizens in Miéville’s novel] must 
learn to ‘unsee’ the people, buildings, streets, motor vehicles, and everything else 
that the other city contains. Unseeing – the central ideological operation required 
to be conventional, law-abiding Besź or Ul Qoman citizen – is a maddeningly 
complex and indeed self-contradictory process that seems directly indebted to 
Orwell’s influential concept of doublethink.152 
I do not mean here to draw a direct parallel between the fictional world that Miéville creates in 
The City & The City and Western Sahara, or to suggest that the Moroccan and Sahrawi political 
entities are roughly equal in power, like two city-states. Instead, I draw attention to a kind of 
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disciplining that goes on when two competing sovereignties are operating over a long time in the 
same absolute space. An example of this sustained, subjective inattention is how Sahrawi 
nationalists discipline themselves to “unsee” the overbearing presence of Moroccan sovereignty 
everywhere around them. In private gatherings, through social media, in connection with human 
rights groups that follow the plight of political prisoners in jails throughout Morocco, and in 
following SADR television broadcasting from the refugee camps, Sahrawi nationalists carve out 
alternative spaces replete with the signs and information associated with the Sahrawi state. When 
I asked one young man about an upcoming Moroccan national holiday, for example, he 
responded with a dismissive wave of his hand and said, “that’s just ‘ajaj” referring to a strong 
wind that comes from the east and brings with it a lot of sand and dust. Through a speech act, 
this young man sought to render Moroccan sovereignty invisible, like the wind: an annoyance, 
and distraction (and one that, like the weather, he hopes will eventually give way to something 
new) that does not require one’s attention. It can be unseen. Meanwhile, at tremendous effort and 
expense, and by pretty much any means necessary (including propaganda and favors, arrest and 
torture), the Moroccan state relentlessly tries to bend the subjects of its occupation to its will: to 
refer to the region as the Moroccan Sahara or Morocco’s Southern Provinces, to make the 
Moroccan flag as visible as possible, to erase all signs of resistance from the streets and walls of 
the city. It seeks to make its subjects unsee the state’s lack of legitimacy. 
Despite the highly structured, binary dimensions of this political formation, it should not 
be surprising that there remains tremendous mobility among people across southern Morocco, 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, and northern 
Mauritania.153 The quotidian nature of movement, in a situation polarized by nationalist conflict, 
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however, is anything but banal. For one thing, the very physical act of traveling from the camps 
to Moroccan-occupied territory (and back) keeps channels of movement open where they have 
otherwise been restricted by militarized occupation and political borders. At the same time, 
political commitment in a situation of longstanding political conflict requires tremendous effort 
in the face of various forms of political violence and, in some cases, social marginalization. This 
next chapter will examine the resulting tension between fluid and multiple subjectivities that 
exist within a binary field of national conflict structured by the poles of loyalty and betrayal. 
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Chapter 2 – Subjectivity in Abeyance: Identification and “Return” across western Sahara 
 
 
Chapter Overview: On Sahrawi Identity, Subject Position and Political Subjectivity 
 
 The previous chapter focused on the history that is sedimented in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, 
and which shapes the city’s political geography and built environment. The city’s development 
has paralleled the region’s decolonization dating back to the 1950s, and this history of multiple, 
unrealized political projects remains apparent in the city’s nomenclature and neighborhoods. 
Since 1991, when the ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario shifted the locus of conflict from 
armed combat to diplomacy, Laâyoune/El Aaiún has increasingly become a focal point in the 
struggle over sovereignty. Between Morocco’s military rule and Sahrawi nationalists’ efforts to 
publicize human rights violations (the subject of Chapter 5), everyday life in the city has become 
inextricably shaped by nationalist conflict. Social relations and public spaces are shot through 
with suspicion, and people are subject to intense surveillance and policing of their actions, 
relations and identities. 
As the largest city and nexus of conflict in the disputed territory of Western Sahara, 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún epitomizes the polarizing effects of contested sovereignty, and how this 
situation has come to structure everyday life in the city, including constructions of the past. 
Contested narratives of the past create a discursive space of multiple, conflicting stories, which 
together undermine an epistemology of political truth. At the same time, I suggest that competing 
Moroccan and Polisario projects of sovereignty affect residents’ subjectivities by shaping what 
they can say, and how. The composite spelling of Laâyoune/El Aaiún foregrounds this 
dichotomy: the dual spellings denote the same name in Arabic [el-‘ayun] but, in the context of 
the dispute between Morocco and Polisario, connote two different political regimes. My use of 
both names is a redundancy and exaggeration. But I hold onto this split nomenclature to 
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foreground how competing sovereignties have divided the attention, allegiances and identities 
among people sharing the same absolute space of the city. The effects of this division create an 
effect of estrangement, or even erasure, among Sahrawi residents adhering to opposing poles 
within a field structured by Moroccan or Sahrawi national identities. Highlighting this dichotomy 
as an ideological effect of life in a situation of longstanding conflict also foregrounds this 
political formation as both a thing, and not a thing: a concrete abstraction. 
 The dichotomous structure of this concrete abstraction is both a lived reality and an effect 
of a longstanding dispute over sovereignty. However, in this chapter I argue that a focus on 
polarized national identities misses the processes of fixing identity that have defined the region’s 
history of decolonization and which contribute to a disaggregated political geography today. In 
the literature on Western Sahara, one could be mistaken for thinking that there are but two, 
national identities, Moroccan and Sahrawi, at odds in a zero-sum conflict over a single territorial 
entity. In particular, scholarship has focused on establishing Sahrawi nationalism as a social and 
political fact, largely through research conducted within the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria. 
This work has had important implications in countering Moroccan propaganda that seeks to 
undermine Sahrawi nationalism in the ongoing political conflict. Despite providing this 
important political contribution, however, I suggest that a pervasive methodological nationalism 
has obscured other optics for understanding this fragmented and polarized political geography, 
and this complex history of decolonization.  
 While national identities such as “Sahrawi,” “Moroccan” and “Mauritanian” are 
frequently taken for granted in literature on the region, this chapter interrogates the processes 
that have been pivotal to fixing the identities of people in the Sahara since decolonization 
became an animating feature of regional political projects. When attention has been paid to 
 103 
Sahrawi political subjectivity, scholarship has tended to focus on the formation of “ethnic” or 
nationalist identity. However, the geographic distribution of Saharan peoples has always been 
dispersed across an area much broader than a single, bounded territory. As a result, the 
correlation between people, rights and territory in the area has been deeply contested throughout 
the decolonization process, and since before the relatively recent formation of a Sahrawi national 
identity. For these reasons, I suggest that fixing Sahrawis nationally, much less ethnically, misses 
the dynamics of contestation over their political subjectivity – the dynamics of decolonization, in 
effect – in which people across western Sahara have been caught since the 1950s. 
Rather than taking national identities as given, I propose an analytic distinction between 
identity, subject position, and political subjectivity. By identity, I mean the labels, whether 
chosen or ascribed, that individuals use to express belonging to various collectivities. In this 
region of the Sahara, these identities may be national (Sahrawi, Moroccan, Mauritanian, 
Algerian), tribal (e.g.: Rguibat, Izerguiyin, among many others),154 or one of several statuses 
within a cultural sphere known as trab al-bidan (hassani, m‘allem, hartani). Individuals 
frequently, but do not necessarily, have a sense of belonging at all three levels, contributing to 
multiple identities. Many of these terms are relational: Sahrawi is defined against Moroccan, or 
dakhili, and, as explained in the Introduction, bidani identity is defined in relation to both 
Amazigh (chilha, pl. chleuh in the Saharan dialect of Arabic, Hassaniya), and non-Arab black 
Africans (kury, pl. lkwar).  
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With the term subject position, by contrast, I refer specifically to categories produced by 
different political projects during the history of decolonization that continue to confer certain 
rights or benefits in the present upon those who qualify. Unlike identities, subject positions exist 
in relation to institutional power (both state and multilateral) rather than to each other. While 
they have come into existence through specific political projects and at different historical 
moments, these subject positions remain in place today thanks to the particular configuration of 
different state, multilateral and humanitarian administrative organizations that sustain each of 
these subject positions. In a more conventional political landscape, the most common subject 
position in this formulation would simply be “citizen.” Across western Sahara, by contrast, a 
field of competing regimes that support multiple, unresolved political projects supports a variety 
of subject positions, including refugees, ‘a’idin, human rights activists, and former members of 
the Moroccan Liberation Army. While these subject positions often exist on opposite sides of 
this political divide – refugees, for example, live in the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, while 
‘a’idin have left those camps and returned to Morocco – they co-exist within the same field of 
political conflict. 
In contrast to identities, which are a matter of belonging, and subject positions, which 
retain their lasting significance through various regimes of governance, political subjectivities 
refer to the modalities of recognition through which subjects relate to this complex field. These 
political subjectivities intersect with both identities and subject positions but political 
subjectivities are less positions, or figures, than features of a field distinguished by the politics of 
recognition. The political subjectivity of a Sahrawi female refugee, for example, cannot be 
understood without taking into account her visibility in relation to the international community. 
The political subjectivity of an ‘a’id, or returnee, who leaves the Polisario refugee camps to 
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“return” to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, takes form through the modality of movement, 
both in terms of physical mobility and political transition. And, finally, the process of 
identification can be explored through the prolonged attempt to hold a referendum on self-
determination in the 1990s, which shaped political subjectivities within this contested political 
field. 
Through this critique of methodological nationalism, I suggest that scholarship on 
Western Sahara that attempts to explain the contemporary dispute strictly in terms of nationalist 
conflict and identity reduces multiple subjectivities and subject positions to the terms of the 
conflict itself. In this respect, identities and subject positions that both precede and are produced 
by the Morocco-Polisario dispute are elided by questions of identity and citizenship, loyalty and 
opportunism. This chapter will explore political subjectivity as shaped by movement and 
identification in two sections. 
In order to counter the naturalization of this process of “fixing” the geography of 
subjectivities in this political landscape, the first section of this chapter foregrounds multiplicity, 
movement and mobility. Beginning from Nouadhibou, a Mauritanian coastal enclave which 
attracts people from around the region during the summer, I present a geography of movement 
and mobility in a context of political confinement.155 Whereas Chapter 1 focused on Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, this chapter is situated in northern Mauritania, 
which borders both Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and the Polisario-controlled territories 
of Western Sahara and southwest Algeria. Conveying the dynamics of political identification 
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from outside of both the Sahrawi refugee camps (where much recent scholarship on Western 
Sahara has taken place), and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara (where the stifling political 
climate limits much of what can be said) is part of a methodological claim for the usefulness of 
multi-sited ethnography in a disaggregated political geography. From Nouadhibou, I profile the 
‘a’id, or “returnee,” a subject position produced by the conflict between Morocco and Polisario, 
but which occasionally escapes the nationalist political epistemology upon which the conflict is 
based. Despite the cynicism and stigma of betrayal frequently associated with this subject 
position, I suggest that the ‘a’id exemplifies the tension between ambivalence and commitment 
underlying seemingly fixed political identities in this region. 
The second section of this chapter elaborates how the process of identification continues 
to shape political subjectivities across the region in two ways. First, I explore how 
documentation and “being counted,” structures how belonging is conferred or withheld for 
Mauritanians and Sahrawis moving between refugee camps and northern Mauritania. While the 
focus on refugee camps within literature on Western Sahara gives the impression that people’s 
residencies and identities are largely settled, many people have always moved between a region 
now divided between northern Mauritania, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and Saharawi 
refugee camps in southwest Algeria. This chapter examines the regimes of documentation that 
restrict and facilitate this movement in a fragmented political geography. Second, in recounting 
UN-led attempts to hold a referendum on self-determination during the 1990s, I examine how 
these efforts subjected certain groups to intense contestation over their identities and political 
commitments. While the identification process was shelved over a decade ago and the 
referendum was never held, I consider the effects of the identification process on a man who 
became the object of intense political recruitment during this time. 
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The first chapter showed how surveillance serves as an overarching modality of political 
recognition that shapes political subjectivities in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. This chapter will consider 
the two modalities just mentioned – mobility and identification – to describe geographies and 
subjectivities that exceed, complicate and sometimes reinforce the structured dichotomy of 
Moroccan-Sahrawi nationalist conflict. 
 
Section I – ‘A’idin or Returnees: an Overview 
‘A’idin are, in the terminology of the Western Sahara conflict, people who left the 
Sahrawi refugee camps, and “returned to” Morocco. The name derives from a speech given by 
the late King of Morocco, Hassan II, on November 6, 1988, marking the 13-year anniversary of 
the Green March, when some 350,000 Moroccan civilians crossed en masse into what was then 
Spanish Sahara as part of Morocco’s efforts to annex the territory, causing Sahrawis to flee to the 
refugee camps in Algeria where many remain today. The King’s annual speech on the 
anniversary of the Green March marks the occasion as a national holiday in Morocco, but the 
speech that year took on particular import since 1988 marked a critical year for Polisario 
leadership. After thirteen years, war with Morocco had stalemated, and Polisario had been unable 
to dislodge Morocco from the territory they occupied in Western Sahara. With social and 
political upheaval rocking Algeria,156 Polisario’s main political sponsor was rumored to be in 
negotiations with Morocco to potentially sell out the Sahrawi nationalist cause as part of a 
political bargain to normalize relations. And as reports of disappearances and torture carried out 
during wartime in the refugee camps came to light, Polisario leadership faced protests and 
                                                
156 Ed McAllister, “The Revolution That Wasn’t: Social Fragmentation and Urban Space in Algiers,” in Beyond the 
Square: Urbanism and the Arab Uprisings, ed. Deen Sharp and Claire Panetta (New York: Terreform, 2016): 30-43. 
“Nationwide riots in October 1988 led to the collapse of the single-party system [in Algeria] and marked the 
beginning of the Arab world’s first experiment with multiparty democracy and press freedom.”  
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upheaval in the camps.  
After spending much of the previous decade on the military defensive, King Hassan II 
sought to take advantage of this newfound position of strength by addressing the population of 
the refugee camps directly: 
“…I say to whomever lost their way and strayed from the path, that they must be 
dealt with mercifully [by] the homeland and kin, for God’s sake, [‘elayhim ‘an 
yttaqu allah fi al-watan wa al-rahem], and that they should know that the nation 
is forgiving and merciful…”157 
By using the language of those who had “gone astray,” Hassan II discursively created a moral 
and physical arc of “return” for anyone seeking to leave the refugee camps and come to Morocco 
– even if, as was the case with some refugees, they had never been in Moroccan-occupied 
Western Sahara, let alone Morocco proper, to begin with.158 Similarly, Hassan II evoked the 
nation in terms of moral acceptance and divine authority (“forgiving and merciful” [al-ghafur wa 
al-rahim] are both terms in the Qur’an used to describe God) as a way to exhort Sahrawis to 
leave the camps, i.e., “to return.” It is important to note that Hassan II’s speech did not have the 
intended effect of inducing mass defections from the refugee camps.159 It did, however, create a 
new category of political subject: the ‘a’id’, or “returnee.”  
Between 1989 and 1997, a little over 1200 people left the refugee camps and “returned” 
to Morocco.160 These first ‘a’idin coming from the camps tended to be high-profile members of 
Polisario’s leaderhip who were recruited to defect by Moroccan intelligence services with 
                                                
157 http://www.oujdanews.com/news.php?action=view&id=2196 
158 Though the majority of refugees reached the camps in exodus from Western Sahara as Morocco and Mauritania 
occupied the territory, it was not uncommon for others to join the movement from northern Mauritania, or southwest 
Algeria. 
159 The number of ‘a’idin has been estimated to be between 10,000 and 11,000 in total. [Fieldnotes, 6/17/14, 6/30/14, 
Lââyoune/El Aaiún] It is important to note, however, that precise figures are not publicly available because opaque 
institutions of Moroccan state security, including the Department of the Interior, intelligence agencies, and military 
personnel, oversee the process of approval and registration. 
160 Ángela Hernández Moreno, Sáhara: otras voces (Málaga: Editorial Algazara, 2001), 49. Hernández Moreno 
counts 1274 people who defected between 1976 and 1997; all but 61 of those left 1989 or later. Because “’a’idin” 
was not a category before 1988, I am focusing on the numbers from 1989 onward. 
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promises of government jobs, large houses and other amenities. In this first wave during the late-
1980s and early-90s, especially, ‘a’idin were frequently enlisted by Morocco to publicize their 
experience of torture or other harsh treatment under the Polisario.161 One woman whose husband 
disappeared during this period showed me pictures from her travels across Europe in the late-
1990s and early-2000s as part of a human rights group funded by Morocco.162 A Mauritanian 
living in Laâyoune/El Aaiún who had joined Polisario as a young man only to be imprisoned in 
the refugee camps as part of a purging of the “Mauritanian community,” gave me a copy of a 
book published by the Moroccan government that features a collection of profiles and 
testimonials by former supporters who had fled the camps after allegedly suffering torture at the 
hands of Polisario.163 The subject position of the “returnee” within the framework of political 
conflict came to resemble defectors who had suffered under the hands of Polisario leadership and 
would now collaborate with Morocco. The author of a 2001 collection of oral histories by ‘a’idin 
suggests that the term “which literally means those who return, are known in Morocco as the 
people, men and women, who deserted the Polisario Front and came back, or returned, to this 
country, since in joining this organization [meaning Polisario] they abandoned their country.”164 
An older Sahrawi man who had been imprisoned by Polisario for most of the 1980s 
provides testimony characteristic of the ‘a’idin who were imprisoned in the camps during the 
war years: 
‘A’id: [Polisario leadership] didn’t accept us [Tekna]; they were suspicious of us, 
imprisoned us, and made life difficult for us [ykarfasuna yasir min attakarfis]. 
Whoever died in prison, died, and whoever survived, came out of prison 
                                                
161 See, for example, Brahim Hakim and Omar Hadrami who had defected from the camps and arrived in Morocco a 
couple of months before this speech. 
162 Fieldnote, May 4, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Far from being proud of her experience, this woman noted with 
resentment that Morocco “harvests from people what it wants.”  
163 Martyrdom and Suffering of the Moroccan Prisoners and Confined Persons within the Tindouf Region in the 
South of Algeria/Mehna Wa Mu’anat Al-Muhtajizin Wa Al-Sujana’ Al-Maghariba Bi Al-Mintaqa Tinduf Janub Al-
Jaza’ir, n.d. 
164 Hernández Moreno, Sáhara, 47. 
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handicapped, or messed up in the head [tari’ bi shay fi ‘aqilu]… You see: [he is 
showing me an effect of imprisonment/torture] The skin is gone here [misloukha] 
- it used to be normal/natural. See? 
 
Me: That was a result of-  
 
‘A’id: The handcuffs. They put your hands like that, and tie them together with 
rope, and the feet…they tortured us a lot. Thirteen years. 
 
Me: What did they do? 
 
‘A’id: This [showing me a mark on his skin]: they burned us, with fire. That was 
just certain members of the leadership. Whereas, our young people, we weren’t 
against them. 
 
Me: It is difficult (for me) to understand why they did that to, uh, people who 
accompanied/were with them in the war.  
 
‘A’id: Us, we’re not against our people. We’re children of the people, but I 
explained to you before that the leadership – and, in particular, Polisario 
leadership – don’t want someone who could be better than them. And they don’t 
want something to be said about them [shi yngal fiha]. You understand me? What 
they did to us - who did that to us was someone named Bachir [Mustafa Sayid], a 
brother of the Martyr el-Ouali [Mustafa Sayid, a founder and former leader of 
Polisario, since deceased], and Brahim Ghali [current President of SADR], 
Lamine ould al-Bouhali and Soueid Ahmed al-Batal. Those were the Polisario 
leaders, and they’re the ones who governed. You understand? Some spared us, but 
they killed lots of Sahrawis in prison - lots - not just a little, you understand? You 
couldn’t protest your innocence - even if it were your father or mother, you 
couldn’t protest your innocence…You have your father: if your father does 
(something like) that and hits you; the president is like your father. The person 
responsible is like a father. Am I right, or what? But when it happens and they do 
that to you, you’re going to become far from - you can’t.  
 I prefer the Moroccans to them. You understand? Morocco, now, if you 
weren’t here [i.e., in disputed territory] but inside the country, you’d be free. You 
wouldn’t have any worries [ma ‘andek saliha]. But, these disputed territories, they 
are where there is fear.165 
In recounting his own experience with torture, this ‘a’id narrated his experience in the camps as 
a way of bringing to justice the Polisario leadership, particularly since a number of those 
members that he deemed responsible for these abuses remained in power. In doing so, his 
testimony resembles the form through which a couple of publications from the late-1990s and 
                                                
165 Interview, March 28, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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early-2000s presented the voices of ‘a’idin. One of these publications was by a Spanish scholar 
and the other was published as Moroccan political propaganda, but each attempted to frame the 
“voice” of the returnee as a witness to abuse and torture. The Moroccan publication, entitled 
Martyrdom and Suffering of the Moroccan Prisoners and Confined Persons within the Tindouf 
Region in the South of Algeria, includes books and pamphlets in Arabic and English.166 The 
books consist of a series of individual profiles, with background information of each ‘a’id 
accompanied by first-person accounts of the torture that they suffered. Some profiles include 
photographs of the victims’ injuries. The interviews published by a Spanish scholar under the 
title Sahara: Otras Voces provides sociological data on the first wave of ‘a’idin, and is less 
narrowly focused on torture and abuse. However, the oral histories are similarly presented as 
testimony to the injustices perpetrated by the Polisario Front on its subjects during the 1980s. In 
both publications,‘a’idin emerge as historical figures in the form of a dossier, or a compilation of 
documented testimonials that testify to political abuse. As such, they are among the first voices 
in the history of the Western Sahara conflict to publicize dissent within Polisario. More 
importantly, however, the way in which these ‘a’idin are represented as individuals testifying to 
political torture and abuse anticipates the adoption of human rights discourse as a tactic in the 
conflict between Morocco and Polisario, as it shifted from armed struggle to a struggle of 
diplomacy after 1991. This displacement of the language of decolonization by the language of 
human rights now characterizes the contemporary terrain of conflict, and will be discussed more 
in Chapter 5. 
Instrumentalized in this way, the first wave of ‘a’idin arriving the early 1990s were both 
denounced by Polisario, and ostracized by Sahrawis living in Moroccan-occupied territory, 
                                                
166 Martyrdom and Suffering of the Moroccan Prisoners and Confined Persons within the Tindouf Region in the 
South of Algeria/Mehna Wa Mu’anat Al-Muhtajizin Wa Al-Sujana’ Al-Maghariba Bi Al-Mintaqa Tinduf Janub Al-
Jaza’ir. 
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where many of them resettled. As the following poem demonstrates, Sahrawis on either side of 
Morocco’s dividing wall associated ‘a’idin with opportunism and betrayal: 
Betrayal is bad and haram  
[It is] a scandal upon us, and grave  
Leave, you scandalous accuser 
Betrayer of the Sahrawi blood  
Leave and trade dignity  
For little houses and cards  
While orphans and widows  
Are still here in sweetness/goodness [al-halawiya]167 
 
This poem directly addresses the same population that Hassan II sought to sway, but through 
accusation rather than invitation. It contrasts the virtuous steadfastness of “orphans and widows” 
who remain in the refugee camps despite significant sacrifices, with the transactional 
opportunism of those who betray their principles in exchange for “little houses and cards” 
offered by the Moroccan state. (“Cards” refer to state-issued identification cards that provide 
access to benefits.) 
For the first wave of ‘a’idin, the benefits gained from “returning” tended to be negotiated 
individually with political officials connected with the Moroccan military, intelligence services, 
or the Makhzen. For those deemed of value to the government, these benefits were often quite 
generous and might include the promise of a government job. The Moroccan state hoped, or 
perhaps even expected, that the first wave of ‘a’idin might induce mass defections from the 
                                                
167 l-khiyana shina wa haram 
fadaha fina wa rzina 
temshi ya mahdour taham 
kha’in dem as-Sahrawiya 
temshi wa tabadl karam 
bi douira hiya wa kartiya 
wa l-ytam wa l-’aramil 
mazalu hun fi halawiya 
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camps and also sway popular support among Sahrawis within Moroccan-occupied territories.168 
New families that arrived in Moroccan-occupied territory would appear on regional television 
news broadcasts, performatively describing the abuses they had suffered in the camps and 
expressing their gratitude to be in Morocco. First wave ‘a’idin were valued for their capacity to 
testify to abuse and torture, while displaying their loyalty to the Moroccan state. In this way, 
benefits were provided on the expectation that this first generation of ‘a’idin would serve the 
Moroccan cause in the Sahara, visibly and prominently, and were contingent upon political 
cooperation. ‘A’idin were, in short, expected to fulfill the role of the defector. 
In “little houses and cards,” however, the poem refers to the more recent, standardized set 
of benefits provided by the Moroccan government as larger numbers of people began “returning” 
in the early- to mid-2000s. Today, the government provides a small plot of land and house in a 
city of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, as well as an identity card that entitles ‘a’idin to a 
stipend of $200 euros per month (known as al-in’ash). These benefits are less generous and are 
disbursed less reliably than they used to be. A frequent complaint among recent ‘a’idin with 
whom I spoke in Laâyoune/El Aaiún was that the number of benefit cards distributed by 
Morocco to a returning family varies widely, and often arbitrarily. One family may receive a 
card and the accompanying benefits for every child in the family; another may find that only the 
head of household receives a card.169 
                                                
168 One ‘a’id recounted that, before settling in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, he spent time in a hotel in Rabat, where he was 
briefed by intelligence/military personnel about the conditions of his “return”: he could enjoy a stipend of 3000 euro 
per month and a house so long as he agreed to 1) not criticize Khali Henna ould Rachid, then the leading King’s 
counselor on Saharan Affairs, and 2) support Morocco’s autonomy plan. This ‘a’id claimed that he initially accepted 
this offer, but then changed his mind. He now lives on the standard 200 euro per month and lives in a small house in 
one of the outlying neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún where many ‘a’idin live. Fieldnote May 4, 2014, 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
169 Fieldnote, undated, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. As noted in Chapter 1, both 
individuals and families have “returned” since the inception of the category of ‘A’idin. Following the Agdim Izig 
protests in 2010, when the Moroccan government began to suspect the motives of single young men registering as 
‘a’idin and moving to Moroccan-occupied territory, “Morocco announced that it would give the benefits only to 
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Changes to the benefit regime appear to represent a broader shift in the Moroccan state’s 
expectation for ‘a’idin, and therefore in the subject position for those bearing this political label. 
Where ‘a’idin were once valued as defectors whose visibility was meant to impact the morale of 
the refugees in the camps, the increasing regularity and number of returnees permitted during the 
2000s has in effect normalized their presence. Today, entire neighborhoods in Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún are marked by the modest, box-like, single story house described in Chapter 1 for those 
who came from Agjijimat. The same simple constructions were distributed to ‘a’idin. Unlike an 
earlier generation, many of whom fled the refugee camps for explicitly political reasons (whom I 
refer to as “first wave returnees”), more recent, “second wave” ‘a’idin who have come to 
Moroccan-occupied territory since 2000, do so for many different reasons. Some “return” in 
order to care for an elderly relative, or to find a job, or simply to reunite with relatives from 
whom they had been separated for decades. Some, even, seek to turn a quick profit by reselling 
the plot of land or “little house” distributed by Morocco, taking profits from the sale with them 
elsewhere – sometimes even back to the refugee camps. Many of these more recent arrivals 
outwardly disdain the Moroccan state and maintain unwavering support for Sahrawi nationalism. 
Others, it is rumored, may even have been sent by Polisario to serve as operatives in Moroccan-
occupied territory. 
As this expectation of loyalty and patronage between ‘a’idin and the Moroccan state has 
eroded, the stigma associated with this label among Sahrawis has begun to fade, as well. Where 
the “returnee” was once seen as a betrayer and opportunist, they are more often now viewed with 
relative indifference, by both the Moroccan state and Sahrawi society. No longer bound to 
supporting either Morocco or Polisario, the ‘a’id is an unusual figure in the contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                       
families rather than to single young men.” Alice Wilson, “Ambivalences of Mobility: Rival State Authorities and 
Mobile Strategies in a Saharan Conflict,” American Ethnologist 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2017): 87. 
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landscape of political conflict in Western Sahara. On the one hand, this detachment from the two 
parties that structure the political field of conflict can lead to a kind of disillusionment and 
cynicism. No longer necessarily seen as a traitor, the figure of the ‘a’id still epitomizes political 
opportunism. Take, for example, the following joke about Ibrahim Hakim. A former Mauritanian 
government official who joined the Polisario Front in 1975, Hakim played a major role in raising 
SADR’s profile diplomatically by brokering Polisario/SADR’s entry to the Organization of 
African Unity in the early 1980s. After serving as foreign minister and minister of information, 
Hakim became one of the earliest and most high-profile ‘a’idin when he turned up in Morocco in 
1992.170 Around this time, Morocco and Algeria were negotiating a rapprochement to finally 
recognize each other’s borders and build on the recently-established Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU). As part of any agreement, it was rumored that Algeria would close the refugee camps 
and send Sahrawis back to Morocco. As the joke goes, the Morocco-Algeria rapprochement 
never fully materialized and was interrupted, at least in part, by the assassination of one of the 
lead Algerian negotiators, Mohamed Boudiaf. Before the assassination, according to the joke, 
Ibrahim Hakim met with Boudiaf in Algiers, learned of the plans regarding the refugee camps, 
and went straight to Rabat via Paris. The story is told as a joke on Ibrahim Hakim: so eager to 
leave Polisario for a more favorable situation, he anticipated a political development that never 
arose.171 
This joke also reflects more broadly upon the sense that “returnees,” in general, lack 
political principles or commitment. To some extent there is overlap here between the idea of 
opportunism and betrayal. The short poem cited above denounces “returnees” both for betrayal, 
and for trading political and moral dignity for “little houses and cards.” There is also, however, a 
                                                
170 Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, 213–14. 
171 Fieldnote, July 3, 2015, Nouadhibou, Mauritania. 
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certain distinction between these notions. The act of betrayal takes on meaning precisely because 
of the stakes involved in switching from one political commitment or another. The very act 
depends upon a situation of political polarization; one cannot betray an ally to a neutral party, but 
to an enemy. An action taken to be opportunistic, on the other hand, suggests a complete 
disregard for political commitment of any kind. In the context of the Western Sahara conflict, an 
“opportunist” [wahid intihazi] is a label for someone who demonstrates a lack of principles, a 
kind of shallow materialism, and an inability to maintain political commitment.  
The accusation resonates, however, precisely because the potential for widespread 
opportunism is a constant threat in the context of prolonged political stalemate. While the ‘a’id 
serves as the paradigmatic opportunist, the construction of political subjects as opportunistic 
circulates in subtler and more pervasive ways in popular discourse, particularly in Moroccan-
occupied territory. As a jaded observer put it in the context of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, “material 
things [al-mada] are fundamental; give people something and they’ll just be quiet.” Making the 
same point but from the standpoint of the recipients of these “material things,” a friend in a café 
once intimated that the quickest way for anyone in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara to get 
out of a bad legal situation (such as getting arrested for hashish, for example), is to raise two 
fingers in the symbol of Sahrawi victory and claim oneself a political prisoner. These are both 
references to the political economy of political conflict in Moroccan-occupied territory. As seen 
in the example of ‘a’idin, Moroccan state benefits are doled out or withheld through a calculus of 
political loyalty. Competing with the Moroccan state’s system of benefits and punishment, there 
is also an alleged payment system through which SADR/Polisario’s Ministry for the Occupied 
Territories provides incentive for protesters in the occupied territories to make themselves visible 
(and, it is rumored, to sustain injury in a way that can get caught on tape).  
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It is important to note here that many of these generalized examples of opportunistic 
political behavior circulate as rumors. The rumors about protesters getting paid – much less paid 
to sustain injuries – was never anything I could substantiate.172 It should also be noted that 
rumors of opportunism or political indifference serve the Moroccan state’s unrelenting efforts to 
undermine nationalist support, and in this way the state likely encouraged or amplified this 
discourse. Still, these allegations are, in Veena Das’s conceptualization, a form of language 
defined by its lack of signature that becomes pervasive and gains its “perlocutionary force” 
through an appeal to unfinished past events in the present.173 In this context of protracted conflict 
where, despite continuous polarization, the immediate horizon for political change remains 
elusive, these rumors reflect a broader disillusionment. And, as the joke about Brahim Hakim 
attests, the ‘a’id represents the quintessential opportunist in this context. 
*** 
 In the previous chapter, I introduced Lahcen, an ‘a’id who had been in Moroccan-
occupied Laâyoune/El Aaiún since the 1990s. Unlike other “first wave” ‘a’idin who benefited 
from jobs in government administration along with generous pay and housing, Lahcen 
experienced only marginalization since his return: 
When, from the highest reaches of the Moroccan state – which, at that time, was 
the late Hassan II – when we were called to as Sahrawis in the Polisario Front, 
they said to us that “the nation is forgiving and merciful,” and we listened to the 
speech, believing that in the call there was no clientelism or patronage. So we put 
the issue of the Sahara to the side. 
 But when we came to Morocco, they took revenge upon us and they threw 
us in the streets - listen, they threw us in the streets without any integration. Now, 
I am not a [state] employee - but when the Moroccan security forces from 
Mauritania - Sahrawi by origin - come here, they don’t learn/understand anything 
                                                
172 These rumors were, however, specific enough to claim that a Sahrawi living in the Canary Islands known as “the 
crow” [al-ghurab] allegedly serves as conduit for payments from SADR to Sahrawi nationalists in Moroccan-
occupied territory. 
173 Veena Das, “Specificities: Official Narratives, Rumour, and the Social Production of Hate,” Social Identities 4, 
no. 1 (2010): 109–30. 
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[la yfqahu shay’an]. They don’t know anything: on the issue of the Sahara, they 
are not well-educated. They don’t read at all. They don’t know anything besides 
their own name. They integrate here - complete integration, with a public 
job/position, and are welcomed with warm hospitality [bi hafawa]. But when we 
came from the Polisario Front, and we are from this very place – [we] the sons of 
the Sahara – we are thrown out and ignored and thrown in the alleyways and 
streets: decades without integration. Meaning, there was something duplicitous 
[an intent that was not trustworthy] in the call to us in the first place, on the part 
of King Hassan II. They took revenge on us for ten years. Why? 
 First, either because of the period that we spent in the Sahrawi army, or 
because of my father who resisted them. You understand? And that matter, we 
consider the drop that overflowed the cup. And the straw that broke the camel’s 
back…174 
Lahcen draws particular attention in this passage to the contrast between his marginalization, 
despite having lived in the territory prior to Morocco’s occupation, and the state’s recruitment of 
Mauritanians into the state security apparatus, as police, educators or administrators. This 
reflects a longstanding process in which Morocco has sought to turn the population of the Sahara 
“inside-out.” In casting the Moroccan state’s marginalization of him as an act of spite and 
vengeance, Lahcen contends that he and others fulfilled the moral arc of return called for by 
Hassan II, only to be betrayed by a duplicitous Moroccan state. 
 Despite this frustration at the marginalization that he has faced since his return to 
Moroccan-occupied territory, Lahcen’s reasons for returning stemmed from a similar sense of 
frustration while serving in the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army during the 1970s and 80s. 
Lahcen reported that, after being hospitalized in Algiers for battle wounds, he was reprimanded 
and imprisoned for his regiment’s behavior, then later removed from his position, serving the 
remainder of the war in a non-military position. Lahcen’s experience of marginalization by both 
Morocco and Polisario is reflected in his disavowal of both parties: 
I assure you that, now, I belong to neither Morocco nor the Front. I am 
moderate/in the middle [wasati], and I value dignity and peace and dignified 
living. I don’t like injustice or wrongdoing. And I am against the Polisario Front 
                                                
174 Interview October 11, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara 
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in certain matters, despite the fact that…25 [members of my family] are now with 
Polisario. And [I am] against Morocco on a number of ideas. And I do not support 
that Morocco should have sovereignty over the Sahara, unless it happens with our 
consultation and consent. That’s the end. Did you understand me? 
 Salam ‘alaykum. I am going to smoke a cigarette.175 
Many Sahrawis distance themselves from Polisario, for various reasons, but remain deeply 
committed to Sahrawi nationalism and the right to self-determination. Among ‘a’idin such as 
Lahcen, however, I encountered more of a resignation that the principles of the conflict 
themselves were no longer meaningful because they depended upon bankrupt political entities 
for their realization. Hence, his resort to abstract moral principles of dignity and peace. 
 Contrary to what these excerpts might suggest, Lahcen was quite reticent to talk about 
himself, and more interested in relaying a specific history to me, than in talking about himself. 
This set him apart both from pro-Morocco ‘a’idin who reflexively reported their experience of 
torture and abuse at the hands of Polisario leadership during the 1980s, and from huquqiyyin 
(Chapter 5), who would do the same in regards to ongoing Moroccan repression. What interested 
Lahcen most in our conversations were two things: conveying the importance of the events of 
1988 in the refugee camps, and coming up with new metaphors to describe the destruction and 
hopelessness that he bore witness to in the present. 
 The history of Polisario culminating in the events of 1988, in Lahcen’s telling, can be 
divided in two periods. The first period was between 1974 and 82, which involved the most 
intense fighting of the war and during which, for three years (1976-79) Polisario waged a war on 
two fronts against Morocco and Mauritania. Facing constant threats to its existence on the 
battlefield, this period was also marked by power struggles among leadership, some of which led 
to a series of purges within Polisario’s ranks. The first involved a dispute following a conference 
in 1974, when Polisario was still in its infancy. Members from the Saguiet al-Hamra region 
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surrounding Laâyoune/El Aaiún were imprisoned, after protesting that too many members of 
Polisario’s Executive Committee were from northern Mauritania and Algeria. This faction 
claimed that the preponderance of Algerian Sahrawis solidified the alliance between Polisario 
and the Algerian state from that point forward.176 Subsequent purges resulted less from power 
struggles than a concerted effort to target certain populations that were deemed potentially 
foreign elements and therefore untrustworthy by Polisario leadership, including members of 
Tekna tribes, a group of former prisoners under Spanish colonialism (Lglibat Lfoula), a group 
known as “friends of the French community” (Matar al-Ghar), and “the Mauritanian network.” 
 As these purges led to imprisonment, torture, disappearance, or defection (usually, at that 
time, to Mauritania),177 the ongoing near-total mobilization within the camps and beyond around 
winning the war left refugees in the camps unaware that SADR/Polisario’s security apparatus 
was turning on its own. Lahcen claimed that many people chose to ignore, or preferred not to 
know about, the “purging” going on within Polisario’s ranks during that time, in part because to 
voice these misgivings would have invited accusations of being a traitor [kha’in].178 But others 
claimed that conditions within the camps simply didn’t allow for people to acknowledge what 
was going on. On one occasion, a female ‘a’ida remarked that during this time, if one saw 
someone who looked disturbed (like they may have suffered abuse or torture), one didn’t ask any 
questions. However, Lahcen noted that eventually the purges between 1976 and 82 led a younger 
generation to start asking questions. This culminated in an intervention led by one of the 
founders of Polisario who occupied a number of leadership positions in the Front between 1976 
and 1988, including Director of Military Security, Omar Hadrami (also known by his nom de 
                                                
176 Hernández Moreno, Sáhara, 80–84. 
177 Nicola Cozza, “Singing like Wood-Birds: Refugee Camps and Exile in the Construction of the Saharawi Nation,” 
Ph.D. diss., (University of Oxford, 2004), 193. For one allegation of how torture was carried out at what was called 
the “National Hospital.” 
178 Fieldnote July 31, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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guerre, al-‘Athmi). As Hadrami brought these violations to light, the refugee camps erupted for 
five days in October in what is sometimes called the intifada of 1988: 
It was a fragile empire [embraturiya hasha]: no one lifted their head without 
getting it cut, until 1988. That intifada took place, and after that you could speak. 
And you could say, I’m so-and-so, son of so-and-so, from this tribe. You 
understand me? Then, you could say that, and no longer be afraid. 
 And those who undertook it included al-‘Athmi, and a group from among 
the younger members of the leadership. They are the ones who protested, which 
lifted the morale from that place where you couldn’t say a word, to where you 
could speak. And defend yourself/stand up for yourself. You understand me? If 
not for that, nothing.179 
A year later, in July 1989, Hadrami became the first high-profile ‘a’id to return to Morocco.180 
 The history of 1988 is one that has drawn little attention from scholars of the Western 
Sahara, with the exception of the aforementioned collection of oral histories of ‘a’idin 
(Hernández Moreno, Sahara: otras voces), and an unpublished dissertation (Cozza, Nicola, cited 
above). Likewise, Morocco’s best efforts to exploit this history of abuse to political advantage 
has not resonated either locally among Sahrawis, or beyond. Aside from the relative obscurity of 
this history, its importance to a group of ‘a’idin serves to highlight their disjunctive relationship 
to the nationalist histories that frame the ongoing conflict. Hadrami’s prominence in Lahcen’s 
account contrasts with the fact that Hadrami and other high-profile ‘a’idin have failed to build a 
popular following within Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, or in the camps. Indeed, many 
point out that, as a former Director of Polisario’s Military Security, Hadrami may well have been 
responsible for many of the abuses that he shed light on before departing for Morocco. Similarly, 
the significance of the purges during this time are often refracted through different social 
alignments. Some view the repression of this period in tribal terms, as the demographic majority 
                                                
179 Interview, March 28, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Polisario leadership held 
an emergency congress to address the demands of the protesters. Cozza reports that one decision reached as far as 
the abuses was that “a Sahrawi court would judge those high politicians responsible…only after the achievement of 
independence of Western Sahara.” Cozza, “Singing like Wood-Birds,” 199. 
180 Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, 305. 
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Rguibat wielded their power within the camps to persecute Tekna, Wlad Dlim and members of 
other, smaller tribes. Rguibat who consider Hadrami a traitor downplay the significance of the 
uprising in 1988, referring to it as a riot [shughab], rather than an intifada. And, finally, there are 
those who prefer to subordinate this history to the ongoing struggle for self-determination, 
referring to past abuses during this time as “simple mistakes” [al-’aghlat al-basita].181 
  Lahcen’s insistence that I understand the extent of and resistance to Polisario’s 
repression during the 1970s and 80 built upon a longer history in which he made clear that, 
historically, the people of Western Sahara never lived under Moroccan rule. Left with two 
histories negated by the present, it is small wonder that Lahcen’s views of the current political 
situation were shot through with cynicism. Invariably, when I would ask him for his opinion of 
protests in Laâyoune/El Aaiún going on at the time that called for human rights monitoring in 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Lahcen would dismissively state that the politics of the 
present were a product of a “fabricated Sahara” [al-Sahara al-mustana‘a or, sometimes al-
Sahara al-mufabraqa] and that the “original Sahara” which belonged to the “original Sahrawis” 
was as irretrievable as the Americas of the Native Americans. To make this point, Lahcen 
regularly resorted to colorful metaphors, suggesting that the Sahrawi people were like gum, and 
the forces of time, displacement and resettlement continue to stretch them more and more thinly, 
the better to chop them into pieces. (On another occasion, he used cilantro to make a similar 
point.) When I asked whether he supported those continuing to call for self-determination, he 
contended that they represented a “fabricated people” acting Sahrawi better than “the originals.” 
Other times, Lahcen conspiratorially suggested that the Moroccan state itself fostered the current 
version of the Sahrawi nationalist movement in the territory it occupies, and that the 
                                                
181 As one ‘a’id incredulously asked after citing this attitude, “what simple mistakes are there in execution? Or 
killing or kidnapping?” Interview June 30, 2014 Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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prolongation of the conflict served only to benefit political elites in Morocco as well as Polisario 
leadership in Tindouf, Algeria. Citing Nikolai Bukharin in reference to the seeming omnipotence 
of the Moroccan state in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, he grimly asserted, “when the state wants 
something from you, it gets something from you.”182 
 Lahcen’s cynicism constitutes a common and important political emotion in the context 
of prolonged political conflict in Western Sahara, and it is not incidental that the ‘a’id would be 
particularly prone to this disillusionment. As Lisa Wedeen noted in her study of Syrian citizens 
who developed means of dissimulating, or acting “as if” their support for an authoritarian regime 
were real, this dissimulation invariably has a depoliticizing effect.183 Building on Wedeen’s 
observations, Lori Allen remarked that a cynical disposition that had developed among many 
human rights workers in Palestine in the 2000s also created space for critique and hope.184 The 
context of Western Sahara resembles aspects of both Syria before the civil war, and Israel-
occupied Palestine. As in Syria under Assad, Western Sahara is a context of relentless 
politicization; as in Israel-occupied Palestine, the conflict’s prolonged stasis lends itself to apathy. 
In discussing the historiography of Polisario authoritarianism during the 1980s that Lahcen and 
other ‘a’idin find particularly important, I observe that the subordination of this history to a 
broader struggle that they can no longer actively support can lead to a generalized cynicism. 
While this cynicism certainly may create the space for critique, in the case of ‘a’idin such as 
Lahcen this disillusionment with both Morocco and Polisario does not provide much space for 
hope. 
                                                
182 Fieldnotes April 4, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Lahcen was educated in Cuba, 
which may have contributed to his familiarity with Bukharin. 
183 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 81. 
184 Lori Allen, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2013), 21–26. 
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*** 
On the other hand, ‘a’idin are somewhat unique in the context of nationalist conflict for 
openly flaunting political commitment. No longer bound by the poles of national loyalty or 
accusations of betrayal that politicize so much of everyday life in both Moroccan-occupied 
territory, and the refugee camps, ‘a’idin also embody a kind of opportunism that rejects the 
stakes of nationalist conflict. While many Sahrawis oppose Polisario but remain staunchly 
nationalist, the ‘a’id’s relative indifference toward either Moroccan or Polisario legitimacy 
constitutes a position – or non-position – that in certain instances seems to deflate the 
significance of national commitment itself. In this way, the ‘a’id’s opportunism is multivalent, 
constituted by rank self-interest, but also by a capriciousness or fickleness predicated on social 
and political mobility. In a recent article devoted to these figures, Sebastién Boulay notes that 
‘a’idin’s motives for “returning” generally have no bearing on their political convictions. This is 
important to note since Morocco tries to capitalize on the phenomenon of “returning,” [al-‘awda] 
by associating the act with political defection.185 As increasing numbers of ‘a’idin have little to 
no loyalty to Morocco, and may even remain outwardly antagonistic toward the state long after 
their arrival, the politics of al-‘awda may simply be embedded in the very act of mobility within 
a context of separation and confinement. 
As Boulay notes elsewhere in citing the work of the anthropologist Pierre Bonte, in the 
context of the Sahara and Mauritania, departure from a group can itself constitute a political act: 
In this nomadic western Saharan society, to separate [désolidariser] from a camp 
in order to settle elsewhere with one’s relatives is an evident mode of political 
autonomization, and more generally of scission and recomposition of groups 
(Bonte 2008).186 
 
                                                
185 Boulay, “Poétique et politique de la migration au Sahara occidental. Les «câ’idîn»: repentants, migrants ou 
ralliés?,” 103. 
186 Boulay, 100; Bonte, L’émirat de l’Adrar mauritanien. 
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In the contemporary context of prolonged nationalist conflict, the significance of al-‘awda may 
not lie in the act of leaving from one group for another, as was common among the “first wave” 
of ‘a’idin who left the refugee camps to join the Moroccan cause. Rather, in describing the 
relative fluidity of the ‘a’id’s political subjectivity, I am mostly referring to the more numerous, 
“second wave” ‘a’idin whose very mobility constitutes a kind of disconnection from the 
confining geographies and categories of nationalist conflict. Given Lahcen’s insistence on the 
“fabricated” reality of political activity going on around him, one might even see among certain 
‘a’idin in their disillusionment with the terms that structure everyday life a kind of ideological 
“dissociation” that allows them to hold the concrete abstraction of nationalist conflict in 
abeyance. I do not wish to suggest that this way of being relative to the political commitments 
that predominate and shape the contemporary landscape of Western Sahara are somehow 
“better” than the politics of committed nationalists. Rather, I wish to explore the potential, and 
limits, to acknowledging that a subject position produced by prolonged nationalist conflict, can 
generate certain kinds of political movement, mobility and opportunism that in turn challenge 
certain premises of the conflict itself. Can the figure of the ‘a’id, long considered a subject 
position of cynical opportunism, also entail a form of political movement and physical mobility 
that undermines the prevailing poles of loyalty and betrayal in a context of nationalist conflict? 
 
Section II – Nouadhibou, Mauritania: Mobility in Confinement 
Situated midway down the bay side of a peninsula that juts out into the Atlantic, Nouadhibou is 
Mauritania’s second-largest city. Originally established by the French as Port Etienne, the city 
subsequently became integral to Mauritania’s national economy, both as a fishing port and for 
the export of iron ore that is transported by train from the Mauritanian mines of Zouérate and 
F’derik some 670 kilometers to the east. The railway transporting iron in open-air cars reaches its 
 126 
terminus at the peninsula’s southern tip, at one of the administrative headquarters for 
Mauritania’s state mining entity, la Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière (SNIM), in a 
neighborhood known as Cansado.187 In an attempt to recruit foreign investment, the city has 
recently been designated a free-trade zone. In this sense, Nouadhibou is a classic enclave: a hub 
of import-export activity that constitutes a central node in the Mauritanian national economy, 
even as it exists in tenuous relation to the rest of the country geographically. 
 This tenuous relation is exacerbated by the fact that a political boundary dating back to 
the colonial era bisects the length of the peninsula. Where the bay side was part of French West 
Africa, the ocean side belonged to Spain, where a thriving port, La Guëra, emerged during the 
1960s as a commercial hub for imports from the Canary Islands. Separated by several kilometers, 
the growth of Nouadhibou and La Guëra was closely connected during this period such that 
locals, to avoid paying tariffs, would wait until sundown to smuggle imported Spanish goods 
across the peninsula by foot for resale in Mauritania. During the early years of the war in the 
mid-1970s many young men from the tribes of northern Mauritanian, known as “ahel al-Sahel,” 
were recruited by Polisario.188 Both Nouadhibou and La Guëra became military targets because 
of their strategic location relative to the railroad, a vital link to the import and export of 
hydrocarbons and minerals, respectively, for Mauritania’s national economy. Following Spain’s 
abrupt withdrawal in 1975, La Guëra was abandoned and today, under the terms of ceasefire, the 
formerly Spanish half of the peninsula is under SADR/Polisario’s jurisdiction. Because 
SADR/Polisario does not have or exercise the means to oversee this territory beyond periodic 
                                                
187 Cansado, meaning “worn out” in Spanish, is a company town built in the 1960s that houses SNIM management 
and their families. In addition to the railroad terminus, an oil and gas depot are located at the peninsula’s southern 
end. 
188 Interview, June 16, 2015, Nouadhibou, Mauritania. The interviewee described this period as “revolutionary 
times” between the Nasserist, Ba’athist ideas in circulation, as well as the Maoist Kadihin (“toilers”) movement that 
was ascendant in Mauritania in the early 1970s. “Those who stay and study will only worry – better to go” join the 
fight, was one of the sayings from the time that this man recounted. 
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sweeps through the area, this strip of land effectively exists in limbo. Today, aside from a 
handful of licensed fisherman and a few Mauritanian military officers on the lookout for 
contraband, La Guëra is a ghost town. The rest of the peninsula remains undeveloped,189 and 
serves as a kind of demilitarized zone between Morocco and Mauritania. 
As this tenuous relation to borders and competing sovereignties suggests, Nouadhibou is 
shaped by a fractured political landscape even as it is in Mauritania and therefore not technically 
a part of the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Hemmed in by the railroad and the boundary 
fence marking the formerly Spanish territory beyond it, the city stretches north-south along the 
bay side of the peninsula, a long and narrow patchwork of neighborhoods composed of different 
peoples living in relatively unintegrated juxtaposition. The “old” town, which dates back to the 
city’s establishment as a fishing port, is now largely populated by immigrants from across 
Central and West Africa working in artisanal or commercial fishing.190 The villas of Kra‘a 
Nasrani,191 where restaurants cater to Spanish, Chinese and other expatriates involved in the 
fishing industry, line the bank leading down from the “old” town to the commercial port. In the 
opposite direction, Numerowatt, the most populous section of Nouadhibou, stretches north up the 
peninsula toward the mainland, with its back to the bay.192 Dubai193 and Baghdad, two 
neighborhoods on either side of the main road that together constitute Numerowatt, are where the 
vast majority of Mauritanians and Sahrawis, collectively known as bidanis, live. 
                                                
189 The only exception to this is a monk seal observatory run by an environmental NGO that was built on the 
formerly Spanish, ocean side of the peninsula, with approval from SADR/Polisario. 
190 A rotating contingent of Spanish coast guard officers are based in Nouadhibou to police and deter boats of 
immigrants from striking out for the Canary Islands. 
191 Meaning “The Christian’s Leg” purportedly in reference to the leg of a pilot that landed in the neighborhood 
following an airplane accident. 
192 “Numerowatt” refers to a numbering system by which each section of the neighborhood is named according to its 
position in the grid of public water taps. “Robini 1” (from Fr robinet) is furthest south, up to Robini 6 at the edges of 
the city. 
193 Dubai is said to have emerged during the mid-2000s when cocaine trafficking significantly boosted the city’s 
economy. 
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As an enclave, Nouadhibou is a space of transit: for immigrants from Central and West 
Africa to work; for iron ore shipping out of the country with every train arriving from the mines; 
for cars and other goods imported overland from Europe through Morocco, en route east to the 
refugee camps in Algeria, or points south; and for the Mauritanian state to attempt to capture 
rents and fees from goods and people passing through. But it is also an important junction where 
Sahrawis from the refugee camps and from Moroccan-occupied Sahara meet and escape the heat, 
politically and climatically. Morocco and Algeria maintain consulates – meaning, as well, an 
intelligence presence – at opposite ends of the city, demonstrating the political salience of this 
space of movement and mobility within a geography of conflict and division. And in the 
summer, when the peninsula benefits from the cooling effects of Atlantic trade winds not found 
elsewhere in Mauritania, Nouadhibou’s population swells. Expansive villas in the neighborhood 
of Dubai are transformed from empty shells into bustling hubs of sociality. Apartment buildings 
to rent by the day in the more densely settled Baghdad neighborhood fill with vacationers from 
Nouakchott, Mauritania’s capital, as well as Sahrawi refugees escaping the desert heat of the 
camps in Algeria. At night, the streets are flooded with car and foot traffic. 
It was here where I met Mohamed Mouloud, who had come to Mauritania with his wife, 
their two children, his cousin’s family, and several in-laws. By the time we met, Mohamed 
Mouloud had been in Nouadhibou for a month, having arrived from the refugee camps where he 
had spent most of his life. Aside from the requisite tea set, prayer rug, and rolled up bedding, 
Mohamed Mouloud’s modest, two-bedroom rented apartment in Numerowatt remained 
characteristically unfurnished and spare. In the kitchen, stockpiled foodstuffs lined the floor: a 
huge sack of rice, a tub of cooking oil, and other goods brought from the camps and marked as 
humanitarian aid had been brought to provision the family for the summer. Unlike many of the 
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other visitors filling Nouadhibou that summer, however, Mohamed Mouloud, his family and in-
laws sharing the apartment in Numerowatt had packed up and left the refugee camps for good, 
intending to move to Dakhla, in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Although Mohamed 
Mouloud had been born in the refugee camps, and neither he nor any of his immediate family 
had ever been to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, in order to move to Morocco they had to 
present themselves to the Moroccan consulate as “returnees,” or ‘a’idin. 
Gathering I: The Aspiring ‘A’id 
Though some reach Moroccan-occupied Sahara by way of Spain, most “second wave” 
‘a’idin leaving directly from the refugee camps travel overland through northern Mauritania. The 
travel through northern Mauritania is necessary, because the heavily militarized sand berm that 
demarcates the eastern bounds of Moroccan-occupied territory is lined with soldiers and mines 
and largely prevents direct travel between the refugee camps and Moroccan-occupied territory.194 
Mohamed Mouloud’s extended family had taken the route through northern Mauritania to reach 
Nouadhibou, a two-day journey from the camps. The first leg involves roughly twelve hours of 
travel via four-wheel-drive “taxis” that ply the commercial route between the camps and 
Zouérate, the largest mining town of northern Mauritania. From Zouérate, travellers board the 
train that transports iron ore from mine to coast, a 16-hour trip. Though arduous, travel between 
the camps in southwest Algeria and northern Mauritania is a well-worn route, both on account of 
the deep ties between Sahrawis in the refugee camps and ahel al-Sahel of northern Mauritania, 
and because regional commerce based on re-selling humanitarian aid from the camps into the 
Mauritanian market is centered in Zouérate.195 
                                                
194 One of the “multahiqin” who left Moroccan-occupied territory to live in the camps, described his journey from 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún through an unmanned point in the berm and into the Liberated Territories controlled by 
Polisario, where he was picked up by the EPLS and taken to the camps. 
195 Cozza, “Singing like Wood-Birds,” 226–77. 
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When I first met Mohamed Mouloud, he had been in Nouadhibou for several weeks and 
was looking forward to reaching Moroccan-occupied territory soon. Over the next couple of 
months, which coincided that summer with Ramadan, we met fairly regularly either at his 
apartment or with whomever he was visiting among the large contingent of friends and 
acquaintances who were also summering in Nouadhibou. Unlike “first wave” returnees, whose 
discourse tends to adhere to a derogatory and highly politicized portrayal about the camps, 
Mohamed Mouloud easily switched between aspects of life in the refugee camps that he deeply 
valued, and his reasons for leaving. His cousin, he recalled, once denounced Polisario leaders to 
a BBC television crew: proof, he said, that one could speak freely in the camps. On the other 
hand, he noted that taking a political position in the camps that was in favor of anything less than 
Sahrawi self-determination risked facing accusations of being a Moroccan spy. Moreover, 
Mohamed Mouloud considered Polisario leadership corrupt, distributing political and economic 
opportunities along family lines, and monopolized by several subfractions, or afkhadh, of 
Rguibat al-Sharq: Awlad Daoud, Awlad Cheikh, Swayad, Tehellat, Boueihat. When we met a 
Sahrawi policeman riding in an official SADR state vehicle on the streets of Nouadhibou, which 
was not an uncommon sight that summer, Mohamed Mouloud good naturedly said to him at 
some point in their conversation, “but the Sahara’s not Polisario.” In an implicit critique of 
SADR’s centralized authority in the camps, he noted drily about the truck, “[Polisario’s] got a lot 
of those…” 
Perhaps most significantly, Mohamed Mouloud articulated commitment to the refugee 
camps in generational terms. An older generation had cast their lot with life in exile and accepted 
the sacrifices that come with living in the camps indefinitely: “[it’s] between them and God 
[mulana],” as he put it. A younger generation, including his own, will not abide: they go to Spain, 
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or wherever else, while making it clear that they won’t stand the status quo indefinitely. 
Mohamed Mouloud considered himself between these two generational positions: he had been 
born and grew up in the camps, went to school in Algeria196 – an experience that he remembered 
fondly despite the fact that it took place in the midst of the Algerian civil war – and, since 
returning to the camps, grew impatient with the lack of any meaningful opportunities to work, or 
save, for his family. As a result, he has turned his attention to providing for his children, and with 
that in mind, had made arrangements through a relative to move to Dakhla, in Moroccan-
occupied territory. Initiating this process required registering with the Moroccan consulate in 
Nouadhibou for the “right to return” [haq al-‘awda] and qualify for benefits [al-in‘ash]. 
Like many aspects of the Morocco-Polisario conflict, the process of “returning” is 
coordinated between Moroccan state officials in Foreign Affairs, the military, and intelligence 
apparatuses associated with the Ministry of the Interior. In the late-1980s and early-90s, the first 
‘a’idin would simply appear, unannounced, in Morocco while their means of getting there 
remain shrouded by the opacity of intelligence work and the intrigue of diplomatic maneuvering.  
As mobility between the refugee camps and Moroccan-occupied territory has increased since 
2000, the process of “return” has become somewhat less fraught. The approval of ‘a’id status 
still passes through the Moroccan security state nexus, however, and therefore remains opaque 
and arbitrary. When I first met Mohamed Mouloud, he was optimistic that he and his family 
would be moving to Dakhla as soon as within a week. In anticipation, he was full of questions 
about how the cities in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara compared with Nouadhibou. As time 
wore on, however, it became apparent that he had little sense or control over when Morocco 
                                                
196 It is common for students in the refugee camps to be sent abroad for secondary and higher education. The state 
sponsors a limited number of students to study in Cuba; larger numbers study in Algeria. See Dawn Chatty, 
Deterritorialized Youth: Sahrawi and Afghan Refugees at the Margins of the Middle East (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2010). 
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would grant him “the right of return.”  
On the surface, the process of “return” seemed simple. Mohamed Mouloud reported that 
after presenting himself at the Moroccan consulate in Nouadhibou and declaring his interest in 
“returning to the nation [al-watan],” he was asked some questions (“they examine your frame of 
mind verbally” [ykharras nefsiyatek shafahiyan”]), and then told to wait. Mohamed Moloud and 
his friends and acquaintances who had either gone through the process of “return,” or were trying 
to, all recognized that the Consulate is mere window-dressing. Rather, they said, the men 
working in intelligence stationed at the Consulate were the ones running the operation and 
making the decisions. Whatever the logic and timing to getting approval for “return,” the process 
seemed both simple but also entirely opaque. 
One evening, an acquaintance from the camps who had become an ‘a’id and was working 
in Moroccan-occupied Dakhla joined Mohamed Mouloud and his friends. Gathered on the floor 
around the requisite tea set, in the back room of a rented house in Numerowatt Robini 1, the 
evening had the feeling of an information session: everyone was interested in what the friend 
from Dakhla had to say about conditions in Moroccan-occupied territory. The man from Dakhla 
embraced the role of resident expert, regaling us with stories of what daily life was like in 
Dakhla (“people are citified and time is full”), his ambivalence about living amongst so many 
chilha197 (“you feel as though it’s not in your interest [to be around so many chilha], but then 
when you think about it…”), and his encounters with the Moroccan state. Most dramatically, 
however, the friend from Dakhla launched into a story of crossing the border in order to arrive in 
                                                
197 The word (chilha, sing.) refers to the amazigh, or Berber, people of southern Morocco, distinguished by their 
language, tachelheit. Catherine Taine-Cheikh, Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français. dialecte arabe de Mauritanie 6, 6, 
(Paris: Geuthner, 1990). Tachelheit-speaking amazigh people have historically been Sahrawi’s immediate neighbors 
to the north. In my fieldwork, chilha-chleuh was commonly used to refer to Moroccans or Algerians, in general, as 
people from north of the Sahara. In Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara chilha frequently simply refers to 
Moroccans.   
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Morocco, largely to advise Mohamed Mouloud who had purchased a van in Nouadhibou and 
hoped to bring the vehicle with him and his family into Morocco. 
Everyone, the friend from Dakhla says, has the right to bring a car into Morocco, but not 
livestock.198 As proof, he described reaching the border between Morocco and Mauritania, which 
involves a gap of several kilometers, known variously as al-Guerguerat, “the hole” [al-hufra] or, 
colloquially, Qandahar, where free trade in various kinds of goods (cars, cigarettes, hashish) has 
flourished over the years.199 According to several accounts I heard about this border (I did not 
make this border crossing myself), there is often a long line of vehicles waiting to get through 
Moroccan customs – “Africans transporting ‘all kinds of stuff,’ and chilha bringing goods from 
Morocco,” as the friend from Dakhla put it – such that travelers often have to sleep in their 
vehicle overnight in order to keep their place in queue. After waiting overnight in line, the friend 
from Dakhla described reaching the front of the line only to be told that he couldn’t bring his car 
into the territory. As the friend told it, he used “convincing language” [al-kalam al-muqni‘a], 
holding his ground until a higher-up came down from his post and ultimately approved entry for 
this man and his car. In this way, the success story of using “convincing language” (the friend 
was quick to point out that “convincing language” did not entail getting angry or yelling at the 
gendarmes), provided an example for how ‘a’idin could strategically assert their agency in the 
face of a vast political machinery meant to intimidate them. As background to this example, 
however, the ‘a’id friend from Dakhla stressed the important role played by luck [“al-’azhar, 
                                                
198 In this conversation, it was alleged that the Joumani family enjoys a monopoly on camels in the territory. 
199 The unregulated nature of this space between borders leaves it vulnerable to arbitrary intervention. Folks in 
Nouadhibou reported that sales of second-hand vehicles from Europe had flourished in “the hole” throughout the 
2000s until the President of Mauritania, Mohamed ould Abdelaziz, enacted new regulations restricting the kinds of 
automobiles that could be imported into Mauritania. In August, 2016 Moroccan armed forces, in an apparent 
violation of terms of the UN ceasefire occupied “the hole” under the pretense that they were cracking down on 
contraband there.Edith M. Lederer, “Morocco Accused of Cease-Fire Violation in Western Sahara,” The Big Story, 
August 16, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/f647c6f8c73b4e7fbdbfb16431bdf183/morocco-accused-cease-fire-
violation-western-sahara. 
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‘endhu dur kebir”] in determining how long one has to wait to earn the “right of return.” The 
friend had waited several months; the same would end up being true of Mohamed Mouloud and 
his family, as well. 
Gathering II: Judgment 
Late one evening during Ramadan, Mohamed Mouloud and I were in a rented house in 
the northern reaches of Nouadhibou, in Numerowatt Robini 6. We were with a group of men 
watching television and making tea, including: an ‘a’id who had made the trip to Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún to see relatives from the refugee camps summering in Nouadhibou; a friend from the 
refugee camps; Mohamed Mouloud’s brother-in-law; and a Mauritanian-Sahrawi man who lived 
in Nouadhibou but had family in the refugee camps. It was after midnight, and we had all had 
many rounds of tea when the conversation turned to Omar Hadrami. Hadrami, as mentioned 
previously, was one of the earliest ‘a’idin, having defected to Morocco in 1989. As a founding 
member of the Polisario Front, Hadrami was and remains one of the most high-profile ‘a’idin to 
have left the camps and, since his “return” to Morocco, has served a number of prominent roles 
in national and regional government. 
In the summer of 2015, Hadrami was in the news again, having recently been appointed 
to a new position advising the King of Morocco on Saharan affairs, which prompted Mohamed 
Mouloud to assert that he thought Hadrami “supports Sahrawis” [ybghri al-Sahrawiyyin] despite 
actively opposing the Polisario Front and having disavowed Sahrawi nationalism. The 
Mauritanian-Sahrawi man with family in the refugee camps flatly rejected this statement as “a 
contradiction.” The group argued over this for a while, and it became clear that most of the 
others were dubious of Mohamed Mouloud’s view. Mohamed Mouloud’s younger brother-in-
law sided with the Mauritanian-Sahrawi, explaining that Hadrami chose his mother’s people, 
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referring to the Aït Oussa, a Tekna tribe based in Wed Nun, over “his own” tribe (meaning the 
tribe of his agnatic kin), the Rguibat. This led someone to take a straw poll. Everyone besides 
Mohamed Mouloud thought the assertion that one could “be” Sahrawi and not be nationalist was 
an untenable position. One friend, making tea, stared at the television, apparently abstaining. 
This led someone to declare cryptically that national identity can be democratic in this way, and 
conversation moved on. 
Although this impromptu referendum brought closure to the question of identity in the 
context of this gathering, the constituents of this conversational vote were themselves occupying 
multiple subject positions. The man who flatly rejected Mohamed Mouloud’s proposition as “a 
contradiction,” for example, lives in Mauritania but has close ties to the refugee camps. These 
folks are sometimes referred to as “Mauritanian of Sahrawi origins” or simply ahel al-Sahel. 200 
Ahel al-Sahel refers to the tribes historically associated with the territory of Western Sahara, 
such as Rguibat, Wlad Dlim, Laarousiyin and Barikallah, which are largely coterminous with 
those found throughout Mauritania, but specifically those concentrated in the country’s drier, 
northern region. The ties between Polisario and northern Mauritania run deep. After facing 
repression within Morocco, Polisario leadership was largely based out of northern Mauritania 
between the years of 1973 and 1975 and announced its establishment from the northern 
Mauritanian mining town of Zouérate in 1973. Even as the Mauritanian state capitulated to 
pressure from first Spain and then Morocco to repress Polisario’s activities within the country, 
many people in northern Mauritania continued to materially support Polisario fighters. A 
Mauritanian National Security report from that era notes: 
                                                
200 al-Sahel in the social geography of the Sahara refers to “the coast” where the desert gives way to the landscapes 
of less arid climates. Ahl al-Sahel is a relational term that predates colonial or national borders and distinguishes 
more nomadic people of al-Sahel from those living in the similarly arid east (ahel al-Sharq), where there are more 
oases, and the south (al-Qibla), which borders the Senegal River and supports cattle. 
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It is certain that all of the sons of the tribes of the region are offering support for 
the Sahrawi fighters, and especially those of the Rguibat tribe to which most of 
the Front’s leadership belong…this includes the contributions of merchants and 
Sahrawi workers, as well as certain Bedouin notables/elders [wujuha’] who 
present their camels to the Front’s bases in order to provide meat to the fighters, 
while the women donated their jewelry.201 
 
The leader of Polisario at the time, El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, sought to convince the President of 
Mauritania, Mokhtar ould Daddah, of their shared cause by describing the Sahrawi and 
Mauritanian peoples as “two eggs in one nest.”202 At the diplomatic level, however, the 
Mauritanian government contested the Western Saharan people’s right to self-determination 
before the UN on the very grounds of these similarities, claiming that the peoples of the two 
territories shared the same “cultural entity” known as trab al-bidan.203 When war broke out in 
1976 and the Mauritanian state sided with Morocco, many ahel al-Sahel moved to the refugee 
camps and joined Polisario. And as processes of displacement, resettlement and mobility have 
continually shaped and reshaped the geography of political conflict in the Sahara since the 
1970s, the overlap between Sahrawi and Mauritanian peoples – particularly those in northern 
Mauritania – has remained constant.  
Unofficial figures from ten years ago estimate that 25,000 Sahrawis live in Mauritania, 
mostly in the cities of northern Mauritania, Nouadhibou, F’derik and Zouérate.204 It should not 
be surprising, then, that refugees in the camps remain closely connected with Mauritania through 
commercial, kinship or other property ties that go back generations. It is not unusual for a family 
to maintain property both in the camps and in the mining towns of Zouérate and F’derik, 
regularly traveling between both. An older generation, in particular, may use a combination of 
                                                
201 Mohamed Mukhtar Bin Sidi Mohamed al-Hadi, “Harb Al-Sahra‘ Al-Gharbiya Wa ‘atharuha Fi Mauritaniya 
1975-1978,” Majalla al-Dirasat al-Tarikhiya Wa Al-Ijtima‘iya 1 (Summer 2013): 28. 
202 Fieldnote, Nouadhibou, Mauritania, May 25, 2015. 
203 ICJ., Sahara Occidental. Avis Consultatif Du 16 Octobre 1975 = Western Sahara. Advisory Opinion of 16 
October 1975. ([The Hague]: ICJ, 1975). 
204 Cozza, “Singing like Wood-Birds,” 33. 
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Mauritanian and Sahrawi forms of identification to access pasturelands of northern Mauritania 
and those in the territory of Western Sahara under Polisario control, known in the refugee camps 
as the Liberated Territories. Others may renew a prior generation’s connection with Mauritania 
in search of employment, or simply mobility. In one instance, I met a man who was born in 
Zouérate where his father worked on building the railroad that now transports iron ore to the 
coast. When the war broke out in 1976, his father joined Polisario and the family moved to the 
camps, where they have been based ever since. Forty years later, the family retains the original 
plot of land in Zouérate, though diminished in size, where, when I met him, this man was staying 
and applying for a Mauritanian passport in order to visit family in Moroccan-occupied territory. 
To be sure, certain distinctions between Mauritanians and Sahrawis have inevitably 
sharpened with time, whether from the lingering bitterness left by the four years of war between 
Mauritania and Polisario, the effects of Morocco’s attempts to instrumentalize “non-Sahrawi” 
Mauritanians by resettling them in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, or simply the distinct 
habitus that has developed among those living in the particular political and economic conditions 
of refugee camps. Particularly when people from around the region converge on Nouadhibou in 
the summer, a range of markers, from clothing to moral and ethical judgments of behavior, are 
used to distinguish between Sahrawis and Mauritanians. However, the identity “Mauritanian of 
Sahrawi origins” captures the enduring overlap between refugees and the tribes of ahel al-Sahel, 
blurring these distinctions and complicating the relationship between the consolidation of 
national identity and its boundaries. 
In this way, the resident of Nouadhibou who called Mohamed Mouloud’s position on 
Omar Hadrami “a contradiction,” himself embodies a contradiction inherent in the Sahrawi 
national project. In a disaggregated political landscape where affiliation and belonging typically 
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mapped onto genealogical cartographies of kinship, in the case of tribe, and cultural spaces tied 
to models of moral excellence, in the case of trab al-bidan, efforts to consolidate a unitary sense 
of ethnic nationalism constantly face the issue of who falls “inside” and “outside” of these 
boundaries. Recent literature on the importance of “connectivity” to the reproduction of 
economic, social and cultural space in the Sahara highlight the difficulties posed by new, 
postcolonial modes of identification: 
Hence, in the contemporary Sahara, with the growing impact of centralized states, 
nationalism, and the bounded and exclusive ethnic categories that accompany 
them, radically different notions of identity are put forward, putting pressure on 
earlier identities that relied on regional connectivity.205 
The notion of connectivity is an important one, as it conveys an aspect of life in the Sahara 
integral to the sociocultural realms. However, I would also like to posit the importance of fluidity 
and multiplicity, which are characteristic of political subjectivity in the Saharan context where 
mobility and separation are as important to the realm of political authority as connectivity and 
consolidation. The “Mauritanian of Sahrawi origins” embodies this phenomenon of multiplicity 
and fluidity in a single subject position. 
While the man from Nouadhibou called Mohamed Mouloud’s proposition “a 
contradiction,” the more extended reply came from Mohamed Mouloud’s brother-in-law. By 
referring to Hadrami’s split allegiance between his mother’s people, from the Ait Oussa tribe, 
and his father’s people, the Rguibat, Mohamed Mouloud’s in-law questioned Omar Hadrami’s 
loyalty not explicitly in national terms, but through the idiom of kinship and tribal affiliation. By 
suggesting that Hadrami placed ties to his matrilineal kin over and above those on his father’s 
side, the young man used the patrilineal norms of tribal kinship to cast aspersions on Hadrami’s 
political loyalty. Parsing Hadrami’s national and political commitment through the idiom of 
                                                
205 Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 127. 
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kinship and tribal affiliation, this explanation highlights the entanglement of national and state 
sovereignty projects in the Sahara with social relations organized by kinship and tribe. This 
returns to Alice Wilson’s point that state and tribal sovereignty in the Sahara are formed out of 
the same social relations, and that one process of making sovereignty entails the “umaking” of 
the other. Wilson foregrounds this mutual imbrication between the relations of tribal and state 
sovereignty in the context of the refugee camps in order to note that this relationship is not 
unidirectional: sometimes tribal relations are overwritten by the state, while at other times they 
reassert their significance.206 Similarly, the young man’s evaluation of Hadrami’s loyalty and 
betrayal in terms of kin aligns Sahrawi nationalism with Hadrami’s father’s tribe, Rguibat, and 
allegiance to Morocco with his mother’s, Aït Oussa. 
In doing so, the brother-in-law is also referring to Hadrami’s subject position along two 
fault lines that have persisted during efforts to unify under the collective identity of Sahrawi 
during the era of decolonization. While the Rguibat constitute the largest tribe populating 
Western Sahara, and are particularly dominant in both refugee camp society and Polisario 
leadership, Aït Oussa is one of the largest Tekna tribes (a collection of Saharan tribes based in 
Oued Noun in southern Morocco). Rguibat and Aït Oussa have historically intermarried, 
Hadrami being just one product of this union between members of these rival tribes. Following 
the failure of the Moroccan Liberation Army in the 1950s, however, the Moroccan state 
cultivated support among the Aït Oussa, furnishing them with weapons and promoting raids 
between the two tribes as a means of sowing distrust.207 Perhaps as a result, the Aït Oussa tribe 
has been heavily recruited into the Moroccan Army, and Aït Oussis occupy prominent positions 
in the upper echelons of Moroccan state administration. By suggesting that Hadrami “preferred 
                                                
206 Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile, 32. 
207 Fieldnote, undated, Tan Tan, Morocco. 
 140 
his mother’s people” to his father’s tribe, the young man accuses Hadrami of siding with the Aït 
Oussa over the Rguibat and, by association, Morocco over Polisario. The distinction remains 
significant both within the camps, where Rguibat are seen to be the dominant constituents of 
Polisario and SADR, and in Moroccan society, where to be Rguibat is to be ascribed a subject 
position of potential traitor (see Chapter 5). 
In addition to the Rguibat-Tekna division, the young man is also referring to a division 
within the Rguibat tribe between the afkhadh, or tribal subfractions, known as “Rguibat al-
Sahel,” found closer to the Atlantic coast, and Rguibat al-Sharq. While together these two halves 
form the Rguibat tribe, this division follows the segmentary logic of North African and Middle 
Eastern tribal affiliations more generally, whereby smaller groupings stand in opposition to one 
another unless the imperative arises to unite against a common foe who lies outside the groups’ 
kinship structures.208 In the case of Rguibat al-Sahel and Rguibat al-Sharq, these divisions have 
largely been subsumed under the Sahrawi identity and Polisario’s project of national liberation. 
However, the consolidation of Polisario’s leadership by members of afkhadh from Rguibat al-
Sharq during the 1970s, and the leadership’s repression, torture and abuse that came to light in 
1988 exacerbated resentment among Rguibat al-Sahel (as well as other tribes) over their 
marginalization. While members of all tribes participated in the 1988 uprising in the refugee 
camps, members of Rguibat al-Sharq view the event as a divisive “riot” that reproduced the 
segmentary divisions between Rguibat al-Sharq and Rguibat al-Sahel. The rebellion was led, of 
course, by none other than Omar Hadrami, a member of Rguibat al-Sahel. 
                                                
208 E Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, a Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic 
People, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940); E Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, By E.E. Evans-
Pritchard. (Oxford  Clarendon Press, 1968); Ernest Gellner, Saints of the Atlas. ([Chicago]: University of Chicago 
Press, 1969). 
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This discussion among ‘a’idin in Nouadhibou captures the complex array of identities 
involved in constituting Sahrawi nationalism, and the competing frameworks for expressing 
collective identities. In light of this conversation, I would like to return to Alice Wilson’s 
perceptive point that nation-state and tribal projects of sovereignty in the Sahara are mutually 
imbricated. Questions of loyalty and affiliation are regularly expressed through the idiom of 
kinship, illustrating how the emergence of national identities do not erase pre-existing forms. 
However, I would suggest that the categories involved in this discursive space are not limited to 
the binary of nation-state or tribe. I have highlighted this conversation among a group of men in 
Nouadhibou for what it conveys about the multiple identities that many individuals embrace 
within the fragmented political geography of decolonization in Western Sahara. Both tribal and 
national affiliations in this context associate with collectivities that overlap current geopolitical 
boundaries (Sahrawi, Tekna, ahel al-Sahel), and in other cases subdivide genealogically and 
geographically within a broader unity (ahel al-Sahel/Sharq/Qibla in Mauritania, Rguibat al-
Sharq/al-Sahel in Western Sahara). Identities emerge in relation to tribe and nation, but also in 
relation to hierarchical cultural spatial imaginaries that exists outside of national time (trab al-
bidan), as well as subject positions that emerge in the context of prolonged nationalist conflict 
(‘a’id). 
Indeed, the fact that most of the men were either ‘a’idin, or in the process of “returning” 
is an important factor in the conversation that I have been analyzing. Their mobility, as ‘a’idin, 
destabilizes the poles of loyalty and betrayal in the context of nationalist conflict. But the inverse 
is true, too: the group’s appraisals and dismissals of Omar Hadrami, who is in many respects 
considered the original ‘a’id, serves to historicize the category that they share. Their willingness 
to judge Hadrami without assuming that his status as a defector defined their own, highlights 
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shifts and continuities in the significance of the figure as a subject position in regional context. 
The “return” of Hadrami in 1989 was nothing short of a political spectacle: for many, al-‘Athmi 
embodied the notion of “return” as betrayal. Twenty-five years later, the act of “returning” was 
less about political motive, and more a matter of finding work, education for children, a future. 
In this way, requesting “the right to return” from the Moroccan state is no longer considered a 
humiliating act of betrayal and shame, but simply an expression of movement and mobility. 
Reflecting upon the aftermath of civil war in Sri Lanka, another context of nationalist conflict, 
Sharika Thiranagama suggests that historically shifting judgments of treason and betrayal give 
perspective for how judgments of political right and wrong are made, but additionally indicate 
how politics could have been framed otherwise: 
Traitors, then, are not given once and for all but created by history, as new frames 
of interpretation are opened up, allowing a sense that it could have been different, 
that there were other possible forms of engagement. Only by exploring the 
complex ethical terrain through which acts of treason are judged and evaluated 
can we begin to understand why some people are violently punished for acts of 
betrayal, while others are either forgiven or ignored.209 
 
Given the multiple frameworks for making sense of identity and political action that were 
expressed in this conversation about Omar Hadrami, and the fact that it took place among 
“returnees,” itself a subject position of movement and mobility, I suggest that these men were 
implicitly discussing “other possible forms of engagement” within a political context structured 
by nationalist loyalty and betrayal. 
Finally, it is not incidental that this conversation was taking place in Nouadhibou, rather 
than within Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara or the refugee camps in Algeria. Mohamed 
Mouloud’s suggestion that one could “support” Sahrawis collectively and not support Sahrawi 
nationalism, for example, would immediately invite suspicion of betraying the national cause if 
                                                
209 Sharika Thiranagama, Tobias Kelly, and Sharika Thiranagama, Traitors: Suspicion, Intimacy, and the Ethics of 
State-Building (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 21. 
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he were to state this in the refugee camps. Conversely, questioning Morocco’s occupation of the 
Sahara from within Morocco is nearly impossible.210 In Nouadhibou, by contrast, there is much 
greater latitude in discussing the effects of ongoing political conflict. In this space of transit, 
Sahrawis and Mauritanians from across the region converge in a space devoid of much of the 
suspicion and surveillance that structures Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Likewise, the 
popular discourse of national diplomacy that predetermines many interactions with foreigners 
visiting the refugee camps is not pervasive here. Of course, the convergence of people from 
around a politically fragmented region will reproduce many of the tensions and suspicions at the 
heart of the nationalist conflict. It was not incidental that one of Mohamed Mouloud’s friends 
kept his silence when the “referendum” on Sahrawi identity was put forward in Robini 6, staring 
at the television instead: many prefer to keep these thoughts to themselves, even in Nouadhibou. 
Nonetheless, in serving as both a hub of movement and mobility within the regional geography 
of confinement, and an enclave that stands outside of the loci of competing sovereignties, 
Nouadhibou provides a setting where the processes of fixing people’s identities are held in 
abeyance. This context where the recitation of political scripts that achieve diplomatic visibility, 
express national loyalty, and confirm identification are contested, if not refuted, provides the 
conditions for “other possible forms of engagement” with the region’s past in the present.211 
 
Section III: Identification by Referendum 
                                                
210 Two noteworthy exceptions, Samia Errazouki and Nadir Bouhmouch, have both visited Sahrawi refugee camps 
and critiqued Moroccan state policy on the Sahara, although both accounts were published from outside Morocco, I 
believe. Samia Errazzouki, “Part 1: Notes from the Western Saharan Refugee Camps,”                   
(blog), accessed May 17, 2014, http://samiacharquaouia.wordpress.com/2014/05/11/part-1-notes-from-the-western-
saharan-refugee-camps/; Errazzouki, “Chomsky on the Western Sahara and the ‘Arab Spring.’” 
211 Nicola Cozza’s dissertation serves as another example. Most of Cozza’s fieldwork was conducted in 
Nouadhibou, and he recorded oral accounts of the 1988 intifada in the refugee camps. The silence on this part of the 
history in literature on the Western Sahara conflict reflects the predominance of research conducted within the 
refugee camps. (‘A’idin in Moroccan-occupied territory spoke of this event, as well, but in Morocco any discourse 
devaluing Polisario carries the stain of state-backed propaganda.) Cozza, “Singing like Wood-Birds.”  
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 One such form of engagement took place through the straw poll, which brought the 
men’s discussion of Omar Hadrami and Sahrawi nationalism to an end. As was intended by the 
Sahrawi-Mauritanian man who proposed it, the vote was carried out quickly and informally, by 
voice and gesture – or abstention from both – and confirmed a majority view within the group 
that Sahrawi identity could not be decoupled from nationalism. Neither the suggestion nor the 
outcome of the vote elicited much debate. Rather, in bringing closure to a voluble exchange of 
views, the casting of votes provided a segueway for the conversation to move on to a less 
contentious or explicitly political topic. Despite its apparent simplicity, the conversational vote 
was also a gesture toward the unrealized referendum on self-determination for Western Sahara. 
A part of the formal process for applying self-determination under international law, a 
referendum in Western Sahara was preempted first by Morocco’s invasion in 1975, and 
subsequently – and perhaps more agonizingly – during a prolonged process during the 1990s. As 
part of the ceasefire agreement of 1991, the United Nations established a peacekeeping mission 
in Western Sahara, MINURSO, tasked with overseeing a referendum. Hopes were high that the 
referendum would be carried out within the year.212  
From the outset, however, Morocco and Polisario staked out conflicting positions on how 
to determine the list of eligible voters for the upcoming referendum. Polisario sought to restrict 
the list of eligible voters to those listed on a 1974 Spanish census, and their descendants. 
Morocco sought much more expansive criteria, calling for the inclusion of all members of all 
tribes associated with the territory. These differences were strategic. Polisario counted on a more 
restricted voter roll to work in its favor, even if the colonial-era census may have excluded some 
of the families of Polisario’s founding members and highest ranking officials. Morocco’s 
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Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate? (Boulder, CO [etc.]: Rienner, 2012), 43. 
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position in opposition sought to include tribes with tenuous connections to the territory, but 
whose members, the government believed, could be counted on to vote in Morocco’s interest. 
Those tribes which under Spanish administration had been listed as “Tribes of the North,” and 
“Tribes of the Coast and South” became the focus of the dispute, since these were terms used by 
Spanish administration to categorize anyone living in the territory who did not belong to one of 
what Spain identified as the territory’s seven main tribes (Rguibat Charg, Rguibat Sahel, 
Izerguiyin, Ait Lahsen, Laaroussiyin, Wlad Dlim, Wlad Tidrarin).213 The dispute centered on 
both which tribes to include, but also, if including parts of “neighboring” tribes, whether to allow 
eligibility up to the level of tribal subfraction (al-fakhdh), or a more narrow kinship group (al-
ahel).  
In an attempt to resolve this dispute over the criteria for voting, MINURSO established 
an Identification Commission, with agencies set up across the region in Moroccan-occupied 
Western Sahara, Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, as well as across Morocco and Mauritania. 
As Erik Jensen, the former UN employee who directed this process, notes in his detailed account 
of MINURSO’s Identification Commission during the 1990s, Morocco and Polisario’s dispute 
over the criteria of eligible voters for the referendum did not translate easily into a technical 
solution.214 The struggle over the anthropological basis for determining a voter list had 
implications for the evidence and procedure used for verifying potential voters’ identity and 
affiliation. Polisario’s position depended upon Spanish documentation for verification. Morocco 
argued that colonial-era documentation excluded family members living outside the territory at 
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that time. In response, Morocco asserted that all members of any tribal subfraction counted in the 
Spanish census should be eligible to vote, and that oral testimony verified by shaykhs from each 
subfraction ought to be used.  
Moreover, as the UN-led process of determining eligible voters unfolded, Morocco 
increasingly appeared to be exploiting the bureaucratic process by flooding the Identification 
Commission with applications. The Commission, which had set up processing stations in 
Morocco, northern Mauritania, the refugee camps, as well as the territory of Western Sahara 
itself, received three times as many new applications from its offices in Morocco as from those 
in refugee camps and Mauritania combined.215 In addition, I heard from several people whose 
relatives had been recruited to “train” non-Sahrawi’s to present themselves as Sahrawi before the 
Commission.216 As a result, the process of identifying a list of eligible voters dragged on for the 
better part of a decade, and has been largely abandoned ever since results of the initial round of 
the identification process were published in 2000.217 Across the region, this period is referred to 
holistically as ‘amaliya tahdid al-hawiya, or the identification process. 
 Given this context, the impromptu vote in Nouadhibou among friends evoked the history 
of this unresolved political project. Not only did it bring closure to the topic of conversation but 
this gesture performed a kind of resolution to determining the “self” in Western Sahara. Even as 
it evoked the unresolved project of Sahrawi popular sovereignty, the vote among friends also 
served as a point of contrast, an expression that consolidated the meaning of Sahrawi identity 
simply, decisively, and in a manner which has eluded Sahrawis to this day. By staging “other 
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possible forms of engagement” with the region’s past in the present, this brief and relatively 
uncontroversial vote among friends in Robini 6 in Nouadhiobu was, in a sense, an act of self-
determination. In this way, the act was performative if not effective. Their vote, which stages the 
sovereignty of “the people,” in a national sense, brings to mind Nathaniel Berman’s notion that 
the “self” in self-determination is a “form of argument:” 
The recognition of a particular ‘people’ is an effect of a particular form of 
discursive reconstruction. The ‘self’ of self-determination emerges through the 
particular textual dynamics of subjective and objective conceptions, dynamics 
guided by the particular type of disruption giving rise to their conflict. No less 
than the legal competence over self-determination, the ‘self’ is a form of 
argument.218 
Berman’s analysis comes from looking at the legal discourse of self-determination in 
international law, one which has taken place through moments of disjuncture or transition when 
sovereignty is, as his title indicates, “in abeyance.”219 This insight helps to think through the 
discussion of identity and belonging taking place in Numerowatt 6 as, similarly, a form of 
argument between a group of men. In this sense, evoking the referendum belies its inescapable 
presence in the history of the region’s decolonization, but is also expressive of their own 
“subjectivity in abeyance,” as ‘a’idin who, themselves, were on a trajectory, movement, or 
transition, between identities and subject positions. 
 
Section IV – Multiple Returns 
 Despite the duration of the Identification Commission process throughout the 1990s, the 
intricacies of the process directly affected only certain groups. Those shaykhs appointed by 
either Morocco or Polisario to preside over oral testimony of prospective voters, for example, 
found themselves in positions of concentrated power. In the context of the refugee camps, this 
                                                
218 Berman, “Sovereignty in Abeyance,” 103. 
219 Berman, “Sovereignty in Abeyance.” 
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made for a particularly sudden shift given that Polisario had worked for a generation to dissolve 
what it considered traditional, or tribal, bases of authority. For those who registered and testified 
before the Identification Commission, however, the process was largely administrative. 
Certainly, there were contentious cases: like something out of a soap opera, people alluded to 
instances where shaykh’s, under political pressure, refused to recognize people who were 
patently from their own family. Or, for example, in the case of those presented by Morocco as 
prospective voters who had no connection to the Sahara, there were stories of how the training 
that these candidates underwent ultimately revealed itself, as these fraudulent applicants 
stumbled over their newly adopted Sahrawi name, or failed in some other crucial detail. More 
generally, however, I found that people who lived through the experience either did not want to 
talk about it, or found the experience mundane. One woman simply recounted her day as a 
mundane, bureaucratic experience: somewhat baffled by what to do, she followed instructions, 
answered questions, and was otherwise nonplussed by the experience.220 
 However, the significance of the identification process could be seen in relation to 
broader transformations to the region. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Morocco transferred large 
numbers of settlers to the territory and began investing heavily in regional economic 
development durin this time. Many of these settlers were poor Moroccans transplanted to cities 
in Western Sahara such as Boujdour, Dakhla and Tarfaya with promises of housing and land. 
Some underwent the training described above; these transplants tended to live in distinct 
neighborhoods built for their arrival. By contrast, large numbers of Sahrawis who belonged to 
the contested category of “Tribes from the North” were transplanted specifically to Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, where they formed a large tent city mentioned in Chapter 1, known as Khaymat al-
Wahda. In addition to transforming the demographics and political geography of the city, the 
                                                
220 Fieldnotes, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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people of Khaymat al-Wahda experienced the effects of the identification process in a 
particularly intense way. Unlike other transplants, who had only questionable basis for voting in 
the referendum, these transplanted Sahrawis were guaranteed the right to vote in the referendum, 
but who they would vote for remained very much in question. While Morocco furnished 
residents of Khaymat al-Wahda with free sugar, flour, oil and other necessities, along with the 
promise of future housing, these transplanted Sahrawis were now in closer proximity to the 
epicenter of Sahrawi national struggle. And as the Identification Commission labored through 
years of administrative and procedural work of identifying eligible voters, Sahrawis in Khaymat 
al-Wahda became subject to a different kind of scrutiny, from friends and neighbors alike, that 
sought to identify their political commitments and affiliations. When people across western 
Sahara refer to tahdid al-hawiya, or identification, during the 1990s, they are referring as much 
to this scrutiny that demanded political identification, as to the years-long administrative process 
which provoked such everyday politicization. 
*** 
Most ‘a’idin formally move between sides in the political conflict only once. The effort 
expended in attempting to fix the identities of those subject to this dispute, however, is ongoing. 
This final profile of an ‘a’id illustrates this continuous pressure to commit to one side or another 
in his double movement. Born in Tan Tan, in the southern Moroccan region of Wed Nun, 
Mohamed Salek’s family was among those brought to Laâyoune/El Aaiún to live in the vast tent 
city known as Khaymat al-Wahda in 1991. Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1, Khaymat al-
Wahda was one of the first major efforts by the Moroccan state to shape the demographics of 
Western Sahara while contesting the list of eligible voters for a potential referendum on self-
determination. Unlike those resettled to Moroccan-occupied territory from the outskirts of major 
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cities across Morocco, however, the population of Khaymat al-Wahda was constituted largely by 
members of Saharan tribes already deemed eligible to vote, but who had been living in the 
neighboring region of Wed Nun. Like many of the major movements of displacement and 
resettlement motivated by decolonization in the Sahara, it is not easy to distinguish between 
voluntary and forced resettlement. Mohamed Salek’s father, for example, was a retired member 
of the Moroccan Armed Forces when the family moved. Whether he participated in this project 
of resettlement orchestrated by the Moroccan state because he was still subject to orders within a 
chain of command, because his pension was threatened if he did not move, or because he wanted 
to support his country in this endeavor, I cannot say. 
What is certain, however, is that upon moving to Khaymat al-Wahda as a child, 
Mohamed Salek grew up in a context of intense politicization. On the one hand, the Moroccan 
state provisioned his family, like all of those living in Khaymat al-Wahda, with free basic goods 
such as water, flour and oil, in addition to free medical care, shelter and electricity.221 At the 
same time, Sahrawis loyal to Polisario sought to educate him of the justness of Sahrawi 
nationalism, no doubt describing the violence of Morocco’s invasion, the number of people 
imprisoned during the 1970s and 80s, or otherwise disappeared, and the ongoing state repression 
of Sahrawi nationalism. Unwittingly or not, in moving to Khayma al-Wahda Mohamed Salek’s 
family put themselves at the epicenter of a fierce political campaign where the upcoming vote 
would determine the sovereignty of their new home. Starting at the age of ten, Mohamed Salek 
himself became one of the most sought-after voters. 
Politicized by the Sahrawi nationalists who recruited him, Mohamed Salek joined pro-
Polisario “cells” named for martyrs of the movement who had died under Moroccan occupation, 
                                                
221 As noted in Chapter 1, the camps were popularly known as “khaymat al-kebsh,” or Tents of the Ram, for the free 
ram distributed to families in the tent settlement on the holiday marking Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac, 
Eid al-Adha. 
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such as the Group of Martyr Bashir Lahlaoui, the Forum for Truth and Equity on the Sahara, and 
others. These groups emerged in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in the mid- to late-1990s, 
when Morocco’s maneuverings with regards to eligible voters increasingly appeared to be a 
strategy meant to prevent the referendum from ever taking place. Drawing upon the emerging 
language of human rights in the context of the dispute (Chapter 5), these groups demanded 
greater information on disappeared persons dating back to the 1990s, and increasingly gave voice 
to a public identity for Sahrawi politics in Morocco. Indeed, some of the most prominent 
Sahrawi human rights activists today, such as Aminatou Haidar, Ali Salem ould Tamek and 
Ibrahim Dahman, first got in touch and involved with each other through these groups. 
Mohamed Salek became involved enough in the Sahrawi nationalist cause that he 
committed, as part of a cohort of activists, to move to the refugee camps in Algeria. Following 
the inverse trajectory of the Moroccan ‘a’idin, those who moved to the camps from Morocco are 
known within the camps as “joiners,” or multahiqin. I met a number of multahiqin who had been 
living in the camps for years, working for SADR-affiliated civil society organizations such as 
AFAPREDESA, and supporting the Sahrawi national cause. Mohamed Salek was among them 
for a time, having moved to the camps, where he benefitted, like many of the refugees, from 
education in Algeria and found work with UJSARIO, a youth organ of SADR in the camps. Not 
long after reaching the camps, however, Mohamed Salek said he became disillusioned by what 
he claims to be Polisario’s favoritism toward members of the Rguibat tribe, and its 
marginalization of members of “Tribes from the North,” or Tekna tribes. Moreover, upon 
learning about the government’s pre-1988 violent past only after arriving in the camps, which he 
also considered an outgrowth of Polisario’s tribalism, Mohamed Salek felt as though he had been 
misled. A few years after arriving in the camps, he decided to return to Morocco as an ‘a’id, a 
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move that he recognized has left him stigmatized by those whom he has left on both sides of the 
berm: “When you return ‘a’id, you live two things: there are those here [in Moroccan-occupied 
Western Sahara] who call you ‘traitor,’ and those with the [Polisario] Front who call you 
‘traitor.’” 
Having moved twice as an act of “désolidarisation,” Mohamed Salek’s experience 
testifies to the experience of having one’s political subjectivity be the object of such intense 
political struggle. Because of his ongoing bitterness toward his experience in the refugee camps 
in Algeria, Mohamed Salek characterizes the experience of his initial politicization in terms of 
being inculcated with a “fabricated reality”: 
Mohamed Salek: The [people of the Khaymat al-Wahda] camps, akhi [brother], 
they were people of the Sahara [ahel al-Sahra’], they came from the Tan Tan 
region, but they're all Saharan and lots of those tribes - every family has a 
member with the [Polisario] Front, or two, or an entire family. So the internal 
separatists, or, human rights activists (huquqiyyin) as they are called, are 
mercenaries (murtazaqin). They [the human rights activists] are among those who 
fed this tendency. Protesting against the Moroccan order…ruined, ruined, the 
thinking of many young people, because they were injected by this antagonistic 
thinking, and by this sabotage. And they [the human rights activists] benefited, 
personally, from these protests. So the residents of the [Khaymat al-Wahda] 
camps suffered two-fold: originally, [the Sahrawi residents of Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
who predated their arrival] say that we're coming from inside Morocco, 
while…the Polisario Front says that we're Saharan people and concerned by the 
issue, and so [we] can organize protests. So what happened is that reality was 
fabricated [fabraqa al-waqa‘]. I mean, there have been a lot of victims from this, 
young men and women. 
 
Me: What do you remember from this time? 
 
Mohamed Salek: I was among the people who were injected [huqina] [with these 
ideas]…and I don't deny that I participated in establishing a number of cells, with 
lots of mobilizing for the struggle and I had a farfetched idea [fikra wahmiya], 
until I joined the Polisario Front [of what I was fighting for], and when I joined 
the Polisario Front everything that I encountered was an illusion inside an illusion 
and so I became convinced [tuwwaladat liddayyi qana‘a rasikha] that we, Tekna 
tribes, we are, in truth, on account of the historical link by bay'a to the King, that 
we are Moroccan tribes. That's a result of what I experienced/lived in the 
[Polisario-run refugee] camps as far as marginalization and exclusion and 
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tribalism and discrimination and being informed about my cousins who'd been 
shot while in Polisario prison. And who were tortured and separated from each 
other and had their families violated. All of that's the truth.222 
Mohamed Salek’s account notes that his political affiliation has been the object of both struggle 
and suspicion since the time he was a child. In being moved to Khaymat al-Wahda, he observes 
that even as Polisario supporters sought to influence his outlook, other Sahrawis living in 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún when Khaymat al-Wahda was established initially viewed the new residents 
with great suspicion. Given that their presence was clearly the result of a project of the Moroccan 
state, and that residents of the camps were lavished with handouts from which longtime residents 
were excluded, the camps could be seen as part of Morocco’s strategy to create and deepen 
divisions among Sahrawis. What is particularly interesting, however, is that his political 
subjectivity became the object of suspicion and marked him as a target for recruitment. In the 
context of political conflict, those who cannot be trusted need to be convinced. 
 Mohamed Salek’s present disillusionment with his past experience in the camps causes 
him to view the subsequent period of his activism as a young man with bitterness and regret. 
Where he once thought that he was being recruited into a revolutionary struggle, he now sees 
“mercenaries” posing as human rights activists. Of course, whether “mercenaries” or human 
rights activists, these people were also likely neighbors and peers: Sahrawis living in 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún and, quite possibly, even in Khaymat al-Wahda. Mohamed Salek frames this 
shift between joining the struggle for independence to leaving it, disgusted, as a trajectory of 
discovering the difference between believing in a “fabricated reality” of the Sahrawi nationalist 
cause, and then learning a much less inspiring “truth” upon arriving at the camps. This trajectory 
is reminiscent of Lahcen’s “return” to Morocco, only in reverse: Lahcen complained about 
responding to the call to “return” to Morocco with an open mind, only to find himself deceived 
                                                
222 Interview 8 July 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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and marginalized upon his arrival. More than the corruption or bankruptcy of Polisario and its 
affiliated human rights activists – who are, as Lahcen’s story points out, no more manipulative or 
coercive than the Moroccan state –  Mohamed Salek’s perspective is noteworthy for his two-
dimensional way of seeing. Where once Mohamed Salek saw the righteousness of human rights 
supporters, he now sees mercenaries and agents paid by the Algerian-backed, Polisario-run 
Ministry for the Occupied Territories. Where once Mohamed Salek saw in Polisario a righteous 
liberation struggle, he later saw an exploitative, discriminatory cadre of corrupt rulers. This two-
dimensionality reflects the binary of friend/enemy, loyalty/betrayal, and Morocco/Polisario, and 
might be thought of as a way of seeing that both produces and is produced by the concrete 
abstraction of nationalist conflict. 
 However, the language of a “fabricated reality” that Mohamed Salek and Lahcen share, 
and that Mohamed Salek heightens with references to having been “injected” with beliefs and his 
decision that the nationalist struggle was, ultimately an “illusion inside an illusion” gives one the 
sense that he, too, holds this structure of conflict in abeyance. In the passage quoted above, he 
has been particularly critical of Polisario leadership of the refugee camps and the ideology that 
led him to join. However, aside from accepting that his people once pledged allegiance to the 
Moroccan sultan, which is his reference to bay‘a,223 Mohamed Salek’s affiliation to Morocco 
was more a matter of necessity than an expression of enthusiasm for their cause. In this sense, his 
movement between nationalist causes highlights the modes of governance that have expended 
tremendous resources in an effort to configure his political subjectivity in certain ways – to 
identify him, politically. At the same time, this same movement highlights how Mohamed Salek 
has sought to hold the concrete abstraction in abeyance. 
                                                
223 In PJ Bearman et al., eds., “Bay‘a,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Glossary and Index of Terms 
(Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2013). “a term denoting, in a very broad sense, the act by which a certain 
number of persons, acting individually or collectively, recognise the authority of another person.” 
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Conclusion 
The experience of Mohamed Salek captures how the political struggle to define the determining 
self of self-determination during the 1990s took place at the level of controlling populations and 
defining political subjectivity, as much as at the level of diplomatic negotiations over the rules 
and criteria for establishing voter rolls.224 And whereas important literature on the Western 
Sahara conflict tends to focus on institutional political actors to identify the “root” causes of 
conflict, the dynamics of its perpetuation, and lessons to be learned about conflict resolution, the 
political subjectivity of the people involved is too often overlooked.  
In the next chapter I aim to show how this history of fixing the political subjectivity of 
the people of the Sahara dates back to the 1950s, and the current political geography is in many 
ways the expression of tensions of autonomy and dependence between bidani people of the 
Sahara and their more sedentary neighbors to the north, the chleuh. 
*** 
By moving without conforming to the polarized dichotomy of Moroccan or Sahrawi nationalism 
– either by moving to Morocco but maintaining Sahrawi allegiances, or by moving to Morocco 
and disavowing national commitments of any kind – these “second wave” ‘a’idin represent a 
more fluid political subjectivity that had been restricted and fixed by the polarized process of 
decolonization in the Sahara. These ‘a’idin are representative of what Hagar Kotef calls “hybrid-
subjectivity,” meaning they are “configured through their mobility, but [they] inhabit spaces of 
confinement.” The movement of returnees between camps, politically and physically, makes 
visible the tremendous efforts expended to fix the Sahrawi as political subjects, in location and in 
identity, throughout the process of decolonization. This “hybrid-subjectivity” of the “returnee” in 
                                                
224 For a detailed account of the latter, see Jensen, Western Sahara. 
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the Sahrawi context is both produced by the polarized political geography of nationalist conflict, 
and has increasingly come to complicate this concrete abstraction through its mobility and 
fluidity. 
In critiquing methodological nationalism as it pertains to Western Sahara, I suggest that 
this approach has foreclosed two important dimensions to the history and political geography of 
the region. Suggesting that Sahrawi nationalism was the outcome of a colonial dialectic reduces 
the historical complexity of the Sahara as a disaggregated political field that has involved 
multiple colonial regimes, a mobile populace with multiple and fluid political affiliations, and a 
temporal disjuncture in the processes of decolonization across the region. Rather than a dyadic 
relation of colonizer-colonized, which, if such a relation existed at all in Western Sahara, existed 
for little over a decade (1958-1970), I suggest that Sahrawi identity emerges within the political 
field of decolonization, where multiple relations to political authority have been in contestation 
for decades. Rather than tracing the emergence and consolidation of a single collective identity, I 
suggest that Sahrawi subjectivity during decolonization might better be understood in terms of 
various attempts to fix multiple, shifting subjectivities. This chapter has elaborated on this 
multiplicity through an account of the ‘ai’d, (pl. ‘a’idin, literally “returnee,”), whose significance 
as a political label has shifted with time. The subject positions of the ‘a’id, stand in ambiguous 
relation to the contemporary poles of loyalty and betrayal that structure nationalist commitment, 
whether Moroccan or Sahrawi. While bearing various stigma of “defector,” “betrayer,” and 
intihazi, or “opportunist,” ‘a’idin are prone in some instances to a stance of cynicism and 
resignation, lacking faith in either Morocco or Polisario. In other instances, I suggest that the 
‘a’idin’s movement represents, in certain cases, a kind of subjectivity that holds the structures of 
nationalist conflict “in abeyance.” 
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Chapter 3 – “Home Is Knocking on the Mind”: Morocco’s Liberation Army in the Sahara 
and the “Unsettled Past” of 1950s Decolonization in Northwest Africa 
 
The mid-1950s were a tumultuous time across the Maghreb, Sahara and Sahel regions, as 
a rising and seemingly pervasive anticolonial sentiment connected the horizons of political 
possibility from across disparate areas of the globe. Anticolonial insurrection had spread across 
Morocco following the exile of Sultan Mohammed V to Corsica and then Madagascar in 1953.225 
On the heels of the Bandung Conference in 1955, the arrival of Algeria’s National Liberation 
Front (FLN) as a diplomatic force with the announcement of its Soummam Platform in 1956, and 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Suez triumph that same year, Third World anticolonialism was emerging 
as a force capable of tipping the scales of global political power against colonial empire. 
Decolonization’s resonance across continents generated a horizon of expectation even in 
seemingly unexpected regions of the colonized world. After a local asked him about the war in 
Indochina while he passed through Wed Nun on a last-gasp “adventure” in 1954, a French 
traveler noted in disbelief that this anticolonial consciousness had reached even the Sahara.226 
And yet, even as the end of European colonial empire became more apparent in the late-
1950s with the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, and Ghana a year later, capital 
investments poured into the Sahara, and regions that had previously been colonial hinterlands 
increasingly became the sites of a late-imperial scramble. In a foreshadowing of its françafrique 
neocolonial policies toward natural resource extraction in Africa,227 in 1957 France established 
l’Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS), a “transcolonial” administrative 
                                                
225 Diego Aguirre, La última guerra colonial de España, 14. Between July 1954 and June 1955 two assassination 
attempts were carried out against the Sultan Ben Arfa who had been installed in the place of the exiled Mohammed 
V, as well as several attempts against a number of high profile members of the French Protectorate. 784 attacks, 477 
explosions, 1430 instances of arson, 331 acts of sabotage were recorded during this time, as well as the death of 41 
French and 254 Moroccans who were considered collaborators. 
226 Ferré, Au désert interdit, 43. “-Comment va la guerre d’Indochine? L’effet de surprise est certain. Je reste 
pantois.” 
227 Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012). 
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regime encompassing the Algerian Sahara, with an eye toward retaining access to newly 
discovered oil reserves.228 The following year, a 75-year concession was granted to an 
international group of investors for the purposes of exploiting iron ore deposits in a northern 
Mauritanian mountain, Kidya Idjill. With the backing of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, this mining concern, known as MIFERMA (Mines de fer de 
Mauritanie), undertook the construction of two worker towns, as well as a 650km railroad near 
the border with Spanish Sahara, for the ore’s extraction and export.229 And although full-scale 
exploitation had not yet begun, Spain’s recently-discovered phosphate deposit in Spanish Sahara, 
known as Bucraa, was drawing the attention of its neighbors.230 As a result, borders that had 
previously been left largely undefined (such as the so-called “Trinquet Line” between the French 
Protectorate in Morocco and French Algeria) or unpoliced (such as the border between Spanish 
Sahara and the surrounding French colonial territories) increasingly became vectors of political 
                                                
228 Yaël Kouzmine et al., “Etapes de la structuration d’un désert: l’espace saharien algérien entre convoitises 
économiques, projets politiques et aménagement du territoire,” Annales de géographie. 2009, no. 670 (2009): 671–
78. The OCRS provided the option for bordering entities to join the economic zone upon decolonization, working in 
coordination with decolonizing bordering entities such as Niger, Mauritania and Chad. 
229 Bonte, La montagne de fer; Audibert, MIFERMA. 
230 Emile Belime, “Avenir de l’Union Française,” Hommes et Mondes, no. 58 (May 1951): 680–81; Ferré, Au désert 
interdit, 118. The relevant passage in Ferré is cited, in translated form, in Chapter 1. 
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struggle.231 As one account of Spanish Sahara noted, “the coast has been replaced, as the zone of 
conflict, by the inland boundary.”232 
These inland boundaries transected the pasturage, wells, oases, shrines and marketplaces 
of trab al-bidan, or land of the bidan, encompassing a Saharan populace that shares the Arabic 
dialect of Hassaniya. Closely associated with the varied geographies shaped by the desert climate 
between these “shores” of the Sahara, this “land of the bidan” was, in the early 1950s, divided 
between multiple colonial administrative regimes: Spanish Sahara, French West Africa, French 
Algeria, and the French Protectorate in Morocco. This region of western Sahara,233 which today 
includes parts of Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Mali, and encompasses the disputed 
geopolitical territory of Western Sahara, was largely a colonial hinterland. Although France 
maintained military posts throughout both northern Mauritania and southwest Algeria, French 
West Africa was administered from Dakar, a thousand kilometers away. And, until the 
establishment of the aforementioned OCRS, France governed the Algerian Sahara under military 
                                                
231 When the military administration of Algeria’s Territoires du Sud was suspended in 1947 the border region 
between French Algeria and France’s Protectorate in Morocco was administered under a peculiar entity known as 
les Confins Algéro-Marocains (CAM). The border between Morocco and Algeria was never fixed juridically. As the 
number of concessions granted for prospecting and mining in places within CAM’s jurisdiction (such as Kenadsa 
and Tindouf in what is now southwest Algeria) increased, it became increasingly difficult for colonial officials to 
resolve the border definitively. In coordinating administration of the border region between colonial regimes, CAM 
became both a means of mitigating the ambiguity of the border situation, and deferring its resolution. When 
Morocco gained independence in March 1956 CAM dissolved, but ambiguity over the border remained, particularly 
since the de facto border had shifted to Algeria’s favor when Moroccan anticolonial movements were gaining 
momentum in the early 1950s. Frank E Trout, Morocco’s Saharan Frontiers (Geneva: Droz, 1969); Benjamin 
Acloque, “L’idée de frontière en milieu nomade: héritage, appropriation et implications politiques actuelles : 
Mauritanie et Sahara occidental,” in Colonisations et héritages actuels au Sahara et au Sahel: problèmes 
conceptuels, état des lieux et nouvelles perspectives de recherche, XVIIIe-XXe siècles, ed. Mariella. Villasante 
Cervello and Christophe de. Beauvais (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 351–81. 
232 Mercer, Spanish Sahara, 15. 
233 When referring to the geopolitical territory that remains under dispute, I use Western Sahara. When referring to a 
regional space – particularly in the 1950s, when borders and political entities differed significantly from today – I 
use western Sahara. The lower case “western Sahara” refers to a broader region than Western Sahara proper, and 
includes parts of southern Morocco, southwest Algeria and northern Mauritania. Some works refer to this region as 
Atlantic Sahara, but I am reluctant to use this term since, in Moroccan scholarship, it serves as a kind of neologism 
to avoid naming “Western Sahara” as a political entity, which is not my intent here. E.g.: Rahal Boubrik and 
Colloque International la Reforme et ses Usages, Le Sahara atlantique (Rabat: Univ. Mohammed V, Fac. des 
Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 2012). 
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administration, unlike the rest of the French colony.234 Spain’s colonial presence was restricted 
largely to coastal fishing enclaves even into the 1950s and, as a result, Spanish Sahara attracted 
bidanis who sought to avoid French taxation and keep contact with colonial rule to a minimum. 
Southern Morocco under the French Protectorate, including Wed Nun, was known as the fiefdom 
of Pasha T’hami el-Glaoui, whose relatively unchecked power distinguished this region of 
French rule from the rest of the Protectorate.235 
In part because of this fragmented geography of colonial rule, the dynamics of 
decolonization across western Sahara did not follow the dialectics of struggle between colonizer 
and colonized. Instead, the late-colonial influx of capital to the Sahara increasingly contributed 
to a scramble not only for territory, but to gain the allegiance and guarantee the support of the 
bidanis living in the region. French advocates used the language of protecting Saharan minorities 
as a justification for establishing OCRS in the Sahara.236 In Mauritania, France focused on 
constructing a national identity so as to facilitate a referendum vote in favor of national 
independence, overseen as part of the French Loi Cadre during the late 1950s.237 Following the 
discovery of phosphates after World War II, Spain belatedly dispatched the anthropologist Julio 
Caro Baroja to its territory, then known as Spanish West Africa, to learn about its colonial 
                                                
234 Kouzmine et al., “Etapes de la structuration d’un désert,” 669–71. 
235 Acloque, “L’idée de frontière en milieu nomade: héritage, appropriation et implications politiques actuelles : 
Mauritanie et Sahara occidental”; Kouzmine et al., “Etapes de la structuration d’un désert”; Ryo Ikeda, “The 
Paradox of Independence: The Maintenance of Influence and the French Decision to Transfer Power in Morocco,” 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 572. Ikeda describes el-Glaoui, 
Pasha of Marrakesh, as a “warlord” whose concentrated power in southern Morocco served as a countervailing force 
both to the Makhzen, or Morocco’s central administration under the French Protectorate, as well as to the religious 
authority of Sultan Mohamed V. 
236 Pierre Boilley, “L’Organisation commune des régions sahariennes (OCRS) une tentative avortée,” in Nomades et 
commandants: administration et sociétés nomades dans l’ancienne A.O.F., ed. Edmond Bernus et al. (Paris: 
Karthala, 1993), 222–30; Belime, “Avenir de l’Union Française.” 
237 Francis de Chassey, Mauritanie 1900-1975: de l’ordre colonial à l’ordre néo-colonial entre Maghreb et Afrique 
noire (Paris: Anthropos, 1978). 
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subjects, the findings of which Caro Baroja published in a 1955 ethnography.238 And while 
French rule in Algeria was increasingly preoccupied with the FLN by the mid-1950s, the 
colonial military administration had been active in reestablishing the market town of Tindouf as 
a regional hub of western Sahara since 1934.239 Newly independent Morocco, meanwhile, tried 
an altogether different strategy of attracting support among people from across the region by 
enlisting them in an armed movement, known as the Moroccan Liberation Army, that aimed to 
destabilize French and Spanish colonial rule. Just as the horizon of decolonization in the Sahara 
increasingly led to an influx of capital to the region, so too, did the 1950s see the intensification 
of efforts to fix the political subjectivity of the people of the region. 
In this sense, this region of the Sahara during the 1950s defies what Luise White terms  
“the orderly process of decolonization.”240 White’s apt phrase joins with a broader critique of the 
historiography of decolonization for retrospectively naturalizing the outcome of a massive 
reconfiguration of the relations between sovereignty, people, and territory. By contrast, 
considering the horizons of possibility opened by decolonization draws attention to the 
discontinuities and alternative possibilities constitutive of this process.241 A particularly 
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([Paris: Presses de la cité, 1959), 198; Gaudio, Le dossier du Sahara occidental, 154. 
240 Luise White, Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2015), 22. “By orderly I do not mean a political process free of riots and repression, but orderly in 
terms of the idea of African territories crossing a threshold by which they would become nation-states and take a 
newly claimed rightful place in the community of nations, the UN, the Commonwealth, and even the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU).” 
241 Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State; Wilder, Freedom Time; Frederick Cooper, “The Dialectics of 
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seductive aspect of the historiography of decolonization involves the assumption of 
synchronicity, or the idea that anticolonial struggle coincided with the achievement of national 
consciousness, culminating in the transfer of power by former colonies to newly independent 
nation states. Decolonization certainly transformed the relationship between people, sovereignty 
and territory across the region, but from the vantage point of the Sahara in the time-space of the 
1950s, in particular this process did not constitute a moment of synchronicity but, rather, the 
onset of a disjunctive political present. Decolonization of the Sahara in the 1950s, I argue, ushers 
in a series of unresolved political projects with afterlives that continue to haunt the region’s 
political present, most clearly in the ongoing dispute over Western Sahara. In this chapter, I will 
be exploring the ongoing ramifications of decolonization in western Sahara through historical 
narratives surrounding Morocco’s Liberation Army in the Sahara from 1956-59. 
 
Section I – Anticolonial Irredentism: Morocco’s Liberation Army in the Sahara in 
Regional/International Context, 1956-59 
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The Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) was the outcome of both territorial ambiguity 
and temporal disjuncture between the abrupt end of the French Protectorate, and the 
intensification of armed resistance in the Moroccan countryside. As a means of attenuating 
anticolonial demands for the withdrawal of French empire from the Greater Maghreb, and in an 
attempt to try and consolidate its control over Algeria, which was governed as an administrative 
unit of France proper, France expedited the decolonization of the adjacent Protectorates in 
Tunisia and Morocco.242 These direct negotiations stood in tension with the aims of the MLA, a 
group with membership from across North Africa, which aimed for the decolonization of the 
Greater Maghreb and drew upon support from Gamal Abd al-Nasr. In August 22-29, 1955, 
French negotiations in Aix-les-Bains with a group of Moroccan political figures established a 
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framework and set the course for ending French colonial rule, but left the outcome uncertain. For 
many involved in anticolonial resistance, and particularly those associated with the MLA and the 
Moroccan nationalist Istiqlal Party, the terms of the Aix-les-Bains agreement were deeply 
disillusioning. In response to the French premise of “independence within an interdependence 
liberally negotiated,” Ahmed Balafrej, a member of the Moroccan Istiqlal party, said:  
“Interdependence was talked about: the word does not possess any juridical content…even the 
notion of interdependence is only valid to the extent that it expresses an organic reciprocity, for 
the people cannot be interdependent unless they are already independent.”243  
Meanwhile, the span of time between the Aix-les-Bains negotiations and March 1956, 
when France recognized Moroccan independence, was marked by political escalation. A 
shipment of arms arranged by Gamal Abd al-Nasr, coming from Czechoslovakia and arriving by 
boat to Morocco’s northern Mediterranean coast, was divided between the MLA and the 
Algerian National Liberation Front. An armed insurrection subsequently developed in the 
mountainous Rif region in northern Morocco.244 Meanwhile, Abdelkebir and Allal Fassi, leaders 
of the Moroccan nationalist Istiqlal Party, hosted a meeting in Madrid in January 1956 with other 
MLA leaders, making the strategic decision to divide the newly strengthened MLA in three.245 
By spreading the freshly armed fighters throughout the country, between the Rif in the north, the 
Central and High Atlas to the east, and the Souss and Sahara to the south, the Liberation Army 
appeared to be preparing for a long resistance. 
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 And yet, by March 1956, just three months after the meeting of anticolonial leaders in 
Madrid, France had restored Mohammed V to his throne, abrogated the Treaty of Fes, ended its 
Protectorate and granted Morocco independence. Spain, which governed northern Morocco with 
a protectorate of its own, ended its rule one month later, but maintained control over enclaves on 
the Mediterranean (Ceuta and Melilla) and Atlantic (Sidi Ifni) coasts, as well as its colony in the 
Sahara. The abrupt end to the French and Spanish protectorates in Morocco stands in marked 
contrast to the growth of the MLA as an armed resistance movement, which appeared to just then 
be preparing for a new scale of conflict. This sense that decolonization did not bring about the 
end of anticolonial struggle was articulated by Allal Fassi on June 19, 1956 in terms that can be 
read as nationalist, irredentist and, simultaneously, as an expression of anticolonial solidarity: 
Now, if Morocco is independent, it is not completely unified. The Moroccans will 
continue their struggle until Tangier,246 the Sahara under French and Spanish 
influence from Tindouf to Colomb-Bechar, Touat, Kenadza, Mauritania are 
liberated and unified. It is necessary to complete Morocco’s independence. Our 
independence will only be complete with the Sahara and all of the other territories 
whose delegates have come to Rabat proclaiming union. It is necessary to struggle 
for a complete union. It is necessary to retake the regions under Spanish and 
French influence. Our solidarity is profound for we have made a promise with 
God to liberate Algeria, Tunisia, the Libyan Fezzan. Our future is in Africa, we, 
North Africans, we have been equals in history, under colonialism, and we will 
live as equals in independence.247 
Fassi’s claim to a “Greater Morocco” has subsequently come to be seen, with reason, as fostering 
an irredentist ideology which has caused lasting instability in the region, what with Morocco’s 
refusal to recognize an independent Mauritania until 1969, and its invasion and annexation of 
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Western Sahara starting in 1975.248 In 1956, however, al-Fassi’s claim was at once anticolonial 
and irredentist, a matter of political posturing surely calibrated for an international audience, 
while also serving as a catalyst for the populist MLA now spread throughout the country. 
Independence had arrived in Morocco only a few months before, and there was already a sense 
that it was inadequate and compromised. 
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While the MLA elsewhere in Morocco disbanded, its extension south into French 
Algeria, French West Africa, and Spanish West Africa, became, in a sense, the expression and 
object of a struggle that had been preemptively foreshortened. Nonetheless, by June 1956, a 
group of some 150 men under the leadership of Ben Hamou Mesfioui, a veteran of the French 
war in Indochina,249 arrived in Goulmime, a northern hub of trans-Saharan commerce that, in 
1956, bordered Wed Nun and what was then called Spanish West Africa. The group included a 
large contingent from the central plains of Morocco known as Zemmour, and was receiving arms 
and aid from anticolonial fighters who had taken refuge in the Spanish enclave of Sidi Ifni, on 
the Altantic coast. Though initially supported by the Moroccan state, the MLA was not a part of 
the newly formed Royal Armed Forces of Morocco, which was then operating under the 
command of Prince Hassan II with French advisers.250  
Even as it established headquarters in Goulmime in the summer of 1956, the MLA was 
an anticolonial armed movement operating in an independent nation-state. This status as an 
“irregular army” indexed the moment of transition in which the MLA’s Sahara campaign 
emerged, between colonial withdrawal and postcolonial state formation. This transitional 
character is also reflected in the MLA’s munitions, organizational structure, and personnel. On 
the one hand, the MLA had a standard military hierarchy, with distinctions between officers, 
most of whom were Moroccan and soldiers, most of whom were from the Sahara. On the other 
hand, the officer-led regiment of 300 soldiers was known as “al-rha’,” a term derived from the 
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word for “millstone” or “grindstone” which refers to the units of armed self-defense around 
which a village or tribe in rural Morocco would rally. 251  
The hybrid organization basis of the MLA, blurring the distinction between a “regular” 
and “irregular” armed force, can also be seen in its munitions. Aside from the Abd al-Nasr 
shipment via Czechoslovakia, the MLA relied upon an eclectic collection of arms, including 
French- and Italian-made grenades, and American-made pistols. Ben Saïd Aït Iddr notes that, 
aside from a stock of guns that the MLA had already accumulated, the Royal Armed Forces of 
Morocco provided 300-450 shotguns, with other arms expropriated from French loyalists, and 
the remainder provided by volunteers who joined.252 In addition to shotguns, the Moroccan state 
at some point funded the MLA, so that the soldiers could be offered stipends. Angela Hernández 
Moréno notes that, upon enrollment, MLA soldiers received 2000 francs, a military outfit, a gun 
(type “lebel”), training, and pay at the rate of 2000/mo.253 Aït Iddr suggested that the Makhzen 
provided 50 million centimes to pay 5000 soldiers, but that this funding only arrived in 1959 and 
became the object of political contestation between MLA leadership and the Moroccan state.254 
At least one interlocutor mentioned that his reason for leaving the Army was due to a lack of 
pay.255 Not unlike the MLA’s organizational structure, however, it appears as though many of its 
armed fighters furnished their own guns, usually rifles of World War I vintage. In oral histories, 
former fighters frequently referenced “ts‘aiya’s” and other rifles used in hunting, during their 
narratives of fighting for the MLA. 
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And this speaks to a significant feature of the MLA’s composite military form: though 
most of its leadership were Moroccan anticolonial fighters, its ranks were filled by bidani and 
Ba‘amranian256 tribesmen of Wed Nun and the Sahara. Sahrawis and Ba‘amranian’s constituted 
an estimated two-thirds of the MLA, and the vast majority of the Army’s combatants.257 Where 
the Moroccan leadership were mostly (although not exclusively) young men who had been active 
in the pre-‘56 urban-based resistance, bidanis who took up arms to join the MLA cut across 
                                                
256 Ba‘amran is a tribe based in and around Sidi Ifni, the center for the administration of Spanish West Africa until 
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Display of rifles from the Rabouni National History Museum, Sahrawi refugee camps, outside 
Tindouf, Algeria. This Museum exhibits artifacts from Sahrawi national history and does not 
mention Sahrawis’ role in the Moroccan Liberation Army. But the gun in the foreground, the 
ts‘aiya, was frequently mentioned by former fighters in the MLA during the author’s research. 
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generations. There were, of course, young Sahrawi men who left their families to join the MLA, 
accounts of which I heard directly through oral histories. But part of the MLA leadership’s 
approach was to recruit shaykh’s, such as Khatri ould Joumani and Lhabib ould Bellal, who, as 
leaders of tribal subfractions, could mobilize large numbers of bidan. In parts of Wed Nun where 
the Aït Oussa tribe is based, I was told that the mobilization around MLA fighting was total: 
entire fergan, or groups of families living in tents that travel together, contributed livestock and 
joined the cause. This mobilization, where it was total, cut across gender lines as women 
prepared food, served as lookouts, and readied camels’ saddles for men to mount and ride into an 
attack.258 
 
                                                
258 Note from Interview, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, June 17, 2014. 
A receipt acknowledging the donation of twenty sheep by Yahdih Bin Bahi to the Moroccan 
Liberation Army in the Sahara. 
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While the reasons for why bidanis joined the MLA may have been manifold, and will be 
discussed later in this chapter, Moroccans’ recruitment appears to have been largely successful. 
Reaching an estimated 1200 to 1500 fighters in early 1957 and as many as 5000 later in the 
year,259 the Army relied heavily on bidani fighters to carry out a series of attacks on French 
outposts along the ambiguously defined border between Morocco and French Algeria, near 
Tindouf. The first attack on a military outpost at Um Laachar was carried out 19 June 1956, part 
of a series that continued from August through January 1957, targeting the French outposts 
Merkala, Zemoul, Zegdou and Tinfouchy along the Algerian/Morocco border. During the fall of 
1957, another MLA detachment had traveled south by camel, traversing Spanish Sahara over 
three months before reaching northern Mauritania. In January 1957, this contingent launched an 
attack near the city of Atar, hoping to benefit from the spontaneous support of Mauritanians in 
the area and spark a larger uprising. Instead, the French met them with an equal force, including 
many bidani soldiers fighting with the French. The support from local Mauritanians never 
materialized, and the MLA was routed, with significant losses, including 41 prisoners taken by 
France.260 During the retreat north, the MLA also was forced to disarm by Spanish colonial 
officers.  
At independence, Morocco was divided between Spanish rule in the north and far south, 
and French rule in the most populous regions in between. When the anticolonial struggle against 
the French Protectorate was at its peak in the early 1950s, anticolonial fighters frequently took 
refuge in areas of Spanish rule, including Sidi Ifni, a coastal enclave in southern Morocco and 
the center of Spain’s colonial administration for the Sahara. MLA leaders have noted that, at the 
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outset, the Liberation Army had counted upon Spain’s accommodating stance toward any 
activity that would undermine French colonial stability. Exploiting “the contradiction” between 
France and Spain, as it has been termed, would allow them to traffic material through Spanish 
Sahara and launch attacks into French Algeria and Mauritania.261 Some former MLA leaders 
even claimed to have been “friends” with Spanish military officers, and in regular 
communication with these officers about their plans.262  
In light of this strategy, the defeat in northern Mauritania in January 1957, compounded 
by having been disarmed by Spanish authorities, represented a turning point for the MLA. From 
that point forward, the MLA established more permanent camps throughout Spanish Sahara, 
along the Saguiet al-Hamra in the north of Spanish Sahara, and in the Tiris region to the south. 
Throughout 1957, the MLA carried out attacks against Spanish military posts and settlements 
from these strongholds throughout the territory, including Argoub, El Ayoun, Lemsid, Tafoudart, 
and Ghaywa. By November 1957, some 4000 to 5000 soldiers, distributed across four or five 
regiments, were stationed in Spanish Sahara263 and Spain’s already-tenuous presence across 
broad swaths of the colony had been further depleted by Sahrawi soldiers who defected and 
joined the MLA. With the MLA now training their old rifles against Spanish targets, the Spanish 
colonial administration withdrew from nearly all of the territory, with the exception of its 
military bases in El Ayoun, and the coastal enclave of Villa Cisneros (now known as Dakhla). 
The MLA’s gains in Spanish Sahara would prove to be temporary, however, as its offensive 
drove Spain to cooperate with French colonial officials. 
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In July 1957, the new Governor General of Spanish West Africa, Mariano Gomez de 
Zamalloa, met with the French General Gabriel Bourgund. The colonial officials met again in 
September in Dakar, and once more in the winter of 1957, by which time they had come to an 
agreement to carry out a two-phased, coordinated countinsurgency campaign against the MLA. 
Meanwhile, by November 1957, Morocco had established a Direction des Affaires Sahariennes, 
while reportedly sending signals, covert and otherwise, that it was ready to be rid of the 
“uncontrolled elements” of the MLA.264 The first phase of Ecouvillon, from 10 to 19 February, 
1958, focused on clearing bidanis out of the northern tier of Spanish Sahara, known as Saguiet 
al-Hamra. To complete the second phase of what was called Opération Ecouvillon,265 a 
combination of soldiers and air strikes were used to “sweep” bidanis out of the southern tier of 
the colony, known as Tiris, from February 10-20, 1958. All told, some 15,000 French soldiers 
entered Spanish Sahara from Mauritania and Tindouf in Algeria, and as many as 8500 Spanish 
soldiers swept in from the coast.266 While leaflets were dropped warning bidani’s to flee the 
territory, one report lists 132 killed, 37 injured, and 51 taken prisoner from Opération 
Ecouvillon.267  
For bidanis who lived through the year commonly referred to as ‘am khabt tyayyir, or the 
year of the aerial strikes, the bombardment drove MLA fighters either south to Mauritania, east 
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to Tindouf in French Algeria, or north to Wed Nun. One former MLA fighter mentioned 
traveling twenty days by foot to reach Wed Nun.268 Another described the journey as follows: 
They arrived in planes. They fired at us and killed camels. The planes hovered 
overhead and sent out parachutes in the sky, and 14 planes went by like this 
[motions with his hand]. And they went back and forth all over the place, and 
descended to fire. By God, by God, the camels - the planes were descending in 
order to seek out a camel and hit it. Because they could get lower and fire at it. So 
our division split up, completely, and we spent the whole day in the wad [river 
bed], our supplies - we lost everything. 
 Complete loss. We lost [everything] there. When it was the afternoon, the 
force arrived with tanks, from near Smara and came to us and fired at us. So we 
surrendered. They left at night, so we took off by foot, to get away from them, and 
we continued on, heading for Morocco. 
 
M: On foot? 
 
Yup, We didn't have clothes. 
 
M: From Lghaywa? [in Tiris] 
 
From Daysfa - Lghaywa's close, also - but we left from Daysfa to Laâyoune 
Ghoman, before Goulimime a little, after Wed Draa on that side. It took us a 
while (fawtna zaman) walking by foot. And there wasn't any food - we were 
eating just the plants, and water. And the clothes, also, a lot of it wasn't with us. It 
was a bad situation! We went through all that trouble/we were worn out. (Nahna 
mtakarfaisin)269 
Several accounts, including one report from a French journalist who visited Tindouf just months 
after the operation, note that the counterinsurgency was entirely covert: “for Ecouvillon there 
were neither war correspondents, nor photographers, nor cinematographers, nor 
communiqués.”270 Just days before Ecouvillon, a bombardment of Algerian FLN regiments in 
Tunisia had drawn unwanted international attention, leaving France sensitive to the need for 
secrecy, particularly since the military operation was being carried out in Spanish Sahara.271 The 
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viability and clandestinity of Opération Ecouvillon underscores the stark contrast in visibility 
between processes of decolonization in the Sahara, and concurrent anticolonial struggles for 
independence elsewhere – even, or especially, in Algeria. 
Far from having overthrown colonial rule, bidani MLA fighters displaced by Ecouvillon 
found themselves ensnared in processes of Mauritanian and Moroccan state formation. On April 
10, 1958, in Tintekrat near Fort Gouraud (now F’derik) in northern Mauritania, a gathering was 
held to rally support for Mauritania’s upcoming vote for autonomy, which was expected to lead 
to national independence under France’s Loi-Cadre: 
Three hundred Rguibi tents were assembled. A colorful spectacle. Six hundred 
fighters parade on camel before the President Moktar Ould Daddah and the 
Commander of the Region of Atar, Mr. Vézy. An offering of camels. Lengthy 
discussion under the presidential tente. It is by design that the High Commissioner 
Cusin refrained from appearing, and asked General Bourgund not to come, the 
better to savor the victory : the Rguibat must recognize, in pledging allegiance to 
Mr. Ould Daddah, of their affiliation to the Mauritanian nation. The presence of 
the Commander of the Region [Cercle] and of officers from the Saharan Affairs 
attest to France having given its support to the President…272 
 
The above description of Tintekrat captures the spectacle surrounding France’s attempt to attract 
bidani tribesmen – along with France’s particular focus on the largest tribe of western Sahara, 
the Rguibat – to affiliate with the emergent political nation of Mauritania, whose representative, 
Mokhtar Ould Daddah, would become the French-backed President for most of the next two 
decades.  
Meanwhile, those MLA Sahrawi fighters who fled north and arrived in Wed Nun 
encountered spectacle of a different sort. April 1, 1958, several months after Opération 
Ecouvillon, Spain agreed to transfer the Wed Nun region at the northern end of its colony, to 
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Morocco.273 By this time, the Liberation Army was in complete disarray. Some members of the 
MLA’s leadership were reputedly seeking to overthrow the King of Morocco and establish a 
republic.274 Fissures within MLA leadership, possibly related to support for or opposition to the 
monarchy, had led certain members to imprison others in the southern Moroccan town of 
Bouizkarn.275 At the same time, Spain and France actively recruited leading bidani shaykhs to 
defect from the MLA. Meanwhile, throughout 1958 the Moroccan state was actively trying to 
disband the MLA and incorporate its members into the Royal Armed Forces. As Sahrawi 
soldiers spent much of 1958 stationed in various parts of Wed Nun, rumors circulated about 
Morocco’s plan to incorporate Liberation Army fighters into the Royal Army of Morocco. By 
the beginning of 1958, bidani fighters had already begun defecting, having become disillusioned 
with the MLA for any or all of the reasons above. 
In early December, 1958, several regiments of bidani soldiers that had been stationed in 
Wed Nun for nearly a year since Opération Ecouvillon had swept them north from Spanish 
Sahara, broke into the stockade in Tan Tan. They detained the one Moroccan officer on hand, 
Saleh al-Jeza’iri, and, led by bidani regiment leader Mohamed al-Kher, they reclaimed weapons 
that had been taken from them months earlier. Ts‘aiya’s in hand, they headed for points west and 
south. Some were actively recruited by the French, which dispatched prominent bidanis who had 
joined the French, such as Ba ould Dkhil, to meet rebelling soldiers partway and provision them 
with supplies flown in by France. Large contingents headed to Tindouf, in French Algeria and 
Bir Moghrein, in Mauritania. Another large contingent, led by Khatri ould Joumani, returned to 
                                                
273 This transfer was concluded through the Angra de Cintra Agreement. The region transferred is sometimes 
referred to as the “Tarfaya Strip” after a small coastal town in the Wed Nun region. 
274 Ben Saïd Aït Iddr, Moulay Abdeslam Jebli, and Nemri were among the leaders of the MLA’s political wing who 
later formed the 23 Mars movement, a radical leftist group whose members were involved in attempts to overthrow 
Hassan II, and were exiled in Algeria and France throughout the 1970s and 80s. Mehdi Bennouna, Héros sans 
gloire: échec d’une révolution, 1963-1973 (Casablanca; Paris: Tarik éditions; Paris Méditerranée, 2002). 
275 Abdellah Kiker, Tajawazat Jaysh At-Tahrir Janoubi Fi Sous Min Khilal Riwayat Wa Shahadat 1956-1960. 
(Rabat: Rabat Net Maroc, 2011). 
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Spanish Sahara, as returning civilians rather than armed insurgents. The breaking into the 
stockade, known as mdigadig l-magazin, or taksir l-magazin, came to define the failed efforts 
between Moroccans and bidanis to collaborate on a project of anticolonial resistance. The MLA 
was finished, but the process of decolonization in the Sahara had only just begun. 
 
Section II – Friends of the State: Morocco’s High Commission for Former Resistance 
Fighters and Publicly Historicizing the Liberation Army in the Sahara 
 
On June 20, 2014, a conference was held at the Hotel de Ville of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in 
Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, with all of the trappings of a state-sponsored affair: traffic 
had been stopped on Avenue Mecca to allow a motorcade of officials and conference participants 
to pass through under the Moroccan flags lining the city’s central avenues, which had been raised 
for the occasion. Sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, the conference was the latest in a series 
dating back to 1989, with each annual installment focusing on the reign of one of Morocco’s 
Alawite sultans. Named for the founder of Morocco’s ruling dynasty and funded by the Ministry 
of Culture, University Moulay Ali Sharif had arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the largest 
Moroccan-controlled city in the disputed territory of Western Sahara, for its 18th installment, 
bringing together historians from across Morocco under the heading “The Second Period of 
Sultan Sidi Mohamed Bin Yousef’s reign: 1939-1955.” 
 In the morning, the Governor of Laâyoune/El Aaiún spoke, thanking specific members of 
the audience for their role in resisting colonialism and participating in Morocco’s Liberation 
Army (MLA). Other officials made reference to the “spontaneous” uprising by the people of the 
Sahara following Sultan Mohamed V’s exile from Morocco in 1953.276 For the afternoon 
session, a university historian from Casablanca, Noureddine Belhaddad, gave a presentation with 
                                                
276 King Mohamed V was exiled by France, briefly to Corsica and then Madagascar, from 1953-55, and replaced by 
his uncle, Mohamed Ben Arafa.  
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the title “The Uprising of the tribes of Moroccan Sahara following the Exile of Mohamed V.” 
The talk was short on specifics, but in the course of his presentation Belhaddad asked 
rhetorically, “When Sahrawis rose up in 1953, and when Sahrawis dressed in black to mourn the 
King’s exile, who was making them do that?” When Professor Belhaddad posed this question, an 
older Sahrawi man seated in the front row, wearing the typical bidani attire of blue, embroidered 
robe, or dra‘a, and black litham head-wrap, stood up in protest and addressed the panelists 
directly. Belhaddad continued, uninterrupted, as the man cinched the dra’a around his waist and 
marched out of the building. 
 I stayed until the end of the talk, then walked out of the Hotel de Ville, the interior of 
which is decorated with large murals (in a vaguely social realist style) that depict the 1975 Green 
March when the Moroccan army organized some 350,000 civilians, as a mass demonstration of 
Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over the territory, to cross the border into what was then Spanish 
West Africa. By the time I exited the hall, the man who had left the conference was waiting for a 
taxi at the curb. I walked aimlessly up the wide avenue; it was well before the mid-afternoon 
prayer, and Sahat al-Mechouar, the vast public plaza across the avenue which had been built 
after Morocco razed the Spanish colonial-era neighborhood Colominat al-Hamra’ following its 
military occupation of the city in 1976, was empty. As I crossed the street, a young man in a 
business suit gave a hiss to draw my attention. Evidently a member of the conference’s security 
retinue, he asked for my information (name, affiliation, etc), first in Arabic and then in English 
as he approached, before letting me go on my way. By this time, the Sahrawi man who had left 
the conference in protest had found a cab, so I continued on my way. 
*** 
A longstanding, ongoing dispute over the sovereignty of Western Sahara between Morocco and 
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SADR/Polisario shape the historicization of the region’s decolonization in readily apparent ways. 
However, I open with this ethnographic scene to illustrate how regional decolonization in the 
1950s – and the MLA’s incursion into the Sahara from 1956-59, in particular – raises 
uncomfortable political histories for both Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalists. For Sahrawi 
nationalists, the MLA serves as an uncomfortable reminder of the Moroccan Sultan’s capacity at 
that time to mobilize people of the Sahara through his religious and political authority.277 The 
MLA’s campaign in the Sahara can also be seen as a precursor to Morocco’s later annexation of 
the territory in the 1970s. For Moroccans, meanwhile, the MLA’s internal divisions and rapid 
demise point to Morocco’s inability to legitimize its rule in Western Sahara, then and now. For 
both Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalists, the MLA epitomizes the complex relations of 
autonomy and dependence between people of the Sahara and their neighbors to the north. The 
reasons for the MLA’s disintegration remain contested, but the conference at Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún’s Hotel de Ville highlights the tensions involved in any effort to make this history visible: 
the complexities of this period of regional decolonization sit in disjunctive relation to any given 
national historical narrative. 
 Following the overview of the MLA’s military campaign in the Sahara between 1956 and 
59 in the previous section, the next two sections of this chapter will examine how historical 
narratives surrounding the MLA shape, and are shaped by, contemporary politics in Western 
Sahara. In a context of nationalist conflict, I suggest that the MLA appears as a history that is 
“alien to the times”278 of the present, since it reveals relations of neither independence nor 
sovereign unity between Moroccans and Sahrawis but, instead, a dialectic of autonomy and 
dependence. As mentioned in the introduction, recognizing the temporality of a past that is 
                                                
277 The National Museum in Rabouni, the administrative center for SADR/Polisario in the Sahrawi refugee camps, 
ignores the MLA in a timeline on the museum’s wall historicizing Sahrawi nationalism and anticolonial resistance. 
278 Bloch, “Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics,” 31. 
 181 
seemingly out of step with the present is important for understanding how the apparently 
anomalous histories of decolonization in the Western Sahara disrupt the very premise of 
decolonization as an orderly sequence of events. As a particular kind of disorderly history that 
both cannot be consigned to the past, and cannot be resolved with the present, I suggest that the 
MLA constitutes a “nonsynchronous contradiction” in relation to the present. Drawing upon 
Ernst Bloch’s concept, this chapter considers the different ways in which the history of the MLA 
manifests itself as an “unsettled past”279 in the present context of nationalist conflict. 
This section examines how the Moroccan state attempts to produce a visible but restricted 
historical narrative regarding decolonization in the Sahara during the 1950s, principally through 
the High Commission for Former Resistance Fighters and Members of the Liberation Army.280 
Through publications, public events and museums, the High Commission publicizes the exploits 
of the Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) in the Sahara, while attempting to control the narrative 
over its relationship to the Moroccan monarchy and Moroccan nationalism. In this sense, the 
High Commission’s role in attempting to monopolize the production of history regarding the 
Liberation Army is an extension of the Moroccan state’s tenuous and contested claims to 
sovereignty.  While the High Commission’s provision of benefits for veterans has made the 
subject position of “former resistance fighter” fairly prominent in Moroccan-controlled Western 
Sahara today, the current visibility of these figures often highlights the MLA’s uneasy 
relationship to Moroccan national history, particularly when these figures evoke controversies 
from the 1950s that continue to haunt the present. While the High Commission’s mission to 
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2015), 74. 
280 al-Mundubiya al-samiyya li qudama’ al-muqawamin wa ‘ada‘ jaysh al-tahrir, or Haut Commissariat des Anciens 
Résistants et Membres de l’Armée de Libération. Hereafter, “High Commission.” 
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publicize this historical moment keeps the MLA visible in the present, its purpose of producing 
history as a means of legitimating sovereignty ensures that this history remains closely tied to 
state security prerogatives. The next section of this paper will examine the tensions between 
visibility and control underpinning state-led efforts to produce the MLA’s public history, by 
focusing specifically on the High Commission’s museums, as well as a private archivist who 
might be described as a “friend of the state.” 
 
*** 
The 2014 conference in Laâyoune/El Aaiún illustrates how the emphasis on Sahrawis’ 
historical allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco remains a prominent theme in Morocco’s state-
sanctioned narrative. When performed, however, this public history frequently encounters 
resistance and begets controversy, as with the Sahrawi man who walked out on Nourredine 
Belhaddad’s conference presentation in protest. As a result, the maintenance of the public form 
of this history is as closely tied with the institutions of Moroccan state security and intelligence 
as with academic scholarship. Much as Morocco is engaged in an ongoing dispute over 
sovereignty in Western Sahara, the historicization of the MLA in the Sahara is imbricated in 
Morocco’s ongoing struggle to legitimate and maintain sovereignty in the region. While the 2014 
conference was sponsored by the Ministry of Culture’s University of Moulay Ali Cherif, the 
state institution with the mandate to sustain national memory surrounding the MLA is the High 
Commission for Former Resistance Fighters and Members of the Liberation Army. The High 
Commission was established June 15, 1973, which, as Samia Errazzouki points out, followed 
two unsuccessful coup attempts against King Hassan II that took place the two previous years 
(July 1971, August 1972). Given this context, the establishment of the High Commission might 
be seen as a counterrevolutionary act, taking place at a moment of political opening in the 
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1970s281 when a number of groups, some including former MLA members, were involved in 
plots to potentially overthrow Hassan II: 
These mobilizations took on the form of violent acts of resistance in Rabat and 
Casablanca, sparking a round of arrests and disappearances. During the same 
month that Hassan II issued dahir nº 1.73.252, on June 25, 1973, 149 people 
accused of taking part in these acts stood trial in the military tribunal in Kenitra. It 
was under the shadow of these events that in 1973 the Moroccan state’s domestic 
intelligence agency, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) was 
created.282 
Initially a means of coopting political opposition through the distribution of state benefits, and 
for Hassan II to consolidate power, the establishment of the High Commission was, in this sense, 
an instance of Moroccan state formation through the reappropriation of the past. 
Today, however, the High Commission makes the past visible in the present through 
museums, events and publications that incorporate the MLA into a narrative of history that 
blends anticolonial nationalism with loyalty to the Alawite dynasty. The High Commission’s 
museum, which opened in 2001, consolidated documents from the MLA’s struggle into an 
archive housed at headquarters in the Agdal neighborhood of government ministries in the 
capital city of Rabat. While purporting to present an exhibit of MLA anticolonial resistance, the 
lower floors of the museum, which one first encounters upon entry, feature a number of artifacts 
that predate or are otherwise not directly related to MLA activities (such as material from the Rif 
War of the 1920s), and the upper floors, which show documents and photos from the MLA, 
focus on the period of Mohamed V’s exile and return, 1953-55.283 Local branches of the museum 
for the High Commission which have opened more recently in Sidi Ifni, Tan Tan, Laâyoune, 
Boujdour and Dakhla (all located in either southern Morocco or Moroccan-occupied Western 
                                                
281 Subject of Chapter 4 
282 Samia Errazzouki, “The Moroccan Non-Exception: A Party, an Army, and a Palace (Part II),” Jadaliyya, 
September 4, 2015, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22525/the-moroccan-non-exception_a-party-an-army-
and-a-p. 
283 Errazzouki. Also based on my own visit to the High Commission’s museum in Agdal, Rabat, July, 2013. 
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Sahara) follow a similar design. With few exceptions (at the museum in Boujdour, for example, 
where a private archivist and friend of the state donated photographs and documents), exhibited 
material emphasizes nationwide uprisings, with very little documentation specific to the Sahara, 
and focuses on the period from 1953 to 1955, which erases the anticolonial unrest, such as the 
MLA in the Sahara, that continued after Moroccan independence in 1956. In each museum 
branch, the exhibited materials are set against the backdrop of portraits featuring Alawite kings. 
In addition to the museum displays, the High Commission has established a prolific 
publication wing, which provides an outlet for dissertation work by Moroccan PhD students in 
history, circulates periodicals such as National Memory (al-Dhakira al-Wataniya), and publishes 
“Kings of the Cherifian 
Alawite State” 
A series of portraits of 
Moroccan Kings at the 
Boujdour branch of the 
High Commission for 
Former Resistance Fighters 
and Members of the 
Liberation Army, in 
Moroccan-controlled 
Western Sahara. 
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edited volumes to commemorate the anniversaries of particular events.284 As with the museum 
displays, the publications align the culmination of anticolonial resistance movements with the 
return of Mohamed V from exile, and Moroccan independence. Mohammed Zade’s Résistance et 
Armée de Libération au Maroc (1947-1956), to take one of the more thorough histories 
published based on High Commission archives, for example, ends its study in 1956. This 
periodization synchronizes the end of anticolonial resistance with Moroccan independence, 
erasing the sense of dissatisfaction with decolonization which remained after 1956, and drove the 
MLA’s campaign in the Sahara.285 Those publications that directly address MLA activities in the 
Sahara from 1956-59 invariably describe this armed movement in nationalist – and gendered – 
terms, phrasing the MLA’s campaign as an effort to reunite the “usurped regions” [al-manatiq 
al-mughtasiba] of the “Moroccan Sahara” with the nation.286 As with the museum display, the 
High Commission’s publishing arm seeks to synchronize MLA anticolonial resistance with the 
timeline of Moroccan national independence and conflate this movement with what Errazzouki 
terms “the perceived organic and enduring centrality of the monarchy that nationalist histories 
have propagated.”287 
 The High Commission’s active role in publicizing this controversial moment stands in 
tension with the control it maintains over MLA archives and which, by association, it attempts to 
maintain over the narrative of the MLA. In the course of my fieldwork, this tension was 
embedded within a broader ambiguity concerning the High Commission’s central mission. The 
publications and museums suggest an active pedagogical role in promoting the public history of 
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the MLA in the Sahara. But, in the course of multiple visits to Morocco and Moroccan-
controlled Western Sahara during fieldwork in 2013 and 2014, I was never granted authorization 
to access High Commission archives, nor were High Commission staff authorized to refer me to 
former resistance fighters. Only on one occasion, in Tan Tan, a city in the Wed Nun region of 
southern Morocco, did an employee address the High Commission’s reluctance to make its 
archive available. Because documentation at the local level remained scarce, according to this 
employee, the vast majority of documentation remains archived in Rabat. As for family and 
privately held documents, the employee said that while the High Commission is open to 
collecting them, very few families have taken the state institution up on this. What followed was 
one of the more frank discussions of the Moroccan state’s relation to MLA history: 
The employee then mentioned that, unfortunately, we would have a hard time 
getting anywhere on the matter given the political sensitivity, and the fact that the 
High Commission really doesn’t deal with or provide this history, for multiple 
reasons.  
       For one thing, the employee said, the High Commission was established to 
manage all matters related to veterans of the National Resistance, and only 
recently (this employee mentioned an initiative started in 2000) was it given the 
additional mandate to historicize that period, but that the Mandoubiya lacked the 
capacity in personnel (naqs kifa’ al-bashari) to carry this out.  
        In addition, though, this employee said that the institute isn’t really interested 
in promoting “scientific” research on the matter.288 This staff member pointed out 
that even if they were to sit down with former Army members and record the 
most basic information, someone would censor it before it ever saw the light of 
day. In this way, the High Commission acts as a kind of puppet master - pulling 
the strings of what gets said at commemorative events (this employee used the 
term “tamjid”) and on the information collected, since its censorship guarantees 
that only selective information is published.  
        In short, as this person put it, there is no freedom in this matter.289 
 
The High Commission attempts to manage the tension between publicity and control over this 
history by restricting access to first-hand sources, even as it keeps MLA history visible in the 
                                                
288 La yhum bi tarikh ‘ilmi 
289 Fieldnote, October 26, 2014, Tan Tan, Morocco. 
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public sphere. In doing so, the High Commission itself represents an institutionalized tension 
between producing historical visibility, and maintaining control over this discourse. 
 There are, however, additional forms which this tension takes, not least in the figure of 
the “friend of the state” mentioned above, who donated certain documents to the High 
Commission’s museum branch in Boujdour, a coastal city in Moroccan-controlled Western 
Sahara.290 Early on in my research, I received a phone call from an unrecognized number. The 
man told me that I “did not need to know” the caller’s name, but that he wished to introduce me 
to someone, who turned out to be Hamadi. Hamadi’s father had kept a private archive and had 
been an active participant in the MLA in the 1950s, and the son had inherited both his father’s 
archive and political proximity to the Moroccan state. After the introduction by phone, Hamadi 
invited me to his house in Lââyoune/El Aaiún (he has property in both Boujdour, his hometown, 
and in Laâyoune/El Aaiún). When he welcomed me to his home, Hamadi had just returned from 
an annual trip to Rabat for the Festival of the Throne (Eid al-‘arsh) to perform bay‘a, a ritual 
renewal of allegiance and submission to the Moroccan king performed by notables from around 
the country. 
 The purpose of my visit had been for Hamadi to introduce me to some of his documents 
pertaining to the MLA, and he initially expressed his enthusiasm at the prospect of being able to 
share documents from the history of the MLA toward academic ends. When I asked whether I 
could share the documents with two Moroccan graduate students with whom I had been working, 
Hamadi expressed his reservations. Instead, he suggested that it was possible to share some of 
this history with me precisely because I was approaching the subject from outside Morocco. 
Once he began showing me documents, however, this certainty waned. One document Hamadi 
                                                
290 Thank you to Professor Beth Baron, Andrew Alger, Jeremy Randall and Sara Pekow of the Middle East Studies 
dissertation workshop at CUNY-Graduate Center for encouraging me to flesh out this figure. 
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pulled from his binders was a type-written report that circulated among MLA leadership about 
how to proceed following Opération Ecouvillon. At its conclusion, the report identified several 
prominent Sahrawis for having collaborated with French and Spanish counterinsurgency efforts. 
Another handwritten paper, which Hamadi said was French propaganda, named three bidanis 
who had “joined” the French cause, encouraging others to do the same. All of the documents 
appeared to be originals. After spotting the names, Hamadi asked me not to photograph the 
documents and to erase the photographs I had already taken, suggesting that I could copy 
portions of the documents by hand, but at a later date. 
That later date, as it turned out, took place at an evening gathering at Las Dunas, a public 
outdoor café situated near one of the busiest intersections of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Hamadi agreed 
to meet with me, along with the two Moroccan graduate students with whom I had been 
arranging interviews and conducting research. As we were getting started, Hamadi noted that a 
colleague who had important contacts with regards to the MLA was going to join us. The fellow 
arrived, and upon introduction he mentioned that he had done his research on US foreign policy 
toward terrorism. He sat and listened as we talked about the MLA in general terms and discussed 
the prospects for meeting people to whom Hamadi might introduce us. After about 15 to 20 
minutes, Hamadi’s guest got up and left, leaving me his email address as we talked about 
meeting in the next few days. Somehow, it was only after we finished meeting with Hamadi and 
went to another café, when one of the graduate students pointed out the obvious: the man to 
whom Hamadi introduced us was clearly working for the Department of the Interior, and had 
been conducting reconnaissance.  
 My interactions with Hamadi the archivist were representative of how the history of the 
MLA became manifest in the present: visible and therefore seemingly accessible, but with that 
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access conditional upon being cleared, first, as a friend of the Moroccan state. The publications, 
museums, archives and events together comprise the Moroccan state’s attempts to coopt and 
consolidate a hegemonic narrative in which the Sahara had to be reclaimed in order to restore 
national unity from French and Spanish colonial usurpation. That the state remains deeply 
invested in controlling what should be remembered and what must be forgotten about the MLA 
in the Sahara should not be surprising precisely because Morocco’s legitimacy in the region 
remains tenuous. But given that publicizing this history still requires the cooperation of living 
members from this period, former resistance fighters themselves often manifest this tension 
between publicity and control over this history. However, they cannot fully escape the 
hegemonic narrative surrounding this history which is tied to Morocco historicizing its claims to 
sovereignty. As a result, the counternarratives emerge as scandals more than as means of 
rethinking the historiography itself. The pervasive sense of scandal functions as a kind of 
institutionalized controversy surrounding the history of the MLA. 
 
Section III: Institutionalized Controversy: Counternarratives and Public Secrets in 
Historicizing the MLA 
 
As much as the history of the MLA is mediated in a highly restrictive manner by the 
politics of the present, the Moroccan state cannot fully monopolize the historical narrative on the 
MLA in the Sahara. This is in part because the state’s failure to address the complexities entailed 
by this unresolved project of decolonization ensures that this history remains riven with 
controversy. Another reason is because living, former members of the MLA do not necessarily 
conform to Moroccan state narratives. In this section, I will examine historical counternarratives, 
including histories by Ben Said Ait Iddr, a former member of the political wing of the MLA, oral 
histories published as part of dissertation research by the Moroccan sociologist, Ali al-Omri, and 
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rumors that I encountered in the course of my fieldwork. Each of these counternarratives 
complicate the official narrative promulgated by the Moroccan state. However, because they 
cannot separate themselves from the political stakes of nationalism shaping the political field in 
the present, these counternarratives are frequently consumed by controversy. This 
“institutionalized controversy” surrounding decolonization of the Sahara in the 1950s, as 
manifested by rumors, oral histories and other counternarratives, both indicates and conceals the 
complexities of this unresolved project of decolonization. 
In my initial meeting with him, Hamadi appeared to be hesitant to share his documents, 
not because of the imperatives of state security and sovereignty, but presumably out of concern 
with protecting the reputations for the descendants of those named in the documents. This 
consideration of the history of the MLA differs from the state security imperative, and is worth 
exploring on its own terms. If the state security approach to the history of 1950s decolonization 
emphasizes synchronism and control, another aspect of the historiography of the MLA is rife 
with scandal. Even in a context of competing sovereignties, where Moroccan legitimacy in the 
Sahara remains deeply contested, the distinction between an anticolonial resistance fighter and a 
“traitor” (kha’in) still holds great currency. In this way, the sense of scandal surrounding the 
history of the MLA is structured by the same poles of loyalty and betrayal that structure the 
contemporary political field of nationalist conflict, and perspectives on the MLA become a kind 
of prism through which political dynamics of the present are read. 
Ali al-Omri, a Moroccan sociologist who conducted his dissertation research on the 
Moroccan Liberation Army in the Sahara, published a collection of oral histories through the 
High Commission.291 The first edition created an uproar among certain veterans who claimed 
                                                
291 Ali al-Omri, Al-Muqawama Al-Sahrawiya Wa Al-’aml Al-Watani: Muqabalat Wa Watha’iq, 1st ed. (Rabat: al-
Mandubiya al-Samiyya li-Qudama’ al-Muqawimin wa-‘Ada’ Jaysh al-Tahrir, 2008).  
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that they had been slandered by the claims found in specific interviews from the published 
collection. Those who felt wronged went so far as to take the author to court.292 The High 
Commission attempted to withdraw the first printing from circulation, and published another 
edition. Both editions are marked as “first edition,” and with the same publishing year, but 
certain passages in the first edition are missing from the altered version. In the first edition, for 
example, El Ouali Ba Bayt asserted that one Larabas Ma al-Aynayn had been charged by the 
MLA with delivering arms to a regiment near Laâyoune/El Aaiún, but ended up giving himself 
up to the Spanish authorities and disclosing his cargo.293 Though Larabas was imprisoned on the 
Canary Islands for this, El Ouali Ba Bayt’s account implied that Larabas had not been a reliable 
or trustworthy member of the anticolonial struggle of the 1950s. In the second edition, this 
account has been removed and, according to several people, Larabas was one of the aggrieved 
parties who threatened al-Omri with libel. As the son of an influential shaykh, Mohamed 
Laghdaf Ma al-Aynayn, and as part of a tribe that has been considered loyal to the Moroccan 
state, Larabas has occupied a series of powerful governmental posts since 1975, including 
President of the Provincial Council, President of the Council of Learning, and Judge on the High 
Appellate Court for the region of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In the role of judge, Larabas presided over 
trials for Sahrawis arrested for their political activity, and was notorious for accepting bribes in 
this role. In this sense, El Ouali, who was imprisoned for thirteen years following Moroccan 
annexation for allegedly providing material support to the Polisario Front, was perhaps settling 
scores for the injustices and imbalances of power that had accrued over decades of political 
dispute.  
                                                
292 A news article where al-Omri addresses the controversy: “Ali al-Omri, mu’alif kitab ‘al-Muqawama al-
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It was not simply that El Ouali was questioning Larabas’s participation in the MLA, 
however. After all, there is no doubt, according to those I spoke with, that Larabas was involved 
in the MLA, and was imprisoned by Spain for these activities. Rather, El Ouali may have been 
trying to correct for the privileged role that Larabas, as member of a tribe favored by the 
Moroccan state, has had in making and speaking for this history. This has afforded Larabas, and 
“friends of the state” like him, not just the status that comes with public acknowledgment as a 
member of anticolonial resistance, but the opportunity to frame the history in simple terms of 
anticolonial nationalism: in fighting for Morocco, Larabas was imprisoned by Spain. This 
narrative, buttressed by the High Commission’s events and publications, marginalizes the 
participants who experienced this history in all of its complexity of competing sovereignties and 
transforming relations to political authority.294 The controversy over Larabas’s role in the MLA 
also reflects the “nonsynchronous contradiction” entailed in historicizing the MLA in the present 
– even disagreements end up filtered through the binaries of loyalty and betrayal to the 
nationalist cause. 
The prestige associated with being recognized as a former MLA fighter might appear 
paradoxical. After all, the recognition bears the ambivalence of having participated in an armed 
movement that did not succeed in its primary aim to dislodge Spanish and French colonial rule 
across western Sahara, and which was largely sold out by the Moroccan state that initially 
backed the effort. Moreover, part of the MLA’s leadership may have been plotting to overthrow 
the Moroccan king, while many of the Sahrawi fighters who joined this armed movement ended 
up feeling betrayed and defected. Perhaps to compensate for this historical ambivalence, the 
High Commission liberally bestowed recognition upon former members of the MLA after its 
establishment in the 1970s. Some claimed that people took advantage of the financially tenuous 
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situation of certain former members of the MLA, paying them for an attestation in order to gain 
approval for benefits. Others allegedly enlisted enough relatives willing to sign an attestation in 
order to compel an obliging member of the High Commission’s administration to grant 
recognition.295 Whether directly sanctioning these practices, or not, it is not difficult to see how 
the enrollment of large numbers of former anticolonial fighters under the High Commission’s 
benefit regime served the state’s interest in repurposing the MLA’s anticolonial heritage to align 
with both the monarchy, and Morocco’s state-sanctioned historical narratives.  
Regardless of the process, the end result was that the ranks of former members of the 
MLA swelled with fraudulent members. As the Director of one of the High Commission’s local 
branches acknowledged, some pensioners receiving benefits from the High Commission had 
birthdates on their veterans’ identification cards that preceded the MLA in the Sahara by only 
twelve years. This speaks to the space which the MLA history occupies between public history 
and public secrets. Because of the Moroccan state’s politicization of this history, the gap between 
the state-sanctioned historical narrative, which is both visible and visibly inaccurate, casts a 
shadow over parts of this history which do not align with the national narrative but are too well-
known to be ignored.  
In the relatively limited historiography of the MLA that is not sponsored or published by 
the High Commission, Ben Saïd Aït Iddr’s works distinguish themselves for providing a 
relatively comprehensive account of the MLA, and a distinct argument. Aït Iddr was a part of the 
MLA’s political wing, which organized funding and funneled arms to the Army’s headquarters 
in Goulmime, but did not participate in military campaigns in the Sahara. Like others involved in 
the MLA’s political wing, including al-Fqih Ben Basri, Said Bounailat, Moulay Abdeslam Jebli, 
and Ibrahim Tizniti (later known as Nemri), Aït Iddr went on to form the 23 Mars movement, a 
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radical leftist group whose members were engaged throughout the 1960s and 70s in attempts to 
overthrow the monarchy in Morocco.296 After spending decades in exile in Algeria and France, 
Aït Iddr returned to Morocco and published two histories of the MLA, based both on his 
experience and on MLA documents that he obtained privately.297  
In doing so, Aït Iddr presents a history of the MLA that foregrounds two dynamics, one 
of them explicitly, the other perhaps unwittingly. Aït Iddr’s central argument, first presented in 
his 2001 publication, is that the MLA was not undone by French-Spanish joint 
counterinsurgency but by a series of damaging schisms and unnecessary obstacles that emerged 
between the MLA and the Moroccan state, and from within the MLA itself: 
Rather, the difficulties and obstacles that [the MLA] faced from within were 
effectively and actually stronger, so despite the military loss before the colonial 
alliance, the Liberation Army could have come out with a new result, enabling the 
lifting of morale, and opening new horizons in order to continue fighting a new 
battle.298 
 
Primary among these internal constraints was the Moroccan state’s ambivalence toward the 
MLA. This is the focus of Aït Iddr’s first book on the subject, Safahat min Melhamat Jaysh al-
Tahrir bi Janub al-Maghrib.299 As Aït Iddr suggests, the newly independent Moroccan state 
became increasingly ambivalent toward the MLA even before the group had arrived in 
Goulmime. As the armed faction made its way south taking revenge upon and seizing property 
from people seen as French loyalists, and kidnapping French officers who were still stationed in 
southern Morocco, the MLA became seen as a threat to the stability of the new nation state. 
 As a result, Aït Iddr suggests that the Moroccan state increased surveillance over the 
MLA’s operations in Goulmime and, more damagingly, sowed discord among MLA leadership. 
                                                
296 Bennouna, Héros sans gloire. 
297 These documents reputedly belong to Nadil al-Hashimi, leader of one of the MLA regiments. 
298 Ait Iddr, Safahat Min Melhamat Jaysh Al-Tahrir Bi Janub Al-Maghrib, 12. 
299 The title translates as Pages from the Saga of the Liberation Army in Southern Morocco 
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Drawing upon the notebook kept by an official in the MLA, Aït Iddr suggests that a meeting was 
arranged in Bouizkern, just north of Goulmime, in 1957. At the height of their gains against 
Spain, MLA officers were commanded to leave their posts. Some traveled from as far south as 
Tiris, in southern Spanish Sahara and, upon reaching Bouizkern, a number of those summoned 
were arrested. The entire town was apparently under siege while the power struggle between 
MLA officers played out. There are conflicting reports about who led this plot. Aït Iddr blames 
officials from the Moroccan state who, he claims, had convinced a faction of MLA officials to 
join the Royal Armed Forces, and then force others to do the same.300 Another historian, 
however, documented how some of the MLA’s leaders, including Ben Hamou and Driss el-
Alawi, ruled with impunity, imprisoning and executing French “collaborators” during 1956 and 
57 when the MLA first arrived in Goulmime. By this account, Bouizkern may have either been a 
continuation of this heavy-handed leadership, or a revolt among a disillusioned group of MLA 
officers.301 Regardless, Aït Iddr notes that what he calls the “Bouizkern Plot” “contributed in a 
fundamental way (bi shakal jidhari) to changing the original direction of the Liberation Army, 
and pushing it to build a different strategy that was forced upon it, without its wish.”302 
 In his first history, written in 2001, Aït Iddr focuses largely on the role that the formative 
Moroccan state played in stymying the MLA’s campaign in the Sahara. According to Aït Iddr, 
state agents withheld support from the MLA, or actively undermined its efforts. Though Aït Iddr 
never mentions him by name, the implication is that the Prince Hassan II was responsible for 
these countermeasures, seeing the MLA as a threat to the Royal Armed Forces that was newly 
under his command. In this first historical account, Aït Iddr depicts the MLA as a largely 
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coherent extension of the anticolonialism that predated Moroccan independence, but which was 
suddenly betrayed by the newly independent Moroccan state. However, not unlike the High 
Commission museums, the bidani and Ba‘amrani fighters who constituted most of the MLA’s 
armed force have a limited role in this history. In Aït Iddr’s second history Watha’iq Jaysh al-
Tahrir fi Janub al-Maghrib, published in 2011 and based largely on notes kept by an MLA 
officer, Aït Iddr characterizes the MLA as an armed movement betrayed by potential allies and 
besieged by otherwise avoidable obstacles. In this history, there are plots and conspiracies (al-
dasa’is wa al-mu‘amarat) at every turn. In this second account, Sahrawis do make an 
appearance, but they are most prominently identified as the creators of these plots and 
conspiracies. Nonetheless, unlike the earlier publication, Aït Iddr focuses more on the 
relationship between MLA leadership, which was largely Moroccan, and the Sahrawis who 
constituted the rank and file of the armed movement. 
 This leads to the second insight from Aït Iddr’s historiography of this period, which 
begins to shed light on the relationship between Moroccans and the bidani tribesmen they had 
recruited to join their ranks. In both works, Aït Iddr is invested in redeeming the MLA’s 
leadership from the suspicions and aspersions that have dogged historical understandings of their 
role in potentially plotting to overthrow the King, as well as alienating the Sahrawis who initially 
rallied to their cause. As a result, Aït Iddr makes it his task to prove that members of the MLA’s 
leadership were motivated purely by nationalism (with no other, anti-monarchical aims) and 
sought to spread this nationalism to the people of the Sahara. In one passage, he notes: 
To that end, the leadership opened a school for political formation whose 
responsibility fell to one of the leaders of the Resistance, comrade Abdesslam 
Jebeli, with the aim of raising the political level of the Liberation Army 
soldiers.303 
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The MLA, Aït Iddr notes, also provided education and housing to children displaced by 
Opération Ecouvillon in cities across southern Morocco such as Agadir, Tafraout and, most 
famously, in a repurposed mansion in Casablanca known as Dar Touzani.304 
 In drawing attention to the MLA’s material efforts to better the people of the Sahara, Aït 
Iddr also provides an unvarnished perspective of how MLA leadership viewed Sahrawis at that 
time: 
The Army took some major steps in creating a national consciousness (al-wa‘yi 
al-qawmi) and nationalist feeling (al-sha‘ur al-watani) until the words ‘traitor’ 
and ‘loyalist’ and ‘general interest’ and ‘independence’ and ‘freedom’ and 
‘colonialism’ and ‘struggle’ and ‘unity’ and ‘racism’305 – and other expressions 
that had not been in use before the Army’s arrival, when the Sahara only knew the 
likes of the word ‘camel’ and ‘rain’ and ‘grazing’ and ‘tea’ and ‘French territory’ 
and ‘Spanish territory’ and a distorted picture of ‘the North’ and ruinous battles 
(al-ma‘arik al-tahina) that took place between one tribe and another.306 
 
Whether one believes that the MLA was responsible for instilling these feelings in the people of 
the Sahara is less important, here, than drawing upon Aït Iddr’s account – which is, again, based 
on a journal kept by a Moroccan MLA officer – for its ethnographic insights into the relationship 
between Moroccans and bidanis at this time. The condescension in this passage is apparent, 
associating the bidanis with political ignorance and backwardness. Without the “gift” of national 
consciousness, this passage implies that the people of the Sahara knew only the geographies 
imposed by French and Spanish colonialism. This passage also constructs the way of life in the 
Sahara as a series of vacuous preoccupations with ostensibly apolitical things: livestock, weather, 
and sociality, i.e., “‘camels’ and ‘rain’ and ‘grazing’ and ‘tea.’” What politics they do have, this 
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stereotype asserts, is the chaos of tribal warfare associated in the Moroccan political imaginary 
with al-bilad al-siba’, or the land beyond the pale of state control. 
 Aït Iddr’s historiography of the MLA is well-known in Morocco, and for good reason. In 
acknowledging obstacles which the MLA faced from the Moroccan state and within its own 
ranks, this perspective contests the High Commission’s state-centered historiography, which 
attempts to erase any separation between the politics of anticolonialism, Moroccan nationalism, 
and allegiance to the Alawite dynasty. Because he is writing within certain political constraints, 
Aït Iddr cannot directly accuse the King of undermining the MLA. Instead, he focuses on other 
parties: the agents of the state responsible for Bouizkern and, subsequently, the Sahrawis who, in 
defecting from the MLA, failed to show the requisite loyalty of committed nationalists. In a 
certain respect, Aït Iddr’s work serves as a counternarrative to Moroccan state-centered 
narratives that refuse to acknowledge the complexity of this historical moment. This also serves 
to some extent as a corrective to the Spanish historiography, largely completed by military 
historians, which minimizes the level of Sahrawi involvement in the MLA.307 
 However, Aït Iddr’s focus also belies a preoccupation with the terms set by the state-
centered narrative: the people of the Sahara are characterized as blameworthy (whether 
duplicitous or ignorant) because of their inability to remain steadfast and loyal to a national goal. 
In this specific way, Aït Iddr’s counternarative resembles the controversy surrounding Ali al-
Omri’s oral histories. Both counternarratives complicate, in different ways, the state’s attempt to 
align this history with its own interests of legitimation and sovereignty. In doing so, these 
counternarratives spark controversies that contest the most visible inaccuracies in the state-
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sanctioned public history. Nonetheless, these counternarratives remain constrained by the politics 
of national historiography and, as a result, their debates end up framed by the poles of loyalty 
and betrayal. 
*** 
In this section, I have examined historical accounts that, in one way or another, contest the High 
Commission’s attempts to monopolize the historical narrative of the MLA in the 1950s. Because 
these studies must accept certain parameters within which to debate what took place, the focus 
tends to leave nationalism itself unexamined. When Sahrawis aren’t erased entirely from this 
narrative, they are generally evaluated relative to the framework of loyalty and/or betrayal to the 
MLA cause. This even occurs in the instance of oral histories, where the controversies 
engendered focused on questions of loyalty and betrayal, and not necessarily the ambiguities of 
the MLA as a political phenomenon. These controversies illustrate how the MLA remains an 
“unsettled past” that sits in disjunctive relation to the political present of nationalist conflict. In 
the next section, I attempt to displace this framework by using the MLA as a point of departure 
from which to consider the transformative effects of decolonization on the people of the Sahara 
during the 1950s. The sources for this account include oral histories, a rumor, and a poem. 
 
Section IV – Disorderly Histories: 1950s Decolonization of the Sahara through Oral 
Histories, and Rumor 
With one exception to this point, I have largely avoided presenting oral histories by MLA 
participants, despite the fact that the recording of oral histories through interviews constituted a 
significant part of my research of the MLA in the Sahara. This is in part because the 
methodology presented a number of challenges, which I have tried to outline above. In Morocco 
and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, the High Commission’s effort to coopt the history of 
decolonization in the Sahara in the 1950s in order to serve the Moroccan state’s struggle to 
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legitimate sovereignty in the territory constrained everything from the use of names (“Moroccan 
Sahara”) to the recognition or omission of historical events. No one I interviewed while I was in 
Morocco or Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, for example, would provide a first-hand 
account of mdigadig l-magazin, although people would acknowledge that the event took place. 
The contemporary framework of nationalist conflict often served as the “audience,” whether 
absent or present, shaping interviewees’ narratives.308 This polarized context constrained what 
could be said and what could not be said about events of the period leading, as I suggested in the 
previous section, to a historiography grounded in assigning blame for the demise of the MLA. 
This “institutionalized controversy” manifested itself in interviews I conducted with certain 
interlocutors eager to blame Ben Saïd Aït Iddr, for example, for revising the history of the MLA 
for the purposes of resuscitating his own reputation. When I conducted interviews in the 
Polisario/SADR-run refugee camps in southwest Algeria, the effects of the political conflict 
manifested themselves in reverse form, particularly since I was carrying out interviews with the 
assistance and in the presence of an employee of SADR’s Ministry of Communications.  
Although the form and content of oral histories about this period deserve further analysis 
in their own right, I turn to a specific passage from a single interview with a former MLA fighter 
in an attempt to situate this experience within broader changes across western Sahara during this 
period. Rather than evaluating this military campaign in relation to national projects still in 
formation at that time, or that were yet to come, I suggest that the events in the region between 
1956 and 59 can be particularly revealing for what they can tell us about decolonization as an 
attempt to fix the political subjectivity of people of the Sahara. M’hamid, for example, was a 
soldier under Spanish rule in Smara in 1957, when a MLA contingent arrived and commanded 
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his group to surrender. M’hamid spent the next year fighting for the MLA. After the Army was 
routed by Operation Ecouvillon, M’hamid and his unit spent twenty days traveling on foot to 
reach Wed Nun, where they subsequently remained camped out for months awaiting orders. 
M’hamid recalls that during this time, word spread among the bidani fighters that they had been 
“tricked,” and so they broke into a stockade of arms and defected, in what was known as 
mdigadig l’magazin: 
M’hamid: …Mdigadig L-magazin: when a year had passed, at the beginning of 59, 
the chleuha said, “The war's over.” For them, in their minds [damir unfusahum 
huma], the war was over and they said that they were going to disarm the 
Sahrawis. …[It was a] trick [khid‘a]: ... Take their arms, and leave them. You 
understand? 
 
Me: Meaning, they took the arms from the Sahrawis… 
 
M’hamid: …Almost three months passed, and they were promoting that idea, that 
the Liberation Army will be followed by the Royal Army…And when they said 
that they were going to promote that rumor, that it would trick us into [joining] 
the Royal Army. 
 There was someone in Tan Tan who was the leader of a unit [katiba], a 
Sahrawi, known as Mahfoud ould Ma'atalla…raised in Marrakesh, in 
Morocco…He called the leaders of the platoons [fasa'il], and leaders of the 
regiments. All of them Sahrawi. Called them and told them a story, that it was a 
trick: Morocco tricked you. 
  
Me: He's the one who told you about the trick. 
 
M’hamid: But, it wasn't clear to us; we weren't convinced by it. [mahi jadd ‘elina] 
 
Me: Why not? 
 
M’hamid: We had at that time, just the Sultan, and nothing else. Just the Sultan, 
and that's it. [Ma‘atalla] was the one who was there for us, and that's it. Three 
months passed and he called them and met with them, the leadership, two days 
each week. They met. And he passed along the trick that was being planned. You 
understand, or what? This guy was raised in Morocco, and he was aware [khbari] 
- smart. 
 
After becoming convinced by Ma’atalla of this trick, M’hamid participated in mdigadig l-
magazin, when MLA soldiers tied up their Moroccan commander and broke into the stockade of 
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arms which had been taken from them. M’hamid and hundreds of others then left Tan Tan with 
the aid of a handful of prominent shaykhs who, with the support of France, provided material 
goods and transport to Tindouf, Bir Moghrein, or points south in Spanish Sahara. By 1960, 
M’hamid was a soldier in the Mauritanian army, attending independence ceremonies in 
Nouakchott. Since joining the Polisario Front in the 1970s, he has lived in the Sahrawi refugee 
camps in Algeria. 
There are three aspects of M’hamid’s oral history and itinerary that I would like to dwell 
on. The first is his political mobility. The significance here is not only that there were different 
perspectives from bidani former combatants about why they participated in the Liberation Army 
– the myriad of motives both contradict the notion that nationalism was a hegemonic force at the 
time, but also defy cataloguing. Rather, I take the significance of these varied perspectives to 
suggest the multiple political and ethical commitments, as well as the various collectivities to 
which people of the Sahara had a sense of belonging at that time. Rather than thinking of their 
identities as fixed in tribal (Rguibi, Ma al-Aynayn, Izerguiyin, Wlad Dlim, among many others) 
or national (Mauritanian, Moroccan, or Sahrawi), I have used the descriptor bidani to draw 
attention to the relatively undefined political geography of western Sahara during the 1950s. 
Recognizing these processes as in flux serves to highlight the tremendous effort expended during 
this time – by the Moroccans, by the French, and by the Spanish – to define and redefine borders, 
to fix the subjectivities of their subjects, and to delineate the horizon of political futures in the 
region. 
The second part of M’hamid’s personal narrative that I would like to focus on involves 
his reference to the Sultan, and to being “tricked.” Whether the people of the Sahara have 
historically pledged some form of allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco, or not – and whether that 
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constitutes “a sovereign tie” – has been the subject of a ruling by the International Court of 
Justice, and is beyond the scope of this chapter.309 But the reference to having “nothing but the 
Sultan,” and then being “tricked” by the Moroccans they encountered, can be understood in a 
number of ways. For M’hamid, it seemed to reference the fact that he and many others had been 
ordered to trek north to Morocco and disarm, and then, rather than receiving compensation, he 
and others were threatened with conscription into the Moroccan Army. He had been tricked into 
fighting for a national project, rather than an anticolonial one. 
But the notion of being “tricked” speaks to tensions that exist on a number of levels. It 
speaks to the tension between people of the Sahara and their neighbors to the north, whom 
M’hamid refers to, in ethnicized terms, as chleuh.310 Without resorting to overdrawn dichotomies 
between nomadic and sedentary peoples, it is worth recognizing how the MLA laid bare many of 
the relations of complementarity and antagonism that are entailed between these mutually 
imbricated groups, particularly in border regions such as Wed Nun, which is where mdigadig l-
magazin took place. Underpinning the apparent reciprocity in regards to this transitional region 
on the shores of the Sahara, there is a tension between autonomy and dependence, between 
pastoral and commercial modes of living, that entail questions of trust, power and respect, as 
well as political and moral commitment. This tension is captured more generally in multiple 
Sahrawi proverbs that invoke the north as a place to be avoided: 
The sahel is the house of money 
The south, for wandering 
The east is the house of fire 
And don’t look to the north311 
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311 Al-sahel bayt al-mal 
Al-gibla tuf 
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And, again, this time framed in terms of advice should one’s son head in one of two directions: 
 
If he goes south, don’t hesitate 
And if he goes north, don’t [let him] go312 
 
And, finally, a couplet that more explicitly associates danger and difficulties with Morocco: 
 
 Whoever goes south, gets what he needs 
 And whoever goes to Morocco, it is ruined313 
  
Whether as a potential site of moral corruption, or political trouble, these proverbs present the 
North, or tell, as a place to be avoided.  
 And, yet, the North was also a place where people from the Sahara took refuge, whether 
from drought or war (both of which occurred during 1956-57314) as well as for commercial 
purposes. In this sense, the third aspect of M’ahmid’s narrative of particular interest is the figure 
of Mahfoud ould Ma‘atalla the bidani raised in Marrakesh who alerted the MLA fighters to 
having been tricked. M’hamid spoke with reverence during our interview about ould Ma‘atalla’s 
role in alerting the bidani soldiers to the fact that they had been sold out by the Moroccan 
leadership of the MLA. Ould Ma‘atalla’s position as a go-between aligns, in this telling, with his 
subject position as a bidani living in Morocco. In M’hamid’s telling, this left ould Ma‘atalla both 
alert to the machinations of the MLA leadership, yet sympathetic to his fellow bidanis. Ould 
Ma‘atalla is far from an anomaly. On several occasions in the course of my fieldwork as people 
referenced their family history they mentioned relatives – often from just one or two generations 
prior – who had spent time in locations throughout Morocco, such as Ben Guerir, or the 
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314 Gaudio, Le dossier du Sahara occidental, 142. 
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Maamora forests outside of Rabat. In both instances, this had been a temporary stay and the 
relatives had returned to the Sahara with their identities and way of life intact. The sense of 
danger posed by the North, however, would seem to be related to the prospect of those who do 
not return but, instead, settle in the north and, potentially, assimilate.  
My point is to suggest that distrust between people of the two regions is no more 
structural than a certain interdependence. However, as a horizon of political possibility, 
decolonization foregrounded the tensions in this social relation in historically specific ways. 
Indeed, while much literature on colonialism in North Africa has focused on the centrality of the 
construction of Arab and Berber identities under French colonial rule,315 I would suggest that 
making sense of the relationship between peoples of the Sahara and people to the north is 
fundamental to understanding the region’s decolonization. This is not simply because of the 
‘sedentary/nomadic’ difference, but because the two groups experienced colonialism and 
decolonization in related, but radically different ways. Unlike Morocco under the French 
Protectorate, the Mediterranean French Algeria, or the Senegalese of French West Africa, the 
Sahara had largely been treated as a military outpost, and a colonial hinterland. And, likewise, 
just as European empire was withdrawing from its former colonies in the 1950s, capital 
investment in the Sahara was surging. And yet, decolonization brought about a political 
convergence of these divergent histories. 
This brings me to my last point, which is that M’hamid’s description of having been 
“tricked” by the Moroccans resonates with what I’m going to call a persistent rumor, or story, 
related to the MLA that crops up in written sources and that I also encountered during fieldwork. 
                                                
315 Katherine E. Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means: Customary Courts in the Moroccan Hinterlands, 
1930?1956,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 4 (2010): 851–80; Patricia M. E Lorcin, Imperial 
Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria (London; New York: I.B. Tauris; Distributed by St. 
Martin’s, 1995); Ernest Gellner, Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa ([London]: Duckworth, 
1973). 
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Multiple written accounts have suggested that internal dissension which led to a certain number 
of bidani defections from the MLA may have been attributable to disagreements between 
Moroccan leadership and certain bidani shaykh’s who had rallied to the cause. Tony Hodges 
writes: 
Very little is known about the causes of these defections. The western ways of the 
young radical Moroccans in the Army of Liberation’s leadership may have 
alienated the austere and traditional nomads…316 
 
And reporting from Tindouf, Algeria in 1959, shortly after Operation Ecouvillon, Paul Mousset 
reports that Rguibat tribesmen who had been combattants in the MLA whom he met there 
claimed that: 
…these Moroccans who presented themselves as the flower of Islam were praying 
very little or not at all, drinking beer and shaving their beards.317 
The persistence of this rumor came through in my fieldwork. One interlocutor suggested that 
bidanis in Goulmime had been put off by MLA leaders who put out their cigarettes on portraits 
of Mohamed V. On another occasion, a man of a younger generation said that he’d been told: 
[the Moroccans of the Liberation Army] didn't pray, they drank wine and they 
shaved their beards…and that's when it all began.318 
This difference in religious or ethical sensibilities between young Moroccan freedom fighters – 
some of whom were fighting not for the King, but for a republican or socialist future – and 
Sahrawi combatants, point to 1950s decolonization in the Sahara as a disjunctive time-space. 
Where the political and religious authority of the Sultan could still rally freedom fighters from 
the Rif to the Sahara in the name of anticolonial struggle, their conceptions of what constituted 
the Sultan’s authority differed significantly.  
                                                
316 Hodges, Western Sahara, 79. 
317 Mousset, Ce Sahara qui voit le jour., 202. 
318 Fieldnote, November, 2015 
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This is not to suggest, in any way, a lack of coevalness between the two, or to place one 
within modernity, and the other without. Indeed, one former MLA fighter now living in Sahrawi 
refugee camps in Algeria responded to the name of a Moroccan who had been involved in the 
MLA and is now a retired colonel living in Rabat by saying, “Jenah bin Acher, he was my 
friend!” Those who converged on Goulmime in the summer and fall of 1956, whether Moroccan 
or bidani, shared many things, not least an anticolonialism, broadly construed. However, the 
divergent projects animating a young, socialist Moroccan liberation fighter from Casablanca and 
a bidani shaykh from the Sahara highlight the different political horizons for which each was 
fighting: the nation, or the Sultan; jihad, or a socialist future. These might be thought of as 
indicative of the “disorderly” nature of this history: reflecting neither nationalist unity nor 
separatist antagonisms, the history of the MLA reveals the complex relations of autonomy and 
dependence between Moroccans and bidanis that constitute a nonsynchronous, or “unsettled past” 
in relation to the present context of nation state-based decolonization. 
 
Section V – Alternative Geographies: 1956-58, Tan Tan, and western Sahara at the 
Threshold of Decolonization 
Stanza I – Tan Tan and Tiris: Place and Displacement across western Sahara 
Somewhere between 1956 and 1958, in the fall, two brothers composed a poem in Tan 
Tan. Alternating stanzas, Mohamed Ibrahim ould Sid Ahmed ould Sidi composed the first and 
third stanzas, and his brother Bashir composed the second. This dialogic form, known as l-
gta‘,319 illustrates how poetry can serve as a means of spontaneous entertainment and creative 
expression in Hassanaphone, or bidani, poetry. While this dialogic form of poetic composition 
                                                
319 See Tara Flynn Deubel, “Between Homeland and Exile: Poetry, Memory, and Identity in Sahrawi Communities” 
Ph.D. diss., (Tucson, Ariz., 2010); Catherine Taine-Cheikh, Le pilier et la corde: recherches sur la poésie maure, 
http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00456221/en/; Catherine Taine-Cheikh, Pouvoir de la poésie et poésie du 
pouvoir. Le cas de la société maure, http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00456281. 
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can serve as the basis for a verbal duel, Catherine Taine-Cheikh notes that “poetic jousting is not 
tied to a specific theme.”320  In this instance, the brothers’ tone is structured less by a sense of 
competition than a tacking back and forth between playful boasting, a celebration of moral 
goodness, and a longing for their home. These three themes are all present in the first stanza, 
composed by Mohamed Ibrahim:321  
Lmagta‘ Lahmar and Lkhaljan 
And Lgara and Fam Ifandan 
And the “Jardin” and the Hasi of Tantan 
And Lahmaydiya and Dra‘a Lkhayl 
This is my home (since) the summer 
And that is thanks to God  
But replace those with Iniyyan 
Or with Lmanhar and Najdayl 
And the longing that surrounds me 
And comes to me at the end of the night 
Reminds me of the home of the Bidan 
Morning, noon and night 
And all the other seasons of the land 
The autumn with the rainfall and the runoff 
And I’m still here, trembling/lonely322 
I don’t see any way for poetry 
But home is knocking on the mind 
There is nothing more beautiful 
As for me, my home has never been spoken badly of 
The meaning of which is clear, and as proof 
All of that from Nagjir323 on 
It’s like it recognizes me even at night 
And don’t be afraid of me forgetting 
I won’t forget you, not for a long time324 
                                                
320 Taine-Cheikh, “Pouvoir de la poésie et poésie du pouvoir. Le cas de la société maure,” 296. 
321 Transliteration of the poem follows vernacular pronunciation in Hassaniya, rather than IJMES transliteration 
standards. 
322 Rejfan : lit. “trembling”  
323 A kidya, or small mountain, in Tiris. 
324 Lmagta‘ Lahmar wal Khaljan wa Lgara wa Fam Ifandan 
wa ljardin wa hasi Tan Tan wa Lahmaydiya wa Dra’a Lkhayl 
had wakri fi sayf nban  dhak lla tasrif Jalil 
badal had bi Iniyan  wa bi Lmanhar wa Najdayl 
dhak lhazem elayyi zignan  wa jinni ‘ad ‘agib layl 
wa hajjal wakr lbidan  lmbat wa lmathal wa lmgayl 
wa had ‘ad awwan at-turban li kharif wa lmsayl wa sil 
wa ana bagi hun wa rejfan mani ra’i lejhan sabil 
ghayr lwakr targ dhhan  ma fi ha lilmakhlouq jamil 
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Mohamed Ibrahim opens by listing a series of places in and around Tan Tan, at that time 
a military outpost south of the river Wed Draa.325 Situated in a narrow and variegated plain 
between Morocco’s Anti Atlas mountains to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the 
hard rocky Saharan hammada to the east, Tan Tan is located in a region at the northern end of the 
Sahara, known as Wed Nun. Thanks to its intermediary climatic and geographic position 
between the Sahara and points north (the “tell”), Wed Nun has historically been a gateway for 
trans-Saharan trade coming from the south and leading through the market town of Goulmime 
toward the agricultural plains and cities of Morocco. Unlike the more arid desert regions to the 
south, however, Wed Nun receives sufficient rain for seasonal grain cultivation, such that in 
times of drought it often hosts an influx of camel herding pastoralists from neighboring tribes 
who otherwise follow seasonal pasturage throughout western Sahara. As a place where pastoral 
nomadic and sedentary living overlap, Wed Nun has historically served as a point of 
convergence between multiple modes of life. Writing in 1934, the French colonial officer 
Frederic de la Chapelle suggested that the region “nicely synthesizes the reciprocity between 
nomads and sedentary people.”326  
Although uniquely situated at a point of convergence between overlapping ways of life, 
Wed Nun, like much of the Sahara, is also structured by displacement. The historical 
                                                                                                                                                       
wa ana wakri ma gut shiyyan ma’ana ha battil wa dalil 
had kamil Nagjir ‘ala  khayf lima ya’refni filil 
wa la kha’ifni li nansahu  mani nassih wa dhak tawwil 
325 Spain’s modern colonial presence in the Sahara was first established through a concession at the Berlin 
Conference of 1884, when it was granted by the European powers an enclave in southern Morocco, known as Sidi 
Ifni, and a coastal territory proximate to the Spanish Canary Islands. Surrounded by French colonies, after World 
War II Spain’s Saharan territories administratively became a part of was called “Spanish West Africa,” and 
governed under Spain’s Moroccan Protectorate. Spanish colonial presence beyond several coastal enclaves was 
nominal until the late 1950s, when the territory was administratively incorporated into a province of Spain and 
renamed Spanish Sahara. 
326 F. de la Chapelle, Les Tekna du Sud Marocain; étude géographique, historique et sociologique., ed. Rahal 
Boubrik, Les trésors de la Bibliothèque 11 (Rabat: Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines - 
Rabat, 2011), 57. 
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involvement of Wed Nun tribes in trans-Saharan trade has led to their dispersion across 
commercial networks to places as far-flung as Atar, Tindouf, Taoudenni, Walata, Timbuktu and 
Saint-Louis.327 As a semi-desert region, Wed Nun itself is also susceptible to water shortages, 
and, like other tribes of western Sahara, people in Wed Nun have been known to take refuge in 
the rural plains of Morocco during times of drought. Underpinning this apparent reciprocity, 
then, is a tension between autonomy and dependence that cuts across several axes: between 
sedentary and nomadic modes of living, between commercial and pastoral means of subsistence, 
and between the different tribal (Tekna, Rguibat, Laarousiyin, among many others), ethnic (Arab 
and Amazigh), and religious (Muslim and Jewish) groups that converged, intermingled and 
dispersed through these intersecting ways of life. 
In the mid-1950s, before Spain began expanding its nominal colonial presence in the 
Sahara beyond several coastal enclaves, Tan Tan was more a military garrison than a town. In 
1956, Tan Tan was a Spanish military outpost at the threshold, in space and time, of 
decolonization. And unlike other Saharan towns such as Goulmime and Tindouf, which emerged 
through trade networks that were either trans-Saharan or colonial in nature, Tan Tan would 
develop largely through the struggles over political authority and population control that 
characterized processes of decolonization in the Sahara. By the fall of 1958, after Spain 
transferred the northernmost strip of its Saharan colony, Tan Tan was a part of newly 
independent Morocco.328 In the intervening two years, the city would swell with bidani fighters 
who, after joining the Moroccan Liberation Army in the Sahara (MLA), were pushed north by a 
                                                
327 Ghislaine Lydon refers to “a certain cosmopolitanism” enjoyed by the Tekna, a confederation of tribes in Wed 
Nun, thanks to these far-flung commercial networks. Ghislaine Lydon, On Trans-Saharan Trails (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 161.  
328 This transfer took place in April 1958, through the Agreement of Angra de Cintra, between Spain and Morocco. 
Osama Abi-Mershed and Adam Farrar, “A History of the Conflict in Western Sahara,” in Perspectives on Western 
Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and Geopolitics, ed. Anouar Boukhars and Jacques Roussellier (Lanham MD; 
Plymouth UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 3–27. 
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joint Spanish-French counterinsurgency. Many bidani’s who had joined the MLA subsequently 
found themselves in Tan Tan, stranded and disarmed. Some were conscripted into the Moroccan 
Royal Armed Forces (RAF), as tanks from the RAF surrounded the city following its transfer 
from Spanish to Moroccan control. Others fled to French Algeria and Mauritania. Another 
contingent returned to Spanish Sahara, no longer as anticolonial insurgents, but as colonial 
subjects fleeing the nascent processes of postcolonial state formation.  
While I received conflicting reports as to whether the brothers composed this poem in 
1956 or 1958, whether at the outset or end of their participation in the MLA, it is clear from 
Mohamed Ibrahim’s first stanza that Wed Nun has failed to capture his imagination. In referring 
to it as a hasi, or well, he implies that, regardless of its military importance to either Spain or 
Morocco, Tan Tan is more waystation than destination. Though he begins by listing a series of 
places in and around Tan Tan to situate himself in time and space, he does not dwell in his 
present situation. Perhaps finding this fledgling settlement uninviting, unimpressive (his use of 
the French word “jardin” was perhaps dismissive) or simply unfamiliar, he runs through a series 
of places nearby (Lmagta‘ Lahmar and Lkhaljan, Lgara and Fam Ifandan, Lhamaydiya and Dra‘a 
Lkhayl), without offering any further description. Indeed, his mind is elsewhere and he soon 
moves on to his main preoccupation, the absent presence of home, using this conversation with 
his brother to indulge in “the feeling that surrounds me” when he thinks of places like Iniyyan, 
Lmanhar, Najdayl and, later in the stanza, Nagjir. Together, these hills, stream beds and water 
sources constitute a region known as Tiris, some 900km south of Tan Tan that in the late 1950s 
was divided between the northern reaches of French West Africa (soon to be Mauritania), and 
the southern tier of what was then called Spanish West Africa.329 With its varied landscape, Tiris 
                                                
329 This border remains the same today, marking the de jure border between Western Sahara and northern 
Mauritania. Today, this borderland is far more complex, marking the de facto lines of occupation when a 1991 
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is renowned for providing an unusually vast expanse of seasonal pastureland ideal for grazing 
camels, sheep and goats, following rains (“The autumn with the rainfall and the runoff”). In 
1859, from the administrative capital of French West Africa in Dakar, Senegal, Colonel Louis 
Faidherbe wrote of Tiris: 
Between this sebkha (d’Ijil) and the sea one finds a country that is not found on 
any map, nor in any geography, and the name for which is nonetheless continually 
on the mouth of those who speak of this part of Africa or who live there, or who 
travel there; it is Tiris. 
Now what is Tiris? It is a country where there is neither a village nor a 
tree, nor of course the smallest stream; until now it has not seemed important to 
make it appear on maps. But from October to May it is covered in pasture, and all 
of the tribes from Wed Nun in the north, until Senegal in the south, and to Tichit 
in the east, that is to say, living within an area of 40,000 square [km], go to Tiris 
with their herds of camel and sheep in order to find grass there. During our winter 
in Senegal, by contrast, from June to October during the season of rains, there is 
no grass in Tiris, and the tribes return each one to their country where they find 
pasture. This year, even Mohammed el Habib, cheikh of the Trarza, went to 
Tiris.330 
This place, which, Mohamed Ibrahim boasts, is so familiar to him that it would recognize him 
“even at night,” visits him during his time in Tan Tan, reminding him of its beauty. This longing 
for home leaves the poet feeling “rejfan,” trembling from a cold that one can assume is a result 
of being both north of Tiris, and simply so far from home. Despite this separation, Mohamed 
Ibrahim expresses a clear resolve in the stanza’s closing couplet, directly addressing his home 
with the reassurance that his longing won’t be forgotten, “not for a long time.” 
                                                                                                                                                       
ceasefire ended 15 years of war between Morocco and the Sahrawi national front, Polisario. Because Morocco does 
not occupy the full extent of Western Sahara, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Polisario’s state-in-exile 
based in refugee camps in southwest Algeria, administers the unoccupied strip as its Liberated Territories. 
Furthermore, there remains a gap between Morocco’s de facto southern border (not recognized internationally) and 
Mauritania’s northern border. At the main checkpoint between the two countries, this gap of ten or so kilometers is 
known variously as “the hole” or “Kandahar,” where a certain amount of unregulated trade takes place. This “no 
man’s land” has become the flashpoint for military maneuvers in the ongoing conflict between Morocco and 
SADR/Polisario in the past year and a half. See Armstrong, “North Africa’s Next War.” 
330 From “Renseignements géographiques sur la partie du Sahara comprise entre l’oued Noun et le Soudan” 
Nouvelles Annales des Voyages 1859, 3: 129-136. Colonel Louis Faidherbe. Quoted in Pierre Bonte, La montagne 
de fer: la SNIM, Mauritanie: une entreprise minière saharienne à l’heure de la mondialisation (Paris: Karthala, 
2001), 12–13. 
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Stanza II: “Neither Stifled nor Pressured”: bidani Moral Geography and Genealogical 
Identity 
 
Lmagta‘ and Fam Targuan 
Those are in my soul, and Lkarban 
And L‘atef, also, and Amazzan331 
Meaning affection, oh, from before 
From Tagba to Zemoul Iniyyan 
The place where the land separates 
And from Laglat to Inzaran 
Here the people are generous332 
Tiris is not two hearts attached 
From one resting place you see another  
And in all of this are people 
And sharaf who shine in candle light 
And there are zawaya with notables 
And the Qur’an and Khalil 
And the mosque and call to prayer 
And people who give with piety 
And I, among them, with goodness in store333 
And the action that isn’t vile 
And I know about riding camels 
And I travel this way and that 
I am neither stifled nor pressured 
And no route before me is closed off 
And I only befriend notables 
Who are free and small in number 
And I won’t be interrupted in my poetry 
For on my verses an elephant could rest 
And I won’t stray from the bidani way 
As my origins are bidani and the proof 
Is that I make the ambiance, rhythm and poetry 
Biki and Tawwil334 are both known [to me] 
And I pledged/sold335 that to God 
The pledge/sale took place some time ago 
And when people pledge/sell in these times 
I think that one should not rescind 
                                                
331 Places near Dakhla and Aouserd, in Tiris, in present-day Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
332 Tjala, pl tuwajil: “petite colline rocheuse isolée” Catherine Taine-Cheikh, Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français. 
dialecte arabe de Mauritanie 2, 2, (Paris: Geuthner, 1989), 187. (Taine-Cheikh, v.2 p187)5/11/18 3:06 PM. Here, 
the poet appears to be using this feature as a metaphor for the people grouped together in this region 
333 fi khazini li hassan – this is also a reference to being from a “big tent,” or a family with the means (and morality) 
to be generous. 
334 Prosody (buhur) in azawan. 
335 Over these three lines, the poet plays with the meanings of “sell,” and “pledge,” which share the same root [b-a-‘] 
in Arabic. I’ve maintained the split translation in order to illustrate the movement between completing a sale, in a 
transactional sense, and pledging allegiance, in terms of submission to authority. 
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God created these nations 
And separated between them that separation 
From Boulawtad to Dar Aman 
Where there is boukar336 and atil337 
While very little of this is found 
In Tan Tan and Draa Lkhayl 
And if it is there it is not well-known 
Where its traces are found at night.338 
 
Feeling “neither stifled nor pressured,” Bashir ould Sid Ahmed ould Sidi picks up where his 
brother’s first stanza left off, expressing his affection for Tiris. Bashir opens the stanza by 
naming more places (“Lmagta’ and Fam Targan,” “Laglat to Inzaran”) and closes by referencing 
vegetation endemic to Tiris (“boukar and atil”). In referencing the region’s natural features, 
rather than cities or towns, Bashir gives an implicit description of the human geography of the 
region at this time, which in the 1950s was still defined by its inland seasonal grazing, rather 
than permanent settlements on the coast. But Bashir soon makes it clear that his affection for 
Tiris is tied to the people who gather there, as much as the natural beauty of the place. His 
                                                
336 Panicum turgidum. A desert grass. Taine-Cheikh, Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français. dialecte arabe de 
Mauritanie 6, 6,. 
337 Maerua crassifolia. A tree/shrub with green leaves. Taine-Cheikh. 
338 Lmagta‘ wa Fum Tergan     hadou fi khalgi wa Lkerban 
Wa L‘atif mlli wa Amazzan     ma‘ana ‘atf ’ah gbil 
Min Tagbi li Zamoul Ainian    blad mnin y‘ud te‘azil 
Min Laglat ilayn Inzaran     hadha fih nass tuwwajil 
Tiris mahum galbayn gwan    min mgayl tashuf mgail 
Wa hadha kamil fih l-‘arban    wa sharaf yggidhum qandil 
Wa fih zwaya min l-a‘yan     wa fih l-qur’an wa fih Khalil 
Wa fih masjid wa l-’adhan     wa nass tenfaq fi sabil 
Wa ana fi khazni li hassan     wa lfe‘l lli ma hu radil 
Wa n‘arif fih arkub imilian    wa tisdar fi sabil fi sabil 
Mani medium wa la nekdan    wa la mahsur a’liya sabil 
Wa la nesshab shi ma hu l-a’yan    wa ahrawi min had dhalil 
Wa la nqata‘ ‘end azawan     kifani yteku fihum al-fil 
Wa la naqta‘ ‘en yum al-bidan    assli bidani wa dalil 
Mul hawl tarab wazan     ya’refha baygi wa tawwil 
Wa hadha yba’atu li ssabhan    maddayt al-bi‘a fh gabil 
Wa mnadem ba‘  fadha ‘alawan    ma zanti zin ‘alih iqil 
Mulana khalg dha lawtan     wa fassal fiha dkha at-tafsil 
Min Bu al-Witad ila Draman    fiha boukar wa fiha itil 
Wa hadha milkan najad nakir     fi Tan Tan wa fi Dra‘a Alkhayl 
W-allah huwa kanu shahir menin    ykun ‘atheru fi l-layl 
 215 
allusions to a “generous” number of people who still enjoy enough space so as not to be like 
“two hearts attached” describes an idyllic landscape of fergan, or groups of tent-living families 
traveling together, with livestock in tow. That one tent can be seen from another seems to evoke 
an ideal landscape of proximity and distance – a poetic pastoral of seminomadic pastoralism. 
 With his affection for the land established, Bashir elaborates on the piety and moral 
goodness of the people populating Tiris. From the mosque and call to prayer to the acts of 
giving, he extolls their religious devotion (mosques and zawaya) and ethical goodness (“people 
who give”). At the same time, a boastful pride runs through Bashir’s stanza. In defining the 
company that he keeps by their moral propriety, he refers both to their religious commitment, 
and their sharaf, or honor. This honor, based on the claim of patrilineal descent from the Prophet 
Mohamed, continues to underpin Arab identity in the Sahara, and to mark the status of certain 
tribes in the region, among them Bashir’s Laaroussiyin. As Mandana Limbert and Engseng Ho 
have shown in the Indian Ocean context, this renders Arabness not so much an ethnic identity as 
“a caste or class notion, reproduced through patrilineal genealogy.”339 In the Sahara, this status is 
racialized as bidani “white” identity in contradistinction to non-Arab Africans (“l-kwar”), and 
made hierarchical through the genealogical nobility of sharaf, in contradistinction to the servility 
of slaves and other dependents. The line “sharaf who shine in candle light” expresses this 
racialized status by referring to light-skinned people who “shine,” or glow, by candlelight.  
 Bashir’s boast of being “neither stifled nor pressured” elaborates a sense of subjectivity 
constituted by relations with bidanis of similar status “who are free and small in number.” In this 
                                                
339  Mandana Limbert, In the Time of Oil Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town. (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), 144; Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 158. Limbert looks more at the racial aspect of this genealogical 
Arabness in contemporary Oman, while Ho emphasizes the religious significance of genealogy in constituting an 
Indian Ocean Arab diaspora. Ho: “a particularly complex interweaving of religious and genealogical status has 
helped define what it means to be Arab in this wide field.” 
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way, Bashir’s sense of freedom and autonomy is deeply tied to ethically appropriate behaviors, 
moral goodness, as well as status within the hierarchies of Saharan social formations. This 
bidani-ness is highly differentiated and shot through with hierarchies, distinctions and tribal 
affiliations.340 Beyond the status distinctions between tribes, a group of firgan in Saharan society 
may be constituted by another set of hierarchies, differentiating between “notables,” such as 
Bashir, and their dependents, who might include haratin, or freed slaves, ma‘allem (a class that 
provisioned a collection of families with cookware and necessities for traveling), iggawen, 
(traditionally, families of poets), and slaves. As one colonial officer put it, the multiple sets of 
status distinctions within and between tribal affiliations render Saharan society “doubly 
hierarchical,”341 since authority and autonomy in the Sahara have historically been predicated on 
the control of dependents, or people, rather than territory.342 
In their ethnographies of Bedouin poetry in Egypt and Yemen, Lila Abu-Lughod and 
Steve Caton both discuss the importance of autonomy as an orienting value in Bedouin society, 
which bears a close family resemblance to bidani forms of life. For Caton, the persuasiveness of 
poetic rhetoric in Yemeni politics was necessary because “rule over those who cherish their 
autonomy demands the art of persuasion, not coercion.”343 Lila Abu-Lughod qualifies the 
importance placed on autonomy as a cultural value among Bedouin in Egypt by noting its 
gendered dimension, as an ideal that for many women remains unattainable: 
But if honor derives from virtues associated with autonomy, then there are many, 
most notably women, who because of their physical, social and economic 
dependency are handicapped in their efforts to realize these ideals. Although they 
                                                
340 Tara Deubel refers to “Bidan” to as “a high-status category.” Deubel, “Between Homeland and Exile,” 2010, 19, 
footnote 12. For a more contemporary discussion of this “social pyramid” and the efforts of SADR/Polisario to 
overwrite these hierarchies, see Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile, 50. 
341 Françoise Beslay, Reguibats: de la paix française au Front Polisario. (Paris: L’harmattan, 1984), 82. 
342 Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 133. 
343 Steven Charles Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon” Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 32. 
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share the general ethos and display some of the virtues of autonomy under certain 
conditions, their path to honor in this system is different.344 
For Abu-Lughod, poetry becomes – for men and women alike – a medium for the culturally 
acceptable expression of vulnerability. In both Caton’s and Abu-Lughod’s accounts, poetry is 
understood as an expressive form that preserves an idealized sense of autonomy through an 
allusive language that achieves and conceals its primary aim (submission to authority of another 
in Caton’s case study, disclosure of vulnerability in Abu-Lughod’s). With Caton’s and Abu-
Lughod’s insights in mind, Bashir’s stanza about being “neither stifled nor pressured” might be 
thought of as a poetic expression that conceals the relations of dependence underpinning bidani 
notions of autonomy. 
 At the same time, however, Bashir’s stated “proof” (dalil) of his “bidani origins” refers 
not only to hierarchical status, but to the cultivation of certain moral behaviors, as well as the 
mastery of certain cultural practices, such as poetry. Bashir uses poetry to boast of his capacities 
as a poet, both in technical terms (when he announces the prosodic forms he knows “Biki” and 
“Tawwil”), and in a more expansive sense (“for on my verses an elephant could rest”). With 
these boasts, Bashir is making clear that poetry itself is an aspect of a cultivated bidani identity. 
As Judith Scheele points out in her ethnographic work from southern Algeria, in Saharan society 
“status categories and 'ethnic groups' more generally are not thought about in terms of bounded 
groups but rather with reference to a model of excellence to which people correspond to varying 
degrees.”345 In this stanza, poetry, piety and genealogy together serve as elements around which 
bidani “models of excellence” are cultivated, claimed and expressed. 
                                                
344 Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986), 33. 
345 Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 133. On genealogical imaginaries, see also, Andrew Shryock, 
Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley, 
Calif: University of California Press, 2008); Jonathan Holt Shannon, Performing Al-Andalus: Music and Nostalgia 
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This model of excellence relates to what Scheele describes as “a genealogical vision of 
the world” with implications for property, identity and authority that run counter to the bounded 
concepts of race, ethnicity and nation.346 Scheele’s notion of a genealogical relation to identity 
and authority based on hierarchical but open-ended encompassment, rather than the boundaries 
of ethnicity and nation, brings to mind the work of Engseng Ho and how a genealogical lexicon 
enabled the translation and transferal of authority across an Indian Ocean diaspora of mobility 
and trade. Ho’s insights regarding the production of a “moral geography” where “places in turn 
become signs for values”347 also provides an apt frame for thinking with Bashir and Mohamed 
Ibrahim about the moral goodness associated with the place-names, otherwise poetic and 
inscrutable, dotting the poem like sign posts. 
With the moral geographies of Tiris and the complexities of bidani identity elaborated in 
this stanza, I hope to show that this poem challenges easy translation of the concepts of identity, 
land and belonging across western Sahara to the contemporary context of nationalist conflict, just 
as the complexity of Saharan social, cultural and political formations have long defied bounded 
nation-state configurations of territory, people and sovereignty. Of course, Mohamed Ibrahim’s 
and Bashir’s expressions of longing in this poem describe a sense of displacement that would 
understandably resonate with the current political field driven by nationalist conflict, fragmented 
political geography, and exile. But in reducing these expressions entirely to a presentist discourse 
of nationalism, as they so often are in the literature on Western Sahara conflict, the richness of 
poetic longing is lost, as are the complexities of Saharan subjectivities, and the layered histories 
of regional decolonization. Rather, I suggest, this poem illustrates the degree to which western 
                                                                                                                                                       
across the Mediterranean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015); Ho, The Graves of Tarim; Limbert, In the 
Time of Oil Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town. 
346 Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 145. 
347 Ho, The Graves of Tarim, 94. 
 219 
Sahara has been radically transformed from the 1950s to present – or since the boundary-making 
processes of decolonization emerged. Therefore, the evidence of experience from different 
moments of decolonization in the region need to be historicized rather than assumed.348 
 
Stanza III – Love and Longing 
Today, really, Jalyat is far 
As is Gran and Laghraydat 
This distance and the distance to ‘Agaybat 
The home of your parents for Ramadan 
Where there is a remedy for any sadness, 
For love349 and remedy for Satan 
And moreover it is the place of souls 
The place of souls and such goodness 
Regardless of what has happened with the passing of time 
It nevertheless remains [home] for all time 
Where there are youngsters and girls 
And, what is more, beautiful camels to ride 
And there’s also Lgour which isn’t bad 
And Um Daggan and Lkarban 
And Tarf where I spent the night 
Gart L‘adayl, full of love350 
And Lmanhar and Twinagjarat 
There, where the longing at night 
Took from me all reasoning 
And left my balance trembling351 
This, here, is the place of houses 
And of my joy in the cold and the heat 
Also, there is Sallam, who left 
My mind worn out from so long 
Love for her regenerates352 in my soul 
But right now Iniyyan is far 
And so is Aatf and Laachariyat 
And if there are still understanding people 
They won’t reproach me for turning at length 
Toward the land of the Bidan 
                                                
348 Joan W Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, no. 17 (1991): 773–97. 
349 dellal: “(très rare) “amour”… “Coeur (style poétique)” (T-C, v4, p654) 
350 ghaywan: “séduction, amour, charme” (T-C, v8, p1718) 
351 rejfan 
352 nekrat refers to the end of spring, at a time when plants would otherwise stop growing, when more rainfall causes 
them to resume growing. 
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And the land of the camel and pretty girls 
Return me, without any dissembling353 
To my land, oh God 
Until I see the mouths of the riverbeds 
And I’ll stop and pull up with a tin can/metal barrel 
A kettle of water from Bir Inzaran 
To break, if [only] I were [there], a bit of wood354 
 
In the third and final stanza, Mohamed Ibrahim continues and intensifies the poem’s theme of 
longing for Tiris. At the top of the stanza, he continues listing place-names but, whereas in the 
first stanza he was insisting on their proximity in his mind, now he flatly acknowledges the 
distance of Jalyat, Gran, Laghraydat and ‘Agaybat. Even as he avoids further mention of Tan 
Tan, the reality of his separation from Tiris is more present than ever in this concluding stanza.  
Nevertheless, the timelessness of this homeland remains unchanged, and as the stanza 
progresses Mohamed Ibrahim increasingly expresses this longing for Tiris in terms of desire. 
From “dellal” to “ghaywan” to “’azzat,” he evokes a series of terms that articulate his love, ardor 
and dear feelings for a homeland increasingly personified in the figure of a woman. First 
referring to the appeal of home in terms of the young women (tafilat) and camels (amliyan) who 
are present there, more generally, Mohamed Ibrahim eventually names her Sallam, and recounts 
                                                
353 Jehdan: Taine-Cheikh v2, p295 “dissimulation, secret”; “faire de tenir secret qqc, de cacher (un secret)”. 
354 Assl ba’id lium jelliyat  wa ba‘id Gran wa Laghraydat 
Had ba‘id wa ba‘id ‘Agaybat Dar ahlek dhik fi Ramadan 
L fiha tib l’ayat   Lil dullal wa tib ash-shaytan 
Wa hiya zad bled li khlagat Wa bled li khlag lla yzyan 
Ysu mza ha fi lfat   Yaghayr ytem lla bla azman 
Fi l’ail wa tafilat   Wa shi ma dhak rkub amliyan 
Wa fi Lgour wa ma hum shinan Wa fihum Um Daggan wa Lkarban 
Wa Tarif fih w hi nbat  Gart L’adayl bil ghaywan 
Wa Lmanhar wa Twinagjarat Fum Lhezam al bat kran 
Rah misu bini min hejjat  Lima khalli mezzani rejfan 
Had huwa bul diyarat  Tarabi fi l-berd wa fi l-hawman 
Wa fi hum mulli Sallam khallat ‘Aqli ysaf min ‘awdan 
‘Azzat-ha fi khllagi nekrat  Ghayr ba’id lium Iniyan 
Wa ba’id ‘Atef wa L’asharyat Wa had bad mnadem ftan 
Ma ykessir li tal tilfat  ‘Ala shur trab l-Bidan 
Wa trab ilbil wa shabibat  Rj’ani ma fiha jehdan 
Li trabi ya lwahid fi dhat  Ilayn nshuf afam lwedian 
Wa nukaf wa netla’ min tinuat Maghraj min ma’ Bir Inzaran 
Kasir lu kunt khshibat 
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how his encounters with her both left him “worn out” (“Sallam khallat/‘aqli ysaf,”) and enables 
his longing to regenerate, like the season of extended rainfall and growth (nekrat). This passage 
is particularly interesting because, by equating his love for Tiris with his love for Sallam, 
Mohamed Ibrahim evokes this longing not only as a powerful emotion, but a destabilizing force. 
In doing so, he recycles the term “rejfan” which, in the first stanza, referred to shivering from the 
lack of warmth that he feels in Tan Tan. In this stanza, the poet recalls an evening of love and 
longing in Tiris that “took from me all reasoning/and left my balance trembling.” Here, the 
trembling of rejfan refers to the destabilizing force of an intimate encounter.  Recalling this 
experience with his love/home inverts the relationship of distance the poet currently experiences 
in order to evoke the feeling of longing as a regenerative feeling of intimacy. 
With this, Mohamed Ibrahim concludes the poem with an appeal that allows him to 
imagine his return one more time: 
Return me, without any dissembling 
To my land, oh God 
Until I see the mouths of the riverbeds 
And I’ll stop and pull up with a tin can/metal barrel 
A kettle of water from Bir Inzaran 
To break, if [only] I were [there], a bit of wood 
*** 
In its expression of longing for another place, the brothers’ poem is representative of a popular 
bidani poetic genre known as nasib. According to Catherine Taine-Cheikh nasib as a genre 
“nostalgically evokes ties with formerly frequented places.”355 With movement and displacement 
a structural element of life in 1950s Tiris (as Colonel Faidherbe noted a century earlier, Tiris 
drew people from around the region from October to May, and then emptied out the rest of the 
year), the nasib offers a genre particularly well-suited to seminomadic pastoralism. But the 
                                                
355 Taine-Cheikh, “Pouvoir de la poésie et poésie du pouvoir. Le cas de la société maure,” 298. 
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brothers’ expression of longing remains meaningful beyond the time and space in which they 
composed their poem. Today, this expression of longing may resonate on multiple registers. In 
the present context of nationalist conflict – for the poets’ descendants living in refugee camps in 
Algeria, for example – the longing for Tiris may easily translate to a longing for a return to their 
national homeland, from which Sahrawis governed by SADR/Polisario have been exiled now for 
over 40 years.  
For bidanis living throughout the region, whether in Moroccan-occupied territory, 
Morocco, or even Mauritanian cities, this stanza may express longing, in a more generalized 
sense, for a time when seminomadic pastoralism still prevailed as a way of life. With settlement 
in cities a major feature of the era of decolonization in the Sahara, when colonial and 
postcolonial administrations sought to sedentarize people of the Sahara, poetry became a means 
of expressing longing for the badiya, or desert, in contradistinction to the city. This sentiment 
was articulated with particular emphasis during my fieldwork in the largest city of Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara, Laâyoune, where Sahrawis increasingly found themselves settling 
more permanently, on account of militarized occupation and wage labor, since the 1990s. Not 
infrequently, interlocutors would mention how the inability to “see far” from within the concrete 
walls of an urban residence particularly affects older Sahrawi folk, whose embodied capacity for 
relaxation (a frequently-used term, “ynfatah sadru,” means “opening of the heart”356) depended 
upon escaping the architecture of the house. For Saharans living in cities, the poem’s resonance 
may be understood not only in relation to a specific place (Tiris), but as a kind of cultural poetics 
of space (badiya). It was frequently mentioned to me, for example, that the tent, open at all times, 
                                                
356 Cf. Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006). Hirschkind describes how listeners to cassette sermons in Cairo used the phrase 
“ynshirah al-sadr” (which he translates as “opening of the heart”) as a Qur’anic reference to convey the embodied 
sense-memory of ethical piety which his interlocutors sought to cultivate. 
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is a defining aspect of life in the Sahara, and a characteristic sign of trust and hospitality.357 In 
this way, the locked metal doors of the urban house represent the tent’s antithesis, in synecdochic 
relation to the opposition between the city and badiya. 
Tara Deubel’s research provides further insight into how poetry gives expression to this 
discourse of longing for the badiya.  According to Deubel, the poet Sidati Essallam, a longtime 
resident of Laâyoune, connects the sensory experience of poetry to life outside the city, in the 
badiya. Particularly since this experience has diminished with widespread sedentarization over 
the last generation, the badiya provides a source of inspiration both for the poet and their 
audience: “[Essallam’s] representations of the rural experiences of mobile pastoralists and their 
forms of knowledge resonated with both his contemporaries and urban youth. Older generations 
shared in his nostalgia for lifestyles they had largely abandoned in moving to the city and youth 
sought to reconnect with the badiya…”358 The limiting horizons of the urban built environment 
across western Sahara contrasts with the sensorily rich experience of the badiya, an experience 
which remains evocative for poet and audience alike.359  
*** 
To this point, I have discussed how the poem’s theme of longing for Tiris translates across 
multiple registers, some of them grounded in the present context of (occasionally forced) urban 
living, and conflict between Morocco and the Sahrawi nationalist movement. In concluding, I 
would like to turn now to the context in which the poem was produced. Whether in 1956 or 
1958, the brothers were in Tan Tan either at the beginning or end of their involvement with a 
                                                
357 See Sébastien Boulay, La Tente Dans La Société Maure (Mauritanie), Entre Passé et Présent: Ethnologie D’une 
Culture Matérielle Bédouine En Mutations, Ph.D. diss., (Paris, Muséum national d’histoire naturelle, 2003), 
http://www.theses.fr/2003MNHN0022. 
358 Deubel, “Between Homeland and Exile,” 2010, 169. 
359 For an insightful discussion of the badiya as a both a refuge and space of governance in the context of political 
conflict, see Alice Wilson, “Ambivalences of Mobility: Rival State Authorities and Mobile Strategies in a Saharan 
Conflict,” American Ethnologist 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2017): 77–90. 
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fleeting and peculiar anticolonial armed movement known as the Moroccan Liberation Army in 
the Sahara (MLA). Led by mostly young Moroccan men, the MLA recruited bidani shaykhs to 
mobilize entire Saharan tribes in supporting the armed movement’s attempts to claim parts of 
French Algeria, French West Africa and Spanish Sahara for newly independent Morocco. 
Recruited by Moroccan anticolonial fighters, bidanis from around the region initially rallied to 
the cause, under the sign of jihad or the Moroccan Sultan. Though most of its leadership were 
relatively young Moroccans, the MLA’s ranks were filled by bidani tribesmen, who constituted 
an estimated two-thirds of the Army, and the vast majority of its combatants.360 Where the 
Moroccan leadership were mostly (although not exclusively) young men who had been active in 
the pre-‘56 urban-based resistance to Morocco’s French Protectorate, bidanis who took up arms 
to join the MLA came from across western Sahara, a region that included southern Morocco and 
surrounding Spanish and French colonial territories. By 1957 several thousand members of the 
MLA had occupied most of Western Sahara, effectively reducing Spanish colonial presence to a 
handful of coastal enclaves.361  
The MLA’s success, however, was fleeting. Despite its initial incursion, a covert French-
Spanish counterinsurgency in early 1958 routed the MLA and drove the combatants out of 
Spanish Sahara. On April 1, 1958, several months after the French-Spanish counterinsurgency, 
Spain agreed to transfer the region of Tan Tan at the northern end of its colony, to Morocco. By 
this time, the Liberation Army was in complete disarray. Some members of the MLA’s 
leadership were reputedly seeking to overthrow the King of Morocco and establish a republic.362 
                                                
360 Ángela Hernández Moreno, “Réflexions Sur La Guerre d’Espagne Contre l’Armée de Libération Marocaine 
Dans Le Territoire d’Ifni et Le Sahara Espagnol (1957-58),” The Maghreb Review 37, no. 3–4 (2012): footnote 3, 
285. 
361 Hernández Moreno, 292. 
362 Ben Saïd Aït Iddr, Moulay Abdeslam Jebli, and Nemri were among the leaders of the MLA’s political wing who 
later formed the 23 Mars movement, a radical leftist group whose members were involved in attempts to overthrow 
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At the same time, Spain and France actively recruited leading bidani shaykhs to defect from the 
MLA. Meanwhile, throughout 1958 the Moroccan state was trying to disband the MLA and 
incorporate its members into the Royal Armed Forces. After bidani soldiers spent much of 1958 
stationed in various parts of southern Morocco, with rumors circulating about Morocco’s plan to 
incorporate MLA fighters into the Royal Army, many of them deserted. After overthrowing their 
Moroccan officers and reclaiming their rifles in a revolt known as mdigadig l-magazin (breaking 
into the stockade) they left Wed Nun for points west and south. Large contingents headed to 
Tindouf, in French Algeria, and northern Mauritania. Others returned to Spanish Sahara, as 
colonial subjects rather than armed insurgents. 
*** 
For some, mdigadig l-magazin and the MLA has come to epitomize the failure of Moroccans and 
people of the Sahara in what Hannah Arendt terms “the elementary problems of human living-
together.”363 In the contemporary political landscape of nationalist conflict, mdigadig l-magazin 
is rarely discussed in public. Morocco promotes historical memory of the MLA in Sahara 
through commemorative events and state-sponsored publications, but these efforts remain 
closely tied to Moroccan state security prerogatives that simplify its history and effectively 
silence public discussion of events such as mdigadig l-magazin. In the Sahrawi refugee camps, 
on the other hand, the MLA is erased almost entirely from a Sahrawi national narrative that 
promotes the historical memory of unwavering resistance to both Moroccan and Spanish rule. 
Perhaps it is fitting, then, that the allusive language of Bashir and Mohamed Ibrahim’s poem – a 
poem about longing to leave Tan Tan and return to Tiris – indexes this moment in the region’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hassan II, and were exiled in Algeria and France throughout the 1970s and 80s. Mehdi Bennouna, Héros sans 
gloire: échec d’une révolution, 1963-1973 (Casablanca; Paris: Tarik éditions; Paris Méditerranée, 2002). 
363 Hannah Arendt, “What Is Authority?,” in Between Past and Future  Eight Exercises in Political Thought., [Enl. 
ed.] (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 141. 
 226 
tortuous history of decolonization. By the fall of 1958 in Tan Tan, the MLA was finished, but the 
process of decolonization in the Sahara had only just begun. 
Situating Mohamed Ibrahim’s and Bashir’s poem in relation to their involvement in the 
MLA in the late 1950s also provides background to their longing, and suggests that their 
displacement had a specific cause that was neither the seasonal result of seminomadic 
pastoralism, nor the outcome of nationalist conflict, the displacement from Tiris to Tan Tan in 
1958. Rather, their displacement was the result of mobilizations and conflicts surrounding the 
emergence of decolonization as a horizon of expectation across the Sahara. In this way, the 
brothers’ poetic longing emerges from a particular moment that has had specific ramifications 
for understanding the relationship between decolonization, border-making and displacement 
across western Sahara.   
*** 
Today, the poem’s construction of Tiris as object of longing translates across multiple 
registers. Nasib as a genre is particularly apposite to the situation of displacement in a region 
long characterized by mobility and borderless-ness, and the poem’s ongoing circulation across 
the occupied territories, refugee camps, and borderlands of western Sahara, demonstrates the 
existence of a receptive audience for this form of creative expression of longing. Longing for the 
badiya takes form within a cultural poetics of non-urban space, as well as a nostalgia for an 
eclipsed way of life. Meanwhile, nationalist longing for Tiris is tied to a specific history of 
conflict and exile since 1975, one which also sustains a sense of belonging to the Sahrawi nation, 
and a commitment to realizing the return of Tiris – now configured as part of a national territory 
– in the future. And, finally, I suggest that the longing expressed by Mohamed Ibrahim and 
Bashir presents another layer of signification concerning the moral geography of the Sahara and 
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a genealogical bidani subjectivity that may not necessarily be commensurable with the post-1975 
nationalist concepts of identity and territorial sovereignty. The way in which Mohamed Ibrahim 
and Bashir’s poem resonates at different registers indicates how multiple layers of 
decolonization’s history – including the 1950s, post-1975 nationalist conflict, and today – are 
sedimented in the poem’s expressions of longing. 
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Chapter 4 – Open Horizons of Change, Narrow Spaces of Dissent: the Spatiotemporal 
Frameworks of Sahrawi National Liberation and 1970s Decolonization 
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[Map of Mauritania and Western Sahara ca. 1978]364 
Appendix – Chapter 4 
 
CPASS (Comité Provisoire d’Action Scolaire) – Mauritanian student group at the secondary 
education level that formed in 1968 and became a part of the Kadihin movement. 
 
Ila al-Amam – Marxist-Leninist political group active in UNEM in the 1960s and 70s, and 
affiliated with the publication Anfas. 
 
Kadihin – A popular Mauritanian opposition movement that formed in the early 1970s and was 
a strong early supporter of Polisario. Coopted by state reforms, the movement continued in 
diminished form after 1975. 
 
MIFERMA (la Société des Mines de fer de Mauritanie) – France-based company that 
operationalized the mining and transportation of iron ore from northern Mauritania beginning in 
1960. Industrial engine of Mauritania. Nationalized in 1974; renamed SNIM. 
 
Mars 23 mouvement – Radical New-left political group active in UNEM in the 1960s and 70s. 
Named for the date when the Moroccan state violently repressed student protests in 1965. 
 
MLA (Moroccan Liberation Army) – A Moroccan-led anticolonial, irredentist armed movement 
with widespread Sahrawi participation that briefly disrupted French and, especially, Spanish 
colonial rule across western Sahara in the late 1950s. The subject of Chapter 3. 
 
National Democratic Movement – Formed in 1966 in Mauritania, in opposition to the ruling 
regime, when bidani and non-Arab Black intelligentsia joined together following inter-ethnic 
violence in the country. Joined with what became the Kadihin in the early 1970s. 
 
Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagui el-Hamra y Río de Oro) – Sahrawi 
national liberation movement formed in 1973. Polisario established SADR, a state-in-exile, in 
1976 and, since then, has been based in refugee camps in southwest Algeria. 
 
SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) – The state-in-exile declared by Polisario in 1976. 
Often used interchangeably with Polisario because, even if they are institutionally distinct 
(Polisario is the liberation movement, SADR the state), they operate in combination.  
 
SNIM (Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie) – the name of MIFERMA 
following Mauritanian nationalization in 1974. 
 
UGESM (l’Union générale des étudiants et stagiaires mauritaniens) – Mauritanian National 
Union of Students that formed in 1971 when pre-existing groups organized around bidani and 
non-Arab Black membership, joined forces. 
 
UNEM (l’Union National des Etudiants Marocains) – Moroccan National Union of Students  
                                                
364 Chassey, Mauritanie 1900-1975, 472–73. 
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UNFP (Union National des Forces Populaires) – Primary left opposition party in Morocco; 
crushed by events of and fallout from March 23, 1965. 
 
Vanguard Movement for the Liberation of the Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Wedi Dhahab – The 
first anticolonial movement against Spanish rule to form in Spanish Sahara, in 1968, with the 
arrival of Mohamed Ibrahim Basiri. Dismantled following Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970. 
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Introduction: Three Frameworks for Historicizing Sahrawi National Liberation 
In the mid-1960s, Mohamed Ibrahim Basiri returned to Morocco from his studies in 
Cairo and Damascus and began publishing a newspaper, al-Shumu‘ [“Candles”], that called for 
Saharan independence. Basiri was by lineage a member of the Rguibat, the most populous tribe 
of western Sahara, but had been raised in central Morocco at his family’s zawiya near the 
agricultural city of Beni Mellal. After Moroccan authorities shut down his publication, Basiri 
moved to Smara, a historic town in Spanish Sahara, and began organizing a movement to 
overthrow Spanish colonialism in 1968. Basiri’s movement, known as the Vanguard Movement 
for the Liberation of Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Wedi Dhahab365 began as a secret order amongst 
Basiri’s relatives and other acquaintances who received him in Smara. The movement appears to 
have borrowed certain organizational elements from Ba‘ath Party politics, such as requiring an 
oath of initiation and regular monetary contributions from its members but, according to several 
former members, it did not adhere to any specific political ideology – whether Maoist, Leninist, 
or Arab nationalist (Ba‘athist or otherwise) – among those that were prevalent at the time.366  
The Vanguard Movement was still in its formative stages when Spain organized a festival 
open to foreign journalists in El Aaiún, the provincial capital of Spanish Sahara, on June 17, 
1970. On the day of the event, Sahrawis organized a protest on the outskirts of El Aaiún on a 
small rise known as al-zemla, demanding certain rights of the Spanish government. When 
protesters threw rocks at Spanish police, the police returned with live fire, killing as many as 12 
                                                
365  Harakat al-tali‘ya li tahrir al-Saguiet al-Hamra wa Wedi Dhahab. Wedi Dhahab is also referred to by its 
Spanish name, “Rio de Oro,” particularly in Western cartography. The Spanish referred to this movement as the 
“Muslim Party.” 
366 Interview, May 8, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara; August 13, 2014, Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara; January, 2016, Smara refugee camp, Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic, Algeria. 
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protesters.367 In the aftermath, Spanish officials arrested members of Basiri’s movement. Basiri 
himself, who was not present at the protest, was arrested and disappeared; his body has never 
been found. Apprehended members of the Vanguard Movement were sent to different prisons 
across Spanish Sahara and the Canary Islands. Intifadat al-Zemla, as the event became known, 
came as a shock to Sahrawis living under Spanish colonialism who, in the aftermath, began to 
consider violent means necessary in order to overthrow Spanish rule.368 
Aside from catalyzing the political consciousness of Sahrawis living under Spanish 
colonialism, Intifadat al-Zemla also brought those living in an isolated Spanish Sahara back into 
correspondence with those in surrounding areas: 
Whoever wasn’t taken to prison that evening…Those who could, fled far away, 
beyond the borders - to the north, south and east…When those members (of the 
Vanguard Movement) arrived in those regions, they brought with them the news 
(of the event)…this was the only means of delivering the news: there was no 
telephone, only (direct) communication. And people in the external, surrounding 
areas – Sahrawis – began to think and talk and discuss from 1970 to 1973, about 
three years.369 
Those fleeing Spanish persecution began to break Spanish Sahara’s isolation. One member of the 
Vanguard Movement made his way to Nouakchott and, perhaps through relatives, brought news 
of the uprising to Mauritanian Ba‘ath Party members there, who organized a protest in front of 
the Spanish embassy.370 Others ended up in Morocco and Mauritania.371 In this way, Intifadat al-
                                                
367 “Zemla, Massacre of.” In Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, 453. The number of casualties 
reported ranged between 10 and 12. 
368 Interview, Rabouni, Sahrawi refugee camps, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Algeria, 16 January 2016. 
“After what happened on 17 July, people understood that in order to leave/end colonialism, it won’t happen 
peacefully. But, maybe, the experience was clear: we had protested peacefully, calling for merely some of the rights 
- not even all of them - and the reaction left it difficult to imagine what would happen if we had demanded more 
than that. The reaction [already] was: mutual understanding with colonialism wasn’t possible, unless by fire, or 
violence. Whoever comes [at you] with violence, must be met with violence. That idea began becoming more 
general.” 
369 Ibid. This period, 1970-73, has retrospectively become known among Sahrawi nationalists as the period of al-
harakat al-janiniya, or “the embryonic movement.” 
370 Interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, February 22, 2015. 
371 “There were those who fled toward Morocco: people who were either arrested, or who fled to Morocco, or in the 
direction of Mauritania. Lots of people who were mobilized by the issue and afraid of being assassinated or arrested, 
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Zemla brought Spanish Sahara out of the isolation that had been imposed only a decade before, 
and in convergence with the horizons of expectation prevalent among political movements in the 
surrounding region. 
*** 
 Following official Polisario/SADR discourse, studies of the Western Sahara typically 
begin with Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970 as the starting point for a history of Sahrawi 
nationalism.372 In my research, oral histories from those who witnessed the event only 
corroborate the significant impact that the protest’s violent repression had on Sahrawis living in 
Spanish Sahara, and beyond. These oral histories also corroborate the prevailing historiography 
that suggests that Intifadat al-Zemla served as precursor to the subsequent emergence of the 
Polisario Front in 1973, and the institutionalization of Sahrawi national liberation in a state-in-
exile in refugee camps in Algeria. In this chapter, however, I situate the emergence of Sahrawi 
national liberation movements within several, complex spatiotemporal processes. Rather than a 
linear history of nationalism, beginning from its supposed point of origin, I point to three 
frameworks that are necessary for contextualizing Sahrawi nationalism, yet which remain 
overlooked in historiography of Western Sahara. 
 The first looks toward the past, examining how Spanish colonialism during the 1960s 
isolated the people and territory of Western Sahara in a manner that was unprecedented in the 
Sahara, through border-making practices. Historiography of the region that draws a direct line 
from 1970 to the present naturalizes the geopolitical territory of Western Sahara, separating it 
                                                                                                                                                       
those 30 who were in the ranks [of the movement] when Basiri was arrested, they either fled to Morocco or to 
Mauritania - most of them, of course. There were those who just fled to the countryside, and that’s it, since they 
weren’t very well known, and so they went to the badiya and stayed there. So, that’s the most important event [that 
took place] in the Sahara.” Interview Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, December 4, 2014. 
372 Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 1st ed. 
(Syracuse  N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010); Alice Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Liberation 
Movement Governs (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Manuel Herz, From Camp to City: 
Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara (Zurich, Switzerland: ETH Studio Basel, Lars Muller Publishers, 2013). 
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from a regional context of disaggregated authority that has generated multiple, unresolved 
political projects dating back to the 1950s. Periodizing the political project of Spanish colonial 
isolation during the 1960s, by contrast, historicizes the consolidation of Western Sahara as a 
geopolitical space. Foregrounding the mechanisms of colonial border-making draws our 
attention to sociohistorical and political processes entailed in the production of political 
formations, rather than assuming the territorial nation-state as a natural outcome of post-World 
War II decolonization. 
Training our focus on this exceptional period also foregrounds several developments that 
shaped subsequent dynamics of Sahrawi nationalism. The first concerns the border-making 
processes that effectively isolated the territory and population during the 1960s. The second 
involves urbanization and the emergence of new social formations in the Sahara, which I call 
“government towns.” Concomitant processes of urbanization and isolation can be seen as an 
effect of the spatial fix of international capital, a process which, as I showed in the previous 
chapter, began in the Sahara during the 1950s, but which continued in earnest throughout the 
1960s, both in Western Sahara and northern Mauritania. This isolation is particularly important, 
as well, for understanding how Western Sahara became a political object characterized by what I 
am calling “conceptual blankness.”373 Defined by its isolation and relatively light population, this 
“conceptual blankness” enabled Western Sahara, as a territory, to become the object upon which 
multiple political futures were projected during the 1960s and 70s. 
In the second section of this chapter, I argue that Sahrawi nationalism and the formation 
of the Polisario Front must be understood in relation to contemporaneous political developments 
across the region. Rather than focusing on the contributions to Sahrawi nationalism that came 
from either “inside” or “outside” of its borders, this section, instead, situates Spanish Sahara 
                                                
373 Thank you to Sam Fury Childs Daly for this phrasing. 
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within a regional and global constellation of political developments during the 1970s. The 
implication here is that, as with political projects at other moments of decolonization, the 
emergence of Sahrawi national liberation can only be understood through a framework of 
connected interdependence. Without privileging any specific movement for its “founding” role, 
this traces the connections between Polisario and contemporaneous movements, including the 
New Left Ila al-Amam and 23 Mars movements in Morocco, and the Kadihin374 movement in 
Mauritania.  
Understood in theoretical terms presented by Theodor Adorno, constellation offers a 
conceptual framework or theory of history without “reducing it to individual concepts or pairs of 
concepts.”375 In a region shaped by multiple political regimes and formations that cannot be 
understood through conventional frameworks that focus on self-evident relations between state 
and subject, governing regime and governed populace, constellation becomes a particularly 
apposite framework to understanding decolonization in the Sahara. At the same time, in pointing 
to the contemporaneity between Sahrawi nationalism and a number of other movements across 
northwest Africa, the framework of constellation distinguishes regional political dynamics of the 
1970s from those a generation earlier. In the previous chapter, I argue that the politics of 
decolonization in the 1950s were marked by complex relations of autonomy and dependence 
between people of the Sahara and Maghrib. In this chapter, by contrast, I note that this 
constellation marks a moment in the early 1970s of rising anticolonial, anti-imperial politics 
across the region that is marked by a sense of global political awareness, and a generational 
sense of identification with history. 
                                                
374 The term “kadih” (pl. kadihin) in the Mauritanian context refers to a person who has no wealth. Unlike “al-
‘umal,” which refers to a class of wage laborers, al-tabaqa al-kadiha, refers to a class of poor people that 
encompasses peasants more than wage laborers, or a kind of lumpenproletariat.  
375 Theodor Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 87. 
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Despite the contemporaneity among movements in the early 1970s, the third section of 
this paper examines how shifts in global politics produced another “disorderly” relation between 
Sahrawi decolonization and concurrent developments. This section begins by noting the dramatic 
rupture entailed by Morocco’s invasion of Western Sahara in 1975, which forced Sahrawis to 
flee to refugee camps in Algeria. The backing of Morocco by the United States and France have 
been identified as major factors in facilitating the preemption of Sahrawi national self-
determination.376 While acknowledging these as proximate causes, I suggest that this 
transformation of the Sahrawi national project is particularly important for understanding the 
disjunctive temporality in which Sahrawi nationalism emerged.  
By 1975, the wave of post-World War II decolonization had largely subsided. As Samuel 
Moyn has suggested, during the 1970s political programs overtly asserting collective rights, such 
as Third World anti-imperialism and self-determination, were increasingly overtaken by human 
rights. This latter, as a moral and political regime, would increasingly define institutional 
priorities at the global scale. While this particular historicization of human rights has been 
contested, Moyn is not alone in recognizing the 1970s as a historical conjuncture during which 
the political horizon of national liberation and sovereignty began dissipating.377 Kristin Ross 
describes a similar shift in France following May ’68 when, during the 1970s, prominent former 
activists from the left began an intellectual project of criticizing the politics of Third World anti-
imperialism, promoting in its place a humanitarian ethic in relation to the postcolonial world.378 
Thinking along with Ross and Moyn in this manner helps to see that Sahrawi nationalism 
emerged at a particularly fraught, or disjunctive, moment within “a larger history of competing 
                                                
376 Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity?”; Mundy, “Seized of the Matter”; Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara. 
377 David Scott, “The Aftermath of Sovereignty,” in Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality 
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ideologies of human betterment”379 between anticolonial self-determination and human rights. 
This third framework has implications for situating Sahrawi nationalism within a changing 
history of the national form. As Manu Goswami notes, the modularity of the national form needs 
to be historicized: 
Nationalist claims of particularity and the imagined singularity of national 
formations only become intelligible against and within a global grid of formally 
similar nations and nation-states.380 
While Sahrawi nationalism emerged as an anticolonial, anti-imperial project under Mohamed 
Basiri’s Vanguard Movement, and followed by the Polisario Front, it only became intelligible – 
that is, practicable as a political project – through the paradigmatic form of an emerging global 
humanitarianism, the refugee camp. 
In this way, I suggest that Sahrawi national liberation can only be understood by situating 
its emergence and perdurance in relation to three spatiotemporal frameworks. The first two 
concern the Sahrawi national liberation’s emergence: first, in relation to a specific period of 
isolation under Spanish colonialism during the 1960s; and, second, in relation to a regional 
constellation of liberation movements in the early 1970s. The transformation and perdurance of 
this liberation movement into a “nation of refugees” highlights the disjunctive, or disorderly, 
relation between Sahrawi nationalism and tectonic shifts in global politics during the 1970s from 
Third World self-determination toward a global ethic of humanitarianism. 
 
Section I – Territorial Sovereignty and Spanish Sahara during the 1960s: Border Policing 
and the Government Town 
 
                                                
379 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 86. 
380 Manu Goswami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical Conception of Nationalism,” 
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The Moroccan Liberation Army’s military campaign between 1956 and ’58 had lasting 
effects on the region’s political landscape, even if the insurgency’s aims of destabilizing French 
and Spanish colonialism were generally unsuccessful. The most immediate change involved 
Spain’s transferal of an area, known as the Tarfaya Strip, to Morocco through the Angra de 
Cintra Treaty of April 1958. This shifted the border between Morocco and Spain from the river 
Wed Draa approximately 95 km south to the 27º40´ parallel. Meanwhile, significant numbers of 
Sahrawis had been displaced either after mobilizing to fight with the MLA, or in fleeing from 
Opération Ecouvillon, the joint Spanish-French counterinsurgency of 1958. As noted in the 
previous chapter, Ecouvillon was designed to “sweep” MLA combatants out of Spanish territory, 
either north to Wed Nun in the newly transferred Tarfaya Strip under Moroccan control, east to 
Tindouf in French Algeria, or south to the developing cities of Zouérate, F’derik and 
Nouadhibou in northern Mauritania.381 After fallout between Sahrawi combatants and Moroccan 
leadership of the MLA in 1959, a number of former MLA fighters also returned to the newly 
designated capital of Spanish Sahara, the fledgling city of El Aaiún. 
 The MLA’s campaign in the Sahara also precipitated changes to Spain’s administration 
of its African colonies. On January 10, 1958, Spain dissolved Spanish West Africa, a colonial 
jurisdiction administered from the northern Moroccan city of Tetouan that had included Spanish 
Morocco, Spain’s Saharan territory (often referred to in terms of its northern and southern 
regions, Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Rio de Oro), and the coastal enclave of Sidi Ifni.382 With the 
                                                
381 In March 1958, before the transfer of the Tarfaya Strip, Morocco reported to the UN that 13,000 Sahrawi 
refugees had arrived in its territories following Opération Ecouvillon. Whether accurate or not, this marks the 
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between Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and Morocco proper. Spain retained control of Ifni until 1969. 
Although it was a center of Spanish administrative and commercial activity in Africa, the coastal enclave was never 
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dissolution of Spanish West Africa, Spain not only established separate administrations for Sidi 
Ifni and its Saharan territory, but changed the political status of both from colonies to provinces. 
Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Rio de Oro became a single Spanish province named Spanish Sahara, 
with “all of the rights that this entails.”383 Claudia Barona Castañeda notes that Spanish 
historiography of this period offers multiple reasons for what motivated Spain to hold on to these 
territories, including an interest in maintaining them as protection for the nearby Canary Islands 
and, in the Franquist discourse of the time, as a “defense for Western civilization in Africa 
against Communist advances.”384 Regardless of motive, the reorganization signaled Spain’s 
intent to consolidate control over the Sahara following the MLA’s incursion in the late 1950s. 
The administrative changes reorganized jurisdictions within Spanish Sahara, designating 
El Aaiún the provincial capital for the first time, and establishing city councils in three other 
cities, including the port towns of Villa Cisneros (now Dakhla) and La Guëra in the south, and 
the historical town of Smara to the east. The new administrative structure was also meant to 
bring Spanish government closer to its Saharan subjects by basing provincial governance, at least 
in part, on Sahrawi institutions and practices. Qur’anic law and traditional property rights were 
incorporated into colonial administration, for example, with separate courts and judges 
designated for these proceedings. In deference to the widespread pastoral nomadism of many 
Sahrawis at the time, certain representatives for El Cabildo, a provincial council of 14 that was 
established in 1962, were designated according to tribal fractions, rather than municipality.385 
This practice would be expanded when, facing increased international pressure before the United 
Nations, Spain instituted a general assembly constituted entirely by Sahrawis, known as al-
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Jem‘a, in 1967. Named after one of the traditional forms of bidani inter-tribal council in the 
Sahara, the 82-member al-Jem‘a became the highest representative institution of provincial 
administration, superseded only by the Spanish-appointed Governor General, and with the 
purpose of functioning as interlocutor between Spanish government and what was perceived to 
be an increasingly restive population.386 
Reforms to the territory’s formal political status and governing institutions were not, 
however, what substantively marked this new phase of Spanish colonial rule. A Spanish-
appointed Governor General retained sweeping and final powers and, as Barona Castañeda notes, 
“Although the civil presence in the territory increased, this did not modify the military character 
of the province, even if it did influence relations with the inhabitants.”387 Rather, the 
administrative shift from colony to province coincided with intensified oil and mineral 
prospecting in the region, along with an effort to build infrastructure and operationalize the 
mining of Bucraa, a significant deposit of phosphate rock that had been discovered shortly after 
World War II. Given that Spain’s inland presence in the territory before 1958 amounted to little 
more than a handful of military outposts (many of which had been abandoned at the height of the 
MLA’s campaign in 1957), the new phase of investment in the colony388 was comprehensive.  In 
July 1960, 54 new companies began work in the territory, in sectors ranging from construction, 
shipping and food imports, to banking, hospitality and naval supplies.389 The focus on 
infrastructure led to the construction of over 5000 km of new roads to facilitate communication 
                                                
386 Barona Castañeda, 41; Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, 96–101; Lippert and Annual Meeting 
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numbers vary slightly. Lippert reported that there were 104 members in al-Jema‘a. Pazzanita and Barona Castañeda 
both cite 82, excluding two Spanish officials who attended meetings, but had no voting privileges. 
387 Barona Castañeda, Los hijos de la nube, 39. 
388 Though nominally a province, I will refer to Spanish Sahara as either a territory, or colony, throughout this 
chapter, since the designation of “province” did not substantively alter the colony-metropole relation between 
Spanish Sahara and Spain. 
389 Barona Castañeda, Los hijos de la nube, 22. 
 241 
and transportation between the northern and southern parts of the territory, Saguiet el-Hamra’ 
and Wedi Dhahab, respectively, and to the interior.390 Another major infrastructural project 
involved the construction of ports in the two largest cities, Villa Cisneros in the southern part of 
Spanish Sahara, and El Aaiún in the north.  
El Aaiún, the first Spanish administrative capital in the Sahara that was not a coastal 
enclave, was built largely from the ground up in the early 1960s, with 371 houses constructed in 
1960 alone. As discussed in Chapter 1, Spanish investment beginning in the 1960s transformed 
what had been a water source,391 fledgling local market and colonial military base into a growing 
city of colonial administration and Spanish settlers (many of them coming from the nearby 
Canary Islands). A Sahrawi recalls how the influx of settlers changed the city of his childhood: 
Before then, there were military bases and military men, and you saw very few 
Spanish families. There were maybe one or two small schools, but there were not 
many families of military officers or government officials then. 
 But then companies began coming with their workers and commerce, and 
they started bringing their families and then colonialism started to get established 
and govern [bada’ istiqrar al-ist‘emar wa yhakemha], and they laid out a strategy 
for the region for exploiting resources. And they began to discover phosphates, 
and to figure out and plan investments for those minerals which it was possible (to 
plan for). 
 Prospecting companies came and began prospecting for other minerals or 
natural resources, and life - and El Aaiún began getting bigger and bigger and 
bigger.392 
 
Construction beginning in the 1960s initially addressed the need to accommodate a growing 
colonial settler population that was moving to El Aaiún to staff the administration, and to work 
for newly-arrived companies involved in construction and mining. However, the process of 
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urbanization itself produced wage-labor employment opportunities which, when extended to 
Sahrawis, began transforming their relationship with the city from a marketplace and seasonal 
way-station toward a year-round place of residence.  
This process was by no means immediate or uniform, but several factors were combining 
to influence increased settlement in cities across the Sahara during the 1960s, including the 
social formations developing around extractive industry, the policies of newly independent 
nation-states, and intermittent drought.393 In southern Morocco, Sahrawis continued moving to 
the city of Tan Tan throughout the 1960s, joining a community that had settled there after 
Ecouvillon and the unrest that followed.394 In northern Mauritania, the mining and port cities of 
Zouérate and Nouadhibou grew rapidly along with the multinational iron ore conglomerate, 
MIFERMA, which became operative in 1961.395 As mentioned previously, it was reported that in 
1962 Algerian authorities attempted to “settle” 15,000 members of the Reguibat tribe in 
Tindouf.396 And, according to results from a Spanish census, by 1974 only 17% of Spanish 
Sahara’s population was “nomadic.”397 Even if the accuracy of the Spanish census is uncertain (it 
is unclear what proportion of this population was constituted by European settlers, for example), 
the Spanish administration adopted policies encouraging, or even forcing, settlement during the 
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1960s.398 By 1976, on the eve of Spanish withdrawal, one account estimated El Aaiún’s 
population to be 28,500 (another estimate was “over 40,000”),399 and while these figures clearly 
are not indicative of a major metropolis, El Aaiún constituted a social formation that only 
emerged in the Sahara during the era of decolonization: the government town.400 
 In addition to urbanization and infrastructural investment, post-1958 changes to Spanish 
rule in the Sahara focused on border control. As part of the colony’s administrative 
reorganization, a November 17, 1960 decree integrated the Grupos Nomadas, a mobile Sahrawi 
police force previously delegated to roam the countryside (many of whom defected to join the 
MLA in the late 1950s, only to return following its dissolution), into the military. Many of these 
reorganized “Nomadic Troops” were now tasked with border control, instead of domestic 
patrols.401 During this time Spain increasingly relied upon a “language test” for people seeking to 
cross the border with Morocco that depended upon differences in pronunciation between 
Moroccan spoken Arabic, known as darija, and the Hassaniya Arabic dialect spoken by bidani 
people of the Sahara. Border control on the Spanish side allegedly would ask people crossing 
from the north to enunciate the Arabic word for either “wolf” (dhi’b) or “fox” (th‘aleb). The test 
was used to distinguish and block entry for darija-speakers who gloss the classical Arabic 
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phonemes dh and th into hard “d” and “t” sounds (di’b, t’aleb). Hassaniya-speakers who 
enunciated the dh and th sounds in their speech were allowed to pass.402 
That the intensification of border policing coincided with a shift in the border’s location 
only made it more fraught. Prior to 1958, Spanish colonial territory ended at the Wed Draa river, 
a geographical boundary that has traditionally marked the northern edge of the Sahara. With the 
previously-mentioned transfer of the Tarfaya Strip in ’58, the boundary between Morocco and 
Spain moved approximately 95 km south to the 27º40´ parallel, becoming a veritable line in the 
sand which ran east-west through the desert north of Saguiet el-Hamra’. No longer able to rely 
upon border geography as a natural barrier, Spain increasingly utilized linguistic and cultural 
markers at the border crossing with Morocco in order to demarcate its territorial sovereignty. 
While Spain’s reliance on a linguistic marker to police the boundary with Morocco 
predated the changes following 1958, the shift in location and concomitant intensification of 
border policing during the 1960s gave the border new meaning. The pronunciation test represents 
an attempt to disentangle the complicated relationship between people of the Sahara and people 
to the north in terms of identity, much the way that a border attempts to disentangle spatial 
relations through the instantiation of an abstract line. As explored in previous chapters, the 
complexity of these relations between people of Morocco and people of the Sahara frequently 
defies such neat boundaries, and yet the effects of these policing practices ramify beyond the 
borders.403 As Lauren Derby notes in the context of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, border 
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tests create new mechanisms for social division, including the instantiation of the border as a 
marker of ethnic, or national, difference.404 In this sense, with the intensification of border 
policing, the Spanish administration’s linguistic pronunciation border test to separate Sahrawis 
from Moroccans was effective not only at policing the border, but at inscribing difference in 
terms of “insiders” and “outsiders” to Spanish Sahara. 
Literature on the effects of Spain’s increasingly tight control over the Sahara during the 
1960s is relatively scarce. The rupture brought about by Morocco’s invasion and annexation in 
1975 and 76, which brought Spanish colonialism to an end and produced the geography of 
military rule and exile in refugee camps that continues to structure the political situation today, 
has tended to overshadow the period of Spanish colonialism in terms of historical memory.405 
This erasure is not simply a matter of scholarship. It was not uncommon in the course of my 
fieldwork to encounter a sentiment among Sahrawis that Spain’s presence in the Sahara never 
actually constituted colonialism. Speakers invoking this discourse often cited the fact that Spain 
established their presence in the Sahara peacefully through coastal trade and, in some cases, 
concluded agreements with local tribes over terms of protection and exchange.406 When Spanish 
colonialism was acknowledged, it was usually in favorable contrast to Morocco’s scorched earth 
military campaign and occupation, which has resulted in the disappearance of hundreds of 
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Sahrawis, and the displacement of thousands more.407 Historiography reproduces this nostalgia 
either by glossing over Spanish colonialism, or by reducing its presence to a foil for the 
emergence of Sahrawi nationalism.408  
And yet, even the limited historical material on the subject suggests that Spain actively 
isolated the territory, and Saharan subjects, from outside influence during the decade of 
investment and extraction that began in 1960. Along with closing the border, Spain cultivated a 
discourse within the territory that distinguished the colony’s Saharan subjects from “the enemy” 
to the north: 
“It is certain that, with the scent of these riches, the jackals are beginning to prowl 
around your khaimas,[tents]” Lieutenant-General Camillo Menéndez Tolosa, the 
Spanish army minister, warned the Sahrawis during a visit to El-Ayoun on May 
16, 1967. “But now more than ever,” he promised, “you will have us by your side, 
to the end and to the last sacrifice, to guarantee your will, without foreign pressure 
or interference, to protect you against the maneuvers and false fraternity in whose 
name it is intended to bring you into a household to which you have never 
belonged and in which, if they achieved their goal (something they will never do), 
you would be considered a poor relative to be exploited like a domestic.”409 
 
In this passage, Lieutenant-General Menéndez Tolosa amplifies a sense of vulnerability among 
Sahrawis in relation to their more powerful neighbors to the north in order to situate Spain as the 
protector of Sahrawis’ interests. The allusions to false forms of kinship in this speech also 
present Spain as more trustworthy and less exploitative than Morocco – particularly important 
since deception, as noted in Chapter 3, is often an underlying tension in bidani relations with 
neighbors to the north. Along with the discourse of outside threat (Moroccan in the particular 
                                                
407 Ibid. The phrase in Arabic is, as one interlocutor put it, that Moroccans “burned the green and the dry 
(vegetation)” [harqu al-’akhdar wa al-yabis]. 
408 See, for example, Jacob Mundy, “Colonial Formations in Western Saharan National Identity,” in North African 
Mosaic: A Cultural Reappraisal of Ethnic and Religious Minorities, ed. J. H Krause and Nabil Boudraa (Newcastle 
(UK): Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 294–320. For a contrasting view toward contextualizing colonialism 
in African history without assuming or overstating its effects, see J.F.A. Ajayi, “Colonialism: An Episode in African 
History,” in Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, ed. Lewis H Gann and Peter Duignan, vol. 1 (London: Cambridge 
U.P., 1969), 497–509. 
409 Hodges, Western Sahara, 152. 
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form, Communist in the abstract), Spain also utilized an expanded colonial presence to try and 
inculcate a sense of loyalty among Saharan subjects through patronage and education: 
In 1966, no fewer than 16 African Orders and 25 Imperial Orders of the Yoke and 
Arrows were awarded to compliant Sahrawis. Other handouts ranged from 
blankets to jet flights to Mecca. A sense of nationalism was further encouraged by 
playing on the Sahrawis' fear of neighboring states, and emphasizing the threat of 
communism. (In 1963, for example, Spain published a map of Africa which 
asserted the communist domination of Morocco to be 70-90 percent of the 
population, that of Mauritania and Mali 60-80 percent, and that of Algeria 50-70 
percent).410 
I have not found any other sources to corroborate the claim in this passage that Spain actively 
promoted a sense of nationalism among Sahrawis. The one time it was directly addressed in an 
interview, my interlocutor suggested that “Sahrawi” first became prevalent as a term of identity 
in contradistinction to “Spanish” during the colonial period of the 1960s. It was not, however, 
until political movements took form starting in 1968 and continuing into the 1970s that the term 
took on positive content as a nationalist form of identity, according to this interlocutor.411 I do 
not, in other words, want to suggest that Spain initiated Sahrawi nationalism. Nor did Spain 
fabricate a sense of antagonism between Sahrawis and Moroccans out of whole cloth: mistrust 
was widespread from the fallout of the MLA in the late 1950s.  
The isolation in Spanish Sahara, however, marked a significant departure from the ease 
with which people moved across borders throughout the region of western Sahara before the 
1960s, a change which had significant and lasting effects.412 This shift affected the circulation of 
people, as well as information and ideas. One man mentioned that when he was younger and 
                                                
410 Harrell-Bond, The Struggle for the Western Sahara, 8. 
411 Interview, Rabouni, Sahrawi refugee camps, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Algeria, 16 January 2016. For 
literature on the recent emergence of “Sahrawi” as a political identity, see Sophie Caratini, La république des sables: 
anthropologie d’une révolution (Paris, France: L’Harmattan, 2003); Mundy, “Colonial Formations in Western 
Saharan National Identity”; Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara. 
412 Benjamin Acloque, “L’idée de frontière en milieu nomade: héritage, appropriation et implications politiques 
actuelles: Mauritanie et Sahara occidental,” in Colonisations et héritages actuels au Sahara et au Sahel: problèmes 
conceptuels, état des lieux et nouvelles perspectives de recherche, XVIIIe-XXe siècles, ed. Mariella. Villasante 
Cervello and Christophe de. Beauvais (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 351–81. 
 248 
going to school in El Aaiún, he remembered reading an article by the Moroccan leftist Ali 
Yata413 calling for Sahara’s independence, and that when the article fell into Spanish hands, 
colonial officials tried to buy up all the copies.414 Another recalled that teachers would call 
students “marroqui” if they were behaving badly in school.415 As a man who worked at the 
Bucraa phosphate mine during the early 1970s, and later joined the Polisario Front, put it: 
Very little reached inside (Spanish Sahara)…Everything was forbidden, so what 
got through was just whatever they had with them, because the guards (at the 
borders) were always there.416 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, very little seemed to penetrate the colonial 
isolation of Spanish Sahara until Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970. But when the politics of national 
liberation did emerge in Spanish Sahara following Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970, this was because 
of a regional and international context receptive to the Sahara’s decolonization. The connections 
with existing anticolonial and anti-imperial movements that ensued in the early 1970s, and the 
shared horizons of political possibility that they entailed, are explored in the following section 
through the concepts of contemporaneity and constellation. 
 
Section II – Contemporaneity: A Constellation of Liberation Movements across Northwest 
Africa in 1972 
 
A. Morocco: Open Horizons of Discussion and Narrow Spaces of Dissent 
                                                
413 Ali Yata was the longtime leader of the Parti Communiste Marocaine, and successor groups. By the 1970s, Yata 
adamantly supported Moroccan annexation of the Sahara. See Ali Yata, Le Sahara occidental marocain à travers les 
textes (Casablanca: Editions al-Bayane, 1982). In addition to publishing on the matter, Yata campaigned 
internationally in Eastern Bloc countries pressing Morocco’s claims to the Sahara in the 1970s. Pazzanita, Historical 
Dictionary of Western Sahara, 450–51.  
414 Fieldnote, Smara Refugee Camp, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sahrawi refugee camps, Algeria, January 
10, 2016.  
415 Fieldnote, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, November 26, 2014. 
416 Interview, Rabouni, January 24, 2016.  
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From Nouakchott to Rabat to Algiers, the summer of 1972 was “hot.”417 In May of that year, a 
group of college students from Rabat travelled to Tan Tan, in the Tarfaya strip of southernmost 
Morocco, where some had family. They returned for an annual moussem in honor of Sidi 
Mohamed Laghdaf, a shaykh, religious scholar and son of Ma al-Aynayn. Ma al-Aynayn, the 
elder, was the founder of a colonial resistance movement that originated, initially with Moroccan 
backing, in Smara, in Western Sahara, that later sought to overthrow the Moroccan Alawite 
sultans who had accepted the French Protectorate in 1912.418 The cohort descending upon Tan 
Tan sixty years later were themselves seeking to end Spanish colonialism in the Sahara, and had 
been engaged in discussion with a range of different actors in Morocco over how best to bring 
this about. Motivated by the Zemla uprising in El Aaiún on June 17, 1970, in which Spanish 
authorities shot and killed Sahrawi protesters, the college students believed that the horizon for 
change was near.  
Raising banners in Arabic calling for the end of Spanish colonialism, with slogans such 
as “Free Sahara, and out with Spain,” “Spain, get out, the Sahara isn’t yours,” and “Franco, you 
impostor, Sahara is for the free,”419 the students were building on widespread sentiment in 
Morocco and elsewhere that Spanish colonialism in the Sahara had to end. According to multiple 
accounts, however, the students also raised banners that alluded to King Hassan and Moroccan 
national unity, including “Hassan is our king, liberation our aim,” “Hassan and us, we will unite 
the nation,” and “We are all with Hassan in struggle, and with arms we will make the Sahara rise 
up with our spirits.”420 The references to the King and Morocco do not necessarily represent 
                                                
417 Undated fieldnote, Laâyoune/El Aaiún. 
418 Pazzanita, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, 251–54. 
419 “Al-Sahra’ tasbah hurra, wa al-Esbaniya tamrug burra,” “Ya Esbaniya, sir fi halek, al-sahra’ mashi dyalek” and 
“Ya Franco, al-ghudar, al-sahra’ lil-ahrar.” Fieldnote, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, December 11, 2014. 
420 “Hassan malikuna wa tahrir hadafuna,” “Nahnu wa al-Hassan, nuwahidu al-watan” and “Kulna lil-hassan, bil-
kifah wa al-silah naffadu al-sahra’ bil-’arwah.” Interviews, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, October 29, 2014, and December 
11, 2014. 
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support for the King. Rather, they indicate the fine line that the activists were walking at the 
time, as the King of Morocco had barely survived a military coup d’état the year prior and was 
cracking down on all forms of dissent – which, aside from the military, was predominantly 
coming from the left.  
Indeed, the state did not reward the protesters’ appeal to the King’s authority, and some 
35 of them, including El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, Omar Hadrami, Biydilah Mohamed Cheikh, Ma 
al-Aynayn ould Khalihenna and Ahmed Mahmoud Lilli (a.k.a., Mohamed Lamine ould Ahmed) 
were arrested and beaten. One witness recalls the local authorities’421 harsh response, and the 
resulting fallout from this event: 
These people called to free (the people of the Sahara) from the yoke [mesqat 
ru’usahum] of colonialism. They didn’t say anything about a Sahrawi republic - 
no - they said “Hassan is our King, and liberation is our goal.” With that, they 
were met with a beating with pipes, and jail. Even when they were released and 
returned, their scholarships were taken away. 
 
Me: Meaning all of them were university students at that time? 
 
Some of them, yes. Their scholarships were cut off; their chance of success, 
reduced. An individual can no longer succeed. [They were subject to] police 
surveillance. So, they thought, “we came here to help bury your father - and you 
chased us away with a shovel”…We came here to free (the Sahrawis) from the 
yoke of colonialism, and we’re prepared to liberate (the Sahara) within the 
framework of Moroccan unity, and our operation was met with getting hit with 
metal pipes, our chances for a successful future taken away [nasbat al-najah 
tahayyid], the scholarship taken away, and police surveillance and harassment.422 
 
After their arrest and release, a number of protesters, including El-Ouali, fled Morocco to 
Tindouf, in Algeria, and Zouérate, in northern Mauritania. 
Three months later, in August, the Moroccan National Union of Students (UNEM) 
convened for their 15th congress in Rabat, led by New Left organizations such as 23 Mars and Ila 
                                                
421 It is a common trope in Morocco to single out specific state authorities, or a specific branch of government, as a 
way of registering one’s criticism while avoiding direct criticism of the King. 
422 Interview, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, October 29, 2014. 
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al-Amam [“Forward”]. 23 Mars emerged out of the Union National des Forces Populaires 
(UNFP), a left-wing political party led by Mehdi Ben Barka that had been devastated by violent 
state repression of protests in 1965, which left hundreds dead. Following this crackdown, and 
Ben Barka’s assassination that same year in Paris, 23 Mars formed out of the former UNFP, went 
underground, and adopted a more radical, leftist stance, memorializing the date of the ’65 
protests in its name. The movement included a handful of veterans from the 1950s independence 
struggle (including Mohamed Ben Saïd Aït Iddr and several other former members of political 
wing of the 1950s Moroccan Liberation Army [Chapter 3]), but was predominantly a student 
movement. Ila al-Amam, meanwhile, was founded by Abraham Serfaty, a former government 
functionary, and Abdellatif Laâbi, a poet and founder of Souffles, the influential French-language 
cultural review, and forerunner to Anfas [“Breaths”]. Serfaty and Laâbi established Ila al-Amam 
in 1970, and adopted a more explicit Marxist-Leninist position than 23 Mars, but both 
movements were composed largely of students, and both operated without state recognition.423 
When the groups met as part of the UNEM Congress in Rabat in 1972, their collective 
influence was at its height. Though 23 Mars and Ila al-Amam shared an opposition to the 
Moroccan regime, decolonization of the Sahara had become a central issue in the Congress’s 
proceedings, and a split emerged between the two groups’ positions. Ila al-Amam lobbied for the 
Congress to take a position explicitly in favor of Sahrawi self-determination, while 23 Mars took 
a position that was “more nuanced…without contesting the marocanité of the Sahara,” arguing 
instead for “a voluntary union, on a democratic basis, between the Moroccan people and the 
Sahrawi populations.”424 The position of the 23 Mars movement relative to the Sahara – like the 
                                                
423 Alma Rachel Heckman, “Radical Nationalists: Moroccan Jewish Communists 1925-1975” Ph.D. diss., 
(University of California, Los Angeles, 2015), 235. 
424 Heckman, 241. This quote is Heckman’s translation of an excerpt from Kenza Sefrioui’s work, Kenza Sefrioui, 
La revue Souffles, 1966-1973: espoirs de révolution culturelle au Maroc, 2012, 130. 
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poster slogans at the Tan Tan protest earlier that summer – reflects a combination of political 
expediency and principle that cannot be easily disentangled. On the one hand, by the early 1970s 
the sovereignty of the Moroccan state had created a political field that exerted tremendous 
pressure on Moroccans to conflate Saharan decolonization with Moroccan national unity. The 
stakes for leftists had been clear ever since the Moroccan state jailed leftist Ali Yata and exiled 
Mehdi Ben Barka for their dissent over a border war with Algeria in 1963, and those stakes had 
only risen since.425 On the other hand, it would be overly simplistic to suggest that 23 Mars shied 
away from calling for the Sahrawi right to self-determination simply because of state repression 
and intimidation. The historic ties between Morocco and the Sahara influenced many in Morocco 
from across different social classes and political persuasions.  
Nor was this debate limited to student organizations or the Moroccan left. In the early 
1970s, with the horizon of decolonization imminent, discussion of the Sahara issue in Rabat was 
“open”: 
This discussion/debate would not be limited to a specific group, nor to a specific 
idea. Sahrawis, Moroccans, including those convinced by the need to “return” the 
Sahara to Morocco, presented one idea. And those convinced by the need for 
independence presented their idea. And those coming from a progressive 
perspective - for example, the Marxist thinking present at university, presented 
that idea. The only idea absent was the Islamist position that is happening now; 
that wasn’t present. These were the ideas that were there. Those coming from a 
progressive position combined [ytalaqa’] with the Moroccan left. 
 
Me: Like the 23 Mars movement? 
 
23 Mars, Ila al-Amam, and others. Those coming from the unified Morocco 
position, and the expansion of its empire, joined the Istiqlal Party. Those coming 
from the position of (Sahrawi) independence, depended upon the idea of self-
                                                
425 Heckman, “Radical Nationalists: Moroccan Jewish Communists 1925-1975,” 236. The so-called “Sand War,” 
was based on disputed borderlands between Morocco and Algeria that had been shifted around between French 
administrative regimes during the colonial period and left unresolved at decolonization. Tindouf, in southwest 
Algeria, and a focal point of the MLA’s campaign in the Sahara in the 1950s, was a focal point of this border 
conflict in 1963. See Trout for extensive background on the colonial origins of the ill-defined Morocco-Algerian 
border. Trout, Morocco’s Saharan Frontiers.  
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determination. And in this way, the discussion was open. 
 It took place in people’s homes - even (in the homes) of those who worked 
in the Palace – in the Royal Administration [al-diwan al-maliki]. There were 
people close to the monarchy, yet despite this, they weren’t embarrassed to [lem 
ytaharraj] enter this debate. There were officers in the Royal Army - of course, 
they were formerly of Jaysh Tahrir [MLA] – who participated in this discussion. 
 
Me: Really? The discussion wasn’t limited to students, only? 
 
There was no forum [‘awima] specific to students, or young people: the 
discussion was open. Of course, students played a role and entered this discussion 
from all sides – they even changed positions within the debate. In traditional 
society, women did not participate in the discussions in these kinds of matters, but 
beginning with this period, women were among the central actors, and 
participated in the discussion. 
 So, during this period in the 70s, the debate/discussion was open, and 
everyone participated.426 
I excerpt from this interview at some length, with a man who had been a university student in 
Rabat at the time and was subsequently imprisoned for 13 years, because his account of the 
debate in Rabat over the future of the Sahara in the early 1970s captures the horizon of imminent 
and indeterminate change. In part because of this indeterminacy, and, in part because of Spanish 
Sahara’s isolation within the surrounding region, the Sahara became the object onto which 
multiple, potential futures were projected. 
One, final aspect of the debate between Ila al-Amam and 23 Mars is worth noting 
because it distinguishes the 1970s from a generation prior. By the early 1970s, there was a sense 
that effective decolonization, which would counter both imperialism and neocolonialism, 
required not just national independence, but supranational political formations. The 23 Mars 
movement was likely not immune to a growing sense of disillusionment on the left with the 
postcolonial nation-state. A former member of 23 Mars cited the New Left’s martyr and 
inspiration to convey this tension, claiming that Mehdi Ben Barka once said: “The Sahara must 
                                                
426 Interview, Lâyoune/El Aaiún, December 4, 2014. 
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be a connecting bridge, and not a region of separation.”427 This view could be attributed to the 
various influences of the Non-Aligned Movement and Arab nationalism, and the Cold War field 
of supranational political alignment. From this perspective, the creation of a “mini-state” would, 
in the context of 1970s Third Worldism and the Cold War, invariably create another forum for 
superpower struggles, whereas 23 Mars believed that the decolonization of Western Sahara 
without its independence could render this part of the desert a “connecting bridge” for 
democratizing rule throughout Morocco, Mauritania, the Greater Maghreb and, possibly, beyond. 
Hopes for Western Sahara to become a catalyst for anti-imperial political formations was one of 
several horizons of possibility projected onto the Sahara in the 1970s, which prefigured the 
territory (oftentimes, more than the people) as a space from which region-wide liberation might 
emerge. 
*** 
The basis for the split between 23 Mars and Ila al-Amam came from an article published 
earlier that year in Anfas (“Breaths”), the radical Arabic-language literary and political review 
aligned with Ila al-Amam. Published in the December-January 1971-72 issue – the last issue of 
Anfas before it was shut down by Moroccan authorities – the article ran under the provocative 
title “A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara.”428 Written for an audience across the Maghreb 
and Mashreq (Anfas was estimated to have a press run of 5000 copies, and a “sizable following” 
across the Middle East),429 the piece introduces readers to the situation in Spanish Sahara by 
                                                
427 Interview, Rabat, Morocco, November 24, 2014. “al-Sahra’ khass takun qantara al-wassl, wa laysa mintaqat al-
fassl.” This interviewee, a former member of 23 Mars, also mentioned that the rejection of separatism from the left 
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428 “Philistine Jadida Fi ’Ard Al-Sahra’/A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara.”; 
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429 Olivia C Harrison and Teresa Villa-Ignacio, Souffles-Anfas: A Critical Anthology from the Moroccan Journal of 
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warning that it could become “a new Rhodesia…a new Palestine.”430 Much of the article is 
devoted to providing a historical, sociological and political sketch of the people in the territory, 
describing, for example, the Sahrawi people’s involvement in – and disillusion with – the 
Moroccan Liberation Army of the 1950s as part of the historical background. The sociological 
background provides basic information on the major tribes of Spanish Sahara, with a section on 
“Features of Class Differentiation” that pays particular attention to the potential for “groups of 
young people” [al-shabab] to lead an anticolonial movement. In addition, the article emphasizes 
the need to raise the political consciousness of those living outside of the cities in the desert 
badiya.431 Despite these distinctions, the article stresses the pivotal role that the undifferentiated 
category of “the masses” [al-jamahir] must play in order to overthrow Spanish colonialism.432 
As a reflection of the Marxist-Leninist orientation of Ila al-Amam, with which Anfas was 
closely affiliated, the article references both the forces of imperialism and, in reference to 
Morocco and Mauritania, the “reactionary parties surrounding the territory” that have helped to 
maintain colonial rule and inhibited the formation of a liberation movement there.433 In a section 
that lists several possibilities regarding what could happen to the territory, the article returns to 
the theme of its title by suggesting that the territory’s future could follow one of three paths: it 
could become “a new Rhodesia” ruled by Spanish settlers; it could end up annexed by and 
divided between Morocco and Mauritania; or it could follow a path of “autonomy” [hukm al-
dhati] under continued Spanish rule, deferring decolonization to a later date.434 The hoped-for 
outcome of national liberation is left unstated. The article then lays out a series of “basic facts” 
that capture the present situation in the territory. The first is the continuation and deepening 
                                                
430 “Philistine Jadida Fi ’Ard Al-Sahra’/A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara,” 66. 
431 “Philistine Jadida Fi ’Ard Al-Sahra’/A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara,” 71. 
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433 “Philistine Jadida Fi ’Ard Al-Sahra’/A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara,” 75. 
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[rusukh] of the Arab identity among Sahrawis. The second point warns of the “increasing 
imperial presence” in the region, and the third notes the “expansionist, divisive and exploitative 
intentions” of the “reactionary” parties surrounding the territory, in reference to Morocco and 
Mauritania. Last on the list, however, the article notes the absence of a committed nationalist 
leadership in the territory at that time.435 
By way of conclusion, the article outlines, in a Leninist fashion, the way forward, or  “the 
way to liberation.”436 And here, some of the most intriguing observations are made. In repeating 
a point made several times, the article notes that the “Sahrawi masses” must provide the basis for 
any transformative change. Notably, however, this concluding section of the article is articulated 
under the heading “The link between liberating the Sahara, and liberating the surrounding Arab 
region.”437 Like 23 Mars, Ila al-Amam sees Sahara’s liberation as a means toward broader, anti-
imperial liberation. In contradistinction to 23 Mars, however, the Anfas article argues that the 
notion of the territory’s “marocanité” must be set aside, giving priority, instead, to movements 
across the region coming together in solidarity to liberate the territory. This, in a sense, is Ila al-
Amam’s reply to 23 Mars. It follows, however, that because of the territory’s small population, 
the absence of any nationalist leadership in the territory, and the presence of Sahrawi “refugees” 
in neighboring territories, there is the need “similar to the Palestinian situation” to rely upon and 
mobilize the surrounding areas of the Sahara.438  
The article in Anfas does not list any author, but El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, one of the 
students who protested in Tan Tan in 1972, was reputed to have been involved with Ila al-
Amam, and the article reflects El-Ouali’s close understanding of the situation in the Sahara at 
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that time.439 The article is of particular interest, then, for several reasons. For one, it provides a 
sense of the horizon of expectations animating the discussion and activism surrounding the 
decolonization of the Sahara in the early 1970s. Change seemed imminent, but the possibilities 
were apparently quite indeterminate. In addition, the article appears to be written as a polemic 
drawing attention to Western Sahara, and exhorting an international audience to support the 
Sahrawi cause. In this sense, the points of reference to Palestine and Rhodesia are informative, as 
is the emphasis on Sahrawis’ “continuing and deepening Arab identity.” By describing Sahrawis’ 
Arab identity as “deepening,” the article is presumably not referring to Arab identity in the more 
racialized, genealogical sense discussed in Chapter 2 (since this had never really been in 
question), but, rather, in the political, Arab nationalist sense as an appeal to the journal’s 
readership. In a further appeal to a broader audience, Sahrawi liberation is directly tied to the 
broader cause for “liberation of the surrounding Arab region.”  
Thirdly, the article represents an engagement in the debate within Morocco – or, more 
specifically, within the Moroccan left – over the proper way to support decolonization in the 
Sahara. Ila al-Amam is clear that the “marocanité of the Sahara” should be set aside, and a 
liberated Western Sahara must precede the hoped-for transformation of Morocco and, perhaps, 
the Greater Maghreb. Fourth, if it can be assumed that El-Ouali had a significant role in either 
informing or writing the article, this “way to liberation” outlines what the Polisario Front would 
effectively accomplish from 1973 to 1976: cultivating support among “the masses” in the Sahara 
through secret cells, while concurrently preparing a networked diaspora of Sahrawis in 
Mauritania, Algeria, and southern Morocco to mobilize when the situation demanded action. In 
                                                
439 According to one interviewee, the research and writing was largely done by a 23 Mars member named Mohamed 
Lmarini. Interview, Rabat, November 24, 2014. 
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this sense, the article is a kind of blueprint for what the Polisario Front would do over the next 
few years.  
Lastly, the article draws attention to an important aspect of the Sahara: that the “masses” 
within Western Sahara might not be massive enough.440 This last point connects to a theme that 
runs throughout this dissertation: that the decolonization of this region of the Sahara depended 
upon initiative and support from surrounding areas. We have seen at various moments in the 
region’s history – whether it was the relatively borderless western Sahara of the 1950s, Spanish 
Sahara’s isolation during the 1960s, or Western Sahara today – political projects in the Sahara 
have always depended upon regional and international connectivity to support attendant claims 
of independence and autonomy.441 This dialectic of autonomy and dependence renders moot the 
question of whether Sahrawi nationalism emerged from “inside” or “outside” the territory. 
Beyond the content of the article itself, the context in which it was published illustrates 
the narrow margin in which leftist groups operated in relation to the Sahara issue during the early 
1970s. In August 1972, as 23 Mars and Ila al-Amam attempted to sort out conflicting positions 
over the Sahara at the UNEM Congress, a coup attempt was carried out against Hassan II, the 
second unsuccessful coup attempt by the Moroccan military in as many years. In January 1973, 
UNEM was disbanded, and a series of student political leaders were arrested in police raids on 
universities.442 In March 1973, an Algerian-based group of Moroccans in exile carried out an 
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attack on several rural outposts of Moroccan gendarmes; this was followed by another round-up 
of leftist activists throughout Morocco.443  
Several of the students arrested at the Tan Tan protest in May 1972 had already fled the 
country and thereby avoided getting swept up in these arrests. Almost a year after the Tan Tan 
protest, and just months after the crackdown in Morocco, on May 10, 1973, the Frente Popular 
de Liberacíon de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, or the Polisario Front, announced its formation 
from Zouérate, in northern Mauritania. May 20, the Front carried out its first attack on a Spanish 
military outpost, El Khanga. Some of the students who fled from Tan Tan in the summer of 
1972, led by El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, were involved in both the formation of Polisario Front in 
northern Mauritania, and in the Khanga operation ten days later. 
 
B. “Two Eggs in One Nest”: Mauritania, Polisario and the Kadihin movement 
 
1972-73 marked a clear turning point in the relationship between the left and the 
Moroccan regime, but Moroccan leftists were not the only ones deeply involved in debating and 
discussing the future of the Sahara. In the following section, I will examine the Kadihin 
movement in Mauritania, another point in the constellation of movements that became engaged 
in the liberation of Western Sahara in the 1970s. Mauritania became independent in 1960 but 
gained recognition from Morocco as a nation-state, and admission to the Arab League, only in 
1969. In addition to having its legitimacy as a nation-state contested externally by Morocco 
throughout the 1960s (Morocco claimed Mauritania as part of “Greater Morocco”), there had 
been doubts and schisms within the country about its future since its formation. 
Following its decolonization under the French loi Deferre carried out between 1958 and 
1960, a certain skepticism lingered among many Mauritanians about their country’s 
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independence. This skepticism is captured by several sayings which circulated during this time. 
The first rhyme frames the loi Deferre referendum of 1958 – in which Mauritanians, like all 
former members of French West Africa, chose between immediate independence that would cut 
off ties with France, or continued involvement in the Communauté Française transitioning to 
formal independence in 1960 – as a pair of bad choices: 
“Oui” or “Non” are just two options 
That leave the chooser disinterested; 
“Oui” is no good on principle 
And the problem with “Non” is the money444 
 
“Oui” was a vote to remain a part of the French community while transitioning to independence 
in 1960, presented here as a betrayal of the promise of decolonization and therefore “no good on 
principle.” “Non” was a vote for immediate independence in 1958, with the consequence of 
being immediately cut off from French support. The “oui” vote prevailed amidst widespread 
questions about the integrity of the referendum, and Mauritania became independent in 1960 
with France’s hand-picked “successor,” Mokhtar Ould Daddah, becoming president.445 
Despite its decolonization in 1960, Mauritania’s new status seemed to reflect a 
neocolonial relation as much as an independent one: 
Independence is misunderstood, 
Meaning it is not cheap [mutabakhil] 
Colonialism is buried within 
In the pocket of independence446 
 
The fact that both of these rhymes were composed and remembered in the genre of Hassaniya 
poetry suggests that they circulated broadly and were reflective of popular sentiment of the time. 
For much of the 1960s, then, even as Mauritania was struggling to establish its legitimacy and 
                                                
444 Interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 18, 2015. l-oui wa non la khiyarat, wa l-mukhir mahu marghbun/l-oui 
mhaliya fi l-hassanat, wa mhaliya fi l-fadha non 
445 Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation., 257. 
446 Interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 18, 2015. l-istiqlal mahu mafhum, m‘ana mahu mutabakhil/l-ist‘emar 
dakhil melmum, fi juwa al-istiqlal dakhil. 
 261 
achieve full recognition as a nation-state before the United Nations, there was a certain 
disillusionment within Mauritania that independence was compromised by the country’s 
neocolonial relationship with France. As one former MLA fighter who later became a soldier in 
the Mauritanian army put it, the transition was as superficial as a change of clothing: 
As God is my witness, [laughing] I know exactly who they were. Those that 
ended (colonial) rule, they were with us, but then they changed their clothing - 
just their clothing! They gave independence at that time to countries from here to 
there, and they called it sham independence [al-istiqlal al-mzayf]. They call it 
sham independence. By God. Yup.447 
The country continued to use the French franc, its military continued to depend upon French 
assistance, and the largest post-independence actor in the country’s economy, the multinational, 
World Bank-backed mining concern MIFERMA, was run by international financiers. 
Several movements would emerge within Mauritania during the late 1960s to oppose 
Mokhtar Ould Daddah’s government, calling for an end to the country’s neocolonialism. 
Foremost among these was the Kadihin movement, which coalesced out of multiple points of 
origin beginning in the 1960s. One thread begins in the fallout from the violent confrontations 
between Arab bidani, and non-Arab Soninke, Wolof and Pulaar students at Mauritanian 
educational institutions in February 1966. The violence, which had been precipitated by a 
government attempt to Arabize education, resulted in several deaths and caused a reorientation 
among certain non-Arab Black and bidani elites who had until then been inspired by Modibo 
Keita’s Malian republic and Nasr’s Arab nationalism, respectively.448 Abandoning Arab 
nationalism, these bidani elites joined their Black counterparts at a conference in southern 
Mauritania to develop an agenda premised on national unity, opposition to the governing regime, 
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social transformation and, first and foremost, ending Mauritania’s neocolonialism.449 Out of this 
conference would emerge the National Democratic Movement. 
In May of 1968, the same year as the formation of National Democratic Movement, 
Mauritanian police fired on striking mine workers in Zouérate, at the iron ore mines owned by 
the internationally-financed MIFERMA, killing seven. Students across the country organized 
mass protests in response. At one of these protests in Rosso, a town in southern Mauritania, the 
police again responded with violence. For one student protester, this marked a turning point: 
“The police intervened brutally, hitting students hard with rifles, and I became convinced that the 
regime was by nature a brutal, terrible power.”450 Out of this developed the Comité Provisoire 
d’Action Scolaire (CPASS), whose members became the foot soldiers for the National 
Democratic Movement, producing and distributing the Kadihin’s Maoist-influenced publication, 
Sihat al-mazlum (“Cries of the Oppressed”). A women’s branch of the movement formed, and 
the movement’s social agenda, which included a call for social equality among citizens, a fight 
against slavery, and consciousness-raising among rural folk, took shape.451 The Kadihin 
movement developed as a social reform project as much as a political one, inspired by Maoist 
literature on educating and organizing rural workers. An explicitly populist, anti-elitist 
                                                
449 Interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, April 5, 2015. “Neocolonialism was our principle concern. This movement, 
which formed at Tokomadi [in Gorgol province, in southern Mauritania] in ’68 had four aims. The first was 
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450 Interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, April 16, 2015. This account resonates with the connection between getting 
beaten by the police baton and the politicization of May ’68 protesters in France, which Kristin Ross conveys 
through an examination of the term “matraque,” a French adaptation of the Arabic “matraq.” In the instance cited 
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the experience of getting hit by the police, and political awakening. Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives., 27–32.  
451 Interviews: Nouakchott, Mauritania, March 30, 3015; April 1, 2015; April 16, 2015; April 24, 2015; Nouadhibou, 
Mauritania, June 14, 2015. The women’s branch, l’Association Démocratique des Femmes Nationales (ADFN) and 
other aspects of the movement which focused on social change constitute perhaps the most lasting and significant 
legacy of the Kadihin. 
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movement, the slogan for members went “I’m a kadih and the kadihin are without money, and 
without cars.” This is the second origin story of the Kadihin. 
 The third origin story takes place in Damascus. In July 1968, the same year as the 
formation of National Democratic Movement and CPASS, approximately 20 Mauritanian 
students studying at university abroad (there were no institutions of higher education in 
Mauritania at the time) convened in Damascus for a conference hosted by the Syrian Ba‘ath 
regime. Students came from Dakar, Paris, Cairo and Kuwait. The majority of these students were 
opposed to Mokhtar Ould Daddah’s government, but unable to organize within the country. The 
conference was held in the Damascus parliamentary building but, according to Mohamed 
Mahjoub Ould Bih, a Mauritanian student in Syria at the time, Syrian Ba‘athist government 
officials did not interfere in the conference proceedings. The challenge for those attending was to 
bridge the ideological gap between Arab nationalists and Marxists (who tended to be students in 
Paris, affected by the student protests there). Out of this meeting, Mauritanian university students 
continued organizing around the premise that Mauritania’s problem was a matter of 
neocolonialism, and not ethnic differences between Arab and non-Arab groups.452 
 After a meeting between bidani and non-Arab Black student groups in Nouakchott in 
1971, Mauritanian students formed a national union, UGESM,453 and established contact with 
CPASS and the National Democratic Movement. By the summer of 1972, when UGESM 
declared a general strike, the Kadihin had formed as a popular, grassroots extension of the 
worker, student and party unions. Facing significant repression by the Mauritanian state, 
including forced conscription in the army, members of the party and movement remained 
                                                
452 Interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, April 23, 2015. These events form the basis of Dr. Bih’s memoir  Mohamed 
Mahjoub ould Mohamed Mukhtar ould Bīh, Attadhakar: dhikrayat wa khawatir wa ’ahdath (Nouakchott: Maktabat 
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453 l’Union générale des étudiants et stagiaires mauritaniens 
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underground. The presence of the Kadihin was not officially announced until the following year, 
but with student and labor strikes occurring with regularity, the movement maintained a series of 
demands focused on ending Mauritania’s neocolonial status. Specifically, the Kadihin demanded 
the abrogration of Mauritania’s mutual defense agreement with France, the establishment of 
Mauritania’s own currency (replacing the franc), and the nationalization of the iron ore mining 
concern, MIFERMA.454 
 The Kadihin were ascendant when Polisario was in its formative, or “embryonic” 
stages,455 and members from both movements regularly gathered at an office in the northern 
Mauritanian mining town of Zouérate. Kadihin members provided Polisario with supplies, 
including arms, during this early period. The mutually imbricated relationship between the two 
movements is also captured by a phrase attributed to the Polisario leader, El-Ouali Mustafa 
Sayid, who is reputed to have told the Mauritanian President Mokhtar Ould Daddah that the 
Mauritanian and Sahrawi peoples, sharing the same bidani heritage, are “Two eggs in one nest – 
if you disturb one, you will disturb the other.”456 And, indeed, the simultaneous emergence of 
progressive movements for liberation in Mauritania and Spanish Sahara portended the potential 
for sweeping change in both places. In January 1974, when Polisario convened for its Second 
Congress, held in secret in the badiya close to the border between Spanish Sahara and northern 
Mauritania, the lone delegate from an outside organization to attend was a Kadihin 
representative, Mustafa Badreddine.457 As a former Polisario member from northern Mauritania 
put it “Kadihin were on our side, helping us. Kadihin, by God, Kadihin were against the 
                                                
454 Interviews: Nouakchott, Mauritania, April 5, 2015; April 23, 2015.  
455 The phrase used in reference to Sahrawi mobilization between 1970 and 1973, or after al-Intifadat al-Zemla and 
before the declaration of the Polisario Front, is al-harakat al-janiniya, or the “embryonic movement.” 
456 Bidatin fi ‘ish wahid/lahi ydigdig wahida/dur ydigdig thaniya. This expression has remained a popular idiom for 
characterizing the relationship between Mauritanians and Sahrawis. Fieldnote, Nouadhibou, Mauritania, May 25, 
2015. El-Ouali met Ould Daddah on multiple occasions, including at the national conference between the 
Mauritanian government and the Kadihin in 1974. Notes from interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, April 23, 2015. 
457 Interview, Nouakchott, Mauritania, May 5, 2015. 
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government here…They didn’t like colonialism. Kadihin, by God, they were with us.” 458 In 
1972, as movements were in their “embryonic” stages, Sahrawi nationalists and the Kadihin 
grew in tandem, like two eggs in one nest. 
 
C. Qaddafi, Arab Nationalism and Contested Political Futures in Mauritania and 
the Sahara 
 
If Spanish Sahara was largely isolated from regional and international political currents in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, and politics in Morocco was increasingly circumscribed by state 
repression, the situation in Mauritania was altogether different. Though the Kadihin and Polisario 
Front played an important role in this politicization, they were neither the only political projects 
animating this field, nor the first ones to infuse revolutionary politics into postcolonial 
Mauritanian society. Mauritania appears to have attracted the interest of multiple foreign 
countries after its decolonization, which perhaps viewed its rural populace as a tabula rasa, and 
the country a political vacuum to be filled by competing Cold War ideologies. To hear those who 
came of age during this time tell it, the capital of Nouakchott – which, like El Aaiún, developed 
from almost nothing during the 1960s – was a city of tents and embassies. The Chinese, Iraqi – 
and, later, Libyan – embassies all distributed literature in an effort to win the hearts and minds of 
the residents of this burgeoning capital. 
China had a particularly visible presence in Mauritania in the 1960s, a relationship tied to 
the fact that both the People’s Republic of China and Mauritania struggled to win recognition 
before the United Nations. Through major public works projects, including the development of 
infrastructure for a water supply, the dredging of an industrial port, and the construction of 
landmark public buildings in Nouakchott such as Dar al-Thaqafa, which remains one of the most 
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impressive structures in the capital today, Chinese support visibly bolstered Mauritania’s 
development.459 At the same time, the embassy distributed free Maoist literature. As one man 
reminisced of the 60s and 70s, “oh…in every tent in Nouakchott, there was a Little Red Book by 
Mao Tse-Tung. Can you imagine?!”460 Maoism, in particular, informed the program of the 
Kadihin movement, in educating and organizing rural communities.461  
Of course, the visible presence of propaganda and other political activity in Nouakchott 
did not necessarily affect the vast majority of the population living in rural areas, many of whom 
were averse to explicitly secular and political ideologies of the time. A running joke from that 
era involves the Iraqi embassy which, pleased with rising demand for their Ba‘ath Party 
literature, sent two functionaries to find out who was consuming the literature, and if the 
relationship could be cultivated further. When a man came the next morning and gathered all of 
the free pamphlets and books from the embassy, the Ba‘ath functionaries eagerly followed him 
outside the city, only to be disappointed when they found the ideological tracts fed to a herd of 
goats.462  
Nonetheless, the Ba‘athist and Nasserist political ideologies, like the Maoist literature, 
both found an audience, and the latter became particularly influential following the 1969 coup in 
Libya that brought Colonel Mu‘ammar Qaddafi, an acolyte of Gamel Abd el-Nasr, to power. 
Qaddafi’s charisma and adventurous foreign policy had impacts on the region that were both 
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immediate and lasting.463 On June 6, 1972 – one month after the Tan Tan protest, two months 
before the UNEM student congress in Rabat, and four months before the Kadihin movement 
formed in Nouakchott – Colonel Qaddafi gave a speech in Atar, in northern Mauritania, calling 
for the end of colonialism in Spanish Sahara. Two months later, Qaddafi dispatched an operative 
named Muhammad Saïd Qashshat to northern Mauritania to organize Nasserist groups and 
foment revolution in both Mauritania and Spanish Sahara.464 
Qashshat’s efforts, and Qaddafi’s popularity, spurred the formation of Nasserist political 
groups among a younger generation in northern Mauritania. Between Polisario and the Maoist 
Kadihin already on the scene, the northern Mauritanian cities of Atar, Nouadhibou and Zouérate, 
perhaps more than anywhere else in the region at that time, became centers of political 
fomentation, animating debates and discussions for a younger generation coming of age in the 
1970s.465 While Qaddafi befriended El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid and became the Polisario Front’s 
first major backer (the Mauritanian Kadihin, as an underground movement, had far fewer 
resources), the connection between Arab nationalism and the Sahrawi cause was complicated by 
Arab nationalism’s emphasis on the need for supranational political formations to combat 
imperialism and Zionism. This former Nasserist student-activist was unmoved by the cause of 
Sahrawi independence despite coming of age in Nouadhibou, mere kilometers from Spanish 
Sahara, in the 1970s: 
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The Saharan liberation movement wasn’t a big deal to me – I believed that the 
period of fragmentation [al-tafriq] ought to end with the expulsion of the Spanish 
colonial invader/occupier. But as for establishing an independent country, for me, 
as an example of a separatist movement, I was not for it. That was my 
conviction.466 
The emphasis was even stronger among members of Mauritania’s active Ba‘ath Party, whose 
connections to Ba‘ath Party leadership in Baghdad provided them with resources that other 
groups lacked, but whose support for Sahrawi liberation was mitigated by the Baghdad 
leadership’s refusal to support Sahrawi independence on Arab nationalist grounds.467 
*** 
Between the protest in Tan Tan in May, Qaddafi’s speech in Atar in June, the UNEM 
Congress led by leftist radicals in Rabat and the attempted coup d’état in August, and the 
formation of the Kadihin in October, the summer and fall of 1972 were, indeed, politically “hot.” 
In this sense, I suggest that the movements involved in these events constituted a constellation 
across western Sahara and the Maghreb, subtended by an imminent horizon for change. From 
interviews and oral histories conducted with people who lived through this time, from Rabat to 
Nouakchott, and from Tindouf to Nouadhibou, two features of this constellation are particularly 
striking. The first is the indeterminate future portended by an open horizon of expectation, and 
the widespread debate that this engendered. An older man from northern Mauritania who joined 
Polisario during this time describes the discussions that would take place at Polisario’s office in 
Zouérate: 
The ones with political posts would present, like Shahid El-Ouali [Mustafa 
Sayid], and other leaders [l-kibar] from the Front. They would present to us, and 
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we would continue (the discussion): what do we think about Mauritania [shinhu 
tekhmam fina fi al-muritan]…what do we think about Morocco, and what does 
Algeria have – what are our thoughts (about them)? 
 And they would present (these questions) and we would discuss them. 
And we would discuss like this, “what about this, and that,”…and that was how 
the discussion went: each and every day, discussion/debate, discussion/debate.468 
This account of the discussions taking place in Zouérate involving direct interaction between the 
leaders of Polisario, Mauritanian-Sahrawis, members of Kadihin, Arab nationalists, and others, 
covered the range of political actors and possibilities and precipitated the convergence of people 
from different movements. In this sense, it is remarkably similar to the description of the 
contemporaneous debates taking place in Rabat. 
 The other striking feature of this constellation is the degree to which Western Sahara 
itself became the object upon which different visions for the future could be projected. For the 23 
Mars movement in Morocco, the Sahara held the potential to serve as the first of several 
dominoes that could topple authoritarian regimes and transform the Greater Maghreb toward 
radical democracy – but only if that process began with the affirmation of the “marocanité” of 
the Sahara. For the Kadihin, the Polisario Front represented a movement that was kindred in 
spirit, and which would enable the decolonization of Spanish Sahara to occur in tandem with the 
reinvention of Mauritania, like “two eggs in one nest.” For Arab nationalists, the independence 
of Western Sahara simply represented the further fragmentation of anti-imperial, anti-Zionist 
power, a position which Morocco would exploit in order to undermine support for the Polisario 
Front in the Arab League. For Ila al-Amam and the Polisario Front, meanwhile, self-
determination was a clear goal but this, too, was foreseen as an outcome to be achieved by armed 
struggle, and not by legal process.469 Even Qaddafi, who embraced El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid and 
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the Polisario Front from the outset, was engaged with the Sahara as one of many projects across 
Africa and the Middle East to foment regime change, from the Canary Islands to the Dhofar 
liberation movement in Oman, with Mauritania and Western Sahara in between.470 
 The capacity for Western Sahara to absorb a variety of political projections for the future 
can also be connected to Spanish Sahara’s isolation of the people and territory during this time. 
The Zemla uprising in 1970 was the only visible puncture of this blackout that brought Sahrawis 
in Spanish Sahara in contemporaneous relation to the constellation of surrounding movements 
across the region. But precisely because Spain maintained such tight control over the territory, 
the future of Western Sahara became increasingly tied to a range of political projects and 
possibilities that were emerging along with this constellation of movements in Mauritania, 
Morocco, and further afield. Moreover, as noted in the Anfas article, the populace would need 
support from the outside even if a political movement within the territory were in evidence. 
 
Section III –The Generational Noncontemporaneity of Decolonization, from the 1950s to 
1970s 
The regional constellation of movements that became particularly visible across 
northwest Africa in 1972 formed in relation to a horizon of imminent but indeterminate change. 
This horizon for change was largely filled by plans surrounding the decolonization of Western 
Sahara and yet, this chapter has shown that the political projects anticipating these futures were 
largely taking place outside of Spanish Sahara itself, thanks to the territory’s isolation under 
Spanish rule. The “center” for decolonization of Western Sahara in 1972 was as much Morocco, 
Mauritania, Algeria and even Libya - in Zouérate and Rabat, Tan Tan and Tindouf, Nouakchott 
and Tripoli – as it was in El Aaiún. This dispersion conveys the degree to which the politics of 
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Western Sahara’s decolonization has always entailed and depended upon processes that surpass 
its territorial boundaries. This is precisely why I have found the concept of a constellation to be 
useful, both because it captures the simultaneity of these movements’ emergence, as well as the 
disaggregated political geography of decentralized connectivity which they constituted. 
One feature of this constellation was its sense of connection, not necessarily between 
each movement (the Kadihin movement, for example, appeared to have little direct 
communication with UNEM or other student groups in Morocco), but with political 
developments from around the world. Principle among these were the Six Days War in 1967, and 
the student movement in France that culminated in the Paris protests of May, 1968: 
A period of heightened awareness [marhala idhka’ al-wa‘yi] emerged with two 
fundamental events: the first event is the War of ’67, Palestine, and the second 
event is the French student movement in ’68. They had an influence on the region, 
generally, in mobilizing political awareness in the region. Everyone in the region 
interacted [tefa‘il] with the war in Palestine, but also everyone - especially in 
Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco - lived the events that France went through in 
’68, with that student revolution. It provoked a questioning of (one’s) 
consciousness. 
 A new generation appeared, no longer traditional or religious, which 
considers Hassaniya the sole connection, or religion as the sole connection 
(between people). Instead, political thinking began to crystallize [ytabalwar]. And 
from there, the first movement that came to the Sahara, was established in ’68.471 
My interest here is less in exploring the significance of the Six Days War or the Paris student 
movement from the present moment, or from the perspective of northwest Africa.472 Nor am I 
trying to single these two events out from others as an argument for their decisive role in shaping 
the history of decolonization in the region. These were only some of the political developments 
that my interlocutors cited as being particularly influential in shaping their political 
subjectivities. The Cultural Revolution in China, the Vietnam War, and Maoist-inspired 
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revolutions in Cambodia and Laos also came up several times in interviews among activists in 
Mauritania and Morocco. To cite just one example of another event, a former member of the 
Kadihin mentioned the emotional effect [al-ta’thir al-wujdani] that the guerrilla wars taking 
place in Vietnam and elsewhere across southeast Asia had on him, along with Palestine.473 
However, the Six Days War and the May ’68 protests and strike in France were not only 
referenced most frequently, they also most clearly bore the signature of world-historical events 
that marked a generation’s sense of political becoming. Therefore, I single out the Six Days War 
and the May ’68 protests in France as representative events that indexed a sense of coexistence 
and simultaneity for a certain generation marked by an awareness of global political futures. 
In another important sense, the emergence of this constellation took place not only in 
relation to the open horizon for the future, but also in temporal relation to the past. When the 
interviewee notes that “a new generation appeared” concomitant with the developments in 
Palestine and Paris, he is distinguishing this emergent consciousness from a previous generation. 
In relation to western Sahara, in particular, I suggest that this awareness of global political 
developments distinguished the generation coming of age during the late 1960s and early 70s 
from a previous generation’s “nonsynchronism” with world-historical events in the 1950s. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, the effects of this experience of nonsynchronism during the 1950s left 
many Sahrawis discouraged during a prior moment of decolonization, specifically through a 
sense that the Moroccan Liberation Army failed – or, worse, “tricked” – them. From this 
perspective, the isolation of Sahrawis during the 1960s was not only an effect of intensified 
Spanish rule, but the result of fallout from disillusionment with the MLA a generation prior. The 
sense among Sahrawis of having been tricked or betrayed by the MLA contributed to a turn 
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inward and away from “politics” – a turn which, in the spatial imaginary of the Sahara, entails a 
return to the desert, or badiya.  
By contrast, for those who participated in Sahrawi nationalist movements beginning in 
1968 with Mohamed Basiri and the Vanguard Movement, and then later with the formation of 
the Polisario Front, the horizon for change was imbricated with events in Paris, Damascus, 
Vietnam, Palestine and Guinea-Bissau. This experience of contemporaneity with global Third 
Worldism constituted a break with the politics of a previous generation. The following is from a 
former member who contrasted the politics of Basiri’s movement with what motivated Sahrawis 
who joined Morocco’s Liberation Army in the 1950s: 
There is no comparison (between Jaysh al-Tahrir of the 1950s and the Vanguard 
Movement), not even in their thinking. The thinking of Jaysh al-Tahrir was jihad 
in God’s name [fi sabil allah] and to expel the colonizer from the Sahara, but not 
to call for a state or for independence. The latter (Vanguard Movement) came via 
an experienced man [rajl muhanik] and a nationalist – an Arab nationalist and 
Nasserist – following the East.474 
There are multiple distinctions made here between the politics animating the moment of 
decolonization in western Sahara in the 1950s, from those at play in the late 1960s. Here, a sharp 
distinction is made between the traditional or religious politics of jihad from the modern 
consciousness of nationalism. The former, it is claimed, is what mobilized tribesmen to join the 
MLA in large numbers to expel the Christians [nasara] in the 1950s; the latter, having coming 
from a reliable source (“the East,” i.e., Cairo, Damascus, the Levant), is validated by someone 
whose authority comes not only from moral goodness, or shaykh-ly lineage, but from political 
experience. 
In many contexts, the distinction between generations is understood either in terms of 
disillusionment and frustration, or, as in the excerpt above, as a break between tradition and 
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modernity, which reflects a secular idiom that denies coevalness to non-secular modes of 
rationality.475 However, the setting of Rabat circa 1972 again provides a concrete example for 
conceptualizing this debate about the future as a dialogue between generations, when veterans of 
the MLA were a part of discussions with radical Sahrawi university students in Rabat: 
The subject (of the Sahara) was an issue related specifically to Sahrawis, (that 
involved) perhaps a small number of people. There was a kind of togetherness 
[luhma] between individuals that surpassed political ideas, much of the 
time…Before [Intifadat al-Zemla], there was a kind of sluggishness [al-khumul] 
after what happened with Jaysh Tahrir, from shock, there was shock, there was an 
apprehension of trust [intiza‘ al-thiqa] toward others. Meaning, there was no 
longer a desire to support someone: the south claims you, and the north claims 
you, and Algeria’s not interested – so, there were those in the country just trying 
to live, and that’s it. But with Zemla, the clouds cleared [ihqasha’ al-dabbab] and 
(there was) a reopening of the discussion anew. This discussion would not be 
limited to a specific group, nor to a specific idea.476 
 
This recollection, from a man who was a university student participating in these discussions and 
was later forcibly arrested and jailed without trial for 13 years, frames the debate less as a 
confrontation precipitated by a break in consciousness, and more as a dialogue between 
generations. 
David Scott’s thinking about generation provides another means for thinking through this 
distinction, one which does not assume the kinds of rupture or break often conveyed by social 
memory. By Scott’s conceptualization, generation, as a temporal concept, marks a certain 
noncontemporaneity between cotemporal groups, and that “mere copresence in historical time 
does not make for contemporaneity.”477 In borrowing from Scott, the contemporaneity of the 
generation that formed Polisario was tied to an awareness of and connectivity with regional and 
global political developments that was not shared by a previous generation. At the same time, 
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and in following Scott again, the dialogue between generations illustrates how intergenerational 
tradition constitutes the grounds through which shared horizons of expectation emerge. In the 
context of Rabat in 1972, two generations of Sahrawis were making sense of a changing horizon 
of possibility – metaphorically suggested by the former student’s phrase “the clouds cleared” – in 
relation to their disparate spaces of experience. 
 
Section IV – “A Nation of Refugees:” Humanitarian Nationalism and Postcolonial 
Sovereignty in the Global Space-Time of the 1970s 
 
Despite this constellation of emergent leftist movements across northwest Africa in 1972, 
the open horizon of possibility regarding Western Sahara did not last long. On the one hand, the 
end to Spanish colonialism never seemed nearer: Portuguese revolution and regime change in 
1974 led to the immediate decolonization of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde 
and Sao Tomé.478 Likewise, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was growing, as Algeria hosted 
the largest NAM Summit to date in Algiers in 1973.479 These developments did not, however, 
necessarily bolster the anti-imperialist movements in Mauritania and Morocco. As noted earlier 
in the chapter, the second coup attempt in Morocco was quickly followed by a crackdown on the 
student left, which began with the formal dissolution of the Moroccan student union, UNEM, in 
January 1973. State arrests of leftists continued throughout the year following the attacks on 
Moroccan police outposts by a radical group based out of Algeria, and in November 1974 over 
100 more activists were imprisoned, including Abraham Serfaty, a founding member of Ila al-
Amam. In Mauritania, meanwhile, 1973 was marked by a year-long student strike, another 
miner’s strike in Zouérate, and the growing influence of the Kadihin movement, which was 
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escalating demands for the state to nationalize the mining concern based in northern Mauritania, 
MIFERMA. 
Maneuverings at the state and international level would soon outpace the leftist 
movements. In February, 1973, Spain warned neighboring countries not to allow Polisario to 
operate on its territory, putting additional pressure on a Mauritanian government that was 
contending with both growing internal opposition and severe drought conditions across much of 
the country.480 At the same time, just as the Kadihin movement was ascendant, Mokhtar Ould 
Daddah’s government moved swiftly to meet several of the movement’s demands. In 1972, 
Mauritania ended its mutual defense agreements with France; in 1973, the government 
established a national currency for the first time; and, most substantively, in 1974 the 
Mauritanian state nationalized MIFERMA. That same year, the government invited members of 
the Kadihin movement to a conference with government ministers. This precipitated tremendous 
debate within Kadihin leadership and ultimately led to a split as certain, key members of the 
movement, compelled by Ould Daddah’s reforms, joined the government.481 This schism proved 
decisive, depriving the Kadihin movement of much of its leadership and leaving those who 
rejected joining the government to reorient their activities toward rural activism and away from 
state-oriented demands (such as nationalization of MIFERMA) that had previously anchored the 
movement’s political activities. As several former members put it, the government had “pulled 
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the rug out from under our feet,” effectively coopting the movement just as it had arrived on the 
national scene.482 
A shifting political landscape in Mauritania did not slow Polisario’s activities, however, 
throughout 1973 and 74. As noted previously, the Polisario Front officially formed in May 1973, 
carrying out its first operation, an attack against a Spanish military outpost. In May and June of 
1974, a United Nations convoy visited the region and Polisario, outmaneuvering Spanish and 
Mauritanian authorities, organized strong displays of support at each stop that the envoy made in 
Spanish Sahara and surrounding areas (Tan Tan, Zouérate). Two months later, Spain declared 
support for organizing a referendum, but Polisario, after holding its second congress in the desert 
in August 1974, did not let up. In October 1974, Polisario cells formed by workers at the Bucraa 
phosphate mining operation in Spanish Sahara sabotaged the open-air conveyor belt that 
transported extracted mineral from the mine to the coast. Again in May and June of 1975, new 
attacks on Spanish posts in Guelta-Zemmour succeeded in drawing Sahrawi recruits from the 
ranks of the Spanish military. Throughout this time, Qaddafi was trucking arms and other 
supplies from Libya to Polisario’s base of operations in southwest Algeria. Where the Kadihin in 
Mauritania and leftists in Morocco were in retreat, Polisario was asserting itself: by May 1975, 
Spain declared that it had no intention of prolonging its colonial presence in the Sahara.483 And, 
on October 12, 1975, in a village in northern Mauritania known as Ain Ben Tilli, at the home of 
Ba ould Dkhil, a judge who had fled southern Morocco in 1956 because of a political dispute, an 
intergenerational group that included members of the Spanish representative council, al-Jem‘a, 
voted to recognize Polisario as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people. 
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Just days after the meeting at Ain Ben Tilli, the International Court of Justice issued an 
Advisory Opinion regarding Morocco’s and Mauritania’s claims to sovereignty over Western 
Sahara. Citing proof of historical political ties, the ICJ’s opinion nonetheless denied that these 
historical ties constituted sovereign ties.484 Within Morocco, the regime promoted the ICJ 
Opinion as a victory, disregarding the opinion’s rejection of Morocco’s claim to sovereign ties. 
By the end of October, Moroccan armed forces were encroaching on Western Saharan territory, 
preparing to enter the towns of Smara and El Aaiún.485 Also during this time, the Moroccan 
military transporting hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians to Morocco’s border with 
Western Sahara, to march into the territory as a symbol of national reclamation. This took place 
on November 6, 1975, in an event of mass mobilization that has become steeped in Moroccan 
national mythology, known as the Green March.486 Some 350,000 civilians wielding Qur’ans and 
Moroccan flags marched into the territory, and then withdrew.  
Then, most crucially, on November 14, 1975, Morocco and Mauritania negotiated a 
trilateral agreement with Spain, known as the Madrid Accord, to transfer Western Sahara to the 
two countries: Morocco would annex the northern two thirds, Mauritania the rest. This was done 
while General Franco was on his deathbed, and with his military advisors allegedly divided 
between supporting Sahrawi self-determination, and the terms of the Madrid agreement.487 After 
solidifying its control over the cities and completing Spanish withdrawal during the final months 
of 1975, Morocco then expanded its military sweep of the territory during January and February, 
1976. During these two months, the army indiscriminately killed civilians, precipitating an 
exodus among Sahrawis who fled east. The Moroccan air force strafed camps that were set up in 
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the east of Western Sahara with napalm, forcing Sahrawis into a remote part of the desert in 
southwest Algeria, outside of Tindouf.488 
From 1976, the rupture was profound: Morocco occupied most of Western Sahara 
militarily, and violently repressed any dissent among Sahrawis in the territory. Meanwhile, on 
February 28, 1976, from refugee camps in Algeria, Polisario announced the establishment of the 
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). During this time, Polisario also mobilized 
supporters from across the region to come to the camps and bolster their armed force. One man 
remembers the voluntary exodus of Mauritanians leaving F’derik and Zouérate in northern 
Mauritania to join: 
They left all of their belongings. Really [ga‘a]! They left the house - the car 
wasn’t theirs, it belonged to the company (SNIM)489 - but those who owned their 
houses left them as well. This house of ours [where the interview’s taking place], 
we left it and went. This house here, we left it and went to the Front. And we 
stayed with them; we went to battle with them [nakhubtu m‘ahum], until peace 
was settled and we came (back) to our house. This is our house, and none of us 
remained in it…we went to fight  with our brothers…490 
The decisive series of events in late 1975 and early 1976 precipitated several major changes. 
Where Polisario had previously been waging a battle against Spanish colonial rule, it suddenly 
had to pivot toward simultaneous armed struggle against Morocco and Mauritania. The 
annexation by Morocco and Mauritania, which had seemed unlikely just a few years earlier, also 
precipitated a realignment in the ongoing regional struggle between Morocco and Algeria. This 
led Algeria, which had heretofore treated the Polisario Front with a level of distrust, to embrace 
the Sahrawi national liberation movement. 
*** 
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After Spain withdrew from the Sahara by December 20, 1976, Morocco and Mauritania 
moved quickly to establish control over the annexed territory,491 surrounding the cities with 
barbed wire to pen residents in. Chapter 1 of this dissertation begins with the account of a 
woman who remembers, as a girl, a violent encounter with a Moroccan soldier on the roof of her 
home in Laâyoune/El Aaiún during this time. Concurrent with laying siege to the cities, Morocco 
conducted sweeps through the Saharan badiya. According to journalistic reports from this time, 
these military campaigns were brutal, with eyewitnesses recounting soldiers killing, raping and 
torturing their family members.492 As Sahrawis fled east, preliminary desert encampments in 
Galtah Zemmour and Um Drayga were strafed by the Moroccan air force, which dropped napalm 
on fleeing civilians on four known occasions.493 Meanwhile, Sahrawis living throughout 
Morocco who had any familial connection to Polisario or were believed to harbor sympathies, 
were rounded up and sent to the remote Moroccan prisons of M’gouna and Agdz. One 
interlocutor quoted throughout this chapter was apprehended in Rabat without warning in 1976, 
and spent 13 years imprisoned in the remote fortress/prison of M’gouna. Many of those forcibly 
disappeared died in prison during the war. Although I could not find exact figures for the death 
toll from this campaign, “it is likely that several thousand Sahrawi civilians died” between 1975 
and 1980, with several hundred still unaccounted for and mass graves that have recently come to 
light.494 
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 The aerial attacks at Um Drayga and elsewhere pushed fleeing Sahrawis further east, 
where many settled outside of Tindouf, a market town in southwest Algeria. Polisario scrambled 
to provide a network of Land Rovers relaying people to the camps, not only from Moroccan- and 
Mauritanian-occupied territory, but from across northern Mauritania. As the camps grew, 
Polisario formalized its alliance with Algeria during its Third General Congress held in Algiers 
in August, 1976, which allowed leadership to set up the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a 
state-in-exile in the camps.495 In the early years, women predominantly organized daily life in the 
camps, since most men were fighting with Polisario as it engaged in war with both Morocco and 
Mauritania. As Alice Wilson points out, this period shifted the locus of political subjectivity 
from the tent to the public domain, where Qaddafi-inspired Popular Committees, composed 
predominantly of women, administered education, health care, justice, and Red Crescent matters 
(which constituted much of the camp’s economy).496 A Mauritanian who visited the camps 
during this time recalled a remarkable sense of purpose and collective sacrifice: 
I felt a strong sense of dedication [al-ikhlass al-shadid]. There was a spirit of 
sacrifice and patience, patience, patience at the beginning, at the hunger. And 
there was nothing: people endured [nas tatahamel]. By God, (there was) 
dedication. There was mutual support and I didn’t see anyone at odds. There was 
deep dignity…There was no tribalism at that time, and they were fighting against 
tribalism. Far from Marxist thinking, they were simply Sahrawi nationalists.497 
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Social memory about the hardship and purpose of the early revolutionary period, and women’s 
pivotal role in building and running the camps, remain foundational to the Sahrawi national 
narrative of resistance and exile.498 
 Much has been written about the Sahrawi refugee camps, with particular attention to the 
political operations of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or what Wilson calls Polisario’s 
“state-movement,” within the camps.499 My interest is not to contribute to this literature, but, 
rather, to note the integral role of the refugee camps in making Sahrawi nationalism intelligible 
to an international audience. In focusing on early reports of the refugee camps, some of them 
journalistic and propagandistic, I will examine two tropes of this literature, primarily conducted 
during the time of war between 1976 and 1989, in order to relate these tropes to significant shifts 
in global politics that coincided with the rise of Sahrawi nationalism during the 1970s. 
 The first trope is organization. Initial reports from the camps marveled at the 
comprehensively organized political life of the camps, and the widespread, active participation of 
refugees in these processes. In reporting to the African Studies Association annual meeting 1978, 
Anne Lippert, who made several visits to the camps in the 1970s and 80s, described the highly 
organized camp conditions by listing the popular, administrative committees that organized daily 
and political life, as well as the camp’s spatial organization:500 
The 23 camps of refugees, each carrying the name of a city or village in the 
S.A.D.R., are divided into three wilayas: Smara, El Aaiun, and Dakhla. Every 
person over 12 in the camps belong to one of the nine camp committees 
(education, health and sanitation, crafts, commerce, guard duty, herds, pediatrics, 
social affairs, supplies) and also belongs to a political cell (group of 11 people 
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who meet daily to discuss politics, the war, etc.). Popular meetings in the camps 
are held to discuss problems of the camps, the progress of the war, plans for the 
future. Every one in the camp has a chance to have his say.501 
Tami Hultman, who published several articles from the camps as well as the front soon after the 
outbreak of war, related this committee life to a spirit of mobilization:   
The atmosphere in the frontier camps is so energetic and purposeful that it often is 
difficult to remember that the people are there under duress, living in the most 
extreme conditions of deprivation. Each unit has several thousand people and is 
run by an administrative committee, an economic committee, an education 
committee, and a sanitation committee.502  
Lastly, this trope of organization and participation provided the basis for a discourse on the 
exceptionalism of the Sahrawi camps. This report, prepared by members of a donor organization 
promoting agricultural projects in the camps during the 1980s, emphasized the uniqueness of 
Sahrawi refugees in relation to other situations of forced displacement: 
All the refugees, men and women, participate at all levels of camp activity in 
services and institutions, in production workshops, in the system of justice and in 
the political organization. Other refugees often sink into alienation and apathy. 
The Sahrawi leaders, while recognizing their dependence of external supplies, 
have organized the camps to harness and maximize the energies, commitment and 
hope of the Sahrawi people.503 
As Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh has demonstrated through her in-depth study of Sahrawis in the 
refugee camps, this discourse has a gendered dynamic in singling out female Sahrawis as “the 
ideal refugee.”504 
 The accompanying trope to “the ideal refugee” is one of suffering. This is true in a basic, 
material sense, in that the distribution of international NGO aid through the Sahrawi-run Red 
Crescent has always been the camps’ lifeline: 
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Disease, particularly bronchitis, pulmonary tuberculosis, diarrhea, and other 
intestinal illnesses, is rampant. The children are afflicted by measles as well, and 
the lack of refrigeration as well as the lack of vaccines and medicines have 
resulted in many infant deaths. The refugees are also suffering from burns and 
other wounds as well as from malnutrition. Their plight is serious, and will 
become even more serious as the winter months continue. Tents, warm clothing, 
and medicines are major needs, not to mention food supplies…Additional help is 
hoped for as more people become aware of the plight of this people.505 
While health conditions improved along with the establishment of a working national hospital 
and with medical support from Cuba, in particular, the refugee camps as a situation of 
humanitarian need remains central to their operation. Beyond this fundamental observation about 
the camps’ operation, however, I suggest that the humanitarian appeal has also been what made 
Sahrawi nationalism legible as a compelling political formation. A 1979 Algerian publication 
entitled “Western Sahara: a people in struggle” illustrates how representations of the Sahrawi as 
a people took form through the exodus of forced displacement: 
From the moment Morocco entered the war and later Mauritania, massacres and 
torture accompanied each village occupation initiating a mass exodus to the zones 
controlled by the Polisario Front. In a few days time, the Sahraoui people became 
a nation of refugees.506 
If the martyred figure of the nationalist hero El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid continues to personify the 
negation of Sahrawi national liberation (Chapter 1), then Sahrawi nationalism in its realized form 
emerged through the figure of the refugee – or, collectively, as “a nation of refugees.”507  
 In this way, Sahrawi national liberation militants, not unlike their Kadihin compatriots, 
had “the rug swept out from under their feet.” By this I mean not only that Polisario was 
victimized by Moroccan irredentism and international complicity, which remains as salient and 
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true today as when it took place forty years ago.508 But, also, even as Polisario’s emergence as a 
national liberation movement coincided with a regional constellation of anti-imperial 
movements, it still existed in disjunctive relation to decolonization more generally. Sahrawi 
national liberation as a political project emerged just as human rights eclipsed anticolonial self-
determination as a mobilizing political principle. In this way, decolonization in the Sahara during 
the 1970s remained in disorderly relation to global politics. With a global shift in the politics of 
anticolonialism away from supporting Third World self-determination and toward a global ethic 
of humanitarianism, the bases of support for Third World liberation movements quickly eroded 
just as Sahrawi nationalism emerged.  
Because of the contingencies of Sahrawis’ escape from Moroccan invasion, and Algeria’s 
subsequent support, Sahrawi national liberation has perdured through the convergence of these 
two forms. On the one hand, Morocco’s invasion brought Polisario enduring support from the 
Algerian regime, once celebrated by Amilcar Cabral as the “mecca” for national liberation 
movements.509 Crucially, however, Polisario/SADR has remained intelligible as a political 
project through the space of the refugee camps, and the figure of the refugee. This political 
formation, which relies upon humanitarian aid from a range of multilateral organizations and 
NGOs, is both a space of national liberation and humanitarian politics.  
Parallel to this point, then, is that the refugee camp is simultaneously a space of 
humanitarianism and sovereignty, which builds on Miriam Ticktin’s observation that 
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Elaine Mokhtefi, “Diary,” London Review of Books, June 1, 2017, for an insightful account of Algeria and its 
relationship to the Black Panther Party, in particular, during this time. 
 286 
humanitarianism “allows for the recombination of bare life and political life in new ways, such 
that the political dimension of human life is never lost.”510 Similarly, the Sahrawi refugee camps 
combined national self-determination with humanitarianism in concurrence with the demise of 
Third Worldism as a political project. Not simply an anomaly, however, the Sahrawi refugee 
camps might be considered within a spectrum of postcolonial political formations, each of which 
may be distinguished by varying degrees of compromised sovereignty. Or, returning to Robert 
Jackson’s formulation, as “consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic foundations – 
like separate buildings – but of territorial jurisdictions (supported from above) by international 
law and material aid – a kind of international safety net.”511 In this sense, the Sahrawi refugee 
camps appear much less as spaces of exception, than representative of the tensions of autonomy 
and dependence inherent in post-World War II political formations, more generally. 
Framing depictions of the Sahrawi refugee camps in this way is not meant to justify 
Morocco’s violent invasion, nor to explain Sahrawi national liberation in terms of “success” or 
“failure.” Rather, this demonstrates, again, the “nonsynchronism” of decolonization in the Sahara 
through the disjunctive temporal relation between Sahrawi nationalism and shifting global 
politics of the 1970s. While too many studies of the Western Sahara conflict have uncriticially 
celebrated these camps as a space of experimentation, organization, women’s liberation, and 
autonomy, their emergence and durability are also effects of 1970s shifts in the global space-time 
of decolonization and postcolonial sovereignty. In this manner the words of Elsa Assidon, sister 
of the Moroccan leftist Sion Assidon, are particularly prescient. Writing in 1978, while the war 
between Morocco, Mauritania and Polisario was raging (and while her brother was in Moroccan 
jail), Elsa Assidon suggested that Polisario’s reliance on Algeria and humanitarian aid left the 
                                                
510 Miriam Ticktin, “Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The Violence of Humanitarianism in France,” American 
Ethnologist 33, no. 1 (2006): 36. 
511 Jackson, Quasi-States, 5. 
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movement with very little autonomy, given that international solidarity was increasingly 
mobilized by an ethic of humanitarianism, rather than Third World liberation: 
This aid only leaves a narrow margin of autonomy to the Polisario Front relative 
to the Algerian regime and one no longer clearly sees which strategy the Sahrawis 
have given themselves on this point, besides constant efforts to capitalize on 
international solidarity in their favor beyond the Algerian wake and the political 
work of ‘consciencization’ undertaken in the camps.512 
 
Nearly four decades later, Sahrawi political autonomy remains dependent in much the same way. 
The role of human rights, however, has changed significantly and will be the subject of Chapter 
5 of this dissertation. 
  
                                                
512 Assidon, Sahara occidental, un enjeu pour le Nord-Ouest africain, 75. 
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Chapter 5 – Human Rights in Conflict: The Figure of the Huquqi in Western Sahara 
On February 16, 2017, the Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute at Hunter College convened 
an event entitled “Watching Western Sahara: Human Rights and Press Freedom in the Last 
Colony in Africa.” The panel featured several experts on human rights in Western Sahara, 
including Mohamed Ali Arkoukou, President of the Sahrawi Association in the USA; Katlyn 
Thomas, a former high ranking member of UN-led efforts to hold a referendum in the 1990s; 
Sandra Lynn Babcock, a scholar of international law; Eric Goldstein, the deputy director of the 
Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch; and Madeleine Bair, manager of 
WITNESS Media Lab’s Western Sahara project. The presenters addressed ongoing Moroccan 
violations of human rights in Western Sahara, situating these violations within the history of 
conflict between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists that dates back to 1975. Although the official 
Moroccan state perspective was not represented on the panel, several members in the audience of 
50 or 60 spent the time throughout the panel busily typing into their phones and conferring with 
one another in Moroccan Colloquial Arabic, or darija, as the presentations unfolded. It did not 
seem far-fetched to think that they were keeping their embassy, if not officials back in Morocco, 
apprised of what was being said. Even as it informed a mostly foreign audience in New York 
about human rights abuses in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, the panel itself was part of 
the political terrain – constituted by human rights, diplomacy, and publicity – which has become 
the focal point of struggle between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists since a ceasefire in 1991 
ended armed conflict. 
As the event’s title promised, the panel discussion included the presentation of 
eyewitness footage shot from Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. The footage depicted scenes 
of Moroccan security forces in action. Certain clips showed plainclothes members of Moroccan 
 289 
security forces disrupting street protests, sometimes kicking and dragging protesters as 
uniformed police looked on, while the protesters screamed and shouted. The police, sometimes 
helmeted in riot gear, other times indistinguishable from civilians in their clothing, were also 
shown breaking and entering homes. The footage was usually shot from above, apparently from 
the window or rooftop of a neighboring building across the street from where the confrontation 
was taking place. When the footage became wobbly or abruptly cut off, one understood that the 
videographer risked becoming interpellated as a target of the same kinds of raids and 
interventions that they were depicting. 
Madeleine Bair contextualized these videos by noting that Morocco continues to block 
freedom of expression in the territory of Western Sahara that it controls. Notably, Morocco 
restricts the entry of journalists to the territory, frequently expelling those whom it deems 
politically sympathetic to Sahrawi nationalists and Polisario/SADR.513 Forced to contend with a 
media blackout, the videos attest to the fact that Sahrawis have taken matters into their own 
hands, forming media activist teams and documenting human rights violations of political 
expression by uploading this footage to the internet. An English-speaking Sahrawi I met during 
fieldwork described their role as “citizen media, digital militant, cyberactivists.”514 During 
fieldwork in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, they were typically referred to, neutrally, as 
huquqi (“human rights activist”), or, supportively, as munadil (“militant”). As Managing Editor 
of the recently formed website, “Watching Western Sahara,” Bair noted in her talk that, although 
these videos were readily available online and continued to grow in number over the last several 
years, they remained largely unseen. The purpose of “Watching Western Sahara,” Bair said, is to 
                                                
513 Bair reported that 85 foreign journalists were arbitrarily expelled in 2016. See also “Morocco Continues the 
Arbitrary Expulsion of International Observers from Western Sahara.” The number expelled during 2014, according 
to fieldnotes recorded during the month of December, reached into the 60s.  
514 Footnote November 4, 2014. Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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“curate and contextualize videos to make them more accessible.” She went on to screen an edited 
series of clips showing protests interspersed with interviews with activists. Following the video, 
Bair characterized the situation in Western Sahara as one that suffers from a lack of visibility and 
said that the purpose of making the videos available is for outsiders to “witness what [Sahrawis] 
witness." In curating these videos in order to facilitate the “witnessing” of human rights 
violations in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Bair emphasized the lack of visibility several 
times in her presentation, raising the rhetorical question, “Why is [Western Sahara] invisible?”515 
 Bair’s presentation at the 2017 event “Watching Western Sahara” touches on several 
well-known aspects of human rights. The suggestion that footage documenting police violence 
allows viewers to “witness what [Sahrawis] witness” relies upon a presentational trope through 
which human rights violations are meant to draw attention, generate empathy, and translate to 
political action transnationally. It has long been noted that human rights are made meaningful as 
a moral discourse through the trope of witnessing, and the testimonial has become the standard 
genre through which the documentation of human rights violations are typically communicated. 
In providing a first-hand account, the testimonial is meant to both document human rights 
violations and elicit empathy in a witnessing public audience. As a means of political 
communication, the testimonial as genre rests upon the hope or expectation that a receptive 
public, in witnessing the testimonial, effectively takes note of the violation and is moved to 
respond. Regardless of form, whether as written report, or video clip, the framing of human 
rights in this manner mediates between the fact of the violation, and the construction of an 
audience whose reception makes the fact of the violation morally meaningful and politically 
significant. As Meg McLagan notes, “[i]t is in this sense that a transnational ‘witnessing public’ 
                                                
515 Fieldnote, February 16, 2017, New York, NY. 
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around human rights trauma is constituted through testimony (McLagan 2003).”516 
McLagan also notes that the expansiveness of human rights as a moral and political 
project can lead to tensions between the realist conventions of documentation, the enframing 
devices used to convey testimony, and the acts that constitute human rights violations. For 
example, the widespread effects of militarized occupation may well be apparent to anyone who 
visits Laâyoune/El Aaiún, but if the security forces are trained to avoid and minimize violent 
confrontations as much as possible, then these events must be provoked in order to be classified 
as a human rights violation. As testified by the growing archive of documented abuses compiled 
by Watching Western Sahara and others, activists in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara do not 
seem to have much difficulty in producing material.517 Efforts by the state to prevent the 
recording of the violent breakup of protests, for example, have not succeeded, although these 
efforts have escalated the risks involved for those activists who attempt to document these 
events, as will be discussed later in this chapter. As perhaps an added layer of complication, the 
work performed by the WITNESS Media Lab’s website “Watching Western Sahara” in 
organizing, archiving, curating and contextualizing already-produced videos foregrounds how 
the mediating infrastructure of the internet must also be harnessed in order to make these videos 
– and, by extension, the conflict – accessible for a human rights audience. In these ways, 
Madeleine Bair’s presentation at the “Watching Western Sahara” event in New York City drew 
attention to the problems of publicity and audience in the documentation of human rights 
                                                
516 Meg McLagan, “Human Rights, Testimony, and Transnational Publicity,” The Scholar and Feminist Online 2, 
no. 1 (Summer 2003), www.bernard.edu/sfonline; Meg McLagan, “Principles, Publicity, and Politics: Notes on 
Human Rights Media,” American Anthropologist 105, no. 3 (2003): 605–12; Meg McLagan, “Introduction: Making 
Human Rights Claims Public,” American Anthropologist 108, no. 1 (2006): 191–220. 
517 WITNESS’s “Watching Western Sahara” website compiled protest videos from April 2016 to April 2017: 
https://lab.witness.org/projects/citizen-video-in-western-sahara/. It does not appear to have been updated since. 
Another example, recorded by Norwegian activists traveling in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in 2015, 
documents rock throwing between Moroccan security forces and Sahrawi activists: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zFU2wgCfnWI. 
 292 
violations. 
While the “Watching Western Sahara” event at Roosevelt House in New York City 
suggests that the plight of the Sahrawi national cause suffers from a lack of visibility 
internationally, within the field of conflict in Western Sahara, human rights are everywhere. This 
chapter will trace the emergence of human rights discourse as a political terrain, its more recent 
proliferation in this field of conflict and, in particular, the broader effects of human rights 
operating in close relation to publicity. From New York City to Geneva to Marrakesh to the 
Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria and, of course, back to Laâyoune/El Aaiún in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara, human rights have become a major focus in the ongoing conflict. And 
although this discourse may have displaced armed conflict and national self-determination as the 
primary terrain upon which the political future of Western Sahara is waged in the present, the 
discourse remains embedded in the broader conflict’s ultimate aims. 
*** 
This chapter will situate the emergence of human rights as a political terrain in Western 
Sahara since the end to armed conflict between Morocco and Polisario in 1991, giving particular 
attention to the period of 2014-17, when the use of human rights as a tactic in the conflict 
escalated. In doing so, I will be focusing specifically on the struggle to document and publicize 
human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. While human rights violations 
committed by Polisario/SADR in its governance of the refugee camps have also been 
documented, these largely took place before the 1991 ceasefire, and the grievances associated 
with these violations come largely from ‘a’idin, who were discussed at length in Chapter 2.518 
                                                
518 (AI) Amnesty International, “Human Rights Violations in the Western Sahara,” 1996, AI Index MDE 29/04/96. 
New York: AI, Apr. 18; Nicola Cozza, Singing like Wood-Birds: Refugee Camps and Exile in the Construction of 
the Saharawi Nation, Ph.D. diss., (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2004), 301–3; Martyrdom and Suffering of the 
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Nor will this chapter be addressing the hundreds of Sahrawis whose disappearances under 
Moroccan occupation remain unaccounted for.519 Instead, I will focus on the struggle over the 
production, documentation and publicity of human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied 
Western Sahara which, in contrast to the violations alleged to have taken place in refugee camps, 
have become increasingly pivotal to the broader conflict over the past decade. Specifically, the 
discourse and practice of human rights revolves around the documentation of human rights 
violations in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara as a means of drawing attention to the 
illegitimacy of Morocco’s rule there. Struggles over documenting and publicizing these 
violations have only intensified since Polisario/SADR initiated an effort to broaden the mandate 
for the UN peacekeeping body in Western Sahara, MINURSO, to include human rights 
monitoring. Debated annually each spring during the UN Security Council’s renewal of 
MINURSO’s mandate, Morocco has – successfully, thus far – fought this initiative tooth and 
nail.520 
In discussing human rights in this chapter, then, I am focusing almost exclusively on 
human rights activism – often called human rights discourse – rather than law.521 This is because 
human rights law, whether seen as emanating from United Nations covenants such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or from the Moroccan National Human Rights Council 
(CNDH), have little bearing under Morocco’s militarized rule in Western Sahara. In this respect, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Moroccan Prisoners and Confined Persons within the Tindouf Region in the South of Algeria/Mehna Wa Mu‘anat 
Al-Muhtajizin Wa Al-Sujana’ Al-Maghariba Bi Al-Mintaqa Tinduf Janub Al-Jaza’ir, n.d. 
519 AFAPREDESA, a Sahrawi civil society organization based in the refugee camps, tracks these cases. The 
numbers are cited in Chapter 1. 
520 The initiative seemingly reached a fever pitch from 2013 to 2015, but Morocco successfully outmaneuvered the 
proposals each time. In 2013, after the US State Department recommended the incorporation of human rights 
monitoring to MINURSO’s mandate, Morocco canceled joint military maneuvers with US armed forces. This 
culminated in a march on May 4, 2013 when the main avenue of Laâyoune/El Aaiún filled with thousands of 
protesters. Loveday Morris, “In Western Sahara, Women Play Large Role in Forgotten Struggle for Independence,” 
Washington Post, July 7, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-western-sahara-women-play-large-
role-in-forgotten-struggle-for-independence/2013/07/07/f46f23ec-dd06-11e2-85de-c03ca84cb4ef_story.html. 
521 Jennifer Curtis, Human Rights as War by Other Means: Peace Politics in Northern Ireland (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 15. 
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Madeleine Bair’s talk at Hunter College reveals a particularly prominent dimension of human 
rights activism in Western Sahara: the need for publicity and audience. At the same time, the 
publicity requires not only an audience, but also a subject. The mobilization involved in 
documenting human rights violations has generated a new figure populating the landscape of 
political conflict in Western Sahara: the huquqi, or human rights activist. The huquqi (pl. 
huquqiyyin), is a subject position that has emerged from the shifting terrain of conflict in 
Western Sahara following the ceasefire in 1991, and has subsequently proliferated since the 
Sahrawi intifada began in 2005. As this chapter will explore, the subject position of huquqi takes 
on particular features from different locations across the transnational networks that make human 
rights activism about Western Sahara possible, both inside and outside the territory. Since human 
rights remain subsumed within the field of nationalist conflict, huquqiyyin are subject to 
manipulation by the exigencies of Moroccan state security, and the particular political rationality 
of national-humanitarian sovereignty in the Sahrawi refugee camps. In this way, I suggest that 
the figure of the huquqi is particularly revealing of how human rights have emerged and shifted 
across time and space in the Western Sahara conflict. 
The label “huquqi” requires some clarification, in particular because of its expansive use 
in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. The term derives from “al-haq” in Arabic, meaning 
“right.” “Al-haq” can refer to “right” in both its formal, legal sense (to have a right to something) 
as well as its moral sense (to be correct, or “in the right”). In Western Sahara, huquqi refers to 
anyone involved with a human rights-based NGO, including organizations working in fields 
(such as disability rights, rights of migrants, etc) unrelated to the politics of the dispute. As we 
will see in Marrakesh, huquqiyyin from the Sahara involved with state-sanctioned human rights 
associations working across a range of fields attended the World Human Rights Forum in large 
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numbers. However, in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, huquqiyyin also, and increasingly, 
refers to anyone involved in activism around the politics of the dispute. This includes activists 
for some of the highest-profile human rights organizations sympathetic to Sahrawi nationalism, 
such as CODESA, a collective of Sahrawi human rights defenders and ASVDH, Sahrawi 
Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State. 
Members of these organizations are the quintessential huquqiyyin in Western Sahara, in that they 
are human rights activists involved in leveraging transnational connections to organize around 
the right to political expression in Moroccan-occupied territory. In this respect, the huquqi is at 
least somewhat distinct from the munadil, or militant, who is associated more with “on the 
ground” activism in the streets of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In practice, however, I found that any 
Sahrawi engaged in activism around the dispute was labeled huquqi, whether involved as a 
media activist, participating in demonstrations, or working with a formal organization. And, 
finally, a pro-Moroccan human rights worker would be known as a huquqi, as well, reflecting the 
universal, non-partisan terrain of human rights discourse. In this sense, huquqi refers to both 
NGO employees working in the “human rights industry,” to use Lori Allen’s term, and activists 
engaged in political activity surrounding Western Sahara.522 In tracing the proliferation of the 
figure of the huquqi throughout this chapter, I will be using the term as I heard it used during 
fieldwork, in all of its expansiveness. 
This chapter will first provide an historical overview of the formation of human rights as 
a political terrain in Western Sahara: its emergence following the UN-brokered ceasefire 
                                                
522 Allen, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights, 4. Allen distinguishes between human rights principles, and the 
human rights industry. Of the latter, she writes, “the term human rights industry (or regime, system, or structure) 
refers to the material and financial infrastructure that buttresses human rights work (see also Goodale 2009: 97; 
Sewell 1996: 842). Broadly, it is the complex of activities and institutions that function under the label human rights, 
including the professionals who work within those organizations, the formulas they have learned in order to write 
reports and grant applications, and the funding streams that this industry generates and depends on.” Italics in the 
original. 
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between Morocco and Polisario in 1991, its renewal with the first Sahrawi intifada in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara in 2005, and its proliferation with recent efforts to expand the 
peacekeeping mandate of MINURSO to include human rights monitoring after 2011. This 
historical overview will also serve to trace shifts in the figure of the huquqi, as well as certain 
defining features that have characterized human rights discourse over time in the context of 
Western Sahara. First and foremost, human rights have developed as an instrument, or tactic, in a 
broader conflict where the primary aim remains sovereignty and self-determination. Regardless 
of the increased prominence of human rights in Western Sahara, the discourse remains embedded 
in a struggle over sovereignty and self-determination. Huquqiyyin themselves recognize and 
embrace the reality that human rights are subsumed by, and do not transcend, the political field. 
In this sense, conceptions of human rights as an “ethical theory in social practice,” or as a moral 
initiative existing in tension with the instrumentality of politics, are not terribly applicable to this 
context.523 Nor, however, can human rights be characterized as a depoliticizing discourse – the 
escalation of human rights-inspired protests in Laâyoune/El Aaiún between 2011 and 2015 
attests to the role of human rights activism in amplifying, rather than displacing, the locus of 
conflict.524 
Nonetheless, human rights as an instrument of political conflict in Western Sahara 
highlights a number of features of human rights discourse derived from a number of other 
ethnographic contexts. As in many other situations, human rights in Western Sahara have 
emerged through the development of and reliance upon transnational networks, while human 
rights activism involves a process of the “vernacularization” of universal rights concepts into 
                                                
523 Mark Goodale, Surrendering to Utopia an Anthropology of Human Rights (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 2009); Stephen Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
524 Harri Englund, Prisoners of Freedom: Human Rights and the African Poor (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2006). 
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particular contexts.525 Oral histories and interviews with activists in Moroccan-occupied Western 
Sahara confirm these insights, revealing a process of sensitization and “conscientization” to 
human rights language and practice – most notably in the form of non-violent civil disobedience, 
as well as an appreciation for transnational support as a bulwark against Moroccan oppression. In 
understanding how the “vernacularization” of human rights has played out in the context of 
Western Sahara, the insights from two anthropological studies of human rights practice 
conducted in the context of longstanding political conflict are especially salient. The first insight 
comes from Jennifer Curtis and her characterization of human rights as “war by other means.” In 
the context of Northern Ireland, Curtis notes that “[r]ather than transforming divisions, human 
rights discourse has helped reproduce them,”526 in ways that have the potential to create new 
instabilities in the peace process there. Whereas human rights activism in certain contexts may 
be seen to produce or reflect an emergent ethical subjectivity, in Western Sahara the discourse 
remains bound to the friend/enemy distinction that structures nationalist conflict. The second 
insight comes from Lori Allen’s study of human rights activism in Palestine, and her focus on 
the cynicism that developed as human rights practice became decoupled from the political goals 
of Palestinian nationalism.527 Borrowing from McLagan, Curtis and Allen, this chapter will pay 
                                                
525 Sally Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 2; Goodale, Surrendering to Utopia an Anthropology of Human Rights; 
Winifred Tate, Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in Colombia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007). Merry’s influential concept in the anthropology of human rights, claims that 
human rights concepts only work through processes of translation, or “vernacularization”: “…global law is 
translated into the vernacular, highlighting the role of activists who serve as intermediaries between different sets of 
cultural understandings of gender, violence, and justice.” Tate’s account suggests an inverse dynamic of 
“professionalization,” through which the documentation of human rights abuses get tailored to meet the narrative 
demands of transnational human rights organizations.   
526 Curtis, Human Rights as War by Other Means, 22. Curtis explains at greater length: “The combination of 
consociational institutions and collective rights politics has not transformed Northern Ireland’s ethnopolitics. 
Instead, post-conflict rights discourse extended its function as war by other means. The incorporation of human 
rights discourse into the peace process and the minimal peace being promoted produce other vulnerabilities. These 
contribute not just to present divisions but to the broader contradictions that both human rights law and discourse 
create regarding past and future violence.” (Curtis, 25) 
527 Allen, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights. 
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particular attention to human rights as a political terrain defined in part by its relation to 
publicity, conflict, and cynicism. 
 This will be explored through several ethnographic scenes that demonstrate the regional 
and transnational dynamics of human rights discourse concerning Western Sahara. From New 
York City, we will move to Marrakesh, Morocco. There, I describe the disorientation that 
accompanied my efforts to make sense of human rights activism amidst the spectacle of Morocco 
hosting the 2014 World Human Rights Forum. The second scene takes place in the Sahrawi 
refugee camps in Algeria, the hub for publicizing human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied 
territory, both regionally and transnationally. These efforts guarantee that human rights publicity 
is mediated by Polisario/SADR’s “state feminism,”528 and by the particular political rationality 
of humanitarian-nationalism in the refugee camps. And, finally, the chapter concludes by 
describing encounters with huquqiyyin in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in Moroccan-occupied territory. 
Recounting the challenges that accompanied these meetings, I discuss how huquqiyyin engender 
both tremendous admiration and cynicism, connecting these contrasting responses to the notion 
of “plural vernacularization” articulated by Daniel Goldstein.529 This will, finally, leave us where 
the dissertation started: situating human rights activism within the layered history of 
decolonization across the disaggregated political formations of western Sahara. 
 
Section I  - A Brief History of the Emergence, Deployment and Proliferation of Human 
Rights in Western Sahara, in Three Stages 
 
A. 1991-2005: Emergence, Conscientization 
                                                
528 Laura Bier, Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser’s Egypt (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2011). 
529 Daniel M. Goldstein, “Whose Vernacular? Translating Human Rights in Local Contexts,” in Human Rights at the 
Crossroads, ed. Mark Goodale (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 120. For Goldstein, the fact that human 
rights discourse can be taken up by competing parties (in his case, both disenfranchised urban residents and the 
police in Bolivia), “indicates the ways in which the production of local vernaculars - in the plural - emanate from 
different sources with different, sometimes competing, sets of agendas, resulting in a vernacular plurality that is 
highly contested and strained.”  
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Concerns about human rights violations immediately followed from Morocco’s invasion 
and annexation of Western Sahara, with journalists and academics reporting on the 
disappearances of hundreds of Sahrawis living under, or attempting to escape from, Moroccan 
occupation.530 While the armed conflict between Morocco and Polisario reached a stalemate by 
1984, the war continued to structure the political landscape throughout the 1980s.531 While 
Polisario/SADR began welcoming journalists to the refugee camps to establish international 
support and humanitarian connections, and to promote its viability as a governing entity, 
Moroccan-occupied Sahara remained largely sealed off. Teresa Smith’s account from 1987 
provides one of the few windows into the conditions in Laâyoune/El Aaiún during wartime. 
Relying upon reports from the European Parliament and the SADR-run Sahrawi Red Crescent, 
Smith reported that “[t]he secret police maintain an eminent watch over the city,” and that 
“Moroccan authorities directed a powerful campaign of terror against the Sahrawi people during 
the autumn of 1987. This occurred prior to and during the visit of a United Nations team to the 
territory of Western Sahara.”532 A number of interlocutors referred to the period of war as a time 
of complete militarization. One man from Smara, the city in Moroccan-occupied territory closest 
to the Sahrawi refugee camps, recounted how Moroccan soldiers, serving as his schoolteachers, 
brought their arms with them into the classroom.533 A younger man remembered that, growing 
up, his parents scrupulously avoided political references of any kind – including, and most 
importantly, listening to SADR radio broadcasts from the refugee camps – save for the occasions 
when the family was spending time in the badiya, safely distanced from urban-based, state 
                                                
530 Teresa K. Smith, “Africa Rights Monitor,” 62. Smith wrote that between 1975 and 1980 "it is highly likely that 
several thousand Sahrawi civilians died at Oum Dreiga, Tifariti, Guelta Zemmour, nad Gleibat el Fula." Hultman, 
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531 Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 1st ed. 
(Syracuse  N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 3–29. 
532 Smith, “Africa Rights Monitor,” 63, 68. WSC/16. 
533 Fieldnote, November 7, 2014, Smara, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara 
 300 
security surveillance. Several younger activists mentioned how the disappearances and pervasive 
surveillance during this period instilled a deep fear in their parents. In turn, several reported that 
their parents, out of a sense of self-preservation, avoided discussing the history of the conflict, or 
Sahrawi nationalism, in the hopes of discouraging them from political activity of any kind.534 
 With the war having stalemated to Polisario’s disadvantage, the period from 1988 to 1991 
saw a transition away from armed conflict. In 1988, major uprisings in the refugee camps against 
the impunity of SADR’s rule there led to the first defections of Sahrawis leaving the refugee 
camps. From these defections emerged the figure of the ‘a’id, or “returnee,” the subject of 
Chapter 2. For the first time since 1975, this established movement and communication between 
the refugee camps and Moroccan-occupied territory. The UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991 
between Morocco and Polisario also included agreements for the release of political prisoners. 
Hundreds of civilian Sahrawis who had been “forcibly disappeared” in the southern Moroccan 
prisons of M’gouna and Agdz were released, many of them returning to live in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara. Unsurprisingly, their place in society was at first unsettled. One of the 
formerly “disappeared” [mukhtatef] Sahrawis described the disorientation that followed when he 
was released along with two other fellow prisoners: 
We three, we were in the same group but after we went out in the street, in reality 
not much changed, because what shocked and surprised us after spending between 
4 and 16 years [in prison] - the problem that we faced was that the State [al-sulta] 
wanted to make the blame fall on “the others” [i.e. us],…so that they would be 
afraid of [us], and [decide it was] better not to deal with us…And, [so we were] 
incapable of la intégration in a natural/ordinary way, because people were 
ostracized [menbudhin] within the society.535 
 
The Moroccan state tried to determine the path of re-entry for those Sahrawi civilians detained 
and disappeared during the war. And while this account observed that “not much changed,” by 
                                                
534 Fieldnotes, July 31, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara; November 26, 2014, Rabat, 
Morocco 
535 Interview, December 5, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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the early 1990s the social dynamics in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara were undergoing 
tremendous transformation after fifteen years of full-scale militarization and isolation. 
 Along with ending armed conflict, the UN-brokered ceasefire agreement had established 
a peacekeeping agency, MINURSO, tasked with holding a referendum on self-determination. 
While expectations at first were to hold the referendum within a year or two, disputes between 
Morocco and Polisario/SADR over determining the list of eligible of voters led to protracted 
negotiations and delays. As the two parties continued to contest the criteria for establishing a 
voter roll, the logistics of screening potential voters became increasingly contentious and time-
consuming.536 Delays to the referendum worked in Morocco’s favor, as the state could now 
invest in the territory, and it moved quickly to resettle large numbers of Moroccans from the 
interior of the country to the cities of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Dakhla, Boujdour and Smara. As 
described in Chapter 1, many of those resettled had no prior connection to the territory, save for 
sizable contingents of Sahrawis who resettled to Western Sahara from the southern Moroccan 
region of Wed Nun. In addition to transforming the demographics, cities and regional economy, 
the influx of new “settlers” 537 to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara also generated new, 
sometimes unanticipated dynamics between longtime residents and the new transplants. In the 
years following the UN-brokered ceasefire, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara underwent 
tremendous changes, with state investments, an influx of new residents, the re-entry of Sahrawi 
civilian prisoners detained throughout the war, and the establishment of new lines of connectivity 
between the camps and the rest of the territory. Amidst these changes, Sahrawi nationalists found 
new space for protest, but the idiom of human rights was not immediately apparent. Rather, the 
                                                
536 Jensen, Western Sahara; Charles Dunbar, “Saharan Stasis: Status and Prospects in the Western Sahara,” The 
Middle East Journal. 54, no. 4 (2000): 522. 
537 I use “settlers” in quotations because it was not a term used by my interlocutors. By contrast, see Mundy, 
“Moroccan Settlers in Western Sahara.” 
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referendum was the locus of conflict. 
 According to an interview with a former political prisoner, the first Sahrawi human rights 
organization formed in 1994 under the name The Committee for the Coordination of the Forum 
on Sahrawis, only at that time “There was no awareness of human rights, we didn’t know 
anything…We didn’t know law, we didn’t know the potential, I mean at all…At that time it had 
been two and a half years since we had been let out of prison.”538 Nonetheless, the formation of 
the group occurred contemporaneously with the stirrings of a human rights movement across 
Morocco. Spurred by a reckoning with the repressive “years of lead” under King Hassan II – 
which largely overlapped with the years of war in the Sahara – a nascent human rights movement 
emerged in Morocco during the 1990s.539 This movement, through the demands of human rights 
organizations in Morocco, was augmented by a public sphere captivated by the published 
memoirs of Moroccan former political prisoners (primarily leftists, or relatives of members of 
the military that carried out coup attempts in the early 1970s). The coronation of the new King 
Mohamed VI in 1999 gave further impetus to redress the injustices of the past decades through 
some form of restorative justice. This galvanized human rights organizations across Morocco as 
well as Sahrawis who, according to one activist, joined the movement for restorative justice “in 
numbers.” In 1998, a group of Sahrawi former political prisoners went to Rabat. At a time when 
phone calls from the Sahara to “inside” Morocco were still routed through state security services 
[al-’ajhiza], this marked a renewed point of connectivity that dissolved some of Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara’s isolation:  
due to ignorance or a lack of understanding, we decided to participate in 
everything that had to do with human rights, regardless of [it being] Moroccan, 
foreign. Meaning, every protest having to do with human rights, we’ll go there 
                                                
538 Interview, December 5, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
539 Susan Slyomovics, The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2005). 
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and spread our issue. We’ll spread our issue, and we’ll benefit from getting closer 
to others. Following some months – not many – we began establishing 
relationships – Amnesty International comes to mind, but we must also mention 
and thank a bunch of Moroccan activists who helped us.540 
In a trajectory that bears remarkable parallels to the early 1970s (Chapter 4), this first group of 
activists circulated through Rabat and Casablanca at a time of social and political ferment in 
Morocco. As in the early 1970s, people living in Western Sahara were emerging from a period of 
socio-political isolation and disconnection. And, as in the early 1970s, Sahrawi activists emerged 
from this isolation by negotiating with members of Moroccan political parties and civil society – 
particularly on the left – for support over the future of both Morocco and the Western Sahara. 
 It would be reductive to view this reconnection between Sahrawi political activists and 
Moroccan civil society simply as a matter of political bargaining, however. As one activist 
pointed out, these interactions during 1998 and 99 introduced Sahrawi activists to the lexicon of 
human rights talk and reconfigured their own sense of political subjectivity as activists: 
…the other principle thing, was greater familiarization, as some of the 
terminology took root [tarsikh]: the matter of “Western Sahara,” and “forced 
disappearance” and “torture” and “killing outside of legal convention”: all of that 
terminology, for us, was new. It was new, and it was necessary to use it for its 
efficacy. It was effective with respect to a bunch of assistance, effective because it 
intensified the Sahrawi victimization. We didn’t [even] know that we were 
victims. When someone pointed out that here was a group of people, they would –  
 imagine, when you say “You’re a victim,” [a Sahrawi activist] would say to you, 
“No, I’m a militant and committed,” they’d say to you, “No, fine, you’re a 
committed activist, but by law, and by these specifications [tawssifat] and the 
conditions that you [get] from them, these are crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, these are considered such-and-such.541 
 
In this sense, during the late 1990s the “disappeared” began to adopt the idiom of human rights 
discourse. This “familiarization,” or “conscientization” occurred through the re-connection with 
Moroccan civil society at a moment when human rights discourse was on the rise. 
                                                
540 Interview, December 5, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
541 Interview, December 5, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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While Sahrawi human rights activists were familiarizing themselves with human rights 
discourse and establishing “transnational” connections with human rights organizations in Rabat, 
and beyond, the phenomenon of human rights remained confined to a small vanguard in the 
context of the Sahara. Moreover, while the push for restorative justice resonated with former 
political prisoners, rapid urbanization was transforming the demographics, built environment, 
and local economy on the ground in Moroccan-occupied territory. Tremendous investment and 
immigration to the territory had transformed the cities of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
Entire neighborhoods – some so quickly formed, they were comprised of tents – doubled and 
tripled the size of these cities. Moreover, the dispute over voter eligibility for the referendum 
showed few signs of resolution after Morocco continued to contest the results of a laborious 
vetting process. In this context, restorative justice did not necessarily mobilize Sahrawis 
experiencing frustration with the political and socioeconomic context of the late 1990s. In 1999, 
Sahrawis motivated by socioeconomic marginalization organized a large sit-in in a central plaza 
of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Sahat Dcheira (“City Place”).542 Though not explicitly concerned with 
either human rights or self-determination, the very act of public protest was a landmark event 
given the history of military rule in the Sahara, and Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in particular. Moreover, 
the form of the 1999 protest – a sit-in – has enabled it to be retrospectively incorporated by 
human rights activists into a longer history of non-violent resistance in the Sahara.543  
As frustration in the territory rose with a sense of social marginalization and a constantly 
deferred referendum, former political prisoners became increasingly disillusioned with the 
Moroccan state-led initiative to build on human rights movements and compensate victims from 
Morocco’s “years of lead.” While a number of former prisoners were offered material 
                                                
542 Interview, December 26, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. “The sit-in was, 
honestly, at its root social. A group of unemployed from the region protesting their daily marginalization.” 
543 Fieldnote, October 23, 2014, Agadir, Morocco. 
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compensation for having been political prisoners, many saw this as the Moroccan state’s effort to 
buy out their calls for justice. Indeed, according to one account, several of the most prominent 
current-day Sahrawi human rights activists, including Aminatou Haidar, Ali Salim Tamek, and 
Ibrahim Dehan, participated with committees involved with the process of restorative justice that 
culminated in the formation of Morocco’s Truth and Reconciliation Forum (IER) in 2004.544 By 
this time, the referendum had been all but abandoned. On May 7, 2005, the initial cadre of 
activists educated in human rights in the late-90s formalized their association under the name 
ASVDH.545 ASVDH announced its presence at a conference convened under the title “Response 
to the Forum of Equity and Reconciliation: No Equity without Truth, No Reconciliation without 
Comprehensive Solution.”546 The conference title referred to the state-led IER’s attempts to 
compensate Sahrawi political prisoners without investigating the hundreds of disappeared 
civilians during the war, on the one hand, while attempting to impose a resolution to past 
injustices without addressing Sahrawi demands for self-determination, on the other. From this 
point, the activists’ familiarization with human rights discourse enabled them to deploy human 
rights as a tactic in the broader struggle over Western Saharan self-determination. 
 
B. 2005-2010: Deployment 
 
In 2005, with the collapse of negotiations between Morocco and Polisario/SADR over a peace 
                                                
544 According to Zunes and Mundy, the Sahara branch of the Truth and Reconciliation Forum, in which the 
aforementioned human rights activists participated, was the only Sahrawi human rights organization recognized by 
the Moroccan state at the time in 2003. Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 160. IER: L’instance d’équité et 
reconciliation. 
545 ASVDH stands for “Sahrawi Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the 
Moroccan State.” 
546 Interview, December 5, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. ASVDH was not 
formally recognized as an association by the Moroccan state until 2015. Human Rights Watch, “Morocco and 
Western Sahara: 2016 World Report,” Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2016/country-chapters/morocco/western-sahara. 
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settlement and the prospect of holding a referendum long diminished, Sahrawi’s living in 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara launched what became known as an intifada.547 The 
uprising began among youth across the territory under Moroccan control, calling for the removal 
of Moroccan security and intelligence officers from their schools.  
Munadil1: 2005, there was a student movement without any relationship with the 
[Polisario] Front. It was a group of people-  
 
Munadil2: Students. 
 
Munadil3: Students, organized through institutions [i.e., schools]. That was the 
time of [cough], meaning the years of adolescence - from 2005, to be exact, or 
from 2004, to we’ll say 2007. The situation was a little fluid. After the intifada of 
2005, the situation moved from the institutions to – in each institution, you found 
some mobilization. And in each institution, at 12 and 6 in the afternoon, there was 
mobilization. Each time, the number of police increased. Because each institution 
has police. The young people confronted the police after… 
 
Host: The Moroccan state, after the creation of youth, student organizations, they 
monitored them and blockaded the institutions [tehasir]. 
 
Multiple: They blockaded the institutions. 
 
According to Zunes and Mundy, these protests spread throughout Moroccan-occupied Western 
Sahara and into southern Morocco, as well as universities that host large numbers of Sahrawi 
students, in Agadir, Marrakesh, Casablanca, Rabat, and Fes. The protests continued for months, 
with “almost nightly clashes between Sahrawi youths and Moroccan police,” culminating in the 
death in October, 2005 of protester Hamdi Mbarki, since memorialized as a nationalist martyr, at 
the hands of Moroccan security officials.548 
In addition to incorporating a new generation of activists into the experience of political 
struggle, the protests ushered in a more public era of civil disobedience among Sahrawi’s in 
                                                
547 While intifada simply means “uprising” in Arabic, since the term is so closely associated with the Palestinian 
uprisings against Israeli occupation in 1987-91, and 2000-05, this appears to be one of many instances in which 
Sahrawis have drawn upon both the tactics and symbolism of the Palestinian struggle. (Another example: the 
Western Sahara national flag closely resembles the Palestinian national flag.) 
548 Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 154–56. 
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Western Sahara, making the role of human rights much more prominent within the framework of 
the conflict. While human rights activists had been gathering and forming committees since the 
armed conflict between Morocco and Polisario ended in the early 1990s, the focus on human 
rights had been, as described above, on restorative justice. Meanwhile the center for Sahrawi 
nationalist action in its visible form – military or otherwise – had until 2005 been the refugee 
camps. In this sense, the intifada of 2005 represented a new phase in the role of human rights in 
Western Sahara now used as a tactic, or instrument, in the broader struggle for self-determination. 
Looking back on the changes since 2000, one activist noted: 
Huquqi: The subject of human rights during the last 15 years, has been a pivotal 
[mihwari] subject/matter in the conflict/struggle. Of course, not that each party 
has been defending human rights – that has not been the goal – but [each party] 
was working with it as, how do you say–  
Friend: Instruments? [al-’adat] 
Huquqi:  ...instruments in the struggle.549 
 
Using human rights as a tactic through public, regular protest in cities such as Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, foregrounded the fact that Morocco’s rule operated without popular consent. Additionally, 
the uprising in Moroccan-occupied territory gave expression to Sahrawi nationalist sentiment 
that, once displaced from the refugee camps, was less directly dependent upon Polisario and its 
ties to Algerian security forces and state funding. And, finally, a decade and a half after the 
ceasefire in 1991, the deployment of human rights had effectively re-instantiated conflict 
between Sahrawis and Moroccans. Whereas human rights are sometimes conceptualized as an 
ethical means of transcending the stasis of competing political parties, their use in the 2005 
intifada demonstrates the usefulness of human rights activism for Sahrawi nationalists in 
producing confrontation with the Moroccan state, thereby publicizing the friend/enemy relation 
of the nationalist conflict. In other words, since 2005 human rights has become the means 
                                                
549 Interview, December 5, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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through which Sahrawis make politics visible – to themselves, to their families and compatriots 
in the refugee camps, and to a transnational audience.   
 Certain dynamics of the confrontations produced by human rights activism warrant 
particular attention. The confrontation produced by human rights activism differs from previous 
iterations of conflict in two ways. The first, of course, is that the confrontation occurs between 
state and subject. This asymmetry, however, was not absent from Morocco’s military invasion 
and annexation in 1975-76, when hundreds of civilians were killed and “disappeared.” The 
second, and perhaps more consequential, distinguishing characteristic of human rights as a 
political terrain in conflict is the imperative for treating violence as an object of publicity and 
transparency. Each violation, after all, is meant to be documented. As one longtime activist 
observed, this differs significantly from the history of violence in the 1980s, which an older 
generation, victimized by state violence, generally sought to conceal these conditions from 
younger Sahrawis who did not experience them directly, or were too young to remember: 
For us, during the time when forced disappearances were taking place and all of 
the [other] atrocities that we lived through, once you emerge from them, we don’t 
tell our children about them. And they don’t know anything about that.        
 “Small children who were in school, for example – our generation kept 
quiet about the atrocities, we were participating positively in agreement between – 
because we believed in the future of the unity of the people of a Greater Maghreb. 
And this land must be a land of peace among the people where they could live 
together in peace, connecting people. But now, I believe that with things this will 
be difficult in the future, because the young children, now, when you ask a small 
child, you find that he will talk with a kind of resentment [al-kurahiya] and hatred 
[al-haqd] for Morocco and Moroccans because of what he’s seen in the streets 
and what is done to the children, women and men – but to the women, in 
particular.550 
The rise of human rights activism in Moroccan-occupied Sahara has reflected its utility as a 
                                                
550 Interview, December 5, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied territory. A younger activist’s words  
“When [Moroccan state agents] beat women as in 2005, during the intifadat al-qiyada – I mean, Sahrawis here, for 
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December 26, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied territory. 
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tactic, or instrument, in drawing attention to the Moroccan state’s illegitimacy in the Sahara. As 
one activist put it, the shift with the 2005 intifada allowed activists to “transition from a position 
of defense to a position of attack in terms of human rights.”551 However, the public, 
asymmetrical, and gendered dimensions of the violence produced by human rights activism in 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara have particular ramifications. Embedded in a context of 
political conflict, human rights as a political terrain in Western Sahara has amplified the moral 
repugnance between Sahrawis and Moroccans to a level that concerns even some of the activists 
at the center of this struggle. Jennifer Curtis noted that, in functioning as “war by other means,” 
rights discourse can “contribute not just to present divisions but to the broader contradictions that 
both human rights law and discourse create regarding past and future violence.”552 Although 
Western Sahara differs from the context of Northern Ireland in certain key respects, Curtis’s 
main insight still applies: when functioning as an instrument of confrontation in political 
struggle, human rights activism has the capacity to elicit and exacerbate potential violence in the 
future. 
 
C. 2010-Present: Proliferation 
As efforts to publicize Moroccan detention and abuse of Sahrawi political prisoners grew, 
the role of the videographer in capturing the physical abuse of protesters became all the more 
important and small groups of mostly young men with names such as Intifada May Network, or 
Equipe Media, became increasingly pivotal figures in the terrain of political conflict. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the son in Batimat related a litany of arrests and confrontations with 
police that occurred while filming protests, usually from a nearby rooftop or window. This 
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552 Curtis, Human Rights as War by Other Means, 25. 
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access comes with great danger, however, and the focal role of publicity in making human rights 
violations “count” in the conflict became most apparent following the breakup in 2010 of 
Sahrawi protest encampments in an area outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún known as Agdim Izik. 
After months of protest, Moroccan security forces laid siege to the tent encampment, estimated 
to include 6000 tents and upwards of 10,000 Sahrawis.553 During the siege, carried out the 
morning of 8 November 2010, eleven members of Moroccan security forces, as well as two 
civilians, were killed. In rounding up suspects to bring to trial over these deaths, Morocco 
targeted militants involved in media teams, rather than seeking the perpetrators. The accused 
were tried in military court using confessions that observers claimed were extracted through 
torture, and the group of 25 were given sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment. 
Although this verdict was overturned on appeal in 2016 (trial by military court having become 
illegal in the intervening years with the ratification of a new constitution), in July 2017 the Rabat 
Court of Appeals convicted 23 activists to sentences ranging from two years to life 
imprisonment.554 
The increasingly important and visible role of human rights in the conflict over Western 
Sahara over the last decade can be seen in the proliferation of huquqiyyin, or human rights 
activists, and the discourse around them. Since the intifada of 2005, longtime activists who had 
been operating largely underground have been able to form organizations, the most prominent 
being the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA), and the Sahrawi 
Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations (ASVDH). Operating in Moroccan-
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occupied Western Sahara, these organizations have managed to connect with international 
organizations such as the UN High Commission for Human Rights and members of European 
Parliament, even as Morocco refused to recognize them as human rights organizations.555 In 
forging these connections, which provide important leverage in piercing the media blackout that 
Morocco had managed to maintain through decades of military occupation, these activists have 
increasingly fashioned themselves as human rights activists, or huquqiyyin. When the Moroccan 
authorities refused re-entry to the activist Aminatou Haidar at the airport in Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
in 2009, ostensibly because she refused to declare her nationality as Moroccan, her subsequent 
hunger strike drew international media attention, elevating her profile as a human rights activist, 
and of human rights activism among Sahrawis more generally.556 But with international 
connections and a higher profile for human rights, the surveillance of huquqiyyin in Moroccan-
occupied territory has intensified. 
With this emerging influence, human rights activists and Polisario’s diplomatic corps 
have devoted substantial efforts since 2011 to broadening the mandate of the UN mission in 
Western Sahara, MINURSO, to include human rights oversight.557 Each April, as MINURSO’s 
mandate has come up for renewal before the UN Security Council, protests and repression 
intensify in the Occupied Territory and the focus on human rights reach a fever pitch. In 2013, 
this campaign succeeded in gaining the backing of the US Department of State, which 
recommended to the Security Council the expansion of MINURSO’s mandate to include human 
rights oversight, only to withdraw the recommendation when a diplomatic crisis with Morocco 
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the Moroccan government, and MINURSO staff have minimal interaction with the populace at large.  
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ensued. In 2014 and 2015, while I was conducting field research, tremendous hope among 
Sahrawi nationalists in Moroccan-occupied territory was placed in breaking through with what 
almost was achieved in 2013, but to no avail. Given these failures, the burgeoning role of human 
rights issues in the Morocco-Western Sahara conflict may be reaching its apogee, as the failure 
of recent campaigns have taken their toll. In the Spring of 2014, there was a genuine sense that 
the Security Council could cause real change. Following failed campaigns in both 2014 and 2015, 
the rhetoric coming from Sahrawi nationalists has increasingly deplored UN inactivity and called 
for the expulsion of MINURSO peacekeepers from the refugee camps.558 In 2016, in an 
unprecedented move in the conflict’s history, Morocco expelled MINURSO peacekeepers from 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún in response to then Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s use of the term 
“occupation” in reference to Western Sahara during a recent trip to the refugee camps, and have 
been pre-emptively cracking down in the occupied territories.559 Whether this means that human 
rights have reached certain limits as a useful instrument in the nationalist conflict, or will take on 
new forms in the shifting terrain of political struggle, remains to be seen.  
*** 
 
From the intifada of 2005 to the international event involving Aminatou Haidar in 2009 
through to the ongoing attempts to lobby the UN Security Council to append human rights 
oversight to the UN peacekeeping mission, human rights and civil disobedience have been 
mobilized as key strategies for drawing international attention to the abuses of political rights 
taking place in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, as well as for the broader political aim of 
achieving self-determination and establishing an independent Sahrawi nation-state. With their 
proliferation in the last decade, however, both parties to the conflict have used the discourse to, 
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in the words of one activist, move “from a position of defense to a position of attack.” This, in 
turn, has blurred certain distinctions regarding human rights activism, and heightened certain 
features of the practice in the context of Western Sahara. I will explore these ambiguities and 
specificities through an ethnography of the huquqi across several contexts of the disaggregated 
geography of conflict. Having started in New York, we now move to Marrakesh, followed by the 
Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, before returning, at last, to Laâyoune/El Aaiún.   
 
Section II – Marrakesh, Morocco. 2014 World Human Rights Forum 
On Saturday evening, at the conclusion of a musical concert by a Lebanese quartet, two friends 
and I stand on the steps outside of the downtown Marrakesh theater La Colisée, amidst a crowd 
bubbling with positive energy and excitement. The concert marked the end of the international 
day of solidarity with Palestine, itself the culmination of the four-day long World Human Rights 
Forum, a sprawling event hosted in Marrakesh that convened hundreds of panels and brought 
together thousands of delegates representing human rights organizations from around the world. 
As we stood on the steps, a group of young people, sporting kefiyas and still inspired by the 
concert, broke out in song, waving Palestinian flags and jumping in unison with their arms 
wrapped around each other. Passing cars honked from the boulevard below, galvanizing the 
singers to continue with even greater verve and excitement. The effervescent expressions of 
transnational solidarity in the name of human rights and social justice seemed both boundless 
and, in garnering attention from the passing nightlife in Marrakesh’s cultural district, glamorous, 
at one and the same time. 
*** 
 The celebration in support of Palestinian rights that evening in Marrakesh would seem to 
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capture something essential about the spirit of transnational solidarity that animates and 
characterizes human rights as a moral and political project, more generally, and that justifies a 
gathering on the scale of the World Human Rights Forum, which reportedly involved over 5000 
participants from 94 countries, more particularly.560 And yet, preoccupied as I was with making 
sense of Moroccan-occupied Sahara, I couldn’t help but think about how the event had gone off 
as planned with effectively no mention of the human rights situation in Western Sahara. Despite 
the fact that Marrakesh is less than 1000km from the northern border with the territory (referred 
to in Morocco as the “Southern Provinces,” or, for Sahrawis traveling in Morocco, “the 
region”),561 the four-day event had taken place without – as far as I knew – any public protest 
drawing attention to Western Sahara, nor any panels devoted to the subject.562 This was not 
necessarily a surprise, as a number of the most high-profile Sahrawi human rights organizations, 
including CODESA, ASVDH, CPSRON, the Forum for the Future of Sahrawi Women, and a 
group known as the Gdim Izik Families of Political Prisoners, had announced a decision to 
boycott the event weeks before the World Human Rights Forum began. The boycott extended 
beyond Sahrawi organizations, and took place amidst an increasingly hostile environment for 
Moroccan human rights organizations, in general.563 However, given the parallels between the 
situation in Western Sahara and the Palestinian cause, including everything from the claim to 
national self-determination to the national flags that closely resemble one another, the marked 
                                                
560 Tom Finn, “Morocco Rights Groups Boycotting Marrakech Meeting,” Middle East Eye, November 26, 2014, 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/morocco-fears-rollback-rights-1382176292. 
561 Al-mintaqa or, both more and less specifically, “the Sahara” (al-sahra’). These latter two terms are general 
enough to conveniently elide the sovereign matter of naming. Uttering “Southern Provinces” is distasteful for 
anyone who doesn’t support Morocco; uttering “Western Sahara,” or “occupied territories” (al-’aradi al-muhtalla) 
anywhere in public in Morocco can draw unwanted attention. 
562 As the boycotting organizations plainly understood, the politics of naming in Morocco would prevent any 
discussion under the title of “Western Sahara,” but any topic that might bring Morocco’s sovereignty into question 
(or the human rights violated in the history of establishing such sovereignty) would never see the light of day, either. 
563 Finn, “Morocco Rights Groups Boycotting Marrakech Meeting.” The month prior to the Forum, Morocco’s 
Interior Minister, Mohamed Hassad, had accused Moroccan human rights organizations of serving a “foreign 
agenda.” This aspersion precipitated a nationwide protest – including in the Sahara – by branches of the Moroccan 
Association of Human Rights (AMDH). Fieldnote, October 16, 2014. 
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contrast in visibility was particularly striking. On the steps of the concert hall that evening, 
instead of imparting inspiration, the song and dance of human rights left me bewildered. 
 This bewilderment stemmed not just from that evening’s events, but from my full 
experience of the Forum. It should come as no surprise that the Moroccan state would not allow 
discussion of an issue that it considers a threat to national sovereignty. Likewise, Sahrawi human 
rights groups supporting the right to self-determination recognized that participation in the 
Forum would only burnish Morocco’s image as a regime that respects human rights, and so 
boycotted the event. And yet, like so many of the dynamics of the politics of the Sahara in 
Morocco, what was happening on the ground at the Forum was at once more confusing and more 
disturbing than the newsworthy developments of boycott and exclusion. As I found out, 
Sahrawis were not so much barred from the World Forum as they were selectively invited, 
coopted, rewarded or manipulated into attending. And their responses ranged from active 
participation to wary acceptance to completely ignoring the event. It was, in short, a microcosm 
of everyday life in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, where the discourse of human rights 
proliferates and sometimes almost everyone, it seems, claims to be a huquqi, or human rights 
activist.  
Almost from the moment I arrived in Marrakesh for the World Forum on Human Rights, 
I started running into friends and acquaintances from “the region.” Not every encounter came as 
a surprise: students whom I’d met at the Sahrawi Studies graduate program at Mohamed V 
University in Rabat, for example, staffed a booth representing their program. But, soon after 
visiting this booth, I encountered a Mauritanian English teacher, who was one of the first people 
I had met during my preliminary research trips to Laâyoune/El Aaiún. This man had been 
exceptionally gracious in accommodating me during times when I knew very few people in the 
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city, inviting me to his apartment for meals and out for coffee with his friends. For that reason, I 
thought that I knew him fairly well, and yet, he had never expressed any involvement with 
human rights organizations of any kind. If anything, he displayed a strong aversion to anything 
that might be construed as political, since his wife had lost a family member during the 
Morocco-Mauritania-Polisario phase of the war in the 1970s. Of course, it was entirely possible 
that he could have been a member of a human rights organization – although, if this were the 
case, I would assume that he would be involved with a state-associated group working in a less 
politicized realm. If that were the case, then perhaps he was here to attend panels and network 
with people from similar organizations, I thought. I was even more surprised, then, when he told 
me that he had just presented a talk with the title “Social Change for a Society Living in the 
Shadow of Human Rights.” On what authority, I wondered, was this man presenting on human 
rights at an international forum?  
I was curious and confused but, before I could ask him questions, we encountered an 
acquaintance to whom the English teacher friend had introduced me years earlier at a café in 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún. If it seemed unlikely for my English teacher friend to be presenting on 
human rights at an international conference, this acquaintance’s presence at the World Forum 
seemed even more far-fetched. On the occasion when we first met, this acquaintance told me that 
he was a businessman involved in commerce in Dakar. How did English teachers and 
businessmen in Laâyoune/El Aaiún somehow become human rights activists in Marrakesh? I 
didn’t get to talk to either one of these two to learn more about their involvement in the Forum, 
but the presence of Sahrawis in Marrakesh began to emerge like mirror images in a 
kaleidoscope: they were the same, in appearance, as the people I knew in Western Sahara, but 
here in Marrakesh, on the other side of the border, they inexplicably occupied new subject 
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positions.564  
I soon learned that the Moroccan state had transported a contingent of people from the 
Sahara to attend the World Forum in Marrakesh. Flown free of charge, this Sahrawi contingent 
was housed on a property owned by one of Morocco’s public unions.565 Compact and private, the 
property included a hotel, bungalows and outdoor swimming pool – the landscape and setting of 
a Moroccan middle class summer vacation spot. Vacant and largely unstaffed in the wintry off-
season, the slightly worn property, combined with the cold, rainy weather, made the arrangement 
feel like an impromptu occupation. For a few nights of the World Forum, I stayed in a bungalow 
on this property with two friends, and each evening seemed to reveal new insights – and 
confusions – into who was attending this event, and why. Yet, like most of the dynamics 
involving politics of the Sahara in Morocco, it was difficult not to sense the Moroccan state 
operating the kaleidoscope and bending the will of its subjects to meet the interests of state 
security and intelligence. 
  One evening over dinner in the hotel dining room, I met women and men representing 
different sectors of civil society groups from Laâyoune/El Aaiún, working with or on behalf of 
people with disabilities, immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, and so on. For representatives of 
these civil society groups, the World Forum appeared to be a genuinely unique occasion to 
connect with and learn about discussions and best practices taking place among colleagues 
working in similar fields elsewhere in the world. The disorienting experience of unexpectedly 
                                                
564 In writing this, I realize that this could represent another example of what Karen Strassler terms “paranoid 
visuality,” or a relation between state and subject predicated on identification as threat under surveillance. Karen 
Strassler, Refracted Visions Popular Photography and National Modernity in Java (Durham [NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010), 138.  
565 Moroccan labor unions have a long history of supporting the welfare of people from the Sahara, but in a manner 
that aims to incorporate or assimilate them into the Moroccan nation. In the aftermath of the Moroccan Liberation 
Army and the Spanish-French counterinsurgency known as Ecouvillon (discussed in Chapter 3), when many 
Saharans had been displaced to the Wed Nun region in and around Tan Tan, a leading Moroccan labor union backed 
the education of young Sahrawis at a converted mansion in Casablanca known as Dar Touzani. Ait Iddr, Safahat 
Min Melhamat Jaysh Al-Tahrir Bi Janub Al-Maghrib, 118–19.  
 318 
encountering people I had previously met in Laâyoune/El Aaiún would recur, however, after 
dinner when people gathered in the hotel’s ground floor. After encountering multiple 
acquaintances of my Mauritanian English teacher friend during these leisurely evenings, I began 
to discern a cohort of participants distinct from the members of civil society described above. 
The cohort of friends connected to my English teacher friend did not appear to have any 
organizational affiliation and were attending, I suspected, as a favor for some service rendered to 
the state intelligence services. For this group, the “politics” of attending the World Forum on 
Human Rights was no different from any other trade conference, where people are rewarded for 
their work with an all-expenses-paid trip to a nice place – on this occasion, cold, rainy 
Marrakesh. 
I eventually learned that there remained yet another group of “attendees,” distinct from 
the first two. One evening during the Forum, my friends and I visited a group in a neighboring 
bungalow to where we were staying on the property. As soon as we walked in, the ambiance felt 
a world apart from the rest of the hotel and conference. A group of several young men and 
women had gathered in a bedroom of the bungalow and were drinking tea. Like so many 
gatherings I’d been to during the course of fieldwork in the Sahara, the cycle of boiling, steeping, 
pouring, sweetening, re-pouring, percolating, distributing, cleaning and re-starting pots of tea 
was the focal point of the room. There, on the floor and with the aid of an electric kettle and the 
ubiquitous accouterments of metal serving containers arranged on a metal tray, yet another round 
of tea was brewing. Those gathered had wrapped themselves in thick comforters to ward off the 
penetrating damp cold from the unrelenting rain, warmed as well by the uniquely pungent steam 
of Chinese tea fortified with sugar.566 Conversation and energy ebbed and flowed, pulling 
                                                
566 Historically heavy rains that November had caused flooding throughout southern Morocco and in the Sahara. The 
World Forum took place in the midst of those rains. 
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conversation deeper into the night with each new round of tea.567 While I have no record and 
little recollection of what we talked about that evening, I do recall that the World Human Rights 
Forum never came up. No one mentioned their interest, much less their involvement in the 
conference, in any way. Rather, the ambiance was reminiscent of countless gatherings I’d 
experienced with Sahrawis in a variety of locations: with ‘a’idin on a beachfront in Nouadhibou, 
Mauritania, with Sahrawi university students in their apartment in Agadir, with refugees in the 
camps in Algeria, and in numerous settings on the floors of sparsely furnished, carpeted rooms in 
homes throughout the peripheral urban neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Although 
everyone in the room of this bungalow had been flown in to Marrakesh for the occasion, and 
were housed with the rest of us on the campus of the retreat facility, the World Human Rights 
Forum was of little to no interest, and so, symbolically, the space was transformed into a 
gathering typical of any other across northern Mauritania, southwest Algeria, southern Morocco, 
or the Moroccan-occupied territory. Indeed, it was as if we were back in Smara, or Laâyoune/El 
Aaiún, where these folks were from. As I later learned, many of the younger functionaries whose 
trip was paid for, spent their time in Marrakesh visiting friends at university, shopping in the 
medina, clubbing in the fashionable quarter of Gueliz – or, as I learned that evening, simply 
staying in their bungalow, ignoring and unseeing the broader political context in which they were 
embedded.568 
*** 
 On the last day of the World Human Rights Forum, on the afternoon before the Lebanese 
music performance, I sat with a few other men in a gravel-strewn space outside the massive tents 
                                                
567 On tea, sociality and temporality, see Adeline Masquelier, “Teatime: Boredom and the Temporalities of Young 
Men in Niger,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 83, no. 3 (2013): 470–91; Ahmed Elbachir 
Damani, Al-Shay’ Al-Sahrawi: Dars Al-Tarikh Wa Siyaqat Al-Taghayur Al-Ijtima‘i (Casablanca, Beirut: al-Markez 
al-Thiqafat al-‘Arabi, 2013). 
568 Fieldnote, Marrakesh, Morocco, December 3, 2014. 
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set up for the event. The passing stream of people leaving the tents from one of the last panel 
sessions of the Forum gradually thinned as we took advantage of one of the first clear afternoons 
in what felt like weeks to brave the chill and reflect on the experience. Appropriate to the World 
Forum’s transnational reach, conversation began by lamenting the lack of representatives from 
Syria, Iraq and Libya – all in the throes of civil war and proxies to regional and international 
conflicts, in some form or another. Eventually, the violent conflict gripping many other Arab 
countries led to some reflection on and appreciation for the UN-brokered framework that has 
structured the Morocco-Sahrawi conflict since a ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario in 
1991. In contrast to my encounters with younger media activists in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, no one in 
this group, comprised of middle aged, professionally accomplished Sahrawi men working in 
different parts of Morocco, was pining for a return to armed conflict.  
Having established a general appreciation for this peace-in-conflict, one man articulated a 
new problem produced by this state of perpetual irresolution.569 Having worked at a fairly high 
level in the central administration of the Moroccan government, in Rabat, he described a 
particularly demoralizing experience. During 2011, a time when the revolutionary horizon of the 
Arab Spring was galvanizing protest throughout the region – including the 20 February student 
movement in Morocco – King Mohammed VI ordered the drafting of a revised constitution to 
put before the people of Morocco for ratification. This man was a functionary in government 
during this time and, in the office one day, a French-language Moroccan newspaper was lying 
around with the headline “Si les Marocains disent non?” (“If Moroccans Say ‘No’?”). Upon 
seeing this headline, his boss looked at him and said, “You will be the ones to say ‘No.’” By 
“you,” his supervisor meant Sahrawis in general whom many Moroccans regard as lazy, 
                                                
569 Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 1st ed. 
(Syracuse  N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010). 
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ungrateful and – worse yet – disloyal, for not responding appropriately to the largesse spent by 
the Moroccan state to “improve” their standard of living. As a government functionary working 
on major state initiatives, this man regarded his boss’s statement as both an accusation and an 
assumption. Beyond simple stereotype or mere slight, this man understood that no matter how 
much loyalty one expresses, as a Sahrawi in a context of ongoing nationalist conflict, one’s 
essence as a political subject remains in doubt. As a Sahrawi in Moroccan society, one is, he 
said, “A traitor until the reverse can be proven.”570 
This story clearly touched a nerve with the rest of the group, and as we drove to drop the 
storyteller off at the train station for him to return to Rabat, a cascading series of stories revealed 
that almost everyone in this party had been approached, at some point, to serve in some agency 
of the Moroccan intelligence services. The man who had worked in government (not directly 
related to security, as far as I knew), told a story before we dropped him off about how, while in 
college, he was approached to by a member of the DST571 to provide information about pro-
Polisario classmates. The story made everyone in the car laugh, because this man not only 
refused the offer, he later pointed out the operative who recruited him in an effort to shame him 
before friends. But the laughter came also from the unhappy awareness that everyone shared a 
similar experience. For Sahrawis who grew up in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, this rite 
of passage usually took place once they reach university campuses in Marrakesh, Safi, Agadir, or 
elsewhere in Morocco proper, which are known as environments of intense student politicization. 
As one man put it, this leaves Sahrawis with a certain level of education always in a “double 
bind:”572 either keep one’s head down and try to avoid involvement with any activity that could 
                                                
570 “Kha’in hta yuthbit al-‘akis.” Fieldnote, Marrakesh November 30, 2014. 
571 Direction générale de la surveillance du territoire (DST). Morocco’s domestic intelligence agency. Founded in 
1973. 
572 “Bayn ikrahayn,” is what the interlocutor said. 
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be construed as “political,” and still face suspicion and coercion of disloyalty by both sides in the 
conflict; or, capitulate and cooperate with the Moroccan security state. 
*** 
As the World Human Rights Forum was winding down, these stories confirmed that, in order to 
become a certain type of human rights activist in Morocco – the kind that gets invited to speak in 
Marrakesh for example or, more significantly, before the United Nations Human Rights Council 
in Geneva, a Sahrawi first had to prove their loyalty, and worth, to the state security and 
intelligence services. These guys then named several individuals whom we had seen at the World 
Human Rights Forum as examples – an undistinguished classmate at university who, somehow, a 
year later, appeared on video speaking as a representative of Morocco at a conference in Geneva. 
The stakes, then, were clear: to become a huquqi, as human rights activists were known, required 
first a willingness to serve the interests of Moroccan sovereignty. For me, after four days of 
confusion, this was finally clarifying: the proliferation of human rights – as a practice of non-
violent protest, as a means of publicizing Sahrawi resistance and Moroccan oppression, and as a 
subject position in the terrain of political conflict – was structured by the terms of loyalty and 
betrayal that permeate everyday life in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. And, as we will see, 
Sahrawi activists who are for self-determination also struggle against a rising cynicism that to be 
a huquqi – whether Sahrawi nationalist, or not – entails “selling oneself” to one side or the other. 
For the men in the car, however, I sensed that sharing these stories was, like so much else 
concerning everyday life at the locus of Morocco-Sahrawi conflict, a matter of carving out a 
space of dignity, relief and privacy in a context of pervasive suspicion, surveillance, and political 
polarization. 
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Section III: Human rights activism in Sahrawi refugee camps, Algeria: gendered publicity 
If my experience at the 2014 World Human Rights Forum in Marrakesh suggests that 
human rights practice in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara is invariably subsumed by the 
structures of Morocco-Sahrawi nationalist conflict, this does not in any way preclude 
transnational networks and publicity from shaping human rights practice in the region. The 
human rights activism that I encountered in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria involved 
elements of the human rights discourse described in New York and Marrakesh: publicity, and the 
ways in which human rights reinforce a project of sovereignty. Although Polisario/SADR has 
recently established a national human rights council with the mandate to monitor human rights in 
the camps, interest in human rights in the refugee camps remains overwhelmingly focused on the 
human rights violations against Sahrawi nationalists that take place in Moroccan-occupied 
Western Sahara.573 Polisario/SADR’s Ministry for the Occupied Territories and Ministry of 
Information coordinate with media activists in Moroccan-occupied territory to record protests, 
devoting significant time on its daily SADR tv and radio broadcasts to disseminating news of 
these reports.574 Publicizing human rights violations through satellite and radio media aims to 
constitute and maintain transnational “witnessing” publics not only in places like New York, but 
among refugees in the camps in Algeria. As described in the opening scene to Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, Sahrawi nationalists in Moroccan-occupied territory even rely upon SADR tv 
broadcasts, via satellite, for news of protests that may have taken place in an adjacent 
                                                
573 The National Committee for Human Rights was established by SADR in 2014, and includes members both from 
the refugee camps, Moroccan-occupied territory, as well as representatives from Sahrawi communities abroad 
(mainly, Mauritania, and Europe). This committee meets once per year; the National Association for Human Rights 
operates under its aegis. Aside from the composition of the Committee reflecting the Sahrawi diaspora, its mandate 
fits the template of a typical National Human Rights Institution. Interview, January 23, 2016, Rabouni, Sahrawi 
refugee camps, Algeria. 
574 I repeatedly heard the claims, while in Moroccan-occupied territory, that children are paid to throw rocks, and 
women are paid if they are pictured bleeding during a protest. Fieldnote June 17, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. I could not confirm this, and all of the activists I spoke with said they were 
paid very little, if at all. 
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neighborhood to their own in Laâyoune/El Aaiún.  
In this way, certain forms of human rights activism are encouraged by Polisario/SADR in 
order to promote the cause of national sovereignty. Polisario/SADR has, since its founding, 
promoted – required, even – the active participation of women in the governance of the camps. 
This governing practice has foregrounded an idealized “Sahrawi woman” whose role was 
foundational to the formation and survival of the camps during the 1970s and 80s, and who 
remains authorized to speak for an international audience.575 With the rise of human rights, and 
the camps’ increasing reliance upon humanitarian aid from the West (and Spain, in particular), 
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh notes the added dimension of international audience in eliciting the 
discourse of a female Sahrawi “ideal refugee.”576 In other words, the particular political 
rationality in the camps of humanitarianism, national sovereignty and international recognition 
intersects with human rights discourse to produce a gendered citizen-activist, in certain contexts, 
and a gendered victim of human rights violations, in others. In the rest of this section, I will 
explore how human rights amplify certain dynamics of gender and publicity through, in 
borrowing from Laura Bier, its intersection with what I am calling Polisario/SADR’s “state 
feminism.”577 
*** 
                                                
575 Joanna Allan, “Imagining Saharawi Women: The Question of Gender in Polisario Discourse,” Journal of North 
African Studies 15, no. 2 (2010): 189–202. 
576 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees. 
577 Bier, Revolutionary Womanhood, 79. Bier’s “state feminism” concerns a facet of Nasser’s “state socialism” 
wherein she argues that “the figure of the working woman became a site of debate, discussion, and intervention, not 
because traditional mechanisms and practices of exclusion made women’s work problematic but in fact because 
state feminism was predicated upon women’s inclusion and participation in public life.” This emphasis (insistence, 
even) on “women’s inclusion and participation in public life” is very similar to what Alice Wilson and others have 
reported on during the “revolutionary” phase in the late-1970s and early 1980s, when Polisario/SADR’s governance 
of the refugee camps was inspired by Qaddafi’s People’s Committees. Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile, 66. 
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One afternoon during my brief stay conducting research in the Sahrawi refugee camps,578 
I was walking with an employee of SADR’s Ministry of Information through El Aaiún579 refugee 
camp in order to meet a man who had taken part in the 1950s Moroccan Liberation Army in the 
Sahara. Walking among the modest, mud brick homes and tents of the camp, we greeted an older 
woman in passing. Before continuing on her way, the woman launched into a speech about how 
she and other women of her generation had built the camps with their own hands and run them 
throughout the 1970s and 80s. In the Sahrawi refugee camps as well as among Sahrawis living in 
northern Mauritania, I regularly encountered women from the generation that had fled Morocco 
in the 1970s who regaled me with this same narrative of the pivotal role that they played in 
running the refugee camps while the men were at war. The similarities from one telling to the 
next were apparent: I heard women recount how they built and ran the camps themselves, 
constructing mud-brick houses, organizing medical care for the wounded, educating children, 
and making military uniforms. In multiple instances, the exact phrase, that this prodigious effort 
was undertaken “with one baby strapped [to the back], and another in the belly,” was repeated 
verbatim.580  
I took the repetition of this narrative to reflect the tremendous sense of pride, both 
individually and collectively, that women of this generation maintain in having participated in 
the collective epic of Sahrawi national struggle and exile, and the sense of solidarity fostered 
from such hardship and sacrifice.581 The consistency of these statements indicated to me that 
                                                
578 I spent four weeks in the refugee camps in January, 2016. 
579 Polisario/SADR named its original camp settlements after cities in Western Sahara (all of which are under 
Moroccan occupation): El Aaiún, Smara, Boujdour, Dakhla and Aouserd. Whereas the spelling of most place-names 
are the same, Polisario/SADR uses Spanish transliteration for El Aaiún, whereas Morocco uses a different 
transliteration (Laâyoune).  
580 Fieldnote, F’derik and Zouérate, Mauritania 5/1-5/8/15. “wahid mutahezem wa thani fi kersh.” 
581 The prominent role of women in running the refugee camps is well documented in the literature from 
humanitarian workers, journalists and scholars who first visited the camps in the 1970s and 80s.Harrell-Bond, The 
Struggle for the Western Sahara; Lippert, “Sahrawi Women in the Liberation Struggle of the Sahrawi People.” 
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members of a certain generation of women were authorized to speak of this experience as 
representatives of the nationalist project, and that, with time, the narrative has become embedded 
in popular Sahrawi national discourse. Through the construction of a courageous, strong woman 
whose active participation in the revolution differentiated the “Sahrawi woman” from both the 
recent colonial past and women in other Arab societies, the groundwork for this authorization 
began at the level of Polisario official discourse dating back to the 1970s. As Joanna Allan has 
noted in her archival research, this construction of women has served the revolutionary project in 
multiple ways: 
It reinforces and links to the POLISARIO’s leftist and socialist ideology, it works 
with constructs of masculinity to recruit young men to the army and encourage a 
strong defensive nationalism as well as promoting the active, powerful role of 
women in order to ensure the effective organization and running of the nation in 
exile, it differentiates Saharawi society from the usual Western conception of 
Muslim, Arabic societies and it distinguishes the Sahara from Morocco.582 
Complementing Allan’s insights, Alice Wilson’s ethnography set in the refugee camps confirms 
that this revolutionary “Sahrawi woman” was the subject of both official discourse, and 
structures of governance, in the form of active participation in the popular committees that ran 
the camps during the war. In a telling account, Wilson notes that women were so heavily 
involved in refugee camp committee work during the “revolutionary period” before 1988 that 
two committees operating in the same district were effectively unable to meet at the same time, 
as practically all of the women in a given camp were involved in both committees.583 In this way, 
the mass participation of women in administrative and political governance of the refugee camps 
reflects the centrality of “state feminism” to the project of sovereignty under Polisario/SADR. 
                                                
582 Allan, “Imagining Saharawi Women,” 199. 
583 Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile, 67–68. Wilson notes that, if not compulsory, “in practice participation was 
universal.” 
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The terms of this “state feminism” have changed, however, with the increased role of human 
rights in the political conflict. 
 What was particularly striking about the way in which this woman presented her story in 
the El Aaiún camp that morning was its performative aspect. She initiated the story, unprompted 
and at full volume, in the middle of the neighborhood following what was otherwise a passing 
interaction. I could not help but be aware that my presence made the encounter propitious for this 
particular kind of gendered political discourse, and an international audience, even of one, could 
be the catalyst for this genre of impromptu speech. Nicola Cozza has shown that the Sahrawi 
refugee camps have long constituted a technology of power that relies upon humanitarian 
resources, mediated by state-like institutions, to produce a political rationality of nationalism.584 
Since foreign aid workers, volunteers, Spanish solidarios, and other visiting delegations are 
regularly cycling through the camps, this international presence is not an incidental or occasional 
part of the camps’ public sphere, but a constitutive element, much the way that international 
legal recognition is not only an aspiration for the people and institutions of the refugee camps, 
but a constitutive element of the camps’ existence.585 Next, I move on to discuss how Elena 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s concept of the “ideal refugee” helps to grasp the degree to which the politics 
of human rights and international publicity figure into everyday “state feminism” in the Sahrawi 
refugee camps. 
*** 
 When not among residents of the refugee camps conducting interviews, I passed time 
during my stay in the camps in the administrative center, known as Rabouni, (where SADR 
governmental ministries, the Sahrawi Red Crescent, and NGOs such as the World Food Program, 
                                                
584 Cozza, “Singing like Wood-Birds,” 144–51. 
585 During my brief stay in the camps in January 2016, a delegation of staffers for United States members of 
Congress came through the camps. 
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among others, are all located). Most of my time in Rabouni was spent waiting at the Association 
of Families of Sahrawi Prisoners and Disappeared (AFAPREDESA) a Sahrawi NGO that 
monitors Sahrawi political prisoners in Morocco, and records the number of disappeared people 
who remain unaccounted for since the beginning of Morocco’s invasion and occupation. I 
usually passed the time during these intervals with AFAPREDESA’s staff – predominantly 
single men, known as multahiqin, (from al-iltihaq, meaning “enrollment,” or “joining”) who had 
fled the repressive political climate in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and “joined” their 
compatriots in the refugee camps. These men welcomed me cheerfully with conversation and tea 
whenever my presence around AFAPREDESA’s office coincided with their downtime. 
One morning, as I was hanging around AFAPREDESA’s office, a group of eight or ten 
university students from Spain were in a nearby conference room, watching video clips of 
Moroccan police attacks on Sahrawis in Moroccan-occupied territory. I recognized some of the 
clips from having watched SADR tv via satellite when I was in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. The 
montage depicted a familiar pattern of police violence in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, 
not unlike what Madeleine Bair showed the audience at Hunter College in New York City a year 
later: plainclothes police and security people hitting, kicking and dragging women in the street; 
police kicking at a house door; police in riot gear swarming a group of protesters and pushing a 
woman around until her melhafa586 became unraveled. At one point in the presentation, when a 
video clip appeared to depict a particularly brutal hit, a student in the group audibly gasped.  
Because the student group was multinational, their Spanish-Sahrawi guide was narrating 
in Spanish as the montage played, while a European woman dressed in melhafa provided 
translation in English: “[The Moroccan police] are in plainclothes so that it is not reported that 
                                                
586 A loose-fitting garment worn by Sahrawi women that wraps them from head to toe. 
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the military is hitting people, which would warrant MINURSO’s587 intervention - which doesn’t 
happen anyway.” At one point a female student raised a question about the victims in the series 
of video clips: “Why are they all women?” The narrator responded with a cultural generalization: 
Sahrawi women feel particularly out of place in Moroccan society, he said, because of “their 
openness and tolerance,” and so are more likely to protest. This cultural difference, he explained, 
translates to the political realm of international support for Sahrawi nationalism: “[Sahrawi] 
society is naturally open and democratic, and for this reason they don’t get very much support 
from Arab countries." One of the female students asked for clarification on this last point, to 
which the narrator responded: “These [Arab] countries, which are hierarchical and have different 
roles for women, they do not want to see an open, democratic country like this succeed. 95% of 
the aid [for the refugee camps] comes from Western countries. Of the eighty-five countries that 
have recognized Western Sahara at any given time, only four (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and 
Syria) have been Arab.”588 
 The heavy-handedness of this presentation seemed to elicit some skepticism even among 
a student group still learning about the conflict. As Joanna Allan’s research shows, however, this 
is a gendered discourse of Polisario/SADR’s that dates back to its founding in the 1970s. I 
present it here to demonstrate that this “state feminism” intersects with the humanitarian 
imperative to amplify the cultural difference, and victimization, of Sahrawi women, for the 
purpose of documenting human rights violations in an attempt to elicit empathy from a 
transnational witnessing public. The significance of an international audience adds another 
dimension to this figure of the gendered Sahrawi citizen-activist. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
                                                
587 The UN peacekeeping body for the Western Sahara conflict. 
588 Fieldnote, Rabouni. January 20, 2016. At present, 44 countries recognize the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. 
(Significantly more support the Sahrawi right to self-determination, but do not recognize SADR.) This number has 
fluctuated significantly; the lecturer here appears to be using a high-water mark when 85 countries recognized 
SADR. 
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suggests that an international audience increasingly shapes the formation of this idealized, 
Sahrawi gendered subject:  
Fundamentally, the idealized Sahrawi women…are re/created for the audience as 
'free' specifically through distancing them from (specific understandings of) 
Muslim identities and practices. Beyond asserting the 'uniqueness' of Sahrawi 
women through comparing them with Other Arab women (and at times with 
Western women), the association that is thus strategically re/created is a 
synecdochic relationship between the liberal, 'free' and 'secular' nature of Sahrawi 
women and the liberal and 'secular' nature of the Sahrawi 'nation.’589 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s attention to the role of international audience implied by the promotion of a 
particular “women’s role” in the Sahrawi national project, past and present, foregrounds the 
mutual imbrication of the camps with international politics of humanitarian recognition. 
*** 
In the Polisario/SADR-run refugee camps in southwest Algeria, human rights discourse is 
driven by the imperative to publicize violations in Moroccan-occupied territory, both to the 
international community, and to the citizen-refugees of the camps. As argued in Chapter 4, a 
humanitarian discourse has been constitutive of Sahrawi nationalism since the establishment of 
refugee camps in Algeria in 1975. This distinguishes Sahrawi nationalism from the anticolonial 
nationalisms that emerged in the immediate post-World War II moment, which themselves were 
distinct from the racialized, imperial nationhoods (Germany, France, Japan, United States) that 
manifested themselves throughout the 19th century. As Manu Goswami notes in historicizing the 
modularity of the nation form, each shift indicates that for emergent nationalisms at different 
historical conjunctures “their temporal simultaneity, structural similarities, and competitive logic 
was conditioned by their location within a single, increasingly interdependent, hierarchically 
organized global space-time.”590 I assert that the logic of Sahrawi nationalism has been 
                                                
589 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees, 170. 
590 Goswami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form,” 788. 
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conditioned by its disjunctive location amidst the shift in “global space-time” between 
anticolonial nationalism ascendant in the late-1960s, and the global ethics of humanitarianism 
that emerged in the second half of the 1970s. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
emergence of Sahrawi nationalism in the late 1960s, and its “translation” into a state-in-exile 
based in refugee camps following Morocco’s 1975 invasion, coincided with this shift.  
 As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh notes, this “ideal refugee” is emblematic of the Sahrawi national 
project’s “politics of survival”591 given its increasing reliance upon humanitarian – and, 
particularly, Spanish – aid. However, the rise of human rights as a terrain of struggle in the 
Morocco-Sahrawi conflict has displaced the locus of this struggle from the camps to the 
Moroccan-occupied territory.592 AFAPREDESA’s presentation to Spanish university students 
visiting the Sahrawi refugee camps suggests that Polisario/SADR’s “state feminism,” which 
emphasizes a politically active, culturally distinct Sahrawi woman, remains alive and well. 
Where a previous generation demonstrated their courage by building, managing and provisioning 
the refugee camps “with one baby strapped [to the back], and another in the belly,” today’s 
“Sahrawi woman” is not in the camps but in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and 
demonstrates her commitment to nationalism by getting bloodied – or worse593 – by a Moroccan 
security agent’s baton or steel-toed boot. In this way, the gendered victim of human rights 
violations has in some ways displaced the gendered refugee as the “ideal” subject of Sahrawi 
humanitarian nationalism. Both figures, however, foreground the importance of transnational 
audience and publicity in shaping the gendered politics of human rights and humanitarianism in 
                                                
591 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Ideal Refugees, 12. “By 'politics of survival,' I refer to the interconnected struggles 
fought by the Polisario and Sahrawi refugees to ensure that support is obtained from a range of non-Sahrawi state 
and non state actors. Such support both protects refugees' continued physical existence in the camps and the physical 
and political survival of the camps as a 'national' project.” 
592 Jacob Mundy, “Autonomy & Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism,” Review of African 
Political Economy 33, no. 108 (2006): 255–67. 
593 One female huquqiya lost an eye from attacks by Moroccan security agents. 
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Western Sahara. 
 
Section IV: Huquqiyyin in Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
 
When I arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún in March 2014, protests were occurring within 
view of my apartment window on Tan Tan Avenue on a regular basis. With the run-up to the 
United Nations Security Council meeting to renew MINURSO’s mandate that April, most 
afternoons a demonstration or confrontation of some kind took place. Occasionally, something 
would transpire at night, taking the form of either rock throwing with the police, or a brief, 
raucous rally of vehicles roaring up and down the avenue and waving the Sahrawi national flag. 
Daytime protests, on the other hand, tended to unfold following a familiar pattern: kids walking 
home from school for lunch gathered on a side street and, accompanied by some of their mothers 
or other female relatives, began cheering and whistling. The women might ululate; the children, 
usually middle school age or younger, might chant “La badil, la badil,” the slogan for the 
Sahrawi independence movement.594 They do this to gather attention and prepare for the 
culminating gesture: raising a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic flag in the middle of the busy 
avenue. The display is usually brief, however, because everyone knows that the police are 
coming: if the protest is small, the kids will scatter after a few rocks are thrown. If a protest 
attracts further attention, the confrontation might play out a while longer. In these instances, the 
protesters toss trash barrels and chunks of concrete into the street to block both lanes of the 
                                                
594 “No alternative, no alternative.” The full slogan is: “No alternative, no alternative to self-determination!” The 
chant is so ubiquitous that enunciating the second half ‘an taqrir al-masir (“to self-determination”) has become 
almost superfluous. The unspoken second half also reflects how closely policed protests are. By the time someone 
chants La badil, la badil, chances are that police will be on the scene to break things up, leaving “‘an taqrir al-
masir” as the unenunciated, unrealized goal. Of course, something that has been chanted repeatedly for so long 
invariably gives rise to parodies, including but not limited to: La badil, la badil, ‘an llahm wa dissir (“No alternative 
to meat and dessert!”), or La badil, la badil, ‘an tasdir ila Agadir (“No alternative to getting sent to Agadir!”). These 
and other spoofs point to an undercurrent of pessimism and cynicism: i.e., the suggestion that people take part in 
protests for the sake of getting some immediate reward, like a meal, or getting sent to Agadir, the economic hub of 
southern Morocco and location of the nearest university. 
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avenue, and light scattered trash on fire for the same purpose.595 When the protest reaches this 
level, Tan Tan Avenue, which serves as a central corridor connecting several popular 
neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, comes to a halt. Shops up and down the street shutter their 
metal doors until the confrontation has passed. Helmeted policemen, baton-wielding soldiers and 
a handful of plainclothes men – members of Moroccan intelligence services such as the DST or 
the Direction Générale d’Etudes et de Documentation (DGED)596 – emerge from the police vans, 
rocks in hand, and return fire. In one instance, I saw police and soldiers turn on a group of young 
men passing by, and arrest them.597 
After the climax of the UNSC decision regarding MINURSO and human rights oversight 
in Western Sahara, these protests became less frequent, and so, too, did my direct encounter with 
the kinds of activism that I had been repeatedly warned – by friends and acquaintances – to 
avoid. Although as time went on the frequency of protests on Tan Tan Avenue decreased, the 
pervasiveness of human rights discourse never dissipated. Whether this involved the events, 
people or places that I was told to avoid, or news of an arrest, protest, or, less directly, a 
contingent of foreigners expelled from the territory, talk pertaining to human rights and the 
activities of huquqiyyin – whether at the level of street protest of transnational connection – was 
ubiquitous. Though spontaneous confrontations often broke out in various quarters of 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the most regular street protests during my fieldwork took place on the 15th 
                                                
595 Principled, non-violent protests of civil disobedience took place at regular intervals on Avenue Smara throughout 
2014. These demonstrated a higher level of organization and planning carried out by organizations in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara that supported Sahrawi’s right to self-determination, and would not involve any rock 
throwing or blockading the street. I never saw one of these protests first-hand, but they tend to be videotaped by 
media-activist groups, such as Equipe Media http://www.emsahara.com/. See also 
https://lab.witness.org/tag/western-sahara/. 
596 DGED, Direction Générale d’Études et de Documentation, is the Moroccan counterintelligence agency 
established in 1973. DGED is distinct from the aforementioned DST, the domestic intelligence agency. In addition, 
each military branch has its own intelligence operations. The coordination between these agencies is unknown to 
me.  
597 Fieldnote June 6, 2014. 
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of every month. Organized by the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA), 
the Agdim Izik Coordination Committee, ASVDH, and other high-profile Sahrawi human rights 
groups, this protest took place at Sahat al-Zemla, the site of the famous 1970 intifada that is 
considered the birthplace of Sahrawi nationalism. Although I received word of these protests via 
local online news sites and, occasionally, by word of mouth, I never witnessed them firsthand. 
As I recounted in Chapter 1, the one time I walked toward Sahat al-Zemla on the 15th at the 
appointed time, I found myself confronted by two security officers who appeared seemingly out 
of nowhere, interrogated me, and then quickly ushered me away from the protest and into a 
supermarket. I never witnessed the protest myself. As a result, I had to settle for second-hand 
accounts, usually through the news.598 One activist I met who was regularly taking part in the 
mid-month protests told me that the tactic evolved through training sessions in non-violent 
resistance that had been hosted by Sahrawi human rights organizations, at which European 
human rights lawyers presented. He also compared participation in the monthly protests on the 
15th to the cathartic experience of playing in a soccer match: he would get a bit nervous in 
advance, excited in the moment, and felt sore afterward from the physical beating, but also 
cleansed by the experience.599 
The pervasiveness of human rights discourse and its ethnographic inaccessibility meant 
that, like the Moroccan security state, I only experienced this political terrain in mediated, 
refracted, oblique form. One encounter with this discourse came in the form of the “taxi speech.” 
Because a cabdriver’s views in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, as elsewhere, ran the gamut of political 
persuasions, periodically I would hop into a cab and be greeted with something like “bienvenido 
à Sahara occidental.” The choice of language (Spanish) indexed the driver’s affiliation with the 
                                                
598 The local news source I referenced most frequently: https://saharanow.ma/ 
599 Footnote, May 26, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara 
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nationalist cause, while the sovereign name staked a claim to independence (Western Sahara). 
On one particularly memorable occasion, the driver launched into his background, which 
included a year in prison following his involvement in the 2005 intifada. He continued to provide 
a description of the activist group that he had been involved with, expressed his view on the 
importance of receiving support from international NGO’s, primarily in Europe, and stressed the 
need for more human rights monitoring in Morocco. The speech continued uninterrupted until 
just before dropping me off, when he said, “this is the Sahara, not Morocco.” Moments like these 
contributed to my sense, articulated in Chapter 1, of a city comprised of competing, if 
overlapping, spaces of sovereignty. Though the taxis appeared uniform from the outside, once 
inside the car, I could be in either of these sovereign spaces depending upon the driver’s political 
persuasions. If I encountered a neutral driver, or a Moroccan-friendly one, I was in the “Southern 
Provinces,” or “Moroccan Sahara.” Anyone discussing the importance of human rights, such as 
the driver described above, meant that I was in the Sahara, i.e. Western Sahara – and for a short 
ride I would fully be in occupied territory. In this way, the project of human rights discourse in 
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara carves out spaces – in taxi cabs, inside homes, on the 
rooftops of buildings – that constitute a sovereign “field of force” for Western Sahara, within the 
machinery of militarized Moroccan rule. Though these encounters, I came to see the huquqi as 
creating these spaces through the display of symbols, private conversations, writing graffiti on 
walls – or, occasionally, participating in and videotaping non-violent protests. 
Given the pervasiveness, yet inaccessibility, of human rights discourse in Moroccan-
occupied Western Sahara, when I finally met with huquqiyyin through interviews near the end of 
my fieldwork, the experience was charged. The covert logistics created a sense of secrecy and 
heightened risk – on one occasion, a friend drove me to meet with an activist on his family’s 
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property outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, under the premise that this man, whose arm had been 
injured during a recent protest, was under too tight surveillance to conduct an interview inside 
city limits. In the very last week of my research, I met with huquqiyyin on the outskirts of 
Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in a neighborhood known as Hay al-Raha. There, a group of a dozen or so 
young activists had gathered in the second floor of a home. Many of them had participated in the 
2005 intifada, which led some of them to be expelled from school. All remained involved in 
Sahrawi nationalist activism. Some had just recently been released from prison. One of them was 
part of a group that had renounced their Moroccan citizenship, torn up their documentation and 
unsuccessfully sought asylum in the Spanish embassy. In addition to recounting their 
experiences of torture in prison, these activists described the process of receiving doctored 
charges in Moroccan court that avoid any legal reference to political activity: 
Munadil1: [The Moroccan state] knows that Sahrawis are not going to retreat 
from their political positions or to the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi 
people. To the extent that even if [Moroccans] put them in prison, they are not 
retreating from their political positions. The militants [munadilin], they always 
want to hear “liberation.” They’ll bring charges against you that don’t have 
anything to do with you: vandalism, or arson. You stand there peacefully, and you 
even have proof on the internet -  
 
Munadil2: They don’t prosecute you for your political position, they prosecute 
you with hypocritical accusations/charges [al-tuhma al-munafaqa]. Criminal 
charges. Like arson. 
 
Munadil3: For participating in protests [al-waqafat]. 
 
Me: Now I understand: in the court proceedings, they announce a non-political 
charge/accusation so that it is not apparent in the court records that - 
 
Munadila1: That there is a political position (involved). 
Aside from the charged atmosphere of these encounters with huquqiyyin, it increasingly struck 
me that what we were discussing had less to do with a practice specifically tied to human rights, 
and more to do with their commitment to Sahrawi nationalism. Unlike the activists who related 
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the experience of “conscientization” of human rights during the 1990s – many of whom were 
considered the “elites” in the world of Sahrawi nationalist activism – for this group that was 
indoctrinated into the conflict through the intifada of 2005, human rights are less of a privileged 
political tool than the idiom into which their political struggle has been translated in order to 
overcome Moroccan media isolation.  
 In this sense, huquqiyyin in the Sahrawi national struggle has become synonymous with 
munadilin, or militants. Huquqi is a figure of the partisan (which is why Moroccans call them 
“separatists” [infissaliyin]): Sahrawis committed to the nationalist struggle. For these munadilin 
described to me as the “foundation of the resistance” to Moroccan occupation, their engagement 
with human rights protest and documentation leaves them at the very center of conflict. As 
engaging as this sounds, one young media activist recounted once getting flushed out of a 
building from which he was filming by Moroccan security forces. The story of the close escape 
sounded exhilarating and dangerous, epitomizing the high-stakes confrontation between two 
competing sovereignties, until he simply stated that “really, filming the same thing every time, 
seeing people getting beaten up, is boring,” adding “I’d rather go back to war.”600 
*** 
I am back at Batimat, where I was dining in the scene described to open Chapter 1. This 
time, I have returned by daylight, and am visiting a neighboring building in the complex, to see 
Mohamed Salek. In the 1990s, when the conflict between Morocco and Polisario shifted from 
war to political negotiations with a focus on carrying out a referendum for self-determination, the 
demographics of Laâyoune/El Aaiún shifted dramatically yet again, with a major influx of 
settlers from the interior of Morocco. In addition to these settlers, some of whom were drawn by 
economic opportunity, Morocco also organized the resettlement of Sahrawi people living just to 
                                                
600 Fieldnote, July 4, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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the north in a region that since 1958 was part of Morocco, known as Wed Nun. Many of these 
people were resettled under the premise that they would be eligible to participate in the planned 
referendum. Those coming from further north underwent “re-education” about their identity by 
Moroccan school teachers and other functionaries in an awkward attempt for them to pass before 
the UN identification panels as Sahrawi. In Laâyoune/El Aaiún, however, the vast majority of 
these settlers coming from Wed Nun were themselves from Sahrawi tribes such as Reguibat as 
well as the group of tribes known as Tekna. This has had far-reaching ramifications on the 
geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún as a center for the political struggle over the future of Western 
Sahara: whereas many Moroccans who came in what is sometimes called the Second Green 
March in the 1990s later moved back north, a great many of those settled in tents in what became 
known as Khaymat al-Wahda, or Tents of Unity, stayed in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Benefiting from 
free basic goods such as flour, sugar and oil, and with the promise of future free housing (which 
was ultimately provided during the 2000’s) these families stayed in Laâyoune/El Aaiún and 
effectively doubled the city in size. Meanwhile, in an attempt to lure Sahrawi’s living in the 
Polisario-run refugee camps following the ceasefire, Morocco built a series of large concrete 
housing projects in anticipation of what Morocco termed “returnees” or people defecting from 
Polisario. Among these projects were Batimat, which, because the large number of returnees 
initially did not materialize, became housing for whoever was opportunistic and needed housing. 
This includes Sahrawis coming from Khaymat al-Wahda who occupied apartments in Batimat 
when they were living in tents during a particularly rainy winter and the rains washed their free 
provisions away.  
Mohamed Salek’s in-law’s occupied their apartment during the rains that winter in 1992, 
and have stayed ever since. When I visit them one day over lunch, Mohamed Salek speaks 
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excitedly about the high-profile human rights activist, Aminatou Haidar, who is scheduled 
speech before US Congress the next day. The UN Security Council’s annual meeting regarding 
MINURSO is coming up, (this was in 2014) and the push to introduce human rights oversight is 
going strong. Aminatou Haidar’s speech is seen as an important diplomatic intervention as part 
of this campaign. In his excitement, Med Salek mentions that in an online poll for the greatest 
woman in the Arab world, Aminatou Haidar had been in the lead, outpolling Queen Noor of 
Jordan, before internet was cut off across the region on the last day of voting. He says, 
admiringly of Haidar’s diplomatic campaign in the US, “human rights, those are life.” But as we 
continue talking and the subject of the protests, which are bound to escalate over the coming 
month, comes up, Med Salek suggests that these protests are all “propaganda” put on by 
organizations representing the “Sahrawi regime,” or Polisario, which he considers as corrupt as 
Morocco.601 
Mohamed Salek’s ambivalence touches on a tension underlying the Sahrawi nationalist 
movement’s strategic use of human rights, and the figure of the huquqi in Western Sahara. In 
deploying human rights as a strategy to further their cause of gaining national independence, the 
campaign seeks to expose the ongoing torture, abuses and violations of political rights taking 
place in the occupied territory. And, indeed, Morocco has long deployed these repressive policies, 
charging anyone believed to have Sahrawi nationalist sympathies with treason, torturing political 
prisoners, and refusing them fair trial. They are, in effect, treated as enemies within the state. In 
their attempt to make these violations visible, however, human rights activists come to be seen as 
not simply suffering abuse, but in actively seeking to instigate violations for the sake of publicity 
and the escalation of conflict. Many of the protests that I observed while in Laâyoune/El Aaiún 
(which were only those that took place outside of my apartment window), were led by women 
                                                
601 Fieldnote, March 22, 2014. Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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and children. This increasingly appears to be part of a strategy to capture a more acute sense of 
violation and suffering, whether for an international audience, or for the viewership of Polisario-
run SADR tv, which play these tapes in heavy rotation, broadcasting them from the refugee 
camps and back into the Occupied Territories via satellite. 
In addition to the aspect of publicity and audience, Sahrawi’s who are as suspicious of 
Polisario as they are of Morocco suggest that becoming a human rights activist in the service of 
Sahrawi nationalism is the easiest way to get paid in a context where political economic 
processes are dominated by the logics of political conflict. (Or, in some cases, get a visa and gain 
asylum to live somewhere else.) As one man put it, anybody who gets caught with hashish can 
raise two fingers (the “victory” sign serves as an emblem of the Sahrawi nationalist movement), 
claim to be a political prisoner, and get paid. While these claims about payment by Polisario are 
difficult to substantiate – most militants will emphasize that given the risks of torture, 
imprisonment and surveillance, payment is irrelevant to what they are doing – the 
association of human rights activism with publicity for a specific political end means that, for 
some, the figure of the huquqi in Western Sahara signifies, as one Sahrawi from the Wed Nun 
region put it, a “mercenary making a profit off of other people’s blood.”602 
*** 
In this sense, the rise of human rights in Western Sahara – and its potential fall, should 
the conflict continue to get more volatile – provides a case study in the use of human rights as a 
strategy within a collective political struggle for self-determination. The use of human rights as 
an “instrument” to instantiate conflict toward broader political (and sovereign) ends, does not 
relate to conceptions of human rights as an ethical ideal in social practice. Far from transcending 
nationalist conflict, human rights remain embedded within political terrain, adding a dimension 
                                                
602 Fieldnote, April 7, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. 
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of visibility and publicity to the displaced politics of decolonization, and to the diplomatic 
struggle over publicity. Nor, conversely, do they inherently constitute a form of depoliticizing 
governmentality. However, its specific uses in the context of the conflict over Western Sahara 
may lead to a certain cynicism, precisely because the proliferating figure advocating for human 
rights, the huquqi, can blur the distinction of what those rights stand for, politically. As in the 
context of Palestine, where human rights also feature in the production of both legitimacy and 
illegitimacy of competing projects of sovereignty, this can lead to cynicism surrounding human 
rights activism more generally.603 In giving rise to multiple, competing practices and figures, 
human rights in Western Sahara reflects what Daniel Goldstein – in building upon Sally Merry’s 
concept – terms “plural vernaculars,” which “emanate from different sources with different, 
sometimes competing, sets of agendas, resulting in a vernacular plurality that is highly contested 
and strained.”604 In considering the “plural vernaculars” that emerge across different settings in 
the Western Sahara conflict, human rights practice appears as a means through which Sahrawis 
make the political visible – to themselves, to each other, and to transnational “witnessing” 
publics. 
  
                                                
603 Allen, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights, 21–22. 
604 Goldstein, “Whose Vernacular? Translating Human Rights in Local Contexts,” 120. 
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Conclusion: An Anthropology of Decolonization 
 
 
Every spring, the intensity of demonstrations across Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara 
increases, as does Moroccan state repression. Flag-waving, and, sometimes, rock-throwing, 
protests pop up across the different neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún “Thulathi” – the 
neighborhoods that, through resettlement, expansion and coercion, have doubled the city’s size 
since the 1991 ceasefire – on an almost daily basis. But so, too, do pre-emptive efforts by 
Moroccan state police and Auxiliary Forces to swarm intersections and prevent Sahrawi activists 
from assembling. The state’s coercive apparatuses operate with even greater impunity than 
during the rest of the year, targeting for arrest media operatives suspected of broadcasting 
protests, and violently breaking up those protests that do arise in the cracks of this machinery. 
Concurrently, the diplomatic machinery that drives the conflict’s political maneuvering at the 
level of international community shifts into overdrive: New York-based events that attempt to 
draw attention to human rights abuses in Moroccan-occupied territory usually take place in 
March and April in an attempt to make the conflict visible to a public audience. As noted in 
Chapter 1, diplomatic maneuvering constitutes a constant terrain of struggle, but in the spring 
months these efforts on both sides intensify. The timing for this intensification, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, relates to the United Nations Security Council’s annual debate to renew the mandate 
for MINURSO, the UN’s peacekeeping body based in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara as 
well as the refugee camps since 1991. 
In a certain sense, the seasonal temporality of intensified conflict serves as just another 
example of the apparently unusual, if not even peculiar, status of the Western Sahara conflict 
relative to global politics. News reports from the Sahrawi refugee camps that depict nationalist 
leaders in military green uniforms organizing a flag-waving march through the desert draw 
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attention to a national liberation movement seemingly out of the 1970s. Likewise, the prolonged 
nature of the conflict between Morocco and Polisario/SADR, combined with the absence of 
state-sponsored armed conflict, renders it largely invisible. When the dispute does become 
visible, particularly during these spring months, its relative obscurity easily plays into the 
narrative of a “forgotten” conflict, neglected by global politics and world history.605 In the first 
instance, the conflict appears to be out of step with a post-World War II global geopolitics 
stabilized through a grid of territorial nation-states. In the second image, Western Sahara simply 
appears to be outside of the movement of history, making an appearance only when instensified 
conflict between competing projects of sovereignty become heated, rendering it, in the words of 
George Joffé a “relic from a realist past.” 
As argued in the Introduction to this dissertation, however, Western Sahara only appears 
anomalous in this way through the optic of methodological nationalism. Seen as two nations 
contesting a single territory, the dispute appears as the remainder of a bygone era of 
decolonization that has otherwise been resolved into a global community of nation-states. 
Alternatively, an overemphasis on globalization is also prone to rendering Western Sahara as out 
of step with the “now” of global political space-time, under the assumption that the dispute over 
nation-state sovereignty appears from this perspective as the pursuit of a political form that has 
already been superseded by the processes of globalization. Disorderly Histories argues, by 
contrast, that Western Sahara is irreducible to nationalist conflict, globalization, or the “ruins” of 
colonial empire.606 By contrast, I suggest that the contemporary political situation in the Western 
Sahara is best understood through the framework of decolonization. 
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Decolonization has been characterized as a transfer of power from colonizers to the 
colonized that resulted in a set of newly independent nation-states in the 1950s and 60s.607 More 
recent histories that focus on structural upheaval during the post-World War II period suggest 
that the outcome of decolonization was less overdetermined than the above approach would 
suggest. Greater critical attention to the dynamics of empire, global political economy, and the 
intellectual history of anticolonial political leaders has focused on the range of outcomes 
considered possible at this conjuncture. Frederick Cooper, for example, has examined how labor 
movements in post-World War II West Africa seized upon wage labor demands to challenge 
universalist values of citizenship and equality espoused under French empire.608 Gary Wilder has 
noted how the “untimely” politics of Leopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire challenged both 
national autarchy and liberal internationalism through political practices that were both 
pragmatic and utopian in their aims for a transformative, interdependent end to European 
empire.609 And in his detailed study of the decolonization of French Algeria, Todd Shepard notes 
that the historical category of “decolonization” signifying a “break” or division between the 
colonizer and colonized only emerged retrospectively as part of French society’s “renarration” of 
“the Algerian history of France.”610 
Disorderly Histories contributes to this critical history by revisiting the historiography of 
decolonization and questioning the methodological nationalism that its outcome has engendered. 
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In building upon this intervention, however, it notes that the study of Saharan decolonization 
need not be confined to a specific post-World War II period. Even Wilder’s work, in opening up 
a host of questions about the futures past of decolonization and their relevance to the present, 
states that “by [1955] the UN-US order had already defined and circumscribed the political field 
on which decolonization would play out.”611 From the standpoint of the Sahara, by contrast, 
decolonization at this point (not to mention colonialism, in Western Sahara) was only just 
starting in earnest. This is not to say that the processes of decolonization in the Sahara were 
exempt from the structural constraints of the Cold War, US hegemony, UN internationalism and 
the politics of Third World national sovereignty that had become entrenched by the mid-1950s. 
Rather, it is to suggest that decolonization has been producing new forms of political space, time 
and subjectivity well beyond the post-World War II conjuncture. 
Some of this may become more evident if we pivot between African postcolonialism, 
framed largely by the end of European empire, and the political imaginary of the Middle East, 
framed largely by anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. As Omnia El Shakry notes: 
I underscore the need to denaturalize the dominant categories and dystopic 
narratives of Middle Eastern social and cultural history, narratives of awakening 
followed by catastrophe or triumph followed by despair. Rather than search for 
the root causes of a present postcolonial melancholia, as tempting as that might 
be, we might be better served by the reconstruction of the disparate ‘horizons of 
expectation’ and ‘indeterminate futures’ that decolonization, as a complex series 
of both historical experiences and ongoing events, offers up. This will require that 
we attend to archives both shadow and real, and conditions both intellectual and 
material, as we look to the textured local debates and endogenous forces, and 
minor literatures of the period of decolonization.612 
I quote from El Shakry at some length here because western Sahara would seem to speak rather 
directly to this call for an examination of the “ongoing events” of decolonization.  
                                                
611 Wilder, Freedom Time, 95. 
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By conceptualizing decolonization as an ongoing process and horizon of expectation, rather than 
a single event, this framework also draws our attention to how the process has ushered in a series 
of unresolved political projects with afterlives that continue to haunt the region’s political 
present. The lasting effects of these projects have produced political formations and 
subjectivities that continue to structure the region’s fragmented political geography. For this 
reason, I have labeled this study an “anthropology of decolonization.” 
 Through the framework of decolonization, certain features of Western Sahara no longer 
appear anomalous, at all. The anticolonial political project that galvanized bidanis and 
Moroccans to briefly join forces in the 1950s are indicative of complex relations of autonomy 
and dependence that do not conform to liberal notions of territorially bounded, sovereign, 
independent peoples. Likewise, the constellation of anti-imperalist political movements that 
emerged across the Maghrib and Sahara in the 1970s is suggestive of a moment of 
decolonization when the future horizon of imminent change animated a political formation that 
briefly transcended boundaries and notions of national belonging. And, finally, the mobility in 
confinement of ‘a’idin serves as a reminder that contemporary crises surrounding migrants and 
refugees return to the border-making processes that began during the period of post-World War 
II decolonization, and that continually fail to “fix” the locations and identities of nation-state 
subjects in ways presumably envisioned. 
 When viewed through the framework of decolonization rather than methodological 
nationalism, the Western Sahara conflict brings to mind a range of other political formations. 
Israel/Palestine, for example, serves as an inescapable point of reference, as it has for Sahrawi 
nationalists since at least 1971 when, in the Marxist-Leninist Moroccan journal Ila al-Amam, a 
piece was published with the headline “A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara.” Particularly 
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when thought of as a geopolitical space that is “simultaneously shared and divided,”613 
Israel/Palestine bears striking parallels to Western Sahara in the sense of both a site of ongoing, 
violent occupation, but also a political formation that defies neat separation into clearly defined 
national containers. Or, perhaps, Western Sahara might be understood in relation to Cuba, where 
a number of my interlocutors were educated, sometimes from primary through postgraduate 
levels of education as part of a longstanding agreement between Fidel Castro’s regime and the 
Sahrawi national liberation movement which runs the refugee camps in Algeria. Like Cuba, this 
“refugee nation,” as it is sometimes called, has transformed society through a revolutionary 
politics defined by political solidarities combined with a kind of controlled isolation from global 
political economic processes. A third point of comparison for the Western Sahara would be other 
trans- and subnational struggles over autonomy and dependence, such as East Timor, Kashmir, 
West Papua, Tibet, or, even Catalonia and Crimea, each of which raise questions about the 
contradictions of territorial sovereignty that have been heightened, but left unresolved, by 
decolonization. In this way, the ongoing conflict over Western Sahara appears as what might be 
thought of as an archipelago of “frictional surfaces,”614 irreducible to nation-state sovereignty, 
that trouble the seemingly stable grid of nation-states. 
*** 
If I have focused on the relevance of decolonization as an analytical framework for 
Disorderly Histories, the use of “anthropology” warrants some commentary, as well. As should 
be evident from the structure of this dissertation, I do not mean to conflate anthropology with 
ethnography, and the presentist focus that this method sometimes entails. Rather, in borrowing 
from Talal Asad, I use “anthropology” here to suggest a broader inquiry into the grammar of 
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concepts – sovereignty, self-determination, autonomy and dependence – involved in the process 
of decolonization:  
In my view anthropology is more than a method, and it should not be equated – as 
it has popularly become – with the direction given to inquiry by the 
pseudoscientific notion of ‘fieldwork’…What is distinctive about modern 
anthropology is the comparison of embedded concepts (representations) between 
societies differently located in time or space. The important thing in this 
comparative analysis is not their origin (Western or non-Western), but the forms 
of life that articulate them, the powers they release or disable.615 
 
Asad’s formulation of anthropology as the “comparison of embedded concepts” correlates to this 
project’s approach to disembed understandings of decolonization by examining how this process 
articulated, in practice, with “forms of life” in and across the Sahara. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Mohamed Ibrahim and Bachir ould Sid Ahmed ould Sidi 
composed a poem together, sometime between 1956 and 1958, that expresses a sense of longing 
for Tiris. The translation of this longing across multiple registers – from the 1950s when the 
poem was composed, through post-1975 exile and nationalist conflict, to today – requires a 
translation of concepts of political space, time and subjectivity. The moral geography of “Tiris” 
longed for by the brothers in the 1950s, for example, is not necessarily commensurable to the 
“Tiris” imagined in relation to the space of national exile, of the 1970s. Nor is a hierarchical, 
genealogical bidani identity equivalent to Sahrawi nationalist belonging. Though the concepts 
change, however, their overlapping resonance at multiple levels suggests that these different 
meanings remain sedimented and overlapping in the poem’s ongoing circulation and reception. 
In this sense, the poem is a cultural artifact of decolonization, and its circulation in the present 
reflects the region’s disaggregated political geography.  
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In a modest house in the southern Moroccan city of Tan Tan, father and son pause before 
reciting the poem that was originally composed by two relatives in the late 1950s. The pause is 
not for lack of familiarity: both father and son have the poem memorized. Indeed, the son, who 
initially introduced me to this poem in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, has accompanied me on the day-long 
trip north specifically to consult with his father. For additional reference, a recording in the voice 
of one of the two brothers who originally composed the poem had been uploaded to the internet a 
year earlier by cousins living in Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria. The son keeps this recording 
downloaded on his phone, and here in Tan Tan it serves to supplement the collective memory in 
case there is lingering doubt or uncertainty over a specific word. From my introduction to the 
poem in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, to the voice recording uploaded to YouTube from 
refugee camps in Algeria, to the father and son reciting its meaning to me in Tan Tan, in 
southern Morocco, my encounter with this poem in 2014 was also an encounter with the 
disaggregated geopolitical space of western Sahara.  
As an object of cultural production that both traces the region’s disaggregated political 
geography in its contemporary circulation, and contains the sedimented layers of past political 
projects in the present, the poem represents many of the qualities of political time and space 
engendered by decolonization in this region. And, as just mentioned, in its expression of longing, 
transformations from bidani to Sahrawi subjectivity can be translated through the poem’s 
multiple layers of meaning. As an example of the “textured local debates…and minor literatures” 
of decolonization mentioned by El Shakry, through which the qualities of political space, time 
and subjectivity engendered by decolonization in the Sahara are embedded, this poem is also 
illustrative of what I mean, then, by an anthropology of decolonization. For this reason, I will 
leave the final words of longing to Mohamed Ibrahim: 
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Return me, without any dissembling 
To my land, oh God 
Until I see the mouths of the riverbeds 
And I’ll stop and pull up with a tin can/metal barrel 
A kettle of water from Bir Inzaran 
To break, if [only] I were [there], a bit of wood 
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Appendix: Western Sahara (1975) and the Limits of “Orderly Decolonization”  
It might be surprising that Western Sahara (1975) – a non-binding legal document that 
was essentially disregarded by the concerned parties as soon as it was issued – is given a 
prominent place in the historiography of international law. International legal scholarship 
considers Western Sahara (1975) integral to a larger corpus of UN-based decisions and 
resolutions during decolonization that contributed to the development of an international legal 
doctrine defining the right to “external” self-determination.616 The operative part of the decision 
reads: 
Thus the court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the 
application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, 
in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine 
expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.617  
 One scholar, writing soon after the decision was published, asserted “the Western Sahara case 
marks the clearest judicial statement to date with regard to self-determination as a legal right.”618 
A more recent analysis lists Western Sahara (1975) first among “the major international 
decisions on the meaning of self-determination.”619 In this vein, Catriona Drew suggests that 
Western Sahara (1975) helped to define self-determination as a legal doctrine specifically in 
formal, rather than substantive, terms. According to Drew, Western Sahara (1975)’s operative 
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decision guarantees a people’s right to the exercise of free and fair choice over their political 
destiny.620 Seen as a sort of capstone to several decades of the customary practice of 
decolonization by self-determination, Western Sahara (1975) gave definition to this customary 
law as the right to a formal process (such as a referendum or plebiscite) enabling the expression 
of “free will” during the process of decolonization.621  
On the other hand, historiography of the Western Sahara conflict reduces the decision to 
a tactic wielded amidst an escalating power struggle between regional powers, Morocco and 
Algeria.622 In this historicization, Western Sahara (1975) is typically characterized as “a brilliant 
time-buying stratagem”623 masterminded by the savvy Hassan II. The genesis of Western Sahara 
(1975) – as a tactic of realpolitik that forestalled a UN-referendum on self-determination – and 
its subsequent failure to impact the outcome of Western Sahara’s decolonization, makes for a 
seemingly contradictory lesson in legal and political terms. The decision’s contributions to the 
definition of self-determination in international law can be difficult to reconcile with the 
conflict’s complete departure from this legal definition at the moment of its promulgation.  
Writing in the immediate aftermath of the ICJ Opinion, and amidst ongoing armed 
conflict between Polisario, Morocco and Mauritania, Thomas Franck decried the yawning gap 
between the legal decision and the unfolding political events. For Franck, Western Sahara (1975) 
affirmed “the paramountcy” of the right to self-determination as legal means of decolonization. 
And yet, the conflict over Western Sahara supplanted the exercise of this formal right and, in 
doing so, departed from “a clear pattern of orderly decolonization.”624 As mentioned in the 
                                                
620 Drew, “The Meaning of Self-Determination,” 105. 
621 Catriona Drew, “The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial,” European Journal of International Law 
122001 (2001): 661–62. 
622 Yahia H Zoubir, “In Search of Hegemony: The Western Sahara in Algerian-Moroccan Relations,” Journal of 
Algerian Studies, no. 2 (1997): 43–61. 
623 Hodges, Western Sahara, 183. 
624 Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,” 696, 701. 
 353 
Introduction, Catriona Drew captures the bitter irony of this seeming contradiction while 
referencing Franck’s article (entitled “The Stealing of the Sahara”) three decades later: 
The Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975 did more for the legal fortunes of 
the right of self-determination of peoples than it did for the political fortunes of 
the people of the Western Sahara.625 
If Franck saw the order of decolonization ruptured by the outbreak of armed conflict in Western 
Sahara, Drew retrospectively situated Western Sahara (1975) in “a more certain legal past,” one 
before the end of the Cold War caused the principle of self-determination to descend into “legal 
indeterminacy.”626 
In this sense, Western Sahara (1975) emerges as pivotal to both the consolidation and 
disruption of the “pattern of orderly decolonization.” A broader reading of Western Sahara 
(1975), along with a broader contextualization of the history of Western Sahara’s decolonization, 
however, raise questions about this “orderly” decolonization. What constituted this “pattern,” or 
process? And why do the conflict and Court decision appear to mark its end? By questioning the 
assumed historical complementarity between the end of “orderly decolonization” and the origin 
of the Western Sahara conflict, this appendix will discuss some implications of Western Sahara 
(1975) based on a reading of the case that goes beyond the conclusion quoted above, by 
engaging with the operative text of the advisory opinion, as well dissenting opinions, and certain 
oral pleadings by lawyers representing the parties to the case: Morocco, Mauritania, Spain and 
Algeria.627 In doing so, I argue that Western Sahara (1975) provides important insights into the 
conceptual dilemmas that have served to produce Western Sahara as a geopolitical object of 
dispute. These dilemmas revolve around sovereignty, constructions of the political subject, and 
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temporality. Throughout Western Sahara (1975), Jurists repeatedly encounter, discuss and 
sometimes evade theoretical dilemmas concerning the relationship between past, present and 
future, on the one hand, and between people, polity and territory, on the other. The remainder of 
this appendix will address these questions in much the same order as Western Sahara (1975) 
itself: first, by discussing terra nullius, jurisdiction and the Court’s deliberation over whether to 
take up the questions as presented; and, second, by considering the Court’s treatment of 
Morocco’s and Mauritania’s distinct claims to pre-colonial sovereign ties in Western Sahara. 
 
Western Sahara (1975): terra nullius, legal ties, sovereign “entities” 
Western Sahara (1975) deserves both contextualization and a closer reading because 
some of the unresolved dilemmas of sovereignty underpinning the Western Sahara conflict 
emerge through the legal language of reasoning and argumentation from the Case’s operative 
and dissenting opinions, as well as international legal scholarship surrounding the Case. Take, 
for example, the questions posed by UN General Assembly Resolution 3292, which framed the 
ICJ’s response: 
I.  Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of 
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? 
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, 
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco 
and the Mauritanian entity?628 
Two central doctrines of international law – terra nullius and sovereignty (implicit in the 
question about legal ties) – serve to frame the Advisory Opinion.  Underlying these questions, 
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however, remain theoretical dilemmas about time, evidence and authority that keep cropping up 
throughout the text’s operative and dissenting opinions.629 
 Given the contested nature of the matter, the Court first had to justify taking up the 
questions proposed by Morocco and Mauritania, and presented by the UN General Assembly. 
Because they are framed in terms of Western Sahara’s status “at the time of colonization by 
Spain” in 1884 it was suggested that neither question had any bearing on the territory’s 
decolonization, circa 1975. By this argument, the Court had been presented with academic 
questions of no legal significance that were therefore unrelated to its jurisdiction. To this, the 
Court responded that the questions pertain to “a broader frame of reference than the settlement of 
a particular dispute and embrace other elements. These elements, moreover, are not confined to 
the past but are also directed to the present and the future.”630 In grappling with the broader 
significance of the Case, the Court brings questions of pre-colonial authority within the purview 
of decolonization, implying that colonialism does not cause complete rupture with pre-existing 
legal and sovereign ties. In asserting the Court’s jurisdiction, Western Sahara (1975) articulates a 
relationship between past, present and future that leaves open the possibility for the need to 
historicize legal ties in order to determine sovereignty. 
Spain objected to the Court’s involvement on the premise that sovereignty, concerning 
the past and present, and decolonization, concerning the future, involve separate sets of facts, 
concern distinct legal-temporal frameworks, and should be treated as such. Any attribution of 
sovereignty by international law, Spain contended, would inherently violate its own sovereignty 
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over Western Sahara.631 Spain objected that the questions posed to the ICJ invite the Court to 
determine Western Saharan sovereignty when “[t]he attribution of territorial 
sovereignty…usually centres on material acts involving the exercise of that sovereignty.”632  In 
this sense, Spain’s position echoes that of Carl Schmitt, for whom the founding act of 
sovereignty is the “material act” of land occupation.633 As the constitutive means of naming, 
legitimating, and ordering, sovereignty (or what Schmitt terms nomos) derives from a material 
act of occupation, and therefore can be supported, but never attributed, by law. For Spain, the 
fact of the matter, in the Schmittian sense, was materially self-evident: Spain exercised 
sovereignty over Western Sahara, and had done so since 1884 through an occupation sanctioned 
by international law.  
The resonance between Spain’s objection and Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty draws 
our attention to the relationship between sovereignty, international law and imperialism.  For 
Schmitt, international law was generated by European imperial expansion, first in the New 
World and then elsewhere.634 Founded on the acts of discovery and occupation, jus inter gentes 
served to establish equilibrium between imperial powers (for Schmitt, a self-evident category 
based primarily on criteria of European civilization). In this sense, international law facilitated 
imperial expansion through the mitigation of warring powers, but it could not preempt or alter 
the sovereign order of states. By the late-19th century, however, Schmitt considered the principle 
of legitimacy irreparably compromised by various uses of international law to establish 
sovereignty. Spain’s position on Western Sahara (1975) parallels Schmitt’s critique in this sense. 
In addition to distinguishing the “material acts” of sovereignty from international law, Spain’s 
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objection seeks to ensure that the question of past sovereignty remains separate from the present 
question of decolonization. 
Interestingly, however, Spain’s argument rests not only on bracketing late-19th century 
sovereignty from informing questions of mid-20th century decolonization; it also calls for the 
application of self-determination as positive law. Spain’s position before the Court, supported by 
Algeria, was that, by 1975, the UN Charter and subsequent resolutions had already established a 
legal doctrine for decolonization by self-determination, obviating the need for any historical 
considerations.635 Taking up questions of historical ties, Spain argued, would undermine an 
already existing legal framework governing the transfer of power under the framework of 
decolonization. Spain’s position was supported by Algeria’s representative before the ICJ, 
Mohamed Bedjaoui, whose oral arguments asserted that, by 19th century standards, Western 
Sahara would be considered terra nullius. As such, Spain’s colonial borders remain the salient 
markers of the territory. By mid-20th century standards, Algeria argued, self-determination had 
displaced terra nullius as the operative means of establishing new sovereign entities under 
international law. According to Algeria, any reference beyond these two doctrines – terra nullius 
for demarcating the territory, self-determination for establishing its present and future status – 
would be superfluous.636 Bedjaoui’s argument is premised on the application of intertemporal 
law, “which applies in cases where the governing legal rules have changed over time so that the 
original rules and the later rules require different results.”637 In allowing for the applicability of 
terra nullius “at the time of colonization by Spain,” intertemporal law upholds a separation 
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between past and present, implying a kind of rupture between “classic” and “modern” 
international law. 
Although the Court ultimately agreed that the decolonization of Western Sahara 
warranted the application of self-determination, it did not follow Spain’s or Algeria’s reasoning 
in order to arrive at this conclusion. As a reminder, in Western Sahara (1975), the Court was 
asked first to apply terra nullius as a kind of legal test:  
I.  Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of 
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? 
If Western Sahara “belonged to no one” at the time of Spanish colonization in 1884, it would 
follow that legal ties could not have existed – with Morocco, Mauritania or any other political 
entity – because the territory lacked any form of political or social organization. Some judges 
were clearly uncomfortable that the concept of terra nullius even had to be addressed, remarking 
in their individual opinions on the inapplicability of such a Eurocentric standard in postcolonial 
times.638 Regardless, the prompt led the Court to find that Spain’s agreements with Sahrawi 
tribes from “the time of colonization” served as proof of social and political organization in the 
region: “Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and 
politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them.”639  In a sense, then, 
terra nullius provided a clear – if discomfiting – test case against which the Court discerned that 
the existence of some form of political organization in Western Sahara predated colonization.  
Deciding that Western Sahara in 1884 could not be classified as terra nullius brought the 
Jurists to the second question: 
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II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco 
and the Mauritanian entity?640 
Devising legal tests to positively determine the more complex claims posed by this second 
question proved elusive. Unlike the concept of terra nullius that framed Question I, the Court 
noted that an answer to Question II hinged on the understanding of “legal ties,” which “was not a 
term having in itself a very precise meaning.”641 Despite the term not being a part of 
international law’s lexicon, one scholar has noted that this question “stimulated a whole range of 
competing perspectives about the extent to which international law can recognise non-European 
forms of rule over territory.”642 Based on the basic threshold of terra nullius that some kind of 
political organization existed in pre-colonial Western Sahara, Question II asked the Court to 
determine the qualitative nature of this organization.  
 Conceptually, the inquiry revolved around the analytical gap between legal ties and 
sovereign ties. If the Court found that Morocco’s and Mauritania’s separate claims to the 
Western Sahara constituted pre-colonial sovereign ties, then it could recommend that the process 
of decolonization reconstitute these ties. As one judge wrote in an individual response separate 
from the operative opinion, this required “a specific criterion by which to differentiate one kind 
of tie from another.”643 What, then, constitutes a legal tie: a mode of authority, a sense of duty or 
obligation, a shared sense of ethics? Furthermore, what is it that the tie binds? Is a legal tie the 
basis for a sovereign tie, or are sovereignty and the law constituted by qualitatively different 
relations to authority? As we will see, these questions presented fundamental challenges to the 
regimes of evidence and modes of reasoning upon which the Court relied. 
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The operative decision in Western Sahara (1975) remarks upon the “the very special 
characteristics” of the territory “which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely determined 
the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it.”644 In its brief 
summary of these conditions, the Court cites the desert conditions and nomadic routes that 
encompassed a region much larger than the boundaries of Spanish Sahara.645 Though by no 
means unique in this regard, the Sahara historically defies fixed territorial boundaries which, 
whether literally or figuratively, are largely incompatible with a way of life predicated on long 
distance movement, and a natural environment of shifting sands. Whether conceptualized as a 
barren wasteland that divides civilizations,646 or as a sea of many passages that ties them 
together,647 the social and political relations of the Sahara have been predicated on 
“connectivity” and genealogical “encompassment” more than territorial boundedness.648 
Nevertheless, in following the phrasing of Question II, Western Sahara (1975) focused on 
political and social organization in territorial terms, even when observing that territorial 
boundaries had rarely been decisive when it came to organizing political relations in the Sahara. 
 
Legal Ties, Sovereign Ties I: “Special Characteristics” of Morocco’s Sherifian State 
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In addressing Morocco’s claims to sovereign ties, Western Sahara (1975) acknowledged 
the “special characteristics” of the pre-colonial Moroccan state: 
That the Sherifian State at the time of the Spanish colonization of Western Sahara 
was a State of a special character is certain.  Its special character consisted in the 
fact that it was founded on the common religious bond of Islam existing among 
the peoples and on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through their 
caids or sheikhs, rather than on the notion of territory.649 
The legitimacy of this state was based on shared religious authority affirmed through the 
expression of allegiance, known as al-bay‘a, rather than land occupation.  As with its 
observations about the Sahara, the Court’s remarks on the Sherifian State are also supported by 
scholarship, in this case on Moroccan sources of pre-colonial political authority.650 In a 
comparative study on pre-modern sources of political authority, Clifford Geertz noted that the 
values attributed to sovereign authority were constantly being renewed – not through fixed 
borders and territorial occupation, but through movement. Referring specifically to a caravan 
undertaken in 1893 by the Moroccan Sultan Hassan, Geertz suggested that the Sherifian court’s 
peripatetic nature was crucial to legitimating the Sultan’s political authority: “the realm was 
unified…by a restless searching out of contact, mostly agonistic, with literally hundreds of lesser 
centers of power within it.”651 
 The significance of this insight forces us to rethink the basis of authority, and the spatial 
distribution of power, in a pre-modern political entity. The conception of sovereignty in the 
modern, territorial sense assumes uniform and total occupation. With the divine ruler replaced by 
the abstract secular authority of the state, the legitimating sovereign principle becomes, 
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tautologically, the state’s ability to maintain control over its territory.652 In the pre-colonial 
Moroccan context, political authority was concentrated in the religious figure of the Sultan, and 
regularly renewed through the reinstantiation of sovereign ties with his subordinates. While this 
entailed near-constant movement, the purpose of the Sultan’s caravan was not to establish, 
defend or move a border, but to renew or establish the allegiance of a subordinate. A further 
distinction is sometimes drawn between bilad al-makhzen and bilad al-siba,653 differentiating 
between regions that paid taxes to the Sultan, and those that did not. Before the Court, Morocco 
argued that groups in bilad al-siba enjoyed greater autonomy, but still paid allegiance to the 
Sultan.654 
As Western Sahara (1975) noted in passing, “legal ties are normally established in 
relation to people.”655 Through the lens of international law, however, sovereign ties are a 
territorial matter – and this is where the unstable relationship between people, polity and 
authority becomes more apparent. After all, Question II asked for the legal ties “between this 
territory” of Western Sahara, and Moroccan and Mauritanian political entities. This framework is 
logical within the context of 1975 and an international state system based on territorial 
sovereignty. However, the Court had set itself the task of analyzing legal ties in the historical and 
political context of 1884, when neither the Moroccan nor Mauritanian political entities claim 
territorial sovereignty as the basis of political authority. As one scholar noted in their analysis of 
                                                
652 For Schmitt, political theology. Liberal political theory, following from Hobbes, attempts to resolve this dilemma 
through the conception of the social contract, but naturalizes the concept of society and a certain conception of 
human nature, in order to do this. 
653 Definitions of these terms have shifted from pre-colonial to colonial and postcolonial times. The following, 
contemporary definitions are attributed to John Shoup. Bilad al-makhzen: a “zone of Morocco administered more or 
less directly by state officials”; bilad al-siba’: a “zone of Morocco indirectly administered through tribal leaders 
and/or religious brotherhood.” Dawn Chatty, Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 
21st Century (Leiden: Brill, 2006), xxvii. 
654 Jacques Eric Roussellier, “Elusive Sovereignty—People, Land and Frontiers of the Desert: The Case of the 
Western Sahara and the International Court of Justice,” The Journal of North African Studies 12, no. 1 (2007): 60; 
Maurice Barbier, Voyages et explorations au Sahara occidental au XIXe siècle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985). 
655 ICJ., Sahara Occidental. Avis Consultatif Du 16 Octobre 1975 = Western Sahara. Advisory Opinion of 16 
October 1975., 41. 
 363 
the Case, the resulting “reliance on anachronism is startling” as terms such as “state” and 
“border” are repeatedly utilized to describe 19th century Saharan social and political formations 
for which these terms are ill-suited.656 In this sense, the relationship between past and present in 
Western Sahara (1975) remains a disjunctive one, and the Court finds itself contending with two 
regimes of evidence that are not necessarily commensurable. As a judge suggests in a dissenting 
opinion, “the reply, as worded in the operative part…contains an internal contradiction. Mention 
is made there of the territory of the Sahara, but it is immediately explained, by the cross-
reference, that it is the tribes that are meant.”657 The Court recognizes the “special 
characteristics” of the Saharan territory and Sherifian State, but the categories that it has to work 
with contribute to a fragmentary view of the past, producing an internal contradiction in its 
conception of the present. 
The confusion in terms involving people, territory and legal ties relates, then, to questions 
about evidence, but also time. In addition to the anthropological knowledge that the Court 
appears to draw from when discussing Saharan nomadic and Moroccan pre-colonial state 
structure, the Opinion references a number of 18th and 19th century agreements between Morocco 
and European countries and corporations.658 Particular attention, for example, is given to letters 
exchanged between France and Germany in 1911, which discuss the limits of Moroccan rule in 
geographical terms that refer to Rio de Oro (in Arabic, Wedi Dhahab), a river in present day 
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Western Sahara. Morocco presented this exchange as proof of the external recognition of 
Moroccan sovereignty. In addressing whether this could be taken as definitive evidence of 
Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara, the Court noted that the geographical description in 
letters from 1911 contradicted the terms of a French agreement with Spain from 1904, which 
fixed Morocco’s border by latitude at a point further north. Of course, the function of these 
diplomatic exchanges, from the standpoint of competing imperial powers, was precisely to keep 
Moroccan territory vague, so as for each of these powers to maximize their own interests in the 
region. As Western Sahara (1975) notes:  
The various international agreements referred to by Morocco and Spain are of 
concern to the Court only in so far as they may contain indications of such 
recognition [of sovereignty].  These agreements, in the opinion of the Court, are 
of limited value in this regard; for it was not their purpose either to recognize an 
existing sovereignty over a territory or to deny its existence.  Their purpose, in 
their different contexts, was rather to recognize or reserve for one or both parties a 
‘sphere of influence’ as understood in the practice of that time.659 
In this sense, Moroccan attempts to provide proof of territorial sovereignty faced a double bind. 
The precolonial basis of Moroccan Sherifian authority was not constituted exclusively by 
territory, and ties of allegiance refer to people more than places. Moreover, as Geertz’s account 
illustrates, neither the Moroccan Sultan, nor the groups whose allegiance he sought were fixed in 
place, making pre-colonial territorial ties not only difficult to ascertain, but beside the point. 
Documentation with Western powers, meanwhile, often purposely avoided making careful 
geographic references, specifically to undermine Moroccan sovereignty and reserve, as broadly 
as possible, imperial “spheres of influence.”   
Legal Ties, Sovereign Ties II: the Mauritanian “entity” 
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In discussing Morocco’s Sherifian State, the Court was primarily concerned with the pre-
colonial basis of authority and its spatial configurations, rather than legal ties per se. 
Mauritania’s case, based on the tribe and the tribal confederation, or emirate, involved two, 
decentralized political forms that entail a different conception of how we understand law itself. 
In reference to a hub of trans-Saharan trade that also served as a base for the Emir of Adrar, the 
Court called this entity Bilad Shinguitti, and its basis of political authority shared many of the 
“special characteristics” used to describe Saharan social and political organization more 
generally. Specifically, the Court referred to the jema‘a, an assembly of tribal sheikhs that reach 
consensus based on shari‘a and customary law. In addition, the Court noted that confederations 
formed between tribes “either of dependence or of alliance, which were essentially tribal rather 
than territorial, ties of allegiance or vassalage.”660 
As in the case of Morocco’s Sherifian State, Bilad Shinguitti highlighted certain defining 
characteristics of pre-colonial political authority that share little in common with the modern, 
territorial state structure. In determining the nature of legal ties between the territory and the 
Mauritanian entity, Western Sahara (1975) focused on the word “entity” in an attempt to clarify. 
For the authors of Western Sahara (1975), this term “expresses the essential test where a group, 
whether composed of States, of tribes or of individuals, is claimed to be a legal entity distinct 
from its members.”661 Here we have the antithesis to the earlier observation that legal ties are 
usually between people. Taking the state to be an entity independent of society and the 
individual, the Court sought proof of sovereign ties in this independent entity. The critical 
criterion was whether Bilad Shinguitti constituted “an entity capable of availing itself of 
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obligations incumbent upon its Members.”662 The tribes and emirates of Bilad Shinguitti with a 
system of political authority based on an entirely different conception of law, were being 
measured against the classic criteria deployed by Max Weber to differentiate the modern state 
from a political association.663 Unsurprisingly, the Court determines that this pre-colonial set of 
affiliations based on lineage, shared moral authority and cultural practices, “did not have the 
character of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the several emirates and the tribes 
which composed it.”664 
 
Responses to Western Sahara (1975): The Imperial Limits of International Law, or the 
Legal Limits of “Orderly” Decolonization?  
In attesting to the Case’s canonical status, legal scholars continue to debate whether Western 
Sahara (1975) contributed to a more inclusive international law of “overlapping consensus,” or 
reaffirmed international law’s inability to surpass its exclusionary dependence upon European 
imperial concepts.665 Antony Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law takes the latter position in tracing international law’s exclusive structure through what he 
terms “the dynamic of difference.” Like Schmitt, Anghie historicizes sovereignty in order to 
examine the contradictions that arise amidst shifts in the criteria or normative principles used to 
define the concept. Unlike Schmitt, however, Anghie suggests that international law has a much 
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longer history of contributing to sovereignty’s indeterminacy through changing criteria of 
recognition and exclusion that shift with the exigencies of European imperialism. Where Schmitt 
emphasizes occupation, Anghie suggests that sovereignty is a legal concept and therefore 
always-already relational. In historicizing the relationality of this concept, Anghie notes that the 
legal categories and techniques that have come to define sovereignty developed through the 
exclusion and disempowerment of non-Europeans through international law.666 
 While Anghie referenced Western Sahara (1975) in relation to a much broader genealogy 
of international law and West/non-West encounters, Michelle Burgis reaches a more nuanced, if 
similar, conclusion as part of an in-depth analysis of the Case. Engaging in detail with the oral 
arguments, dissenting opinions, and operative decision of Western Sahara (1975), Burgis 
recognized the relatively novel forms of reasoning deployed by the lawyers and judges in this 
case. By taking up Morocco’s and Mauritania’s claims to legal ties, Burgis noted that the Jurists 
were contending with “harmonies and dissonances between European and non-European 
approaches to authority over territory.”667 In addressing these particular claims to sovereignty, 
the case was implicitly critiquing the universal basis of international law and opening the 
possibility for a more “cosmopolitan” international law.668 Despite this engagement, however, 
Burgis suggested that Western Sahara (1975) should be read as “an ambivalent compromise” 
that evaded the broader questions of authority by affirming a concept of self-determination “that 
employed Western approaches of territoriality.”669 
 As important as the postcolonial critique has been for demonstrating how concepts of 
Western modernity have legitimized and enabled the decimation of other forms of life, I suggest 
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that it has limited purchase in this context. Take, for example, Anghie’s argument that the 
presence of terra nullius in Western Sahara (1975) represents another example of international 
law’s inescapably Eurocentric “legal grammar:”670 
The doctrine of terra nullius is recognized as a fiction, and yet…These doctrines 
are not so much confronted as evaded through reinterpretation of the relevant 
facts…in the 1975 Western Sahara Case, the judges of the ICJ asserted that the 
Western Sahara could not have been terra nullius because the people who lived 
there did in fact have a form of political organization.  Thus the doctrines 
consolidated by nineteenth-century jurists continue to establish the framework 
within which indigenous peoples struggle to assert their rights.671 
The issue with Anghie’s assertion is that it overlooks the stakes in which terra nullius was 
deployed in Western Sahara (1975). While Anghie might assert that the mere presence of the 
term signifies international law’s irremediably Eurocentric essence, an analysis of the Oral 
Pleadings suggests that the most anti-imperialist party to the Case, Algerian representative 
Mohamed Bedjaoui, argued for the most expansive interpretation of terra nullius, in essence 
legitimating Spain’s occupation of Western Sahara, and therefore, the territory. This, of course, 
was a tactical move by Bedjaoui, but it nonetheless highlights an important relation between 19th 
century imperialism and post-World War II anticolonial national liberation movements of the 
mid-20th century – or, between the territorialization of Schmittian sovereignty and Third World 
sovereignty. Bedjaoui’s argument, of course, was to assert that terra nullius applied to the 
territory of Western Sahara in 1884 just as much as, by intertemporal law, self-determination 
applied in 1975.672 Third World Sovereignty, for leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement such as 
Algeria, was premised on the idea that positive international law ought to uphold uti posseditis, 
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or the principle that successor regimes adopt the boundaries of their predecessors.673 The anti-
imperialism of self-determination and Third World Sovereignty depended upon the territorial 
logic of international law and terra nullius to reinforce the sanctity of territorial borders.  
Rather than reflecting the imperial limits of international law, I suggest that the 
“harmonies and dissonances” that emerge from the legal reasoning in Western Sahara (1975) 
indicate a Court confronted not only with the limits of international law, but with the limits of 
“orderly decolonization.” Western Sahara (1975) illustrates certain dilemmas inherent in the 
concept of territorial sovereignty, but it also shows that this problem lies in the replication of 
territorial sovereignty through decolonization itself. From this perspective, the ICJ Opinion, and 
the political crisis of which it was a part, emerge as a flashpoint when the process of “orderly 
decolonization” encountered a region that has historically defied the territorialization of 
sovereignty. At the same time, this pivotal moment in the 1970s decolonization of Western 
Sahara foregrounds a convergence, of sorts, between the disaggregated authority of post-World 
War II global politics, and the complex relations of autonomy and dependence that characterize 
political authority in the Sahara. 
  
                                                
673 E Joffé, “The International Court of Justice and the Western Sahara Dispute,” in Refugees and Conflict in the 
Western Sahara, ed. R Lawless and L Monahan (London: Frances Pinter, 1987), 17. 
 370 
Bibliography 
 
Archives 
Digital archives of the Bibliothèque Nationale du Royaume du Maroc.  
http://bnm.bnrm.ma:86/pdf.aspx?IDc=475.  
“Philistine Jadida Fi ’Ard Al-Sahra’/A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara.” Anfas 7–8 
(December 1971): 66–76. 
 
WSC  Western Sahara Campaign,  
Archives and Special Collections, SOAS Library, University of London, London UK. 
Firebrace, James, and Jeremy Harding. Exiles of the Sahara: The Sahrawi Refugees Shape Their 
Future. London: War on Want, 1987. WSC/15. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS Archive. 
Gretton, John. Western Sahara - the Fight for Selfdetermination. London: Anti-Slavery Society, 
1976. WSC/16. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS Archive. 
Smith, Teresa K. “Africa Rights Monitor: Human Rights and the Western Saharan War.” Africa 
Today 34, no. 3 (1987): 61–73. WSC/16. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS Archive. 
“Western Sahara: A People in Struggle.” Algiers: Rencontre et Developpement/CCSA, 1979. 
WSC/15. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS Archive. 
 
 
Dissertations 
Boulay, Sébastien. “La Tente Dans La Société Maure (Mauritanie), Entre Passé et Présent: 
Ethnologie d’une Culture Matérielle Bédouine En Mutations.” Ph.D. Dissertation. Paris, 
Muséum national d’histoire naturelle, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003MNHN0022. 
Cozza, Nicola. “Singing like Wood-Birds: Refugee Camps and Exile in the Construction of the 
Saharawi Nation.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford, 2004. 
Deubel, Tara Flynn. “Between Homeland and Exile: Poetry, Memory, and Identity in Sahrawi 
Communities.” Ph.D., The University of Arizona, 2010. https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/305182780/abstract/7A38C1D50521404C
PQ/1. 
Heckman, Alma Rachel. “Radical Nationalists: Moroccan Jewish Communists 1925-1975.” 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2015. 
 
 
Works Cited 
“50 Sana ‘ala Intillaq ‘Amaliyat Jaysh Al-Tahrir Biljanub Al-Maghribi.” Al-Dhakira Al-
Wataniya: Majalla Nasf Sanawiya al-Ta’aniy Bi Tarikh Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Watani, 
no. Special Issue (2006). 
Abi-Mershed, Osama, and Adam Farrar. “A History of the Conflict in Western Sahara.” In 
Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and Geopolitics, edited by 
Anouar Boukhars and Jacques Roussellier, 3–27. Lanham MD; Plymouth UK: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2014. 
Abu-Lughod, Lila. Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986. 
Acloque, Benjamin. “L’idée de frontière en milieu nomade: héritage, appropriation et 
implications politiques actuelles: Mauritanie et Sahara occidental.” In Colonisations et 
 371 
héritages actuels au Sahara et au Sahel: problèmes conceptuels, état des lieux et 
nouvelles perspectives de recherche, XVIIIe-XXe siècles, edited by Mariella. Villasante 
Cervello and Christophe de. Beauvais, 351–81. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007. 
Adorno, Theodor. History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006. 
Agrama, Hussein Ali. Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in 
Modern Egypt, 2012. 
Ait Iddr, Mohamed Ben Saïd. Watha’iq Jaysh Al-Tahrir Fi Janub Al-Maghrib. Casablanca: 
Markaz Mohamed Ben Saïd Ait Iddr, 2011. 
Ait Iddr, Mohamed Bensaïd. Safahat Min Melhamat Jaysh Al-Tahrir Bi Janub Al-Maghrib. 
Casablanca: Matba’a Taysir, 2001. 
Ajayi, J.F.A. “Colonialism: An Episode in African History.” In Colonialism in Africa, 1870-
1960, edited by Lewis H Gann and Peter Duignan, 1:497–509. London: Cambridge U.P., 
1969. 
Allan, Joanna. “Imagining Saharawi Women: The Question of Gender in Polisario Discourse.” 
Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 2 (2010): 189–202. 
Allen, Lori. The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013. 
Amin, Samir. Re-Reading the Postwar Period: An Intellectual Itinerary. New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1994. 
Amnesty International, (AI). “Human Rights Violations in the Western Sahara,” 1996. AI Index 
MDE 29/04/96. New York: AI, Apr. 18. 
Anghie, Antony. Colonialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law. Cambridge  
UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Armstrong, Hannah. “North Africa’s Next War.” The New York Times, January 16, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/opinion/north-africas-next-war.html. 
Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernism. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010. 
Assidon, Elsa. Sahara occidental, un enjeu pour le Nord-Ouest africain. Paris: F. Maspero, 
1978. 
Audibert, Jean. MIFERMA: une aventure humaine et industrielle en Mauritanie. Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1991. 
Austen, Ralph A. Trans-Saharan Africa in World History. The New Oxford World History. 
Oxford [U.K.]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Barbier, Maurice. Voyages et explorations au Sahara occidental au XIXe siècle. Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1985. 
Barona Castañeda, Claudia. Los hijos de la nube: estructura y vicisitudes del Sahara Español 
desde 1958 hasta la debacle. Madrid: Libros de Langre, 2004. 
Bearman, PJ, Th Banquis, CE Bowworth, E van Donzel, and WP Heinrichs Bowworth, eds. 
“Bay’a.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Glossary and Index of Terms. Leiden: 
Brill Academic Publishers, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-
3912_ei2glos_SIM_gi_00525. 
Belime, Emile. “Avenir de l’Union Française.” Hommes et Mondes, no. 58 (May 1951): 672–88. 
Bennouna, Mehdi. Héros sans gloire: échec d’une révolution, 1963-1973. Casablanca; Paris: 
Tarik éditions; Paris Méditerranée, 2002. 
Berman, Nathaniel. “Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law.” 
International Law International Law / Ed. by M. Koskenniemi, 1992, 389–443. 
 372 
Beslay, François. Reguibats: de la paix française au Front Polisario. Paris: L’harmattan, 1984. 
Bier, Laura. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. 
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011. 
Bīh, Mohamed Mahjoub ould Mohamed Mukhtar ould. Attadhakar: dhikrayat wa khawatir wa 
’ahdath. Nouakchott: Maktabat al-Qarnayn, 2017. 
Bloch, Ernst. “Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics.” Translated by Mark Ritter. 
Newgermcrit New German Critique, no. 11 (1932 1977): 22–38. 
Boilley, Pierre. “L’Organisation commune des régions sahariennes (OCRS) une tentative 
avortée.” In Nomades et commandants: administration et sociétés nomades dans 
l’ancienne A.O.F., edited by Edmond Bernus, Jean Clauzel, Jean-Louis Triaud, and 
Pierre Boilley, 215–41. Paris: Karthala, 1993. 
Bonilla, Yarimar. Non-Sovereign Futures: French Caribbean Politics in the Wake of 
Disenchantment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
———. “Unsettling Sovereignty.” Cultural Anthropology 32, no. 3 (2017): 330–39. 
Bonte, Pierre. La montagne de fer: la SNIM, Mauritanie: une entreprise minière saharienne à 
l’heure de la mondialisation. Paris: Karthala, 2001. 
———. L’émirat de l’Adrar mauritanien: Harîm, compétition et protection dans une société 
tribale saharienne. Paris: Karthala, 2008. 
Bonte, Pierre, and Brigid Benson. “Multinational Companies and National Development: 
MIFERMA and Mauretania.” Review of African Political Economy, no. 2 (1975): 89–
109. 
Boubrik, Rahal. Zaman Al-Qabila: Al-Sulta Wa-Tadbir Al-‘unf Fi Al-Mujtama‘ Al-Sahrawi. 
Rabat: Dar Abi Raqraq 2012. 
Boubrik, Rahal, and Colloque International la Reforme et ses Usages. Le Sahara atlantique. 
Rabat: Univ. Mohammed V, Fac. des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, 2012. 
Boulay, Sébastien. “Poétique et politique de la migration au Sahara occidental. Les «‘â’idîn»: 
repentants, migrants ou ralliés?” In La migration prise aux mots: mise en récits et en 
images des migrations transafricaines, edited by Cécile Canut and Catherine Mazauric. 
Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2014. 
Braudel, Fernand. La Méditerranée et Le Monde Méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II. Paris: 
A. Colin, 1949. 
Brown, Wendy. Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. New York ;Cambridge  Mass.: Zone Books; 
Distributed by the MIT Press, 2010. 
Burgis, Michelle L. “Determining the Limits of Law in the Western Sahara Case.” In Boundaries 
of Discourse in the International Court of Justice Mapping Arguments in Arab Territorial 
Disputes. Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009. 
Caratini, Sophie. La république des sables: anthropologie d’une révolution. Paris, France: 
L’Harmattan, 2003. 
Caro Baroja, Julio. Estudios Saharianos. [With Plates and Maps.]. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios 
Africanos, 1955. 
Casas de la Vega, Rafael, Espanya, Estado Mayor del Ejército, and Servicio de Publicaciones. La 
Última guerra de África: campaña de Ifni-Sáhara. Madrid: Servicio de Publicaciones del 
EME, 1985. 
Cassese, Antonio. Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 373 
Caton, Steven Charles. “Peaks of Yemen I Summon” Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North 
Yemeni Tribe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 
Césaire, Aimé. A Season in the Congo; a Play. New York: Grove Press, 1969. 
Chaffard, Georges. Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1965. 
Chapelle, F. de la. Les Tekna du Sud Marocain; étude géographique, historique et sociologique. 
Edited by Rahal Boubrik. Les trésors de la Bibliothèque 11. Rabat: Publications de la 
Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines - Rabat, 2011. 
Chassey, Francis de. Mauritanie 1900-1975: de l’ordre colonial à l’ordre néo-colonial entre 
Maghreb et Afrique noire. Paris: Anthropos, 1978. 
Chatty, Dawn. Deterritorialized Youth: Sahrawi and Afghan Refugees at the Margins of the 
Middle East. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010. 
———. Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century. 
Leiden: Brill, 2006. 
Chopra, Jarat. United Nations Determination of the Western Saharan Self. Oslo, Norway: 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1994. 
Connolly, William E. Why I Am Not a Secularist. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999. 
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French 
Africa, 1945-1960, 2014. 
———. Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa. 
Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
———. “The Dialectics of Decolonization: Nationalism and Labor Movements in Postwar 
French Africa.” In Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, edited 
by Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California 
Press, 1997. 
Correale, Francesco. “La narration de l’histoire en situation de crise. Revendications et 
contradictions dans la construction mémorielle sahraouie.” Les Cahiers d’EMAM. Études 
sur le Monde Arabe et la Méditerranée, no. 24–25 (2015). https://emam.revues.org/838. 
Curtis, Jennifer. Human Rights as War by Other Means: Peace Politics in Northern Ireland. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 
Dahman, Mohamed. Dinamiya Al-Qabila Al-Sahrawiya Fi Al-Magharib: Bayn Al-Tirhal Wa Al-
Iqama. Rabat: Top Press, 2012. 
Damani, Ahmed Elbachir. Al-Shay‘ Al-Sahrawi: Dars Al-Tarikh Wa Siyaqat Al-Taghayur Al-
Ijtima‘i. Casablanca, Beirut: al-Markez al-Thiqafat al-‘Arabi, 2013. 
Damis, John. Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute. Stanford  Calif.: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1983. 
Das, Veena. “Specificities: Official Narratives, Rumour, and the Social Production of Hate.” 
Social Identities Social Identities 4, no. 1 (2010): 109–30. 
Derby, Lauren. “Haitians, Magic, and Money: ‘raza’ and Society in the Haitian-Dominican 
Borderlands, 1900-1937.” Comparative Studies in Society and History: An International 
Quarterly Comparative Studies in Society and History 36, no. 3 (1994): 488–526. 
Deubel, Tara Flynn. “Poetics of Diaspora: Sahrawi Poets and Postcolonial Transformations of a 
Trans-Saharan Genre in Northwest Africa.” The Journal of North African Studies 17, no. 
2 (2012): 295–314. 
“Did Hitler Plan a Coup in the Canary Islands during World War II?” El País in English, June 
26, 2017. https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/06/23/inenglish/1498230611_994185.html. 
 374 
Diego Aguirre, José Ramón. La última guerra colonial de España: Ifni-Sáhara (1957-1958). 
Málaga: Editorial Algazara, 1993. 
Drew, Catriona. “The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial.” European Journal of 
International Law 122001 (2001): 651–84. 
———. “The Meaning of Self-Determination: ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’ Redux?” 
International Law and the Question of Western Sahara International Law and the 
Question of Western Sahara / Ed. by Karin Arts, Pedro Pinto Leite, 2007, 87–105. 
Drury, Mark. “Global Futures and Government Towns: Phosphates and the Production of 
Western Sahara as a Space of Contention.” The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe 
Du Monde Arabe 16, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 101–24. 
Dunbar, Charles. “Saharan Stasis: Status and Prospects in the Western Sahara.” The Middle East 
Journal. 54, no. 4 (2000): 522. 
Dwyer, Kevin. Moroccan Dialogues: Anthropology in Question. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982. 
El Shakry, O. “‘History without Documents’: The Vexed Archives of Decolonization in the 
Middle East.” The American Historical Review 120, no. 3 (2015): 920–34. 
Engle, Karen. The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy. 
Durham, [NC]: Duke University Press, 2010. 
Englund, Harri. Prisoners of Freedom: Human Rights and the African Poor. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006. 
Errazzouki, Samia. “Chomsky on the Western Sahara and the ‘Arab Spring.’” Jadaliyya, October 
30, 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8093/chomsky-on-the-western-sahara-
and-the-“arab-spring. 
———. “Part 1: Notes from the Western Saharan Refugee Camps.” (blog). Accessed May 17, 
2014. http://samiacharquaouia.wordpress.com/2014/05/11/part-1-notes-from-the-western-
saharan-refugee-camps/. 
———. “The Moroccan Non-Exception: A Party, an Army, and a Palace (Part II).” Jadaliyya, 
September 4, 2015. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/22525/the-moroccan-non-
exception_a-party-an-army-and-a-p. 
Evans-Pritchard, E. The Nuer, a Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions 
of a Nilotic People,. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1940. 
———. The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, By E.E. Evans-Pritchard. Oxford  Clarendon Press, 1968. 
Feldman, Ilana. Police Encounters: Security and Surveillance in Gaza under Egyptian Rule. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015. 
Fernández-Molina, Irene. “Introduction: Towards a Multilevel Analysis of the Western Sahara 
Conflict and the Effects of Its Protractedness.” In Global, Regional and Local 
Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: When a Conflict Gets Old, 
edited by Raquel Ojeda-Garcia, Irene Fernández-Molina, and Victoria Veguilla. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. 
Ferré, Jean. Au désert interdit. Lausanne: L’Age d’homme, 2000. 
Fessard de Foucault, Bertrand. “La question du Sahara espagnol, (1 & 2).” Revue française 
d’études politiques africaines. -, no. 119 & 120 (1975): 71–105. 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena. The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi Politics of 
Survival. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2014. 
 375 
Finn, Tom. “Morocco Rights Groups Boycotting Marrakech Meeting.” Middle East Eye, 
November 26, 2014. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/morocco-fears-rollback-rights-
1382176292. 
Firebrace, James, and Jeremy Harding. Exiles of the Sahara: The Sahrawi Refugees Shape Their 
Future. London: War on Want, 1987. WSC/15. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS 
Archive. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-76. 
London: Penguin, 2008. 
Franck, Thomas M. “The Stealing of the Sahara.” American Journal of International Law 70, no. 
4 (1976): 694–721. 
Freedman, Carl Howard. Art and Idea in the Novels of China Miéville. Canterbury UK: Gylphi 
Limited, 2015. 
Gall, Carlotta. “Fighting Is Long Over, but Western Sahara Still Lacks Peace.” The New York 
Times, February 22, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/world/fighting-is-long-
over-but-western-sahara-still-lacks-peace.html. 
Gaudio, Attilio. Le dossier du Sahara occidental. Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1978. 
Gautier, E. F. Sahara, the Great Desert. Translated by Dorothy Ford Mayhew. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1935. 
Geertz, Clifford. “Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power.” In 
Local Knowledge  : Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic 
Books, 1983. 
Gellner, Ernest. Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa. [London]: 
Duckworth, 1973. 
———. Saints of the Atlas. [Chicago]: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 
Gifford, Prosser, and William Roger Louis. Decolonization and African Independence  : The 
Transfers of Power, 1960-1980. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. 
———. “The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960.” Yale University Press, 
1982. 
Goldstein, Daniel M. “Whose Vernacular? Translating Human Rights in Local Contexts.” In 
Human Rights at the Crossroads, edited by Mark Goodale, 111–21. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
Goodale, Mark. Surrendering to Utopia an Anthropology of Human Rights. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2009. 
Goswami, Manu. “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical Conception 
of Nationalism.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 4 (2002): 770–99. 
Gretton, John. Western Sahara - the Fight for Selfdetermination. London: Anti-Slavery Society, 
1976. WSC/16. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS Archive. 
Hadi, Mohamed Mukhtar Bin Sidi Mohamed al-. “Harb Al-Sahra’ Al-Gharbiya wa ‘Atharuha fi 
Mauritaniya 1975-1978.” Majalla al-Dirasat al-Tarikhiya wa al-Ijtima‘iya 1 (Summer 
2013). 
Hajjar, Lisa. Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 
Hansen, Thomas Blom, and Finn Stepputat. “Sovereignty Revisited.” Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 
Annual Review of Anthropology 35, no. 1 (2006): 295–315. 
 376 
Harootunian, Harry D. Marx after Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of Capitalism. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 
Harrell-Bond, Barbara E. The Struggle for the Western Sahara. Hanover, NH: American 
Universities Field Staff, 1981. 
Harrison, Olivia C. Transcolonial Maghreb: Imagining Palestine in the Era of Decolonization. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016. 
Harrison, Olivia C, and Teresa Villa-Ignacio. Souffles-Anfas: A Critical Anthology from the 
Moroccan Journal of Culture and Politics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2016. 
Hecht, Gabrielle. Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2012. 
Hernández Moreno, Ángela. “Réflexions Sur La Guerre d’Espagne Contre l’Armée de 
Libération Marocaine Dans Le Territoire d’Ifni et Le Sahara Espagnol (1957-58).” The 
Maghreb Review 37, no. 3–4 (2012): 284–306. 
———. Sáhara: otras voces. Málaga: Editorial Algazara, 2001. 
Herz, Manuel. From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara. Zurich, Switzerland: 
ETH Studio Basel, Lars Muller Publishers, 2013. 
Ho, Engseng. The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006. 
Hochberg, Gil Z. Visual Occupations: Violence and Visibility in a Conflict Zone. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2015. 
Hodges, Tony. Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War. Westport  Conn.: L. Hill, 1983. 
Hoffman, Katherine E. “Berber Law by French Means: Customary Courts in the Moroccan 
Hinterlands, 1930?1956.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 04 (2010): 
851–80. 
Hopgood, Stephen. Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2006. 
Horden, Peregrine. “Situations Both Alike? Connectivity, the Mediterranean, the Sahara.” In 
Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa, edited by James McDougall 
and Judith Scheele. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. 
Hultman, Tami. “A Nation of Refugees: Western Sahara.” Response 9, no. 3 (March 1977): 4–7, 
42. 
———. “The Struggle for Western Sahara.” Issue: A Journal of Opinion. - 7 (1977): 27–32. 
Human Rights Watch. “Morocco and Western Sahara: 2016 World Report.” Human Rights 
Watch, January 11, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-
chapters/morocco/western-sahara. 
———. “Morocco: Free or Retry 21 Sahrawis Jailed 5 Years Ago.” Human Rights Watch, 
November 5, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/05/morocco-free-or-retry-21-
sahrawis-jailed-5-years-ago. 
———. “Morocco: Tainted Trial of Sahrawi Civilians.” Human Rights Watch, April 1, 2013. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/01/morocco-tainted-trial-sahrawi-civilians. 
ICJ. Sahara Occidental. Avis Consultatif Du 16 Octobre 1975 = Western Sahara. Advisory 
Opinion of 16 October 1975. [The Hague]: ICJ, 1975. 
Ikeda, Ryo. “The Paradox of Independence: The Maintenance of Influence and the French 
Decision to Transfer Power in Morocco.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 35, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 569–92. 
 377 
Jackson, Robert H. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. 
Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Jensen, Erik. Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate? Boulder, CO [etc.]: Rienner, 2012. 
Joffé, E. “The International Court of Justice and the Western Sahara Dispute.” In Refugees and 
Conflict in the Western Sahara, edited by R Lawless and L Monahan. London: Frances 
Pinter, 1987. 
Joffé, George. “Sovereignty and the Western Sahara.” Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 3 
(September 2010): 375–84. 
Kahn, Robin, and Federico Guzmán. Dining in Refugee Camps: The Art of Sahrawi Cooking = 
Cenando En Los Campamentos de Refugiados: Un Libro de Cocina Saharaui. Brooklyn, 
NY: Autonomedia, 2010. 
Kauanui, J. Kēhaulani. “Sovereignty: An Introduction.” Cultural Anthropology 32, no. 3 (2017): 
323–29. 
Kiker, Abdellah. Tajawazat Jaysh At-Tahrir Janoubi Fi Sous Min Khilal Riwayat Wa Shahadat 
1956-1960. Rabat: Rabat Net Maroc, 2011. 
Knop, Karen. Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Koselleck, Reinhart. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1985. 
Koskenniemi, Martti. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument: 
Reissue with a New Epilogue. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Kotef, Hagar. Movement and the Ordering of Freedom: On Liberal Governances of Mobility. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015. 
Kouzmine, Yaël, Jacques Fontaine, Badr-Eddine Yousfi, and Tayeb Otmane. “Etapes de la 
structuration d’un désert: l’espace saharien algérien entre convoitises économiques, 
projets politiques et aménagement du territoire.” Annales de géographie. 2009, no. 670 
(2009): 659–85. 
Lakemfa, Owei. “Pilgrimage to Algeria: The Mecca of African Liberation - Vanguard News.” 
Vanguard News. December 23, 2016. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/12/pilgrimage-
algeria-mecca-african-liberation/. 
Lawless, Richard. War and Refugees: The Western Sahara Conflict. London; New York: Pinter, 
1987. 
Le Robert, and Harpercollins. Le Robert & Collins, anglais: français-anglais, anglais-français. 
9th ed. Paris; Glasgow: Le Robert; Collins, 2010. 
Lederer, Edith M. “Morocco Accused of Cease-Fire Violation in Western Sahara.” The Big 
Story, August 16, 2016. 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/f647c6f8c73b4e7fbdbfb16431bdf183/morocco-accused-
cease-fire-violation-western-sahara. 
Lefebvre, Henri. The production of space. Oxford, OX, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: 
Blackwell, 1991. 
Limbert, Mandana. In the Time of Oil Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town. Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010. 
Lippert, Anne. “Emergence or Subemergence of a Potential State: The Struggle in Western 
Sahara.” Africa Today Africa Today 24, no. 1 (1977): 41–60. 
———. “Sahrawi Women in the Liberation Struggle of the Sahrawi People.” Signs (Chicago, 
Ill.), 1992, 636–51. 
 378 
Lippert, Anne, and Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association. The Struggle in Western 
Sahara and Foreign Intervention: Presented at the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the 
African Studies Association, Baltimore, Maryland, November 1-4, 1978. Baltimore, Ma.: 
African Studies Association, 1978. 
Lorcin, Patricia M. E. Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria. 
London; New York: I.B. Tauris; Distributed by St. Martin’s, 1995. 
Lydon, Ghislaine. On Trans-Saharan Trails. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Mackenzie, Donald. The Flooding of the Sahara, an Account of the Proposed Plan for Opening 
Central Africa to Commerce and Civilization from the Northwest Coast, with a 
Description of Soudan and Western Sahara, and Notes on Ancient Manuscripts... by 
Donald Mackenzie. London: S. Low, 1877. 
———. The Khalifate of the West, Being a General Description of Morocco, by Donald 
Mackenzie,... London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Co., 1911. 
Madariaga, M. R. de. Los moros que trajo Franco--: la intervención de tropas coloniales en la 
Guerra Civil Española. Barcelona: Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002. 
Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. 
Mann, Gregory. From Empires to NGOs in the West African Sahel: The Road to 
Nongovernmentality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Martin, Pablo San. “Nationalism, Identity and Citizenship in the Western Sahara.” The Journal 
of North African Studies 10, no. 3 (2005): 565–92. 
———. Western Sahara: The Refugee Nation. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2010. 
Martyrdom and Suffering of the Moroccan Prisoners and Confined Persons within the Tindouf 
Region in the South of Algeria/Mehna Wa Mu‘anat Al-Muhtajizin Wa Al-Sujana’ Al-
Maghariba Bi Al-Mintaqa Tinduf Janub Al-Jaza’ir, n.d. 
Masquelier, Adeline. “Teatime: Boredom and the Temporalities of Young Men in Niger.” 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 83, no. 3 (2013): 470–91. 
McAllister, Ed. “The Revolution That Wasn’t: Social Fragmentation and Urban Space in 
Algiers.” In Beyond the Square: Urbanism and the Arab Uprisings, edited by Deen Sharp 
and Claire Panetta. New York: Terreform, 2016. 
McDougall, James, and Judith Scheele. Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest 
Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. 
McLagan, Meg. “Human Rights, Testimony, and Transnational Publicity.” The Scholar and 
Feminist Online 2, no. 1 (Summer 2003). www.bernard.edu/sfonline. 
———. “Introduction: Making Human Rights Claims Public.” American Anthropologist 108, 
no. 1 (2006): 191–220. 
———. “Principles, Publicity, and Politics: Notes on Human Rights Media.” American 
Anthropologist 105, no. 3 (2003): 605–12. 
Mercer, John. Spanish Sahara. London: Allen & Unwin, 1976. 
Merry, Sally. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local 
Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
Miské, Ahmed-Baba, and Jean Lacouture. Front Polisario: l’âme d’un peuple. Paris: Rupture, 
1978. 
Mohsen-Finan, Khadija. Sahara occidental: les enjeux d’un conflit régional. Paris: CNRS 
éditions, 1997. 
Mokhtefi, Elaine. “Diary.” London Review of Books, June 1, 2017. 
 379 
“Morocco Continues the Arbitrary Expulsion of International Observers from Western Sahara.” 
Adala UK (blog), January 22, 2017. https://adalauk.org/2017/01/22/morocco-continues-
the-arbitrary-expulsion-of-international-observers-from-western-sahara/. 
“Morocco/Western Sahara: Verdict in Sahrawi Trial Marred by Failure to Adequately Investigate 
Torture Claims.” Amnesty International, July 19, 2017. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/moroccowestern-sahara-verdict-in-
sahrawi-mass-trial-marred-by-failure-to-adequately-investigate-torture-claims/. 
Morris, Loveday. “In Western Sahara, Women Play Large Role in Forgotten Struggle for 
Independence.” Washington Post, July 7, 2013. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-western-sahara-women-play-large-role-
in-forgotten-struggle-for-independence/2013/07/07/f46f23ec-dd06-11e2-85de-
c03ca84cb4ef_story.html. 
Mousset, Paul. Ce Sahara qui voit le jour. [Paris: Presses de la cité, 1959. 
Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2010. 
Mundy, J. “Performing the Nation, Pre-Figuring the State: The Western Saharan Refugees, 
Thirty Years Later.” Journal of Modern African Studies 45, no. 2 (2007): 275–98. 
Mundy, Jacob. “Autonomy & Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism.” 
Review of African Political Economy 33, no. 108 (2006): 255–67. 
———. “Colonial Formations in Western Saharan National Identity.” In North African Mosaic: 
A Cultural Reappraisal of Ethnic and Religious Minorities, edited by J. H Krause and 
Nabil Boudraa, 294–320. Newcastle (UK): Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007. 
———. “Moroccan Settlers in Western Sahara: Colonists or Fifth Column?” The Arab World 
Geographer 15, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 95–126. 
———. “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the 
Spanish Sahara.” The Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 3 (2006): 275–306. 
———. “‘Seized of the Matter’: The UN and the Western Sahara Dispute.” Mediterranean 
Quarterly 15, no. 3 (October 1, 2004): 130–48. 
———. “The Geopolitical Functions of the Western Sahara Conflict: US Hegemony, Moroccan 
Stability and Sahrawi Strategies of Resistance.” In Global, Regional and Local 
Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: When a Conflict Gets Old, 
edited by Raquel Ojeda-Garcia, Irene Fernández-Molina, and Victoria Veguilla, 53–78. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. 
———. “Western Sahara’s 48 Hours of Rage | Middle East Research and Information Project.” 
Middle East Research and Information Project 257 (Winter 2010). 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer257/western-saharas-48-hours-rage. 
Naimi, Mustapha. La dynamique des alliances ouest-sahariennes: de l’espace géographique à 
l’espace social. Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2004. 
———. L’Ouest saharien: la perception de l’espace dans la pensée politique tribale. Paris: 
Karthala, 2013. 
Naimi, Mustapha, and Muhammad Sâlim Wuld Lahbîb Wuld Lhusayn Wuld ’Abd Al Hayy. Les 
Principales Preoccupations Des Rgaybat: Muhammad SâLim Wuld Lahbîb Wuld 
Lhusayn Wuld ’Abd Al Hayy. Translated by Mustapha Naimi. Rabat: L’Institut 
universitaire de la recherche scientifique, 1992. 
Norris, H. T. The Arab Conquest of the Western Sahara: Studies of the Historical Events, 
Religious Beliefs and Social Customs Which Made the Remotest Sahara a Part of the 
 380 
Arab World. Burnt Mill, Harlow, Essex; Beirut, Lebanon: Longman; Librairie du Liban, 
1986. 
Norris, Harry Thirlwall. Shinqītī Folk Literature and Song. London: Oxford University Press, 
1968. 
Ojeda-Garcia, Raquel, Irene Fernández-Molina, and Victoria Veguilla, eds. Global, Regional 
and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: When a Conflict 
Gets Old. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. 
Omri, Ali al-. Al-Muqawama Al-Sahrawiya Wa Al-‘aml Al-Watani: Muqabalat Wa Watha’iq. 1st 
ed. Rabat: al-Mandubiya al-Samiya li-Qudama’ al-Muqawimin wa-‘Ada’ Jaysh al-Tahrir, 
2008. 
Paul, Jim, Susanne Paul, Mohamed Salem Ould Salek, Hadssan Ali, and Tami Hultman. “With 
the Polisario Front of Sahara.” MERIP Reports 53 (December 1976): 16–21. 
Pazzanita, Anthony G. Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 
2006. 
“Philistine Jadida Fi ’Ard Al-Sahra’/A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara.” Anfas 7–8 
(December 1971): 66–76. 
Povinelli, Elizabeth A. The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of 
Australian Multiculturalism. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2002. 
Prashad, Vijay. The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World. New York: New 
Press: Distributed by W.W. Norton, 2007. 
Qashshāt, Muhammad Sa‘īd. al-Asrāb al-jānihah. Bayrūt: al-Tawzī‘, Dār al-‘Ulūm al-‘Arabīyah, 
1988. 
Rancière, Jacques. The politics of aesthetics: the distribution of the sensible. London: 
Continuum, 2004. 
“Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue.” Human Rights Council Seventeenth session. 
United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 2011. 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27.Add.1_EF
Sonly.pdf. 
Rice, Xan. “Western Sahara Activist on Hunger Strike at Lanzarote Airport.” The Guardian, 
November 17, 2009, sec. World news. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/17/western-sahara-hunger-strike. 
Rosaldo, Renato. Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1989. 
Ross, Kristin. Communal Luxury: The Political Imaginary of the Paris Commune. London: 
Verso, 2015. 
———. May ’68 and Its Afterlives. University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
Roussellier, Jacques Eric. “Elusive Sovereignty—People, Land and Frontiers of the Desert: The 
Case of the Western Sahara and the International Court of Justice.” The Journal of North 
African Studies 12, no. 1 (2007): 55–78. 
Rutherford, Danilyn. Laughing at Leviathan: Sovereignty and Audience in West Papua. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
Sassen, Saskia. Losing Control?: Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015. 
Scheele, Judith. Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth 
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
 381 
Schemm, Paul. “Tensions High in Western Sahara despite New Plan.” Yahoo! News, January 1, 
2014. http://news.yahoo.com/tensions-high-western-sahara-despite-plan-110230170.html. 
Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=570548. 
———. The Nomos of the Earth: In the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. New 
York: Telos Press, 2006. 
Scott, David. Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice. Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 2014. 
———. “The Aftermath of Sovereignty.” In Refashioning Futures: Criticism after 
Postcoloniality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
———. “The Temporality of Generations: Dialogue, Tradition, Criticism.” New Literary History 
New Literary History 45, no. 2 (2014): 157–81. 
Seddon, David. Morocco at War: Military, Political and Economic Dimensions of Intervention 
in the Western Sahara. Norwich, Great Britain: School of Development Studies, 
University of East Anglia, 1986. 
Sefrioui, Kenza. La revue Souffles, 1966-1973: espoirs de révolution culturelle au Maroc, 2012. 
Shannon, Jonathan Holt. Performing Al-Andalus: Music and Nostalgia across the 
Mediterranean. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015. 
Shaw, Malcolm. “The Western Sahara Case.” British Yearbook of International Law 49, no. 1 
(January 1, 1979): 119–54. 
Shelley, Toby. Endgame in the Western Sahara What Future for Africa’s Last Colony? London; 
New York: Zed Books: Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave, 2004. 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10231402. 
———. “Natural Resources and the Western Sahara.” In The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role 
of Natural Resources in Decolonization. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2006. 
Shepard, Todd. The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France. 
Ithaca  N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006. 
Shryock, Andrew. Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual 
Authority in Tribal Jordan. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2008. 
Slyomovics, Susan. The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005. 
Smith, Teresa K. “Africa Rights Monitor: Human Rights and the Western Saharan War.” Africa 
Today 34, no. 3 (1987): 61–73. WSC/16. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS Archive. 
Spadola, Emilio. “‘Our Master’s Call’: Mass Media and the People in Morocco’s 1975 Green 
March.” In Anthropology of the Middle East and North Africa: Into the New Millennium, 
edited by Sherine Hafez and Susan Slyomovics, 261–83. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2013. 
Stoler, Ann Laura. Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination. Durham; London: Duke University 
Press, 2013. 
———. “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty.” Public Culture 18, no. 1 (2006): 125–46. 
Strassler, Karen. Refracted Visions Popular Photography and National Modernity in Java. 
Durham [NC: Duke University Press, 2010. 
Swenson, Mitch. “The World’s Longest Minefield Isn’t Where You Think It Is.” The Week, 
January 26, 2015. http://theweek.com/articles/534866/worlds-longest-minefield-isnt-
where-think. 
 382 
Taine-Cheikh, Catherine. Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français. dialecte arabe de Mauritanie 2, 2,. 
Paris: Geuthner, 1989. 
———. Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français. dialecte arabe de Mauritanie 4, 4,. Paris: Geuthner, 
1990. 
———. Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français. dialecte arabe de Mauritanie 6, 6,. Paris: Geuthner, 
1990. 
———. “Le pilier et la corde: recherches sur la poésie maure.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies XLVIII, no. 3 (1985): 516–35. 
———. “Pouvoir de la poésie et poésie du pouvoir. Le cas de la société maure.” Matériaux 
arabes et sudarabiques (GELLAS) 6 (1994): 281–310. 
Tate, Winifred. Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in 
Colombia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. 
Theofilopoulou, Anna. “Ban’s Misstep in Western Sahara - FPIF.” Foreign Policy In Focus, 
March 28, 2016. http://fpif.org/bans-misstep-western-sahara/. 
Thiranagama, Sharika, and Tobias Kelly. Traitors: Suspicion, Intimacy, and the Ethics of State-
Building. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010. 
Thongchai Winichakul. Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994. 
Ticktin, Miriam. “Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The Violence of Humanitarianism in France.” 
American Ethnologist 33, no. 1 (2006): 33. 
Tomba, Massimiliano. Marx’s Temporalities. Translated by Peter D Thomas and Sara R Farris. 
Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2013. 
Trout, Frank E. Morocco’s Saharan Frontiers. Geneva: Droz, 1969. 
Vandeweerd, Pierre-Yves, and Richard Skelton. Territoire perdu = Lost Land. Paris; Bruxelles: 
Zeugma Films [éd.]; Cobra Films, 2010. 
Vásquez, Erica. “The Roots of Conflict: From Settler-Colonialism to Military Occupation in the 
Western Sahara (Part 1).” Jadaliyya, January 9, 2015. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20519/the-roots-of-conflict_from-settler-
colonialism-to-. 
———. “The Roots of Conflict: From Settler-Colonialism to Military Occupation in the Western 
Sahara (Part 2).” Jadaliyya, January 12, 2015. 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20544/the-roots-of-conflict_from-settler-
colonialism-to-. 
Verdery, Katherine. “Property and Power in Transylvania’s Decollectivization.” In Property 
Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition / Edited by C.M. Hann, edited by 
C.M. Hann. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
VICE News. Escaping Moroccan Occupation: The Sahara’s Forgotten War (Part 1), 2014. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Y8w-ACs7Bw. 
Von Hippel, K. “Sunk in the Sahara: The Applicability of the Sunk Cost Effect to Irredentist 
Disputes.” Journal of North African Studies 1, no. 1 (1996): 95–116. 
Weber, Cynthia. Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010. 
Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation. (2nd print.). Philadelphia, 1968. 
Wedeen, Lisa. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary 
Syria. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
 383 
“Western Sahara: A People in Struggle.” Algiers: Rencontre et Developpement/CCSA, 1979. 
WSC/15. Western Sahara Campaign SOAS Archive. 
White. “True Stories: Narrative, Event, History, and Blood in the Lake Victoria Basin.” In 
African Words, African Voices: Critical Practices in Oral History, edited by Luise 
White, Stephan Miescher, and David William Cohen, 281–304. Bloomington, Ind.; 
Chesham: Indiana University Press; Combined Academic, 2002. 
White, Luise. Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
Wilder, G. “Untimely Vision: Aime Cesaire, Decolonization, Utopia.” Public Culture: Bulletin 
of the Project for Transnational Cultural Studies. 21, no. 1 (2009): 101–40. 
Wilder, Gary. “Eurafrique as the Future Past of Black France: Recognizing Leopold Sedar 
Senghor’s Postwar Vision.” In Black France/France Noire: The History and Politics of 
Blackness, edited by Trica Danielle Keaton, T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting, and Tyler 
Edward Stovall, 57–87. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012. 
———. Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2015. 
———. The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude & Colonial Humanism between the Two 
World Wars. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
Wilson, A. “Democratising Elections without Parties: Reflections on the Case of the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic.” Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 4 (2010): 423–38. 
Wilson, Alice. “Ambivalences of Mobility: Rival State Authorities and Mobile Strategies in a 
Saharan Conflict.” American Ethnologist 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2017): 77–90. 
———. “Refracting Custom in Western Sahara’s Quest for Statehood.” PoLAR: Political and 
Legal Anthropology Review 38, no. 1 (2015): 72–90. 
———. Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Liberation Movement Governs. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016. 
Yata, Ali. Le Sahara occidental marocain à travers les textes. Casablanca: Editions al-Bayane, 
1982. 
Zade, Mohammed. Résistance et armée de libération au Maroc (1947-1956) de l’action politique 
à la lutte armée rupture ou continuité? Rabat: Haut commissariat aux anciens résistants 
et ancients membres de l’armée de libération, 2006. 
Zoubir, Yahia H. “In Search of Hegemony: The Western Sahara in Algerian-Moroccan 
Relations.” Journal of Algerian Studies, no. 2 (1997): 43–61. 
Zoubir, Yahia H. “Western Sahara: Political Economy of a Conflict.” In Economic Crisis and 
Political Change in North Africa, by Azzedine Layachi, 149–63. Westport  Conn.: 
Praeger, 1998. 
Zoubir, Yahia H, and Daniel Volman. International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict. 
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993. 
Zunes, Stephen. “Participatory Democracy in the Sahara: A Study of Polisario Self-
Governance.” Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives, 1988. 
Zunes, Stephen, and Jacob Mundy. Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict 
Irresolution. 1st ed. Syracuse  N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010.  
  
  
  
 
